THE  ANTIETAM 


AND 


FREDERICKSBTTRG 


CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR.—V. 


THE    ANTIETAM 


AND 


FREDERICKSBURG 


BY 

FKANCIS  WINTHROP  PALFKEY, 

BRBVKT    BRIGADIER   GENERAL,    U.    8.    V.,    AND     FORMERLY    COLONEL    TWENTIETH 
MASSACHUSETTS   INFANTRY  ;     MEMBER   OF    THE   MASSACHUSETTS 
HISTORICAL   SOCIETY,    AND     OF   THE    MILITARY   HIS 
TORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 


VERSITY 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

743  AND  745  BROADWAY 

1890 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

CHARLES  SCRIBNEE'S  SONS 
1881 


TROW'S 

PRINTING  AND  BOOKBINDING  COMPANY 

201-213  East  izt/t  Street 

NEW  YORK 


PEEFAOE. 


IN  preparing  this  book,  I  have  made  free  use  of  the 
material  furnished  by  my  own  recollection,  memoranda, 
and  correspondence.  I  have  also  consulted  many  vol 
umes  by  different  hands.  As  I  think  that  most  readers 
are  impatient,  and  with  reason,  of  quotation-marks  and 
foot-notes,  I  have  been  sparing  of  both.  By  far  the  lar 
gest  assistance  I  have  had,  has  been  derived  from  ad 
vance  sheets  of  the  Government  publication  of  the 
Reports  of  Military  Operations  During  the  Rebellion, 
placed  at  my  disposal  by  Colonel  Robert  N.  Scott,  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  War  Records  Office  of  the  War 
Department  of  the  United  States. 

F,  W.  P. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

LIST  OF  MAPS, .    xi 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN, 


CHAPTER  II. 
SOUTH  MOUNTAIN, .27 

CHAPTER  III. 
THE  ANTIETAM, 42 

CHAPTER  IV. 
FREDERICKSBURG, 136 


APPENDIX  A. 

COMMANDERS  IN  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  UNDER 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN  ON  SEP 
TEMBER  14,  1862, 191 


CONTENTS. 


APPENDIX  B. 

PAGE 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
FROM  AUGUST  13  TO  NOVEMBER  15,  1862,  FROM  RE 
PORTS  OF  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  DURING  THE  RE 
BELLION,  1860-65,  WASHINGTON,  ADJUTANT-GEN 
ERAL'S  PRINTING  OFFICE, 194 

APPENDIX  C. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  DECEM 
BER,  1862,  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  E.  BURNSIDE  COM 
MANDING,  199 

INDEX   .  .211 


LIST   OF  MAPS. 


MARYLAND, 1 

FIELD  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA,  .  .  .  .12 
THE  FIELD  OF  'THE  A.NTIETAM,  .;....  49 
Tns  FIELD  OF  FREDERICKSBURQ,  .  .  .  .  .  142 


THE 

ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 


CHAPTEK  I 

THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

THE  campaigns  in  the  East  in  the  summer  of  1862  were  a 
disappointment  to  the  North.  McClellan  and  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  not  only  did  not  capture  Richmond  or  disable 
the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  were  forced 
back  from  the  furthest  point  of  their  advance.  Though 
they  inflicted  heavy  loss  upon  the  enemy,  they  suffered 
heavy  losses  themselves,  in  men,  guns,  and  property  of  all 
kinds.  The  last  serious  fighting  they  did  in  the  Peninsular 
campaign  was  at  Malvern  Hill,  on  July  1st,  and  no  further 
events  of  importance  took  place  in  that  region.  The  army 
was  withdrawn  from  the  Peninsula,  under  the  orders  of  the 
Government,  in  the  following  month  of  August.  Whether 
McClellan  himself  had  failed,  and  whether  he  was  not  in  a 
better  position  for  offensive  operations  when  he  was  with 
drawn  than  he  had  ever  occupied  elsewhere,  is  an  interest 
ing  question,  but  one  which  does  not  fall  within  the  scheme 
of  this  volume  to  discuss. 
V.— 1 


2  ANTIETAM  AND  FKEDERICKSBURG. 

While  McClellan  and  the  main  Eastern  army  were  in  the 
Peninsula,  various  bodies  of  troops  were  held  by  the  Govern 
ment  in  positions  nearer  Washington,  to  ensure  the  safety  of 
the  Capital.  The  most  important  of  these  were  the  armies 
of  McDowell,  Fremont,  and  Banks.  By  an  order  dated 
June  26,  1862,  these  forces  were  consolidated  into  the  Army 
of  Virginia,1  and  placed  under  the  command  of  General 
Pope.  Its  career  under  Pope  was  unfortunate.  The  Southern 
generals  found  it  easier  to  deal  with  Banks  and  Pope  than 
with  McClellan,  and  at  Cedar  Mountain  and  at  the  second 
battle  of  Manassas  they  inflicted  upon  them  disastrous 
defeats.  The  guns  that  they  took  were  counted  by  tens,  the 
prisoners  by  thousands,  while  the  lists  of  our  killed  and 
wounded  were  long  and  ghastly.  It  is  at  this  time,  when 
the  Army  of  Virginia  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
united  within  the  lines  constructed  for  the  defence  of  Wash 
ington,  that  our  story  begins,  on  September  2,  1862. 

It  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  the  Union  forces  thus  col 
lected  in  front  of  Washington  were  a  rabble.  It  is  true 
that  even  successful  battle  produces  much  disorganization, 
and  that  defeat,  and  still  more,  a  series  of  defeats,  produces 
much  more.  Officers  are  killed  and  wounded,  men  stray 
from  their  colors,  arms  and  equipments  are  lost,  and  much 
confusion  is  caused,  and  the  effective  force  of  an  army  is 
sometimes  very  seriously  impaired ;  but  with  even  tolerable 
troops  it  is  very  rarely  destroyed  altogether,  even  for  a  day. 


1  It  is  important  for  the  reader  to  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  principal  Con 
federate  Army  in  Virginia  was  known  for  the  whole  time  that  Lee  commanded 
it,  that  is  to  say,  from  the  evening  of  May  31st,  1862,  to  the  end  of  the  war,  as  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  while  the  name  "Army  of  Virginia"  was  never  ap 
plied,  so  far  as  we  know,  to  any  body  of  troops  except  Pope's  army,  which  was 
under  his  command  for  only  about  two  months.  When  he  was  relieved  of  com 
mand,  at  the  beginning  of  September,  1862,  the  Army  of  Virginia  passed  out  of 
existence,  and  the  troops  composing  it  became  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


COMMENCEMENT  OP  THE  CAMPAIGN.  S 

It  hardly  ever  happens  that  all  the  troops  on  either  side 
are  engaged.  Some  are  held  as  reserves,  and  not  brought 
into  action ;  some  are  detached,  guarding  trains  or  roads  or 
bridges,  or  posted  to  meet  an  attack  which  is  not  made; 
others  are  in  the  order  of  battle,  but  by  some  one  or  more 
of  the  singular  accidents  of  the  field,  they  remain  practically 
untouched  while  death  is  busy  around  them.  These  bodies 
of  troops,  except  in  extreme  cases,  preserve  their  organiza 
tion  and  their  efficiency,  and  may  be  made  of  infinite  service 
in  forming  lines  under  cover  of  which  the  regiments  which 
have  been  more  roughly  handled  may  reform.  Then,  in  war, 
it  is  the  universal  principle  that  there  is  never  a  vacancy.  The 
instant  a  superior  falls,  the  man  next  him  takes  his  place, 
without  an  order,  without  an  assignment.  The  colonel  re 
places  the  general,  the  line  officer  the  field  officer,  the  non 
commissioned  officer  the  commissioned  officer.  However 
vacancies  may  be  filled  by  orders  from  headquarters,  what 
ever  form  promotion  may  take,  this  is  the  universal  rule  in 
action — as  soon  as  a  vacancy  occurs,  the  man  next  in  rank 
fills  it  the  moment  he  knows  that  it  exists,  and  he  continues 
to  fill  it  till  orders  from  superior  authority  make  a  differ 
ent  arrangement.  Thus,  except  in  those  very  rare  cases  in 
which  an  army  becomes  a  mob,  even  defeat  works  no  de 
struction  of  the  framework  of  the  great  machine,  and  when 
the  men  are  fairly  intelligent,  brave,  and  disciplined,  order 
and  efficiency  are  restored  with  great  rapidity.  Thus,  after 
the  severe  defeats  which  Lee  inflicted  upon  Pope,  the  rear 
guard  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry  was  orderly  and 
calm,  and  formed  a  strong  line  between  the  Federal  and 
Confederate  forces.  Lee  sent  Jackson  to  the  Little  Eiver 
Turnpike,  to  attempt  to  turn  our  right  and  intercept  our  re 
treat  to  Washington,  and  a  sharp  engagement,  in  which  the 
Federal  General  Kearny  was  killed,  took  place  on  Septem- 


4  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

her  1,  near  Germantown,  not  far  from  Fairfax  Court  House. 
Lee  admits  that  "the  conflict  was  obstinately  maintained  by 
the  enemy  till  dark,"  and  that  the  attempt  was  abandoned. 
His  army  rested  on  the  2d,  near  the  ground  where  this  last 
engagement  was  fought,  and  marched  on  the  3d  toward 
Leesburg. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  attempt  in  this  place  to  state  m 
detail  the  very  peculiar  j)osition  which  General  McClellan 
occupied  during  the  last  days  of  August.1  It  may  be  suffi 
cient  to  say  that  he  was  practically  a  commander  without  a 
command.  General  Halleck  was  General-in-Chief,  and  he 
appears  to  have  been  both  confused  and  scared,  and  to  have 
been  hostile  to  McClellan.  On  the  1st  of  September,  when 
Pope  was  at  and  in  rear  of  Centreville,  and  Jackson  was 
moving  to  assail  his  right  flank  and  rear,  and  all  or  nearly 
all  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  sent  out  to  join 
Pope,  McClellan  left  his  camp  near  Alexandria,  where  he 
had  only  his  staff  and  a  small  camp-guard,  and  went  into 
Washington.  There  General  Halleck  instructed  him,  ver 
bally,  to  take  command  of  the  defences  of  Washington,  but 
expressly  limited  his  jurisdiction  to  the  works  and  their 
garrisons,  and  prohibited  him  from  exercising  any  control 
over  the  troops  actively  engaged  in  front  under  General  Pope. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d,  McClellan  says  :  "The  Presi 
dent  and  General  Halleck  came  to  my  house,  when  the  Presi 
dent  informed  me  that  Colonel  Kelton 2  had  returned  from 
the  front ;  that  our  affairs  were  in  a  bad  condition ;  that  the 

1  There  is  some  reason  for  believing  that  Pope  was  called  from  the  West  to 
command  Banks  and  Fremont,  and  perhaps  McDowell,  and  eventually  to  super 
sede  McClellan ;  that  while  the  belief  prevailed  at  Washington  that  Pope  had 
been  successful  on  the  29th  of  August,  and  because  of  that  belief,  McClellan  was 
deprived  of  his  troops. 

2  An  aide  of  the  General-in-Chief,  sent  the  day  before  to  the  army  under  Gen 
eral  Pope,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  exact  condition  of  affairs. 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  5 

army  was  in  full  retreat  upon  the  defences  of  Washington  ; 
the  roads  filled  with  stragglers,  etc.  He  instructed  me 
to  take  steps  at  once  to  stop  and  collect  the  stragglers ;  to 
place  the  works  in  a  proper  state  of  defence,  and  to  go  out 
to  meet  and  take  command  of  the  army,  when  it  approached 
the  vicinity  of  the  works,  then  to  place  the  troops  in  the 
best  position — committing  everything  to  my  hands." 

So  far  as  appears,  this  verbal  order  of  the  President  was 
the  only  one  by  which  McClellan  was  reinstated  in  command, 
and  there  does  not  seem  to  have  been  any  order  issued  by 
virtue  of  which  the  Army  of  Virginia  ceased  to  exist.  Mc- 
Clellan's  first  official  act  was  to  send  a  letter  of  suggestion, 
rather  than  command,  to  Pope,  and  he  addressed  it  to 
"Major-General  John  Pope,  Commanding  Army  of  Vir 
ginia,"  and  signed  it  "Geo.  B.  McClellan,  Major-General 
United  States  Army."  Eleven  days  later  we  find  him  da 
ting  a  letter  "  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  and  ad 
ding  to  his  signature  the  words  "  Major-General  Command 
ing." 

McClellan's  talents  as  an  organizer  are  generally  admit 
ted,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  at  the  date  of  which  we  are 
writing  he  was  extremely  popular  with  his  men.  As  all 
pressure  of  the  enemy  was  removed,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the 
day  after  the  President  directed  him  to  take  command  of 
the  army,  he  had  a  breathing-space  in  which  to  provide  for 
the  defences  of  Washington  and  to  reorganize  his  army,  but 
as  the  information  which  he  received  on  the  3d  led  him  to 
believe  that  the  enemy  intended  to  cross  the  upper  Potomac 
into  Maryland,  it  was  necessary  that  the  process  of  reorgani 
zation  should  go  on  while  the  troops  were  moving. 

The  necessary  arrangements  for  the  defence  of  the  Capi 
tal  were  made,  and  General  Banks  was  placed  in  command. 
He  received  his  instructions  from  McClellan,  and  he  had 


6  ANTIBTAM  AND  FREDERICKSBUBG. 

under  his  command  the  Third  Corps,  General  Heintzelman, 
the  Fifth  Corps,  General  Porter,  and  the  Eleventh  Corps, 
General  Sigel.  These  troops,  with  other  troops  in  and 
about  Washington,  which  may  or  may  not  have  been  in 
cluded  in  these  three  corps,  were  reported  to  amount  in  all 
to  72,500  men. 

The  army  which  McClellan  led  from  Washington  was 
made  up  of  the  First  Corps,  to  the  command  of  which  Gen 
eral  Hooker  was  assigned ;  of  the  Second  Corps,  under  Sum- 
ner ;  of  one  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  under  Couch  ;  of 
the  Sixth  Corps,  under  Franklin ;  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  under 
Reno,  and  the  Twelfth  Corps,  under  Mansfield.  General 
Couch's  division  was  attached  to  the  Sixth  Corps.  The 
First  and  Ninth  Corps  formed  the  right,  under  General 
Burnside  ;  the  Second  and  Twelfth  the  centre,  under  Gen 
eral  Sumner  ;  and  the  Sixth  Corps,  reinforced  by  the  division 
of  Couch,  the  left,  under  Franklin.  Porter's  Fifth  Corps 
was,  on  the  llth  of  September,  ordered  forward  to  join  Mc 
Clellan.  The  aggregate  present  for  duty  of  these  forces,  as 
reported  by  McClellan,  September  20th,  including  the  cav 
alry  under  General  Pleasonton,  was  89,452.  He  reported 
his  losses  in  the  two  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  the 
Antietam,  both  fought  before  the  latter  date,  as  14,794. 
The  aggregate  of  these  two  totals  is  104,246.  Swinton,  in 
his  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  states  that 
the  army  with  which  McClellan  set  out  on  the  Maryland 
Campaign  made  an  aggregate  of  87,164  men  of  all  arms. 
McClellan,  in  his  Report,  states  that  the  total  of  his  own 
forces  in  action  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  was  87,164. 
The  coincidence  is  suspicious,  and  leads  one  to  believe  that 
Swinton  is  in  error.  McClellan's  statement  of  his  numbers 
present  for  duty  September  20,  1862,  is  officially  certified  as 
accurately  compiled  from  his  morning  report  of  that  day. 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  7 

The  total  of  89,452  therein  given,  not  including  the  forces  in 
the  defences  of  Washington  and  certain  detachments  in 
Maryland,  is  partly  made  up  of  Porter's  Corps,  set  down  at 
19,477.  Deducting  the  latter  number  from  the  former,  the 
remainder  is  69,975.  Adding  the  losses  at  South  Mountain 
and  the  Antietam,  14,794,  we  have  a  total  of  84,7G9  as  the 
force  with  which  he  left  Washington.  Of  course,  the  effec 
tive  force  of  an  army  varies  from  day  to  day,  from  illness, 
death,  discharge,  and  desertion  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
arrival  of  convalescents  and  recruits  on  the  other.  It  seems, 
therefore,  fair  to  assume  that  McClellan  left  Washington 
with  about  85,000  men,  and  that  the  arrival  of  Porter  in- 
ci  3ased  his  force  by  an  amount  about  equal  to  the  losses 
which  he  sustained  in  the  battles  of  the  14th  and  17th  of 
September. 

General  Lee's  army  was  made  up  of  Longstreet's  com 
mand,  of  five  divisions,  containing  twenty  brigades  ;  of 
Jackson's  command,  of  three  divisions,  containing  fourteen 
brigades ;  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  of  five  brigades ;  the 
unattached  brigade  of  Evans,  and  a  very  considerable  force 
of  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  probably  numbered  between 
forty  and  fifty  thousand  men,  present  for  duty,  but  this 
question  of  the  numbers  actually  engaged  on  each  side  in 
the  Maryland  campaign  will  receive  more  particular  atten 
tion  hereafter. 

Washington  and  its  environs  presented  singular  sights  in 
the  early  days  of  September,  1862.  The  luxury  and  refine 
ments  of  peace  contrasted  sharply  with  the  privations  and 
squalor  of  war.  There  are  few  prettier  suburban  drives  than 
those  in  the  neighborhood  of  Washington,  and  no  weather 
is  more  delightful  than  that  of  late  summer  there,  when  a 
cooler  air  comes  with  the  shortening  days.  As  the  shadows 
lengthened  in  the  golden  afternoon,  well-appointed  carriages 


THE 


V 


8  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

rolled  along  those  charming  drives,  bearing  fair  women  in 
cool  and  fresh  costumes,  and  by  their  side  the  ragged,  dusty, 
sunburnt  regiments  from  the  Peninsula  trudged  along. 
Piest,  cleanliness,  ice,  food,  drink,  every  indulgence  of  civil 
ized  life  were  within  reach,  but  our  hands  could  not  be 
stretched  out  to  grasp  them.  Military  discipline  was  the 
dragon  that  guarded  the  golden  apples  of  the  Hesperides. 
They  were  so  near  and  yet  so  far.  The  mythic  Tantalus  must 
have  been  present  to  the  minds  of  many  of  those  who  then 
marched  by  the  road  which  leads  from  Washington  to  the 
Chain  Bridge.  The  carriages  returned  to  their  stables,  the 
fair  ladies  returned  to  the  enjoyment  of  every  pleasure  that 
Washington  could  confer,  but  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
moved  steadily  northward,  to  bivouac  under  the  stars  or  the 
clouds,  and  to  march  again  in  its  tatters  through  the  dust 
and  the  sunshine,  through  the  rain  and  the  mud.  Fortu 
nately  we  had  by  this  time  become  soldiers  in  something  more 
than  the  name ;  we  had  learned  to  make  much  out  of  little, 
we  were  cheered  by  the  more  wholesome  air  and  the  more 
variegated  country,  we  were  glad  to  get  out  of  the  wilder 
ness  of  the  Peninsula.  It  was  pleasant,  too,  to  be  once  more 
in  a  country  that  was  at  least  nominally  friendly.  Whatever 
the  real  feelings  of  the  Mary  landers  might  be,  the  stars  and 
stripes  might  often  be  seen  in  other  places  than  above  the 
heads  of  the  color-guards.  Whether  the  natives  sold  to  us 
gladly  or  not,  they  had  much  to  sell,  and  that  in  itself  was  a 
most  agreeable  novelty  to  us.  In  the  Peninsula,  the  country 
afforded  us  nothing,  and  the  change  from  the  land  where  our 
meat  was  fat  pork,  or  odious  beef  served  quivering  from  an 
animal  heated  by  the  long  day's  march  and  killed  as  soon 
as  the  day's  march  was  ended,  to  a  land  where  fresh  vegeta 
bles  and  poultry  were  not  rare,  was  very  cheering.  Money 
was  not  scarce.  The  pay  of  the  army  was  liberal,  and  we  had 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  9 

Lad  no  chance  to  spend  money  in  the  Peninsula.  So  our 
march  was  pleasant.  Wood  and  water  were  easy  to  find,  in 
stead  of  requiring  weary  searches  at  the  end  of  a  weary  day. 
We  no  longer  had  to  send  the  pioneers  to  search  for  stakes, 
and  then  to  fix  them  toilsomely  in  the  hard,  bare  earth  with 
their  picks,  before  we  could  unsaddle  and  let  our  horses'  bri 
dles  go.  The  foragers  found  forage  for  the  poor  beasts  in 
abundance,  and  the  little  tins  in  which  we  had  learned  to  cook 
so  cleverly  had  often  something  in  them  better  than  hard 
bread,  water,  salt,  pepper,  and  ration  meat. 

We  knew  nothing  of  the  enemy's  movements,  and  though 
we  all  expected  to  fight  again,  yet  the  general  impression 
seemed  to  be  that  it  would  be,  as  Dickens  says,  at  that  some 
what  indefinite  period  which  is  commonly  known  as  one  of 
these  days.  But  it  was  a  time  of  sharp  surprises.  No  leaves 
to  enter  Washington  were  granted,  but  when  the  army  was 
at  Tenallytown,  kind-hearted  "  Uncle  John"  Sedgwick,  then 
commanding  the  Second  Division  of  the  Second  Corps,  or 
dered  one  of  his  officers  into  Washington  for  two  days,  "  on 
regimental  business."  About  noon  of  the  second  day  follow 
ing,  the  officer  heard  that  his  command  had  moved,  and  so 
hastened  to  overtake  it.  Nothing  could  have  been  more 
peaceful  than  the  appearance  of  Washington  as  he  left  it  on  a 
lovely  afternoon.  The  signs  of  war  were  always  plenty  there, 
of  course,  but  there  was  absolutely  nothing  to  indicate  the 
neighborhood  of  an  enemy.  Every  one  seemed  to  be  as  ab 
sorbed  in  the  pursuits  of  peaceful  business  and  secure  pleas 
ure  as  if  the  blast  of  war  had  not  been  heard  in  the  land.  On 
foot,  on  horseback,  in  carriages,  every  one  seemed  to  be  out 
of  doors,  and  enjoying,  whether  working  or  playing,  the  per 
fect  close  of  a  perfect  day.  The  officer  had  not  ridden  many 
miles  when  he  met  a  squad  of  prisoners,  and  learned  that 
they  had  been  taken  that  morning  in  a  skirmish  on  tho 
1* 


10  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Maryland  side  of  the  Potomac.  So  Lee,  or  some  of  Lee's 
men,  had  invaded  a  loyal  State,  and  there  was  every  prospect 
that  there  would  soon  be  wigs  on  the  green.  Proceeding 
a  few  miles  further,  the  officer  found  his  regiment,  part  of 
a  line  sleeping  on  its  arms  in  the  order  of  battle,  and  sup 
porting  some  batteries,  of  which  the  guns  were  unlimbered, 
with  the  gunners  lying  at  the  trails  of  the  pieces.  The  report 
was  that  Jackson,  with  a  largely  superior  force,  was  close  at 
hand,  and  apparently  proposing  to  attack  in  the  morning.  It 
was  a  dramatic  changing  of  the  scene,  from  the  comfort  and 
careless  gayety  of  "Washington  to  a  starlit  bivouac,  with 
every  preparation  made  for  meeting  an  impending  attack. 

Thus  did  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  move  out  in  the  Mary 
land  campaign.  It  remains  to  tell  in  what  order  and  by 
what  roads.  As  Lee  had  by  September  3d  disappeared  from 
the  front  of  "Washington,  and  as  McClellan  had  received  in 
formation  which  induced  him  to  believe  that  he  intended  to 
cross  the  upper  Potomac  into  Maryland,  he  thought  it  likely 
that  he  might  be  obliged  not  only  to  protect  Washington, 
but  to  cover  Baltimore,  and  to  prevent  the  invasion  of  Penn 
sylvania.  He  therefore,  on  the  3d,  sent  his  cavalry  to  the  fords 
near  Poolesville,  to  watch  the  enemy  and  impede  a  crossing 
in  that  vicinity,  while  he  sent  the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps 
to  Tenallytown,  and  the  Ninth  to  a  point  on  the  Seventh 
Street  road,  near  Washington  ;  and  in  these  positions,  and  on 
the  Virginia  side  of  the  Potomac,  near  Washington,  the  whole 
of  the  army  seems  to  have  remained  on  the  4th  and  part 
of  the  5th,  but  by  the  6th  Couch's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  and  Franklin's  Sixth  Corps  were  at  Tenallytown  and 
Offut's  Cross  lioads,  the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps  were 
at  Kockville,  and  the  First  and  Ninth  at  Leesboro'.  On  the 
7th  McClellan  left  Washington,  and  headquarters  and  the 
Sixth  Corps  were  moved  to  Bockville.  By  this  time, 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  11 

McClellan  knew  that  the  mass  of  the  rebel  army  had  passed 
up  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac  in  the  direction  of  Lees- 
burg,  and  that  a  portion  of  their  army  had  crossed  into 
Maryland,  but  he  had  no  means  of  determining  whether  Lee 
proposed  to  cross  his  whole  force  with,  a  view  to  turn  "Wash 
ington  by  a  flank  movement  down  the  north  bank  of  the 
Potomac,  to  move  on  Baltimore,  or  to  invade  Pennsylvania. 
This  uncertainty  made  it  appear  to  him  necessary  "  to  march 
cautiously,  and  to  advance  the  army  in  such  order  as  to  keep 
Washington  and  Baltimore  continually  covered,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  hold  the  troops  well  in  hand,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
concentrate  and  follow  rapidly  if  the  enemy  took  the  direc 
tion  of  Pennsylvania,  or  to  return  to  the  defence  of  Wash 
ington,  if,  as  was  greatly  feared  by  the  authorities,  the  enemy 
should  be  merely  making  a  feint  with  a  small  force  to 
draw  off  our  army,  while  with  their  main  forces  they  stood 
ready  to  seize  the  first  favorable  opportunity  to  attack  the 
Capital." 

The  general  course  of  the  Potomac  above  Washington  is 
from  northwest  to  southeast.  Harper's  Ferry,  at  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Sheuandoah  with  the  Potomac,  is  nearly  fifty 
miles  northwest  of  Washington,  in  a  straight  line.  Lees- 
burg,  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the  Potomac,  is  about  thirty 
miles  northwest  of  Washington.  Loudoun  Heights,  the  hills 
at  the  northern  end  of  the  Blue  Kidge,  and  the  Shenandoah 
River,  are  between  Leesburg  and  Harper's  Ferry.  Maryland 
Heights,  the  hills  at  the  southern  end  of  Elk  Bidge,  the 
ridge  next  west  of  the  South  Mountain  range,  are  on  the 
Maryland  side  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  river  flows  between 
them  and  Harper's  Ferry.  Frederick  City  is  in  Maryland, 
forty  miles  from  Washington,  and  a  little  west  of  north  of 
it.  Baltimore  is  about  thirty-five  miles  northeast  of  Wash 
ington,  measuring  in  a  straight  line,  and  Philadelphia, 


12 


ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 


measuring  in  the  same  way,  is  about  ninety  miles  northeast 
of  Baltimore.  Thus  McClellan's  field  of  possible  operations 
was,  or  was  likely  to  be,  the  quadrant  of  a  circle,  of  which 
the  radius  must  be  thirty  miles,  and  might  be  four  times 


Field  of  Operations  in  Virginia. 


that.  Experience  had  shown  that  his  adversary  and  one  of 
his  first  lieutenants  were  enterprising,  and  that  their  army 
was  extremely  mobile.  His  left  was  tied  to  the  Potomac,  if 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  13 

not  by  the  necessities  of  the  case,  at  least  by  the  fears  of  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  and  he  could  only  reach  but  to 
the  right  so  far  as  was  consistent  with  the  preservation  of  a 
line  of  prudent  strength,  and  with  the  possibility  of  rapid 
concentration. 

The  army  moved  slowly,  but  the  process  of  reorganization 
proceeded  rapidly,  the  more  rapidly,  no  doubt,  by  reason  of 
the  slowness  of  the  march.  On  the  9th,  Couch's  division, 
the  extreme  left  of  the  army,  touched  the  Potomac,  at  the 
mouth  of  Seneca  Creek.  Franklin's  corps  was  at  Darnes- 
town.  The  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps,  constituting  the 
centre,  were  at  Middleburg  (or  Middlebrook),  and  the  First 
and  Ninth  Corps,  forming  the  right,  were  at  Brookville, 
while  the  division  of  Sykes,  of  Porter's  Fifth  Corps,  was  in 
the  rear  at  Tenallytown.  Thus  the  army,  Sykes's  division 
excepted,  was  on  the  9th  on  the  circumference  of  a  circle 
described  from  the  centre  of  Washington,  with  a  radius  of 
twenty  miles,  and  with  an  extension  from  left  to  right  of 
about  twenty-five  miles.1  Couch's  division  moved  by  the 
river  road,  watching  the  fords  of  the  Potomac,  and  ulti 
mately  following  and  supporting  the  Sixth  Corps.  Moving 
through  Poolesville  and  Barnesville,  it  reached  Licksville  by 
the  13th.  Franklin  moved  by  Dawsonville  and  Barnesville 
to  Buckeystown,  "  covering  the  road  (to  the  rear)  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Monocacy  to  Eockville,  and  being  in  a  position 
to  connect  with  and  support  the  centre  should  it  have  been 
necessary  (as  McClellan  supposed)  to  force  the  line  of  the 
Monocacy."  It  reached  Buckeystown  on  the  13th.  Sykes's 
division  moved  by  Eockville,  Middleburg,  and  Urbanna  to 


1  "It  seema  as  if  our  left  rested  on  the  river,  and  advanced  slowly,  while  our 
line  stretched  far  inland,  the  right  advancing  more  rapidly,  as  if  we  were  execut 
ing  a  vast  left  wheel,  one  end  of  the  spoke,  the  hub  end,  being  on  the  river." 
—Extract  from  army  letter,  dated  September  11,  1862. 


14  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Frederick,  which  place  it  reached  on  the  13th.  The  Second 
Corps  moved  from  Middleburg  through  Clarksburg  and  Ur- 
banna,  and  the  Twelfth  through  Damascus  and  thence  be 
tween  Urbanna  and  New  Market,  to  Frederick,  which  place 
both  corps  reached  on  the  13th.  The  First  and  the  Ninth 
Corps,  constituting  the  right  wing  as  before,  moved  on 
Frederick,  the  latter  by  Damascus  and  New  Market,  and  the 
former,  holding  the  extreme  right,  by  Cooksville  and  Eidge- 
ville.  All  of  the  right  wing  was  at  Frederick  on  the  13th, 
except  that  by  night  of  that  day  all  of  the  Ninth  Corps  ex 
cept  Kodrnan's  division  was  advanced  to  Middletown.  Thus 
by  night  of  the  13th  of  September,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  disposed  as  follows :  The  bulk  of  the  army  was  near 
Frederick,  with  a  part  of  the  Ninth  Corps  advanced  some 
eight  miles  to  Middletown,  Franklin  was  at  Buckeystown, 
some  five  miles  to  the  left  and  rear,  and  Couch  was  at  Licks- 
ville,  a  place  in  the  northern  angle  formed  by  the  junction 
of  the  Monocacy  with  the  Potomac.  The  average  distance 
of  the  army  from  "Washington  may  be  set  down  at  forty 
miles.  By  this  time,  McClellan  had  come  into  possession 
of  some  very  important  information,  but  what  it  was  may 
better  be  left  untold  till  some  account  has  been  given  of 
what  Lee  had  been  doing  in  the  last  ten  days,  and  of  the 
state  of  things  existing  at  Harper's  Ferry,  which  place  was 
separated  by  probably  ten  miles  from  the  nearest  troops  of 
McClellan,  as  well  as  by  a  river  and  some  very  mountainous 
country. 

The  views  entertained  by  General  Lee  when  he  entered 
upon  the  Maryland  campaign  are  here  given  in  his  own 
words,  taken  from  his  official  Eeport,  dated  March  6, 
1863,  and  printed  in  the  first  volume  of  the  "  Reports  of 
the  Operations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Eichmond, 
1864." 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  15 

The  armies  of  General  McClellan  and  Pope  had  now  been  brought 
back  to  the  point  from  which  they  set  out  on  the  campaigns  of  the 
spring  and  summer.  The  objects  of  those  campaigns  had  been  frus 
trated,  and  the  designs  of  the  enemy  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina 
and  in  Western  Virginia  thwarted  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  main  body 
of  his  forces  from  those  regions.  Northeastern  Virginia  was  freed  from 
the  presence  of  Federal  soldiers  up  to  the  intrenchments  of  Washing 
ton,  and  soon  after  the  arrival  of  the  army  at  Leesburg  information 
was  received  that  the  troops  which  had  occupied  Winchester  had  retired 
to  Harper's  Ferry  and  Martinsburg.  The  war  was  thus  transferred 
from  the  interior  to  the  frontier,  and  the  supplies  of  rich  and  produc 
tive  districts  made  accessible  to  our  army.  To  prolong  a  state  of  af 
fairs  in  every  way  desirable,  and  not  to  permit  the  season  for  active 
operations  to  pass  without  endeavoring  to  inflict  further  injury  upon 
the  enemy,  the  best  course  appeared  to  be  the  transfer  of  the  army 
into  Maryland.  Although  not  properly  equipped  for  invasion,  lacking 
much  of  the  material  of  war,  and  feeble  in  transportation,  the  troops 
poorly  provided  with  clothing,  and  thousands  of  them  destitute  of 
shoes,  it  was  yet  believed  to  be  strong  enough  to  detain  the  enemy 
upon  the  northern  frontier  until  the  approach  of  winter  should  render 
his  advance  into  Virginia  difficult,  if  not  impracticable.  The  condition 
of  Maryland  encouraged  the  belief  that  the  presence  of  our  army,  how 
ever  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  would  induce  the  Washington  Gov 
ernment  to  retain  all  its  available  force  to  provide  against  contingen 
cies  which  its  course  toward  the  people  of  that  State  £ave  it  reason  to 
apprehend.  At  the  same  time  it  was  hoped  that  military  success 
might  afford  us  an  opportunity  to  aid  the  citizens  of  Maryland  in  any 
efforts  they  might  be  disposed  to  make  to  recover  their  liberties.  The 
difficulties  that  surrounded  them  were  fully  appreciated,  and  we  ex 
pected  to  derive  more  assistance  in  the  attainment  of  our  object  from 
the  just  fears  of  the  Washington  Government,  than  from  active  de 
monstration  on  the  part  of  the  people,  unless  success  should  enable  us 
to  give  them  assurance  of  continued  protection. 

Influenced  by  these  considerations,  the  army  was  put  in  motion,  D. 
H.  Hill's  division,  which  had  joined  us  on  the  2d,  being  in  advance,  and 
between  September  4th  and  7th  crossed  the  Potomac  at  the  fords  near 
Leesburg,  and  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Fredericktown. 

It  was  decided  to  cross  the  Potomac  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  in  order, 


16  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

by  threatening  Washington  and  Baltimore,  to  cause  the  enemy  to  with 
draw  from  the  south  bank,  where  his  presence  endangered  our  commu 
nications  and  the  safety  of  those  engaged  in  the  removal  of  our  wounded 
and  the  captured  property  from  the  late  battle-fields.  Having  accom 
plished  this  result,  it  was  proposed  to  move  the  army  into  Western 
Maryland,  establish  our  communications  with  Richmond  through  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  by  threatening  Pennsylvania  induce 
the  enemy  to  follow,  and  thus  draw  him  from  his  base  of  supplies. 

It  may  be  remarked,  in  relation  to  this  allegation  of  in 
complete  equipment,  that  it  seems  like  an  excuse  for  failure, 
made  after  the  failure  had  occurred,  and  antedated,  for  Lee 
asserts  in  the  same  Report  that  in  the  series  of  engagements 
on  the  plains  of  Manassas,  which  had  taken  place  just  before, 
there  had  been  captured  more  than  nine  thousand  prisoners, 
wounded  and  unwounded,  thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  upwards 
of  twenty  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  and  a  large  amount 
of  stores,  besides  those  taken  by  General  Jackson  at  Manas 
sas  Junction.  Jackson  says1  that  he  captured  there  eight 
guns,  with  seventy-two  horses,  equipments  and  ammunition 
complete,  "  immense  supplies"  of  commissaiy  and  quarter 
master  stores,  etc.  With  these  additions  to  his  supplies,  it 
would  seem  as  if  the  little  army  with  which  Lee  says  he 
fought  the  battles  of  the  Maryland  Campaign,  might  have 
been  fairly  well  equipped,  especially  when  we  remember  how 
far  from  scrupulous  the  Confederates  were  in  exchanging 
their  shoes  and  clothing  for  the  better  shoes  and  clothing  of 
their  prisoners. 

Lee's  plan  was  a  good  one.  It  is  not  probable  that  he 
promised  himself  the  capture  of  Philadelphia,  or  Baltimore, 
or  Washington,  but  he  might  fairly  believe  that  the  chances 
of  war  might  change  the  improbable  into  the  possible,  and 
the  possible  into  the  actual.  He  had  a  right  to  expect  to 


A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  93. 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  17 

get  more  recruits  from  Maryland  when  his  army  was  there, 
than  when  it  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  Potomac,  without 
anticipating  that  "  my  Maryland"  would  breathe  or  burn  in 
any  exceptional  fashion,  or  "  be  the  battle-queen  of  yore." 
Without  indulging  in  the  illusions  of  audacious  hope,  he 
might  fairly  count  upon  great  and  certain  gains  from  trans 
ferring  his  army  to  the  soil  of  Maryland.  By  so  doing  he 
shifted  the  burden  of  military  occupation  from  Confederate 
to  Federal  soil.  He  secured  to  the  Virginians  the  precious 
crops  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  their  other  Northeast 
ern  counties.  He  had  two  or  three  months  of  fine  weather 
before  him.  He  had  for  his  opponent  McClellan,  and  expe 
rience  had  shown  him  that  McClellan  never  attacked,  and 
always  let  him  choose  his  own  time  and  place  for  fighting. 
His  army  had  learned  to  march  with  great  rapidity  and  to 
fight  with  great  gallantry  and  tenacity,  and  he  had  several 
lieutenants  upon  whom  he  knew  he  could  place  very  great 
reliance.  Under  all  the  circumstances,  he  might  well  think 
that  at  the  head  of  his  army,  with  its  habit  of  victory,  and 
with  the  Shenandoah  Valley  open  behind  him,  he  had  every 
thing  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  from  an  autumn  campaign 
in  Maryland,  against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  with  its  habit 
of  defeat,  and  against  McClellan  with  his  want  of  initiative. 
Whether  he  knew  or  even  suspected  how  heavily  the  brave 
and  loyal  and  long-suffering  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
handicapped  by  the  miserable  jealousies,  civil  and  military, 
that  prevailed  at  the  time,  cannot  be  told.  If  he  did,  the 
knowledge  must  have  greatly  raised  his  hopes  and  increased 
his  confidence.  If  Lee  had  been  in  McClellan's  place  on 
the  17th  of  September,  and  had  sent  Jackson  to  conduct  the 
right  attack  and  Longstreet  to  force  the  passage  of  the  lower 
bridge  and  turn  the  Confederate  right,  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  though  commanded  by  a  second  Lee,  a  second 


18  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Jackson,  and  a  second  Longstreet,  would  have  ceased  to  ex 
ist  that  day. 

In  the  northward  movement  of  Lee's  army,  D.  H.  Hill 
had  the  advance.  The  crossing  of  the  Potomac  was  effected 
at  the  ford  near  Leesburg,  between  the  4th  and  the  7th 
of  September,  and  the  army  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of 
Frederick.  The  march  was  unopposed.  The  concentration 
was  effected  while  McClellan's  army  was  still  twenty  miles 
or  more  away. 

Lee  had  expected  that  the  advance  upon  Frederick  would 
lead  to  the  evacuation  of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  thus  open  his  line  of  communication  through  the  Val 
ley  of  Virginia.  Troops  had  been  placed  there,  2,500 
men  at  Martinsburg  under  General  White,  and  9,000 
men  at  Harper's  Ferry,  under  Colonel  Miles,  of  the  Sec 
ond  United  States  Infantry,  to  command  the  debouche  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Whatever  the  propriety  of  placing 
such  forces  in  such  positions  in  ordinary  times  may  have 
been,  it  is  plain  that  the  presence  of  Lee's  army  in  Mary 
land  put  a  new  face  upon  the  matter,  and  that  these  troops 
must  then  either  be  able  to  hold  their  position  till  relieved, 
in  other  words,  be  able  to  stand  a,  siege,  or  ought  at  once  to 
decamp  and  join  themselves  to  the  nearest  substantial  Union 
force.  Lee  thought  they  or  their  superiors  would  see  this, 
and  that  they  would  be  ordered  to  go.  He  says  *  "it  had 
been  supposed  that  the  advance  upon  Frederick  would  lead 
to  the  evacuation  of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  thus 
opening  the  line  of  communication  through  the  Valley. 
This  not  having  occurred,  it  became  necessary  to  dislodge 
the  enemy  from  those  positions  before  concentrating  the 
army  west  of  the  mountains."  McClellan  perceived  that 

i  A.  N.  Va.,  i.,  28. 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  19 

these  troops  were  of  little  or  no  use  where  they  were,  in  the 
altered  position  of  affairs,  and  he  probably  knew  that  they 
could  not  hold  Harper's  Ferry  against  Lee  if  Lee  turned 
against  them.  At  any  rate  he  telegraphed  General  Halleck, 
the  General-in-Chief,  on  the  llth,  "  Colonel  Miles  .  .  . 
can  do  nothing  where  he  is,  but  could  be  of  great  service  if 
ordered  to  join  me.  I  suggest  that  he  be  ordered  at  once  to 
join  me  by  the  most  practicable  route."  General  Halleck 
replied  by  telegraph  the  same  day  :  "  There  is  no  way  for 
Colonel  Miles  to  join  you  at  present.  The  only  chance  is  to 
defend  his  works  until  you  can  open  a  communication  with 
him.  When  you  do  so,  he  will  be  subject  to  your  orders." 
General  Halleck  seems  to  have  been  mistaken  in  the  facts, 
as  Loudoun  Heights  were  not  reached  by  the  enemy  till  the 
13th,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  Miles  might  not 
have  retreated  by  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  long  be 
fore  the  toils  were  drawn  around  him.  Halleck  seems  to 
have  been  in  error,  as  a  matter  of  military  principle,  but  the 
error  probably  resulted  favorably  for  the  Union  arms,  as 
will  be  seen. 

The  position,  then,  was  this  :  Lee,  with  his  army  concen 
trated  at  Frederick,  knew  that  there  was  a  comparatively 
small  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  rear,  and  on  his  main  line  of 
communication,  and  thought  that  it  must  be  dislodged  before 
he  concentrated  his  army  west  of  the  mountains.  He  also 
knew  that  the  Federal  army  was  advancing  slowly,  and  giving 
him  a  chance  to  operate  against  Harper's  Ferry.  McClellan 
knew  by  the  10th  that  it  was  "  quite  probable  "  that  Lee's  army 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  Frederick,  and  on  the  next  day  that 
the  General-in-Chief  declined  to  move  Miles  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  left  him  to  open  communications  with  him.  Here, 
then,  was  the  best  possible  opportunity  for  a  race.  It  should 
be  said,  in  justice  to  McClellan,  that  before  he  left  Wash- 


20  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ington,  and  when  the  movement  was  not  only  possible  but 
easy,  he  had  recommended  that  the  garrison  of  Harper's 
Ferry  should  be  withdrawn  by  the  way  of  Hagerstown,  to 
aid  in  covering  the  Cumberland  Valley,  or  that,  taking  up 
the  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Potomac,  and  obstructing  the 
railroad  bridge,  it  should  fall  back  to  Maryland  Heights, 
and  there  hold  out  to  the  last.  Neither  of  these  suggestions 
was  adopted,  and  there  was  nothing  left  for  McClellan  to 
do  but  to  endeavor  to  relieve  the  garrison.  It  was  plainly 
a  case  for  great  activity  on  McClellan's  part.  His  uncertainty, 
up  to  the  13th  of  September,  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  ene 
my,  and  the  telegraphic  messages  from  Halleck,  the  General- 
in-Chief,  cautioning  him  against  exposing  his  left  and  rear 
and  uncovering  Washington,  may  be  accepted  as  valid  ex 
cuses  for  the  slowness  of  his  movements,  and  his  unwilling 
ness  to  advance  his  left  more  rapidly  than  his  other  columns, 
but  on  the  13th  the  position  of  things  changed,  and  all  un 
certainty  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  enemy  were  dispelled. 
On  that  day,  at  an  hour  which  we  have  no  means  of  fixing, 
further  than  that  it  was  before  6.20  P.M.,  an  order  of  such 
importance  fell  into  his  hands  that  we  copy  it  in  full. 

SPECIAL  ORDERS  No.  191. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
September  9,  1863. 

The  army  will  resume  its  march  to-morrow,  taking  the  Hagerstown 
road.  General  Jackson's  command  will  form  the  advance,  and,  after 
passing  Middletown,  with  such  portion  as  he  may  select,  take  the  route 
toward  Sharpsburg,  cross  the  Potomac  at  the  most  convenient  point, 
and  by  Friday  night  take  possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road,  and  capture  such  of  the  enemy  as  may  be  at  Martinsburg,  and 
intercept  such  as  may  attempt  to  escape  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

General  Longstreeb's  command  will  pursue  the  same  road  as  far  aa 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  21 

Boonsboro',  where  it  will  halt  with  the  reserve,  supply,  and  baggage 
trains  of  the  army. 

General  McLaws,  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  General  R.  H. 
Anderson,  will  follow  General  Longstreet ;  on  reaching  Middletown,  he 
will  take  the  route  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by  Friday  morning  possess 
himself  of  the  Maryland  Heights,  and  endeavor  to  capture  the  enemy 
at  Harper's  Ferry  and  vicinity. 

General  Walker,  with  his  division,  after  accomplishing  the  object  in 
which  he  is  now  engaged,  will  cross  the  Potomac  at  Cheek's  Ford, 
ascend  its  right  bank  to  Lovettsville,  take  possession  of  Loudoun 
heights,  if  practicable,  by  Friday  morning,  Keys'  ford  on  his  left  and 
the  road  between  the  end  of  the  mountain  and  the  Potomac  on  his 
right.  He  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  co-operate  with  General  McLaws 
and  General  Jackson  in  intercepting  the  retreat  of  the  enemy. 

General  D.  H.  Hill's  division  will  form  the  rear  guard  of  the  army, 
pursuing  the  road  taken  by  the  main  body.  The  reserve  artillery,  ord 
nance  and  supply  trains,  etc.,  will  precede  General  Hill. 

General  Stuart  will  detach  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  accompany  the 
commands  of  Generals  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and  McLaws,  and  with  the 
main  body  of  the  cavalry  will  cover  the  route  of  the  army  and  bring 
up  all  stragglers  that  may  have  been  left  behind. 

The  commands  of  Generals  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  after  ac 
complishing  the  objects  for  which  they  have  been  detached,  will  join 
the  main  body  of  the  army  at  Boonsboro'  or  Hagerstown. 

Each  regiment  on  the  march  will  habitually  carry  its  axes  in  the 
regimental  ordnance  wagons,  for  use  of  the  men  at  their  encampments, 
to  procure  wood,  etc. 

By  command  of  GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE. 

R.  H.  CHILTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
MAJOR-GENERAL,  D.  H.  HILL, 

Commanding  Division. 

It  appears  from  the  statement  of  Colonel  Taylor,  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  that  at  this  time 
General  D.  H.  Hill  was  in  command  of  a  division  which  had 
not  been  attached  to  nor  incorporated  with  either  of  the  two 


22  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

wings  of  that  army,  and  that  one  copy  of  Special  Orders  No. 
191,  was  sent  to  him  directly  from  headquarters,  and  that 
General  Jackson  also  sent  him  a  copy,  as  he  regarded  Hill  ia 
his  command,  and  that  the  order  sent  from  general  head 
quarters  was  carelessly  left  by  some  one  in  Hill's  camp  ; 
while  the  other,  which  was  in  Jackson's  own  hand,  was  pre 
served  by  Hill. 

This  order  told  McClellan  two  things,  both  of  great  im 
portance. 

First. — That  Lee,  by  orders  issued  four  days  before,  had 
divided  his  army,  sending  Jackson  and  his  command,  and 
"Walker's  division,  across  the  Potomac. 

Second. — That  the  object  of  this  division  was  the  capture 
of  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  large  outpost  at 
Martinsburg.  It  also  gave  him  the  additional  and  scarcely 
less  important  information,  where  the  rest  of  the  army,  trains, 
rear  guard,  cavalry,  and  all,  were  to  march  and  to  halt,  and 
where  the  detached  commands  were  to  join  the  main  body. 

The  finding  of  this  paper  was  a  piece  of  rare  good  fortune. 
It  placed  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  the  mercy  of  Mc 
Clellan,  provided  only  that  he  came  up  with  it  and  struck 
while  its  separation  continued.  If  he  hurried  his  left  col 
umn  by  Burkittsville,  through  Crampton's  Gap,  it  would 
come  directly  upon  the  rear  of  McLaws's  force  on  Maryland 
Heights.  If  he  pressed  his  right  by  Middletown,  through 
Turner's  Gap,  he  would  interpose  between  Hill  and  Long- 
street  on  the  one  hand,  and  all  the  troops  beyond  the  Poto 
mac  on  the  other.  The  case  called  for  the  utmost  exertion, 
and  the  utmost  speed.  He  could  afford  to  let  one  of  the 
three  great  divisions  of  his  army  move  less  rapidly,  but  not 
a  moment  should  have  been  lost  in  pushing  his  columns  de 
tailed  for  the  left  and  right  advance  through  the  South 
Mountain  passes.  Twenty  miles  is  a  liberal  estimate  of  the 


COMMENCEMENT   OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  23 

distance  which  each  column  had  to  march.  It  was  a  case 
for  straining  every  nerve,  and,  though  it  is  not  certain  at 
just  what  times  the  Confederate  troops  sent  back  to  hold 
these  passes  actually  occupied  them,  yet  it  is  certain  that 
they  were  very  feebly  held  as  late  as  the  morning  of  tho 
14th,  and  that  Harper's  Ferry  was  not  surrendered  till  8  A.M. 
on  the  15th,  thirty-eight  hours  certainly,  probably  consider 
ably  more,  after  the  lost  order  came  to  the  hands  of  Mc- 
Clellan.  It  cannot  be  said  that  he  did  not  act  with  consid 
erable  energy,  but  he  did  not  act  with  sufficient.  The  op 
portunity  came  within  his  reach,  such  an  opportunity  as 
hardly  ever  presented  itself  to  a  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  he  almost  grasped  it,  but  not  quite.  As 
Lee's  movements  were  earlier  in  point  of  time,  we  will  de 
scribe  them  first,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  nothing  could  have 
been  neater  or  completer  than  the  way  in  which  his  lieuten 
ants  carried  out  his  orders. 

Jackson's  command  left  the  vicinity  of  Frederick  on  the 
10th,  and  passing  rapidly  through  Middletown,  Boonsboro' 
and  Williarnsport,  twenty-five  miles  or  more  from  Fred 
erick,  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Virginia  on  the  llth.  From 
Williamsport,  one  division  moved  on  the  turnpike  from  that 
town  to  Martinsburg.  The  two  other  divisions  moved  fur 
ther  to  the  west,  to  prevent  the  Federal  forces  at  Martins- 
burg  from  escaping  westward  unobserved.  General  White,  in 
command  of  the  outpost  at  Martinsburg,  becoming  advised 
of  the  Confederate  approach,  left  that  town  on  the  night  of 
the  llth,  and  retreated  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Early  on  the 
12th,  the  head  of  the  Confederate  column  came  in  view  of 
the  Federal  troops,  drawn  up  on  Bolivar  Heights,  above 
Harper's  Ferry.  The  three  divisions  went  into  camp  at  and 
near  Halltown,  about  two  miles  from  the  Federal  position. 
There  they  waited  for  news  from  the  co-operating  columns. 


24  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

General  McLaws,  with  his  own  and  General  Anderson's 
divisions,  moved  on  the  10th  by  Burkittsville,  into  Pleasant 
Valley.  This  valley  runs  north  and  south,  between  the 
South  Mountains  on  the  east  and  Elk  Eidge  on  the  west. 
The  southern  extremity  of  Elk  Kidge,  where  it  is  cut  by  the 
Potomac,  is  called  Maryland  Heights,  and  these  heights 
completely  command  Harper's  Ferry  with  a  plunging  fire. 
While  Maryland  Heights  were  held  by  the  Federals,  Har 
per's  Ferry  could  not  be  occupied  by  the  Confederates.  If 
the  Confederates  gained  possession  of  those  heights,  the 
town  was  no  longer  tenable  by  the  Federals.  After  meeting 
and  overcoming  some  opposition,  McLaws  gained  full  pos 
session  of  Maryland  Heights  by  4.30  P.M.  of  the  13th.  He 
promptly  made  such  dispositions  of  his  troops  as  prevented 
all  possibility  of  escape  from  the  town  to  the  east,  and  then 
waited  to  hear  from  Jackson  and  Walker.  He  employed 
his  time  in  getting  artillery  into  position  on  the  heights,  and 
by  2  P.M  of  the  14th  he  opened  fire  from  four  guns. 

General  Walker  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Point  of  Eocks, 
during  the  night  of  the  10th  and  by  daylight  of  the  llth, 
and  proceeded  the  next  day  toward  Harper's  Ferry,  encamp 
ing  at  Hillsborough.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  he 
reached  the  foot  of  the  Loudoun  Heights,  and  presently  oc 
cupied  them  with  two  regiments.  In  the  afternoon,  he 
learned  that  McLaws  had  possession  of  Maryland  Heights, 
which  commanded  the  Loudoun  Heights  as  well  as  Har 
per's  Ferry,  and  he  proceeded  to  place  all  of  his  division 
which  was  not  on  the  heights  in  position  to  prevent  the 
escape  of  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  down  the  right 
bank  of  the  Potomac. 

By  these  movements  of  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker, 
the  Federal  force  at  Harper's  Ferry  was  surrounded,  and  at 
the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  Colonel  Miles,  its  commander, 


COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  25 

was  killed  in  the  operations  which  led  to  the  reduction  of 
the  place,  and  it  is  not  known  upon  what  grounds  he  could 
have  expected  to  hold  the  place,  if  attacked  with  energy 
and  intelligence,  without  retaining  possession  of  Maryland 
Heights.  It  is  stated  by  McClellan,  however,  that  on  the 
morning  of  the  14th,  a  messenger  reached  him  from  Colonel 
Miles,  and  told  him  that  Maryland  Heights  had  been  aban 
doned  by  his  troops,  arid  that  they  as  well  as  the  Loudoun 
and  Bolivar  Heights  had  been  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The 
messenger  also  said  that  Colonel  Miles  instructed  him  to 
say  that  he  could  hold  out  with  certainty  two  days  longer. 
If  Colonel  Miles  really  sent  this  message,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  he  could  have  entertained  such  a  belief. 

A  man  may  travel  far  and  wide  in  America  without  com 
ing  upon  a  lovelier  spot  than  the  heights  above  Harper's 
Ferry.  The  town  itself  is  low  and  possesses  no  particular 
attractions,  but  one  who  stands  above  it  may  see  the  beauti 
ful  Valley  of  Virginia  extending  far  to  the  folded  hills  of 
the  southwest.  As  he  looks  to  the  town,  the  Loudoun 
Heights  rise  boldly  on  his  right,  and  betwreen  him  and  them 
the  Shenandoah,  a  stream  that  deserves  the  epithet  of 
arrowy  as  well  as  the  Ehone,  rushes  to  its  union  with  the 
broad  and  yellow  and  sluggish  Potomac.  In  the  hollow 
before  him  is  the  town,  with  Maryland  Heights  rising  like 
the  Trossachs  beyond  the  river,  and,  that  nothing  may  be 
wanting  to  the  picture,  there  is  the  canal,  with  its  "  margin 
willow  veiled,"  and  its  barges,  to  give  the  contrast  of  utter, 
dreamy  repose  to  the  vehemence  of  the  Shenandoah  and  the 
rugged  grandeur  of  the  hills. 

On  September  14th  Jackson  made  his  final  dispositions, 

causing  A.  P.  Hill  to  advance  on  his  right  till  he  reached 

the  Shenandoah,  and  from  there  to  move  forward  till  his 

guns  and  troops  were  above,  to  the  right,  and  in  rear  of  the 

V.— 2 


26  ANTIETAM  AND  FIIEDERICKSBURG. 

left  of  the  Federal  lino  of  defence.  Swell's  division,  under 
Lawton,  moved  along  the  turnpike,  to  support  Hill  and  aid 
in  the  general  movement.  Jackson's  own  division,  under  J. 
R.  Jones,  secured  with  one  brigade  a  commanding  hill  to 
the  left,  near  the  Potomac,  the  rest  moving  along  the  turn 
pike  as  a  reserve.  During  the  night,  seven  batteries  were 
placed  in  advanced  positions,  and  ten  guns  were  taken 
across  the  Shenandoah,  and  established  on  its  right  bank, 
in  a  position  which  gave  them  an  enfilade  fire  on  the  Fed 
eral  line  on  Bolivar  Heights,  while  the  remaining  batteries 
of  Jackson's  command  were  placed  in  position  on  School 
House  Hill.  Early  on  the  15th  every  Confederate  gun 
opened  fire — the  numerous  batteries  of  Jackson's  command, 
Walker's  guns  from  Loudoun  Heights,  the  guns  sent  across 
the  Shenandoah  during  the  night,  McLaws's  guns  from 
Maryland  Heights.  In  an  hour  the  Federal  fire  seemed 
to  be  silenced,  the  signal  for  storming  the  works  was  giv 
en,  and  the  advance  was  begun,  when  the  Federal  fire 
reopened.  The  Confederate  guns  replied,  and  at  once  the 
white  flag  was  displayed  by  the  Federals,  and  presently 
General  White,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  when 
Colonel  Miles  received  a  mortal  wound,  surrendered  himself 
and  11,000  men,  with  73  pieces  of  artillery,  many  small  arms 
and  other  stores. 

The  first  part  of  the  Confederate  programme  had  been 
carried  out  with  complete  success,  but  with  greater  expendi 
ture  of  time  than  Lee  had  anticipated,  and  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  delay  almost  proved  fatal  to  him,  and  that  McClel- 
lan  ought  to  have  made  it  absolutely  fatal  to  him. 


CHAPTER  IL 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN. 

JACKSON  left  Hill  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Federal 
troops  and  property,  and  moved  at  once  with  his  remaining 
divisions  to  rejoin  Lee  in  Maryland.  By  what  he  calls  a 
severe  night  march,1  he  reached  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg 
on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  Walker's  division  followed 
closely,  and  also  reported  to  General  Lee  near  Sharpsburg 
early  on  the  16th. 

We  left  McClellanat  Frederick,  on  the  13th,  with  the  copy 
of  Lee's  order  in  his  hands.  For  military  reasons,  which 
seem  sufficient  as  he  states  them,  he  determined  not  to  at 
tempt  to  move  by  the  most  direct  road,  through  Jefferson  to 
Knoxville,  and  thence  up  the  river  to  Harper's  Ferry,  but  to 
move  his  left  by  Burkittsville  to  and  through  Crampton's 
Pass,  while  his  centre  and  right  marched  by  Middletown  to 
Turner's  Pass.  These  passes  are  gaps  or  gorges  through 
which  the  roads  across  the  South  Mountains  run.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  the  South  Mountains  are  a  continuous  range 
of  hills,  and  not  detached  heights.  By  moving  through 
Crampton's  Pass,  the  Union  left  would  debouch  in  rear  of 
Maryland  Heights  and  of  the  forces  under  McLaws  which 
Lee  had  ordered  there,  while  the  route  chosen  for  the  rest 

»  Seventeen  miles.    A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  128. 


28  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

of  the  army  would  place  it  between  Longstreet  and  D.  H. 
Hill  on  the  right,  and  Jackson's  forces  beyond  the  Potomac 
on  the  left,  and  also  between  Lee  and  McLaws. 

It  has  been  said  that  it  does  not  appear  at  what  hour  on 
the  13th  McClellan  came  into  possession  of  Lee's  order.  A 
somewhat  long  letter  written  by  him  to  General  Franklin  on 
the  13th,  is  dated  6.20  P.M.  In  that  letter  he  gave  Franklin 
the  substance  of  the  information  which  he  had  obtained  from 
Lee's  order,  and  also  told  him  that  his  signal  officers  re 
ported  that  McLaws  was  in  Pleasant  Valley,  and  that  the 
firing  showed  that  Miles  still  held  out.  He  also  informed 
him  that  his  right  advance  had  occupied  Middletown  in  the 
Catoctin  Valley,  and  that  the  four  corps  of  his  centre  and 
right,  with  Sykes's  division,  would  move  that  night  and  early 
the  next  morning  upon  Boonsboro',  to  cany  that  position ; 
that  Couch  l  had  been  ordered  to  concentrate  his  division 
and  join  him  as  rapidly  as  possible ;  that,  without  waiting 
for  the  whole  of  that  division  to  join,  he  was  to  "  move  at 
daybreak  in  the  morning  by  Jefferson  and  Burkittsville  upon 
the  road  to  Rohrersville."  The  letter  proceeded  thus  :  "  I 
have  reliable  information  that  the  mountain  pass  by  this  road 
is  practicable  for  artillery  and  wagons.  If  this  pass  is  not 
occupied  by  the  enemy  in  force,  seize  it  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable,  and  debouch  upon  Eohrersville  in  order  to  cut 
off  the  retreat  of,  or  destroy  McLaws's  command.  If  you  find 
this  pass  held  by  the  enemy  in  large  force,  make  all  your 
dispositions  for  the  attack,  and  commence  it  about  half  an 
hour  after  you  hear  severe  firing  at  the  pass  on  the  Hagers- 
town  pike,  where  the  main  body  will  attack.  Having 
gained  the  pass,  your  duty  will  be  first  to  cut  off,  destroy, 
or  capture  McLaws's  command,  and  relieve  Colonel  Miles. 

1  Who  was  at  Licksville. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  29 

If  you  effect  this,  you  will  order  him  to  join  you  at  once  with 
all  his  disposable  troops,  first  destroying  the  bridges  over 
the  Potomac,  if  not  already  done,  and,  leaving  a  sufficient 
garrison  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  passing  the  ford,  you 
will  then  return  by  Eohrersville  on  the  direct  road  to  Boons- 
boro',  if  the  main  column  has  not  succeeded  in  its  attack. 
If  it  has  succeeded,  take  the  road  to  Eohrersville,  to  Sharps- 
burg  and  Williamsport,  in  order  either  to  cut  off  the  retreat 
of  Hill  and  Longstreet  to  the  Potomac,  or  prevent  the  re- 
passage  of  Jackson.  My  general  idea  is  to  cut  the  enemy  in 
two  and  beat  him  in  detail.  I  believe  I  have  sufficiently  ex 
plained  my  intentions.  I  ask  of  you,  at  this  important  mo 
ment,  all  your  intellect  and  the  utmost  activity  that  a  gen 
eral  can  exercise." 

It  is  proper  to  dwell  upon  this  letter  of  McClellan's,  be 
cause  it  seems  to  be  the  first  order  that  he  issued  after  he 
came  into  possession  of  Lee's  lost  order,  and  it  seems  to  be 
indisputable  that  in  issuing  it  he  made  a  mistake,  which 
made  his  Maryland  campaign  a  moderate  success,  bought  at 
a  great  price,  instead  of  a  cheap  and  overwhelming  victory. 
His  "general  idea  "  was  excellent,  but  time  was  of  the  essence 
of  the  enterprise,  and  he  let  time  go  by,  and  so  failed  to  re 
lieve  Miles,  and  failed  to  interpose  his  masses  between  the 
wings  of  Lee's  separated  army.  "  Move  at  daybreak  in  the 
morning."  Let  us  see  what  this  means.  Franklin  was  at 
Buckeystown.  The  orders  were  issued  from  "  Camp  near 
Frederick,"  at  6.20  P.M.  Buckeystown  is  about  twelve  miles 
by  road  from  the  top  of  Crampton's  Gap.  Franklin's  troops, 
like  all  the  troops  of  a  force  marching  to  meet  and  fight  an 
invading  army,  were,  or  should  have  been,  in  condition  to 
move  at  a  moment's  notice.  The  weather  on  the  13th  was 
extremely  fine,  and  the  roads  in  good  condition.  There  was 
no  reason  why  Franklin's  corps  should  not  have  moved  that 


30  ANT1ETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

night,  instead  of  at  daybreak  the  next  morning.  There  was 
every  reason  for  believing  that  there  were  no  Confederate 
troops  to  interfere  with  him  in  his  march  to  the  Gap,  for  Mc- 
Clellan  knew  that  they  were  all  fully  employed  elsewhere, 
and,  if  there  were,  the  advance  guard  would  give  him  timely 
notice  of  it,  and  if  he  stopped  then  he  would  be  just  so  much 
nearer  his  goal.  We  know  now  that  if  he  had  marched  no 
farther  than  to  the  foot  of  the  range  that  night,  a  distance 
which  he  ought  to  have  accomplished  by  or  before  midnight, 
he  could  have  passed  through  it  the  next  morning  substan 
tially  unopposed,  and  that  advantage  gained,  the  Federal  army 
ought  to  have  relieved  Harper's  Ferry  or  fatally  separated 
the  wings  of  Lee's  army,  or  both.  And  what  we  know  now, 
McClellan  had  strong  reasons  for  believing  then,  and  strong 
belief  is  more  than  sufficient  reason  for  action,  especially 
where,  as  in  this  case,  he  could  not  lose  and  might  win  by 
speed,  and  gained  nothing  and  might  lose  almost  every 
thing  by  delay.  He  was  playing  for  a  great  stake,  and  for 
tune  had  given  him  a  wonderfully  good  chance  of  winning, 
and  he  should  have  used  every  card  to  the  very  utmost,  and 
left  nothing  to  chance  that  he  could  compass  by  skill  and 
energy.  But  there  are  some  soldiers  who  are  much  more 
ingenious  in  finding  reasons  for  not  doing  the  very  best 
thing  in  the  very  best  way,  than  they  are  vigorous  and  irre 
sistible  in  clearing  away  the  obstacles  to  doing  the  very  best 
thing  in  the  very  best  way. 

As  McClellan  respected  the  night's  sleep  of  Franklin  and 
his  men,  so  did  he  that  of  the  rest  of  his  army.  No  portion 
of  it  was  ordered  to  move  that  night,  with  the  possible  ex 
ception  of  Couch,  who  was  ordered  to  join  Franklin  "as 
rapidly  as  possible,"  and  no  portion  of  it  other  than  Frank 
lin's  was  ordered  to  move  so  early  as  daybreak  the  next 
morning.  The  earliest  hour  for  marching  that  was  pre- 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  31 

scribed  to  any  other  command  was  "  daylight,"  on  the  14th, 
at  which  hour  Hooker  was  to  set  out  from  the  Monocacy 
and  go  to  Middletown. 

As  the  distance  between  Crampton's  Gap  and  Turner's 
Gap  is  about  six  miles  in  a  straight  line,  and  as  the  country 
between  is  a  practically  unbroken  range  of  rugged  hills,  the 
attack  and  defence  of  each  pass  was  quite  isolated  from  the 
other,  though  the  fighting  was  going  on  at  each  place  on 
the  same  day,  all  day  at  Turner's  Gap,  and  all  the  afternoon 
at  Crampton's.  As  the  most  immediate  object,  in  point  of 
time,  was  the  relief  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  as  the  Union  left 
earned  its  pass  much  earlier  than  the  Union  right,  the  ac 
tion  at  Crampton's  Gap  may  as  well  be  described  first. 

General  McLaws  does  not  seem  to  have  apprehended  any 
very  prompt  action  on  the  part  of  McClellan  by  the  way  of 
the  South  Mountain  passes,  but  he  was  too  good  a  soldier  to 
leave  his  rear  quite  unprotected.  So,  while  he  was  busy  in 
taking  Maryland  Heights,  at  the  southern  end  of  Pleasant 
Valley,  and  aiding  in  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  he  not 
only  drew  a  thin  line  of  troops  across  the  valley  in  his  rear, 
but  sent  some  troops  and  guns  to  the  lower  passes  of  the 
South  Mountain  range.  On  the  13th,  cannonading  to  the 
east  and  northeast,  and  the  reports  of  his  cavalry  scouts, 
indicated  the  advance  of  the  enemy  from  various  directions ; 
but  he  did  not  attach  much  importance  to  these  indications, 
as  the  lookout  from  the  mountains  saw  nothing  to  confirm 
them.  On  the  following  day,  news  of  an  advance  of  the  enemy 
toward  the  Brownsville  Gap  (the  one  next  south  of  Cramp - 
ton's  Gap,  and  about  a  mile  from  it)  led  him  to  call  up  two 
more  brigades,  and  he  sent  word  to  General  Cobb,  who  com 
manded  one  of  them,  to  take  command  of  Crampton's  Gap 
so  soon  as  he  should  arrive  in  that  vicinity.  The  Gap  was 
over  five  miles  from  the  position  of  his  main  force,  and 


32  ANTIETAM   AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

he  himself  was  directing  the  fire  of  his  guns  on  Maryland 
Heights,  when  he  heard  cannonading  from  the  direction  of 
Crampton's.  Still  he  did  not  feel  any  solicitude  at  first,  and 
simply  sent  orders  to  Cobb  to  hold  the  Gap  to  the  last  man, 
but  presently  he  set  out  for  the  Gap  himself.  On  his  way 
there,  he  met  one  of  his  messengers  returning,  who  told  him 
that  the  Federals  had  forced  the  Gap,  and  that  Cobb  needed 
reinforcements.  The  news  was  true,  and  the  comparative 
ease  and  rapidity  with  which  the  Federals  had  achieved  this 
success,  showed  how  possible  it  would  have  been  to  gain 
it  earlier,  and  so  save  several  priceless  hours.  Franklin's 
superiority  of  force  was  such  that  he  gained  the  crest  after 
a  spirited  action  of  three  hours,  beginning  at  about  noon  on 
the  14th.  He  lost  about  five  hundred  and  thirty  men,  and 
estimated  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  at  about 
the  same ;  but  he  took  from  him  four  hundred  prisoners,  a 
gun,  and  three  colors.  His  advance  moved  into  Pleasant 
Valley  that  night,  and  the  remnant  of  the  brigades  he  had 
beaten,  those  of  Cobb,  Semmes,  and  Mahone,  helped  to  form 
McLaws's  defensive  line  of  battle  across  Pleasant  Valley. 

The  action  at  Turner's  Gap  was  on  a  larger  scale,  took 
longer  to  decide,  and  was  more  costly.  By  the  afternoon  of 
the  13th,  Lee  heard  that  McClellan  was  approaching  by 
that  road,  and  D.  H.  Hill  was  ordered  to  guard  the  pass, 
and  Longstreet  to  march  from  Hagerstown  to  his  support. 
Lee's  information  seems  to  have  come  from  Stuart,  who 
commanded  his  cavalry,  and  it  was  undoubtedly  Pleasonton's 
cavalry  advance  which  Stuart  encountered  and  reported. 
Hill  sent  back  the  brigades  of  Garland  and  Colquitt  to  hold 
the  pass,  but  subsequently  ordered  up  the  rest  of  his  divi 
sion  from  the  neighborhood  of  Boonsboro'.  This,  how 
ever,  he  did  not  do  till  the  next  day,  after  an  examination  of 
the  pass,  made  by  him  very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  14th, 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  33 

had  satisfied  him  that  it  could  only  be  held  by  a  largo 
force.1 

So  much  of  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  as  was  fought 
at  Turner's  Gap  hardly  admits  of  a  precise  description.  It 
lasted  a  long  time,  from  about  seven  in  the  morning  till  well 
into  the  evening,  and  a  good  many  troops  were  used  first 
and  last,  but  the  ground  was  so  peculiar  and  so  little  known 
to  our  commanders,  that  much  precious  time  and  many  gal 
lant  efforts  were  almost  wasted,  and  it  was  not  till  the  day 
was  near  its  end  that  the  Federal  advance  was  conducted 
with  ensemble.  There  was  plenty  of  hard  fighting,  but 
much  of  it  was  sharp  skirmishing,  and  the  whole  affair,  till 
near  the  end,  was  rather  many  little  battles  than  one  con 
nected  battle.  There  were  frequent  charges  and  counter 
charges,  and  many  attempts,  more  or  less  successful,  to  turn 
the  flanks  of  the  opposing  forces. 

The  main  road  from  Frederick,  by  Middletown  to  Hagers- 
town,  crosses  the  South  Mountain  at  Turner's  Gap.  The 
mountain  is  at  this  point  about  one  thousand  feet  high,  but 
the  depression  of  the  Gap  is  some  four  hundred  feet.  The 
mountain  on  the  north  side  of  the  main  road  is  divided  into 
two  crests  by  a  narrow  valley,  which  is  deep  where  it  touches 
the  road,  but  much  less  so  a  mile  to  the  north.  At  Bolivar, 
a  small  village  between  Middletown  and  the  Gap,  roads 
branch  to  the  right  and  left.  The  one  on  the  right,  called 
the  "  Old  Hagerstown  Eoad,"  passes  up  a  ravine  and 
leads  to  the  left  over  and  along  the  first  of  the  two  crests 
above  mentioned,  and  enters  the  turnpike  at  the  Mountain 
House,  near  the  summit  of  the  pass.  The  left-hand  road, 
called  the  "  Old  Sharpsburg  lioad,"  follows  a  somewhat  cir- 


1  The  map  of  South  Mountain,  prepared  in  1872,  in  the  Bureau  of  Topographi 
cal  Engineers,  gives  an  excellent  idea  of  this  peculiar  position. 

2* 


34  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

cuitous  route  to  Fox's  Gap,  at  the  top  of  the  Mountain, 
and  about  a  mile  south  of  the  Mountain  House,  and  thence 
descends  to  the  westward.  Two  or  three  wood  roads  lead 
northward  from  this  road  to,  and  to  the  westward  of,  the 
Mountain  House.  The  mountains  are  steep,  rugged,  and 
thickly  wooded,  and  rendered  peculiarly  hard  to  climb  by 
reason  of  the  presence  of  many  ledges  and  loose  rocks.  A 
good  many  stone  fences  also  were  found  there,  and  they 
afforded  much  protection  to  the  troops  defending  the  posi 
tion. 

At  G  A.M.,  on  Sunday  the  14th,  General  Cox,  commanding 
the  Kanawha  division  of  Eeno's  (Ninth)  Corps,  marched  from 
Middletown  under  an  order  received  by  him  from  Reno, 
directing  him  to  support  with  his  division  the  advance  of 
Pleasonton's  command,  which  was  composed  of  cavalry  and 
artillery.  He  took  the  road  to  the  left  of  the  main  road,  and 
ordered  his  leading  brigade,  Colonel  Scammon  commanding, 
to  feel  the  enemy,  and  to  ascertain  whether  the  crest  of 
South  Mountain  on  that  side  was  held  by  any  considerable 
force.  As  the  brigade  moved  out,  he  accompanied  it,  and 
presently  met  a  paroled  officer  returning.  An  involuntary 
exclamation  of  this  officer,  when  he  told  him  where  he  was 
going,  made  him  suspect  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  at  the 
Gap,  and  he  thereupon  ordered  his  second  brigade,  Colonel 
Crook  commanding,  to  follow  in  support,  and  sent  word 
back  to  Eeno  that  he  was  moving  his  whole  division,  and 
notified  Pleasonton  that  if  the  command  got  into  an  engage 
ment,  he  should  command  as  senior  till  Eeno  should  come 
tip.  Eeno  sent  word  that  Burnside  and  he  approved,  and 
that  he  would  bring  up  the  rest  of  the  corps.  As  the  first 
brigade  advanced,  Colonel  Hayes  (our  late  President)  was 
sent  with  his  regiment  to  the  left,  to  gain,  if  possible,  the 
enemy's  right.  He  succeeded  in  gaining  the  crest  on  the 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  35 

left,  and  established  himself  there,  in  spite  of  vigorous  re 
sistance  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates.  The  rest  of  the 
command,  with  some  aid  from  the  artillery  of  the  division, 
carried  the  entire  crest  by  about  9  A.M.  The  enemy  made 
several  attempts  to  retake  it,  but  though  the  fortunes  of  the 
fight  were  for  some  time  uncertain,  the  Federals  were  solidly 
established  by  noon  upon  the  ground  they  had  won.  The 
Confederate  troops  opposed  to  the  Federals  on  this  part  of 
the  field,  were  Garland's  brigade,  which  lost  its  commander 
and  was  badly  demoralized  by  his  fall  and  the  rough  treat 
ment  it  received,  Anderson's  brigade,  Ripley's  brigade,  and 
part  of  Colquitt's,  all  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  and  Colonel 
Bosser,  who  had  some  cavalry,  artillery,  and  sharpshooters. 

At  about  2  P.M.,  Federal  reinforcements  began  to  appear  in 
masses,  and  something  like  a  continuous  line  was  formed. 
"Willcox's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  the  first  to  arrive 
upon  the  ground,  and  it  took  position  on  the  right  of  Cox, 
sending  one  regiment,  however,  to  the  extreme  left,  where  a 
turning  movement  was  threatened.  Sturgis's  division  of  the 
same  corps  supported  "Willcox,  and  of  Rodman's  division 
Fairchild's  brigade  was  sent  to  the  extreme  left  and  Har- 
lan's  was  placed  on  the  right ;  but  all  these  troops  were  on 
the  south  of  the  turnpike,  that  is  to  say,  to  the  left  of  it,  as 
seen  from  the  Federal  headquarters.  Of  Hooker's  corps,  Gib 
bon's  brigade  was  placed  on  the  turnpike,  to  make  a  demon 
stration  on  the  centre  so  soon  as  the  movements  on  the 
right  and  left  had  sufficiently  progressed.  The  next  troops 
to  the  right  were  Hatch's  division,  and  beyond  him  was 
Meade,  who  moved  up  the  "Old  Hagerstown  Road"  to 
Mount  Tabor  Church,  and  deployed  a  short  distance  in  ad 
vance  of  it.  General  Eicketts's  division  came  up  considera 
bly  later,  and  was  deployed  in  the  rear.  Artillery  was  placed 
in  position  wherever  it  was  thought  it  could  be  of  service  to 


36  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

the  Federal  attack,  cavalry  was  thrown  out  to  watch  suspi 
cious  roads,  and  skirmishers  were  used  freely  to  cover  the 
front  of  the  advancing  brigades.  At  about  4  P.M.  the  gen 
eral  advance  of  the  Federals  began.  The  general  scheme  of 
it  was  that  Eeno's  men  should  close  in  upon  the  Gap  from 
the  ground  which  they  had  won  to  the  south,  while  Hooker's 
men  were  to  reach  the  same  point  by  circling  round  through 
the  valley  which  formed  the  approach  from  the  north  to  the 
Mountain  House.  In  executing  this  movement,  it  was  in 
tended  that  Gallagher's  and  Magilton's  brigades  of  Meade's 
division  should  pass  through  the  ravine.  Seymour's  brigade 
of  the  same  division  was  to  move  along  the  summit  on  the 
right,  parallel  to  the  ravine,  and  Hatch's  division  was  to 
take  the  crest  on  the  left ;  Ricketts's  division  was  to  follow 
in  reserve;  Gibbon's  employment  has  already  been  indi' 
cated.  Thus,  including  the  reserves,  eighteen  Federal  bri 
gades,  with  artillery  and  cavalry,  were  used  in  this  final 
operation. 

To  meet  this  general  attack,  there  were  present  on  the 
Confederate  side  the  five  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill,  viz.  :  Gar 
land's,  Colquitt's,  Kipley's,  Rodes's,  and  G.  B.  Anderson's. 
To  these  were  added,  about  3  P.M.,  from  Longstreet's  com 
mand,  the  brigades  of  Drayton  and  D.  R.  Jones  (under 
Colonel  G.  T.  Anderson),  and  at  about  4  P.M.  the  brigades 
of  Evans,  Pickett  (under  Garnett),  Kemper,  and  Jenkins 
(under  Walker),  and  Hood's  division  of  two  brigades,  com 
manded  respectively  by  "Wofford  and  by  Law.  If  we  call 
Rosser's  command  a  brigade,  it  will  appear  that  the  Confed 
erates  at  Turner's  Gap  met  with  fourteen  brigades  the 
assault  of  the  Federal  right,  made  with  eighteen  brigades. 

In  the  afternoon  fighting,  Colquitt's  brigade  was  in  the 
centre,  astride  of  the  turnpike.  The  right  was  formed  of 
the  brigades  of  Drayton,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Ripley,  and  G.  B. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  37 

Anderson,  in  the  order  named  from  left  to  right,  supported 
by  Hood's  two  brigades,  and  with  Rosser's  men  and  what 
was  left  of  Garland's  brigade  at  and  in  rear  of  the  right ;  on 
the  left  were  the  brigades  of  Rodes,  who  did  most  of  the 
fighting  there,  and  of  Evans,  Kemper,  Pickett,  and  Jenkins. 
The  Confederates  had  plenty  of  artillery,  and  they  placed 
guns  wherever  they  could  find  ground  for  them. 

The  Confederate  reports  of  this  action  are  not  character 
ized  by  tliat  fine  tone  of  superiority  with  which  all  students 
of  their  reports  are  familiar.  They  claim  to  check  and  re 
pulse  and  drive  back  the  Federals,  but  the  general  result  is 
an  admission  of  defeat.  It  is  refreshing  to  find  that  farcical 
overestimates  of  the  strength  of  the  enemy  were  not  confined 
to  the  Federal  side.  General  Garnett's  report  contains  these 
words  :  "It  has  been  subsequently  ascertained  that  General 
McClellan's  army,  consisting  of  at  least  eighty  thousand 
men,  assailed  our  position,  only  defended  by  General  D.  H. 
Hill's  division,  and  a  part  of  General  Longstreet's  corps." 
The  burden  of  all  their  reports,  indeed,  is  that  they  were 
overwhelmed  by  numbers,  and  by  them  forced  to  yield,  and 
were  withdrawn/'  one  of  their  division  commanders  says, 
"  in  Comparatively  good  order  to  the  foot  of  the  hill."  D. 
H.  Hill  does  not  write  like  a  soldier,  and  permits  himself 
strange  assertions.  After  describing  his  formation  of  a  line 
of  four  brigades,  with  Drayton  on  one  flank,  he  says :  "  Three 
Yankee  brigades  moved  up  in  beautiful  order  against  Dray- 
ton,  and  his  men  were  soon  beaten  and  wrent  streaming  to 
the  rear.  Rosser,  Anderson,  and  Eipley  still  held  their 
ground,  and  the  Yankees  could  not  gain  our  rear."  If  Ros 
ser,  Ripley,  and  Anderson  could  hold  their  ground,  when 
three  Yankee  brigades  had  uncovered  their  flank,  they  were 
heroes  indeed. 

The  truth  is  that  this  engagement  "was   f»r..from  being 


38  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

creditable  to  the  Confederates.  Some  of  them  undoubtedly 
fought  extremely  well,  notably  Kodes's  brigade,  which  lost 
very  heavily.  They  were  not  well  handled.  The  position 
was  not  one  of  a 

Straight  pass  in  which  a  thousand, 
Might  well  be  stopped  by  three, 

because  of  the  lateral  roads  which  led  into  it  and  partially 
by  it;  but  it  was  one  which  gave  great  advantage  to  the 
defenders.  It  is  probable  that  the  Federals  outnumbered 
the  Confederates  to  some  extent,  but  probably  not  to  a  very 
great  extent.  If  Eicketts's  three  brigades,  which  were  hardly, 
if  at  all,  used,  be  subtracted  from  the  Federal  total  of  eigh 
teen,  it  will  leave  them  fifteen  brigades  against  fourteen  Con 
federate  brigades,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that 
these  Federal  brigades  went  into  action  very  much  stronger 
than  their  opponents.  It  is  true  that  Longstreet's  men  went 
into  action  after  a  toilsome  march,  but  the  Union  troops  had 
done  some  marching,  too,  and  they  had  to  fight  up  hill. 
Moreover  the  Confederates  were  familiar  with  the  terrain, 
and  the  Federals  were  not.  It  is  altogether  probable  that 
D.  H.  Hill's  assertion  is  true,  that  if  Long-street's  troops,  as 
they  came  on  the  ground,  had  reported  to  him,  who  had  be 
come  familiar  with  the  ground  and  knew  all  the  vital  points, 
the  result  might  have  been  different.  "As  it  was,  they  took 
wrong  positions,  and  in  their  exhausted  condition,  after  a 
long  march,  they  were  broken  and  scattered."  ' 

General  McClellan's  estimate  of  the  numbers  on  each  side 
is  about  as  oriental  as  usual.  He  calls  the  Confederate  force 
"probably  some  thirty  thousand  in  all,"  and  says,  "we  went 

>  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  113. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  39 

into  action  with  about  thirty  thousand  men."  This  is  an  ex 
tract  from  his  report  dated  August  4,  1863,  when  he  had  had 
plenty  of  time  to  think,  and  must  be  accepted  as  deliberate. 
It  deserves  attentive  consideration.  In  the  first  place,  let 
us  consider  his  own  numbers.  It  is  impossible,  from  his 
own  figures,  to  place  the  aggregate  of  the  First  and  Ninth 
Corps  present  for  duty  September  14,  18G2,  higher  than  35,- 
155.  If  he  went  into  action  with  30,000,  he  took  in  more 
than  five-sixths  of  his  aggregate  present  for  duty,  and  no  sol 
dier  who  served  in  the  second  year  of  our  war  will  believe 
that  he  even  approximated  that.  In  the  second  place,  did  he 
believe  in  August,  1863 — did  he  believe  in  September,  1862 — 
that  he  had  driven  from  a  very  strong  position  30,000  of 
Lee's  army — a  force  sufficient  to  occupy  the  whole  position 
—with  30,000  of  his  own  ?  Bunker  Hill,  if  he  had  read  no 
further  in  the  history  of  war,  might  have  taught  him  the 
absolute  folly  of  such  an  idea.  And  Lee's  men  were  not 
embattled  farmers,  or  raw  levies,  or  discontented  conscripts. 
They  were  men  passionately  in  earnest,  men  who  had  de 
veloped  a  natural  aptitude  for  fighting  by  fourteen  months 
of  sharp  and  usually  successful  campaigning.  They  had 
shown  that  they  could  fight  hard  and  march  hard — that 
their  audacity  and  tenacity  were  alike  remarkable — that 
they  were  far  more  likely  to  carry  difficult  positions  than 
to  be  driven  from  them.  For  McClellan,  a  year  after  the 
event,  to  profess  to  believe  that  he  drove  Longstreet  and 
Hill  with  30,000  men  from  the  heights  of  South  Mountain 
with  30,000  of  his  own  men,  is  one  of  those  extraordinary, 
inconceivable,  aggravating  things  that  stirs  everything  that 
is  acrid  in  the  nature  of  those  who  follow  his  career. 

General  McClellan  reported  a  loss  in  this  engagement  of 
1,568  men,  of  whom  all  but  22  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Of  this  loss  a  large  part  fell  upon  Cox's  Kanawha  division, 
which  had  442  men  killed  and  wounded.  Willcox's  division 


40  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

also  suffered  heavily.  The  Federal  General  Eeno  *  was 
killed  almost  as  soon  as  he  came  up  to  the  line  occupied  by 
his  men,  at  about  dark.  About  fifteen  hundred  Confederate 
prisoners  were  taken.  Many  of  them  were  taken  from 
Rodes's  brigade,  which  also  had  218  men  killed  and  wounded. 
Five  Confederate  colonels  and  lieutenant-colonels  were 
killed  or  dangerously  wounded,  besides  one  brigadier-general 
killed. 

The  untrustworthy  character  of  military  reports  is  illus 
trated  by  what  we  read  in  print  from  Federal  and  Confede 
rate  sources  as  to  the  advance  up  the  turnpike  made  late  in 
the  engagement  by  Gibbon's  brigade.  McClellan  says : 
"  The  brigade  advanced  steadily,  driving  the  enemy  from  his 
positions  in  the  woods  and  behind  stone  walls  until  .  .  . 
The  fight  continued  until  nine  o'clock,  the  enemy  being  en 
tirely  repulsed,  and  the  brigade  .  .  .  continued  to  hold 
the  ground  it  had  so  gallantly  won  until  twelve  o'clock,  when 
it  was  relieved."  Colonel  Meredith,  commanding  a  regiment 
in  this  brigade,  says  :  "  It  was  a  glorious  victory  on  the  part 
of  General  Gibbon's  brigade,  driving  the  enemy  from  their 
strong  position  in  the  mountain  gorge."  On  the  other  hand, 
General  Hill  reports  that  this  advance  was  "  heroically  met 
and  bloodily  repulsed  "  by  two  regiments  of  Colquitt's  bri 
gade,  and  that  the  fight  "gradually  subsided  as  the  Yankees 
retired."  Colquitt  himself  says  :  "Not  an  inch  of  ground 
was  yielded."  It  is  of  little  consequence  which  is  nearer  the 
truth.  The  great  fact  remains  that  the  two  battles  of  South 
Mountain  were  tactical  defeats  to  the  Confederates,  but 
strategical  victories  won  by  them.  General  Hill  was  right 
in  saying,  "  We  retreated  that  night  to  Sharpsburg,  having 


1  Gk-neral  D.  H.  Hill  sweetly  says  (A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  Ill),  "a  reneprade  Virginian, 
who  was  killed  by  a  happy  shot  from  the  Twenty-third  North  Carolina." 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.  41 

accomplished  all  that  was  required,  the  delay  of  the  Yankee 
army  until  Harper's  Ferry  could  not  be  relieved."  This  of 
itself  was  bad  enough  for  McClellan,  but  it  was  not  all.  He 
had  lost  his  opportunity  not  only  to  save  the  garrison  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  but  to  interpose  between  the  wings  of  Lee's 
army.  A  night  march  of  his  left  and  right  wing  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  13th — a  far  easier  march  than  Jackson  made  on  the 
night  of  the  15th,  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Sharpsburg — would 
have  given  him  possession  of  both  passes  early  in  the  morn 
ing  of  the  14th,  and  if  he  had  been  there  it  is  hard  to  see 
how  he  could  have  failed  to  do  such  things  as  fairly  startle 
one  to  think  of.  To  crush  McLaws,  relieve  Harper's  Ferry, 
turn  every  gun  he  could  get  on  to  Maryland  Heights  upon 
Jackson  and  Walker,  and  hurl  forty  or  fifty  thousand  men 
on  to  D.  H.  Hill  and  Longstreet  while  he  interposed  between 
them  and  Jackson,  seem  things  not  only  within  the  range  of 
possibility,  but  of  easy  possibility.  But  he  was  not  equal  to 
the  occasion.  He  threw  away  his  chance,  and  a  precious 
opportunity  for  making  a  great  name  passed  away.  It  is  no 
wonder  that  Lee  and  Jackson  were  audacious  at  Chancellorc- 
ville.  After  their  experiences  with  Pope  and  McClellan, 
they  had  some  right  to  believe  that  a  division  of  their  forces 
in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy  might  be  ventured 
upon.  It  may  be  said  that  McClellan  did  better  than  Pope, 
and  this  is  true,  but  such  faint  praise  is  the  most  that  can 
be  said  of  his  action  on  this  important  occasion,  and  as  for 
his  tactical  victory,  it  is  curious  to  read,  as  we  shall  pres 
ently,  that  he  did  not  learn  till  daylight  the  following  morn 
ing,  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  positions. 


CHAPTER  m. 

THE  ANTIETAM. 

LEE  and  his  generals  were  not  slow  to  act  in  presence  of 
tlie  danger  which  still  impended.  General  McLaws  made 
haste,  during  the  night  of  the  14th,  to  form  his  command  in 
line  of  battle  across  Pleasant  Valley,  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
below  Crampton's,  leaving  one  regiment  to  support  the 
artillery  on  Maryland  Heights,  and  two  brigades  on  each  of 
the  roads  from  Harper's  Ferry,  i.e.,  the  road  which  ran  from 
there  over  the  Brownsville  Pass,  and  that  by  the  Weverton 
Pass.  The  object  of  this  was  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the 
garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  by  either  road,  as  well  as  to  pro 
tect  his  own  right  flank.  The  commands  of  Longstreet  and 
D.  H.  Hill  reached  Sharpsburg  on  the  morning  of  the  15th, 
and  were  placed  in  position  along  the  range  of  hills  between 
the  town  and  the  Antietam,  nearly  parallel  to  the  course  of 
the  stream,  Longstreet  on  the  right  of  the  road  to  Boons- 
boro',  and  Hill  on  the  left. 

Lee  moved  to  Sharpsburg,  because  he  would  there  be 
upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  any  force  moving  against  McLaws, 
and  because  the  army  could  unite  there  to  advantage.  Long- 
street  says  that  this  position  was  a  strong  defensive  one,  be 
sides  possessing  the  advantage  just  mentioned.  As  no  other 
Confederate  troops  came  up  to  this  position  till  the  follow 
ing  day,  it  is  convenient  to  return  to  the  Federal  headquar- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  43 

ters,  and  tell  what  McClellan  and  his  troops  did  after  the 
fighting  at  South  Mountain  ended. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  Franklin's  advance  moved 
into  Pleasant  Valley  on  the  night  of  the  14th."  An  hour  after 
midnight  of  that  day,  McClellan  sent  Franklin  orders  to  oc 
cupy  the  road  from  Eohrersville  to  Harper's  Ferry,  placing 
a  sufficient  force  at  Rohrersville  to  hold  the  position  against 
an  attack  from  the  Boonsboro'  direction,  that  is  to  say,  from 
the  forces  of  Longstreet  and  Hill.  He  also  directed  him  to 
attack  and  destroy  such  of  the  enemy  as  he  might  find  in 
Pleasant  Valley,  and,  if  possible,  to  withdraw  Miles's  com 
mand.  The  letter  ends  :  "  You  will  then  proceed  to  Boons 
boro',  which  place  the  Commanding  General  intends  to  at 
tack  to-morrow,  and  join  the  main  body  of  the  army  at  that 
place.  Should  you  find,  however,  that  the  enemy  have  re 
treated  from  Boonsboro'  towards  Sharpsburg,  you  will  en 
deavor  to  fall  upon  him  and  cut  off  his  retreat."  These  orders 
made  Franklin's  duty  perfectly  clear,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
why  he  did  not  obey  them,  except  that  he  seems  to  have  had  a 
fatal  tendency  to  see  lions  in  his  path.  Couch  joined  him  at 
10  P.M.  of  the  night  of  the  14th,  thus  raising  his  forces  to  a 
nominal  aggregate  of  upward  of  eighteen  thousand  men 
present  for  duty,  which  must  have  much  more  than  equalled 
the  strength  of  the  twelve  brigades  which  McLaws  had  to 
oppose  to  him.  He  was  fully  informed  of  McClellan's  plans 
and  wishes  before  these  orders  reached  him,  and  he  knew 
from  the  tenor  of  McClellan's  letter,  if  he  did  not  know  it 
directly  and  in  terms,  that  he  had  forced  the  passage  of 
Turner's  Gap.  Under  these  circumstances  the~  duty  was 
pressing  to  put  forth,  as  McClellan  had  begged  him  to, 
"  the  utmost  activity  that  a  general  can  exercise."  Unfortu 
nately  for  the  success  of  the  -Union  arms,  Franklin  was  not 
the  man  for  the  place,  At  ten  minutes  before  9  A.M.  of  the 


44  ANTIETAM  AXD  FREDERICKSBURG. 

15th,  lie  was  two  miles  from  the  line  of  the  enemy,  which 
was  drawn  between  him  and  the  place  he  was  ordered  to  re 
lieve,  and  waiting  (which  McClellan  had  not  told  him  to  do) 
to  be  sure  that  Rohrersville  was  occupied  before  moving  for 
ward  to  attack  the  enemy,  and  reporting  that  this  might  re 
quire  two  hours'  further  delay.  He  also  reported  that  the 
cessation  of  firing  at  Harper's  Ferry  made  him  fear  that  it 
had  fallen,  and  his  opinion  that,  if  that  proved  to  be  true,  he 
would  need  to  be  strongly  reinforced.  By  eleven  o'clock  he 
had  satisfied  himself  that  the  enemy  in  his  front  outnum 
bered  him  two  to  one. 

Harper's  Ferry  was  surrendered  at  8  A.M.  of  this  day.  It 
was  lost  because  Miles  did  not  make  his  main  defence  on 
Maryland  Heights,  because  McClellan's  orders  were  not 
equal  to  the  emergency,  and  because  Franklin's  action  was 
not  equal  to  the  orders  he  received.  After  what  has  been 
said,  it  is  hardly  necessaiy  to  say  that  Franklin  did  not  make 
himself  disagreeable  in  any  way  to  McLaws.  McClellan 
seems  to  have  thought  that  the  "  gigantic  rebel  army"  l  be 
fore  him  was  so  gigantic  that,  with  Longstreet  and  D.  H. 
Hill  and  "Walker  and  Jackson's  entire  command  away,  Mc 
Laws  could  still  outnumber  three  Federal  divisions  two  to 
one,  for  he  ordered  General  Franklin  to  remain  where  he  was 
"  to  watch  the  large  force  in  front  of  him,"  and  protect  his 
left  and  rear  till  the  night  of  the  IGth,  when  he  was  to  send 
Couch's  division  to  Maryland  Heights,  and  himself  join  the 
main  army  at  Keedysville.  How  he  could  have  expected  to 
beat  the  whole  of  Lee's  armv,  when  he  attributed  such 


*  McClellan's  letter  of  September  11,  1862  (Com.  C.  W.,  i.,  89).  The  army 
estimate  of  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  armies  was  not,  at  least  in  the 
Second  Corps,  the  same  as  McClellan's.  "  We  outnumber  the  enemy  "  (extract 
from  army  letter,  dated  Frederick,  September  13,  1SG2). 


THE  ANTIETAM.  45 

strength  to  a  fraction  of  it,  is  a  riddle  which  it  passes  human 
powers  to  solve. 

General  Franklin  watched  the  large  force  in  front  of  him 
to  so  much  and  so  little  purpose,  that  they  sent  their  trains 
back  across  the  river,  and  gradually  withdrew  themselves, 
marched  through  Harper's  Ferry,  camped  at  Halltown,  and 
joined  the  main  army  at  Sharpsburg  on  the  morning  of 
September  17th.  The  scheme  of  interposing  the  Federal 
army  between  the  wings  of  Lee's  army  was  rapidly  coming 
to  naught. 

On  the  night  of  the  14th  September,  the  centre,  under 
General  Sumner,  came  up  in  rear  of  the  right  wing,  shortly 
after  dark.  Eichardson's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  was 
placed  at  Mount  Tabor  Church  on  the  "Old  Hagerstown 
Eoad,"  about  a  mile  north  of  Bolivar,  and  the  rest  of  the 
Second  Corps,  and  all  the  Twelfth  Corps  around  Bolivar. 
Sykes's  division  and  the  artillery  reserve  halted  for  the 
night  at  Middletown.  Orders  were  given  to  the  Federal 
commanders  to  press  forward  the  pickets  at  early  dawn. 
Their  advance  revealed  the  fact  that  the  Confederates  had 
retreated  during  the  night.1  An  immediate  pursuit  was 
ordered.  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  the  First  Corps  under 
Hooker,  the  Second  under  Sumner,  and  the  Twelfth,  now 
under  Mansfield,  were  to  follow  the  turnpike  to  and  through 
Boonsboro',  whilo  Burnside  and  Porter,  with  the  Ninth 
Corps  and  Sykes's  division,  were  to  take  the  "  Old  Sharpsburg 
Eoad  "  on  the  left.  Burnside  and  Porter  were  to  be  governed 
by  circumstances  on  reaching  the  road  from  Boonsboro'  to 
Eohrersville,  whether  to  reinforce  Franklin  or  to  move  on 
Sharpsburg.  The  Federal  advance  made  its  appearance 

1  Meude  says  in  his  report :  "Morning  opened  with  a  heavy  mist,  which  pro- 
vented  any  view  being  obtained,  so  that  it  was  not  till  7  A.M.  that  it  was  ascer 
tained  the  enemy  had  retired  entirely  from  the  Mountain." 


46  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

on  the  west  side  of  the  Boonsboro'  Pass  at  8  A.M.  of  the 
15th.  This  was  the  hour  at  which  Harper's  Ferry  was  sur 
rendered.  The  fact  of  the  surrender,  and  the  hour  at  which 
it  took  place,  were  speedily  made  known  to  McClellan.  It 
was  reasonably  certain  that  the  troops  assigned  by  Lee's 
special  order  No.  191  to  the  duty  of  capturing  the  garrison 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  were  then  around  that  place,  and  most  of 
them  far  from  Lee,  and  all  of  them  separated  from  him 
either  by  distance  and  the  Potomac,  or  by  Union  troops,  or 
both.  Whatever  his  estimate  may  have  been  of  the  amount 
of  the  force  so  employed,  he  knew  that  it  comprised  all  or 
part  of  Jackson's  command,  and  the  divisions  of  McLaws, 
E.  H.  Anderson,  and  Walker.  If  he  looked  for  no  aggres 
sive  action  on  the  part  of  Franklin  and  Couch,  he  could  at 
least  look  to  them  to  hold  in  check  and  neutralize  the 
forces  of  McLaws  and  E.  H.  Anderson,  and  this  left  him  free 
to  use  his  First,  Second,  Ninth,  and  Twelfth  Corps,  with  all 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  that  was  with  him,  and  Pleasonton's  cav 
alry  command,  against  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill.  In  other 
words,  in  fine  country  and  in  fine  weather,  he  had  thirty-five 
brigades  of  infantry  to  use  against  Longstreet's  nine  bri 
gades,  and  D.  H.  Hill's  five  brigades.  Pleasonton's  cavalry 
and  the  reserve  artillery  were  probably  as  numerous  as 
Stuart's  and  Eosser's  cavalry  and  their  artillery.  We  assume 
this,  in  the  absence  of  figures.  At  any  rate,  McClellan 
claims  that  his  cavalry  on  the  15th  overtook  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  made  a  daring  charge,  and  captured  250  prisoners 
and  two  guns.  Here  again  was  a  great  opportunity.  With 
a  long  day  before  him,  a  force  that  outnumbered  his  oppo 
nent  as  five  to  two,  and  probably  as  six  to  two,1  and  the 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  here  and  elsewhere  numbers  are  treated  in  accord 
ance  with  the  facts,  and  not  in  accordance  with  McCIellan's  statements  of  his 
estimate  of  them.  It  is  true  that  a  commander  must  shape  his  action  with  ref- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  47 

knowledge  that  the  large  detachments  his  opponent  had 
made  could  not  join  him  for  twenty-four  hours,  and  might 
not  join  him  for  forty-eight  or  more,  it  was  a  time  for  rapid 
action.  It  would  seem  that  he  ought  to  have  pressed  his 
troops  forward  unrestingly  till  they  reached  cannon-shot  dis 
tance  from  the  enemy,  and  made  his  reconnoissances  as  his 
columns  were  advancing.  He  would  speedily  have  learned 
the  length  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  as  the  distance  from  the 
summit  of  Turner's  Gap  to  Sharpsburg  is  only  seven  or  eight 
miles,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  why  he  might  not  have  attacked 
in  force  early  in  the  afternoon.  He  had  every  reason  for 
believing  that  delay  would  strengthen  the  enemy  much 
more  proportionately  than  it  would  strengthen  him,  and  ho 
might  be  sure  that  delay  would  be  at  least  as  serviceable  to 
the  enemy  as  to  him  in  acquiring  knowledge  of  the  ground, 
and  much  more  so  in  putting  that  knowledge  to  account. 
But  it  was  not  to  be.  With  all  his  amiable  and  estimable 
and  admirable  qualities,  there  was  something  wanting  in 
McClellan.  If  he  had  used  the  priceless  hours  of  the  15th 
September,  and  the  still  precious,  though  less  precious 
hours  of  the  16th  as  he  might  have,  his  name  would  have 
stood  high  in  the  roll  of  great  commanders ;  but  he  let  those 
hours  go  by,  and,  as  will  presently  be  told  in  detail,  it  took 
him  forty-eight  hours  to  get  ready  to  deliver  his  main  at 
tack,  and  then  he  had  to  deal  not  only  with  Lee  and  Long- 
street  and  Hood  and  D.  H.  Hill,  but  with  all  of  them,  with 
Stonewall  Jackson  added,  with  two  of  his  divisions,  and 


ercnce  to  his  estimate  of  his  own  and  his  opponent's  force,  but  It  must  be  said 
without  reservation  that  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  McClellan  believed  that 
on  the  Peninsula  or  in  Maryland  the  Confederates  had  the  forces  he  attributed 
to  them.  If  he  did  believe  it,  he  ought,  with  his  knowledge  of  their  fighting 
qualities,  to  have  abandoned  offensive  operations  and  thrown  his  army  behind 
fortifications  constructed  to  protect  Washington,  Baltimore,  and  Philadelphia, 
and  waited  for  more  troops. 


48  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

McLaws  and  "Walker.  It  has  already  been  suggested  tha 
Halleck's  error  in  insisting  on  retaining  Miles  at  Harper' 
Ferry  came  near  being  very  damaging  to  Lee.  In  the  seque 
it  proved  damaging  only  to  the  extent  of  the  weakening  o 
his  force  by  straggling  upon  the  march,  and  the  some 
what  enfeebled  condition  of  some  of  his  troops  at  Sharps 
burg;  but  if  the  most  had  been  made  of  the  opportunity 
by  the  Federal  commander,  Halleck's  error  would  hav< 
proved  more  useful  than  the  wisest  piece  of  strategy  ha 
often  been. 

Richardson's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  moved  rapidl; 
through  Boonsboro'  and  Kcedysville,  and  found  the  Con 
federates  occupying  the  position  they  had  chosen  beyom 
the  Antietam.  In  obedience  to  orders,  ib  halted  and  de 
ployed  on  the  east  of  the  stream,  on  the  right  of  the  Sharps 
burg  road.  Sykes's  division  came  up  and  deployed  on  th< 
left  of  Eichardson,  and  on  the  left  of  the  Sharpsburg  road 
The  Confederate  artillery  opened  on  the  Federal  column: 
as  they  came  in  sight,  from  positions  on  the  high  ground  01 
the  west  side  of  the  stream. 

Between  Mercersville  on  the  north  and  the  confluence  o 
the  Antietam  with  the  Potomac  on  the  south,  a  distance  o 
about  six  miles  in  a  straight  line,  the  Potomac  follows  a  se 
ries  of  remarkable  curves,  but  its  general  course  is  such  tha1 
a  line  of  battle  something  less  than  six  miles  long  may  b( 
drawn,  from  a  point  a  little  below  Mercersville  to  a  point  i 
little  above  the  mouth  of  the  Antietam,  so  as  to  rest  both  its 
flanks  upon  the  Potomac,  to  cover  the  Shepherdstown  Fore 
and  the  town  of  Sharpsburg,  and  to  have  its  front  covered  b^ 
Antietam  Creek.  The  Antietam  is  crossed  by  four  bridges 
of  which  that  nearest  its  confluence  with  the  Potomac  was 
not  used  during  the  battle,  except  by  the  troops  of  A.  P 
Hill,  coming  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  reinforce  Lee.  Tht 


The  Field  of  the  Antietam. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  49 

next,  known  as  the  "  Burnside  Bridge,"  is  that  by  which  the 
road  from  Sharpsburg  to  Eohrersville  crosses  the  stream. 
The  next  above  is  the  bridge  of  the  Sharpsburg,  Keedys- 
ville,  and  Boonsboro'  turnpike,  and  another,  two  miles  and 
a  half  higher  up,  is  the  bridge  of  the  road  from  Keedys- 
ville  to  Williamsport.  The  stream  is  sluggish  and  winding, 
and  though  it  possesses  several  fords,  they  are  difficult.  In 
the  rear  of  Sharpsburg  a  good  road  leads  to  the  Shepherds- 
town  Ford  of  the  Potomac.  Besides  the  roads  already  men 
tioned,  an  important  turnpike  leads  northward  from  Sharps 
burg  to  Hagersfcown.  On  the  western  side  of  the  Antietam, 
the  ground  rises  in  a  slope  of  woods  and  fields  to  a  some 
what  bold  crest,  and  then  falls  away  to  the  Potomac. 

In  this  "strong  defensive  position,"  Lee  proceeded  to 
form  his  men  for  the  action  which  events  had  so  forced 
upon  him  that  he  could  not  avoid  it  without  loss  of  prestige. 
His  front  was  covered  by  the  Antietam,  his  line  of  retreat 
was  convenient  and  open,  and  the  way  was  clear  for  all  his 
detachments  to  join  him.  He  was  in  a  position  from  which 
ho  could  not  hope  to  escape  without  serious  fighting  and 
serious  loss,  but  he  had  not  to  fear  destruction  unless  his 
opponent  struck  at  once  and  struck  hard.  His  position  was 
very  different  from  what  he  appears  to  have  expected,  and  ifc 
must  have  been  with  a  strong  sense  of  disappointment  as 
well  as  of  anxiety  that  he  formed  his  thin  lines  in  front  cf 
Sharpsburg.  The  dream  of  raiding  northward  to  the  Sus- 
quehanna,  and  of  drawing  McClellan  so  far  away  as  to  per 
mit  him  to  make  a  point  on  Washington,  had  to  be  aban 
doned,  and  instead  of  that  he  had  to  prepare  for  a  tough 
struggle  to  be  made  with  a  small  army  at  best,  and  with  only 
half  of  that  if  his  opponent  was  prompt. 

The  National  Cemetery  at  Sharpsburg  is  situated  upon  the 
crest  of  a  hill  to  the  eastward  of  the  town,  and  just  outside 
V.-3 


50  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

the  houses.  It  fronts  upon  the  main  road  from  the  town  to 
Keedysville,  and  lies  on  the  southerly  side  of  that  road.  It 
commands  a  view  of  remarkable  beauty  and  extent.  Within 
its  enclosure  is  a  small  mass  of  limestone  upon  which  it  is 
said  Lee  stood  to  direct  the  battle.  If  one  enters  the  ceme 
tery  and  takes  his  position  at  the  base  of  the  flag-staff,  which 
stands  on  the  highest  ground,  he  will  be  within  the  concave 
of  the  Confederate  line  as  it  stood  at  the  commencement  of 
the  battle.  On  his  left,  as  he  looks  northward,  is  the  town 
of  Sharpsburg,  lying  in  a  hollow  between  the  ridge  which 
rises  to  the  west  of  the  Antietam,  and  the  Potomac,  which  is 
not  in  sight.  The  Hagerstown  pike  may  be  partially  seen, 
extending  northerly  from  the  town,  and  with  a  slightly  ob 
lique  direction  to  the  right.  At  the  distance  of  about  a 
mile,  upon  the  western  edge,  and  in  plain  view,  stands  the 
famous  Bunker  Church,  in  the  border  of  a  patch  of  woods. 
To  the  right  of  it,  and  to  the  east  of  the  turnpike,  is  open 
ground,  and  this  is  bordered  on  the  right  by  another  patch 
of  woods.  These  two  patches  of  timber,  with  the  fields  be 
tween,  were  the  scene  of  the  most  sanguinary  fighting  of  the 
17th  of  September.  Looking  further  to  the  right,  to  the 
northeast  of  the  position  of  the  observer,  and  at  a  distance 
of  something  less  than  two  miles ,  a  large  brick  building 
may  be  seen.  This  is  Fry's  house,  round  which  the  tents 
of  McClellan's  headquarters  were  pitched  before  and  during 
the  battle.  The  Antietam  cannot  be  seen,  because  of 
the  depth  of  the  ravine  which  forms  its  bed,  but  its  course 
may  easily  be  traced  by  the  abundant  growth  of  the 
trees  which  fringe  its  banks.  Yet  further  to  the  right,  and 
at  a  distance  of  about  a  mile,  one  sees  the  upper  part  of  a 
basin  formed  by  some  hills.  At  the  base  of  these  hills  the 
"  Burnside  Bridge  "  crosses  the  stream.  In  the  further  dis 
tance  to  the  right,  the  spurs  of  Maryland  Heights  and  the 


THE  ANTIETAM.  51 

stately  South  Mountain  range  frame  the  picture,  which  is 
as  full  of  beauty  as  it  is  of  interest.  Practically  the  whole 
of  the  battle-field  may  be  seen  from  this  single  point.  To 
complete  the  description  of  it,  it  is  to  be  added  that  the 
woods  in  which  the  Dunker  Church  stands,  fringe  the  west 
ern  side  of  the  Hagerstown  pike  for  about  a  quarter  of  a 
mile.  Then  they  turn  to  the  westward  for  about  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  yards,  and,  turning  again  at  right  angles,  the 
edge  of  the  woods  is  parallel  to  the  turnpike  for  another 
quarter  of  a  mile.  Further  to  the  north,  the  ground  is  open 
immediately  to  the  west  of  the  pike,  and  there  are  two  siza 
ble  woods,  detached  from  each  other,  further  to  the  west.1 
For  convenience  of  description,  the  woods  to  the  west,  north 
and  northwest  of  the  Dunker  Church  will  be  called  the 
West  Woods,  and  the  woods  opposite  and  to  the  east  of  the 
pike,  and  separated  from  it  by  open  ground,  will  be  called 
the  East  Woods.  At  the  Dunker  Church  two  roads  meet  the 
turnpike,  almost  forming  a  right  angle  with  each  other. 
The  course  of  the  easterly  of  these  two  roads  is  southwest 
erly  to  the  pike,  while  the  other,  which  is  little  more  than  a 
wood  road,  runs  a  little  north  of  west  from  the  church.  The 
West  Woods  are  full  of  outcropping  ledges  of  limestone, 
which  afford  excellent  cover  for  troops.  To  the  west  of  the 
northern  portion  of  the  West  Woods  is  a  height,  far  enough 
to  the  west  to  enable  the  force  holding  it  to  take  not. 


1  Some  of  the  reports  speak  of  a  stone  house,  with  straw  stacks  near  it.  It  is 
probable,  but  not  certain,  that  the  stone  house  was  Nicodemus's,  west  of  the  Ha- 
gerstown  pike,  and  in  the  angle  between  it  and  the  road  to  Williamsport.  The 
41  burning  buildings"  were,  almost  certainly,  one  Mume's,  east  of  the  Hagers 
town  Pike,  and  not  very  far  from  D.  R.  Miller's  house.  They  are  not  shown  on 
the  plan.  I  saw  them  in  flames,  on  the  right  of  Sedgwick's  division,  as  I  went 
into  action,  and  when  I  next  visited  the  ground,  some  few  years  after,  I  waa 
assured  that  they  were  Mume's.  The  Dutch  or  German  settlers  of  the  neighbor 
hood  seem  to  have  been  family  connections.  I  found  threa  separate  families  of 
Poffenbergers,  for  instance.— F.  W.  P. 


52  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

only  in  flank  but  in  reverse  the  whole  of  the  Confederate 
position. 

As  we  have  now  reached  the  point  at  which  the  nucleus  of 
Lee's  army  has  taken  position  in  front  of  Sharpsburg,  while 
two  divisions  of  McClellan's  army  have  formed  up  for  the 
attack,  the  time  seems  to  have  come  for  some  remarks  upon 
the  character  of  the  two  armies.  There  is  no  occasion  for 
saying  much  about  the  rank  and  file  of  either  side,  for  the 
soldierly  qualities  of  both  are  too  well  known.  After  eighty 
years  of  peace,  the  surface  of  which  had  been  scarcely  ruffled 
by  the  war  of  1812  and  the  Mexican  war,  the  men  of  the 
North  and  of  the  South  had  shown  that  they  still  possessed 
the  soldierly  qualities  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  For  four 
teen  months  they  had  been  opposed  to  each  other,  and  from 
the  first  to  the  second  Bull  Eun,  at  Williamsburg  and  Fair 
Oaks,  and  Gaines's  Mill,  and  Malvern  Hill,  and  in  all  the  cam 
paigning  which  came  between  the  first  clash  of  arms  and  the 
last  struggle  at  South  Mountain,  they  had  displayed  intelli 
gence,  courage,  endurance,  tenacity,  and  patriotism.  The 
qualities  that  had  enabled  the  South  to  win  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  and  had  made  Massachusetts  men  "  stand  in  the 
evil  hour"  at  Ball's  Bluff,  had  been  developed  and  disci 
plined  by  the  experience  of  war,  and  Lee  and  McClellan  now 
had  each  an  instrument  to  work  with,  which  had  been  not 
perfected,  but  much  bettered  by  the  tempering  processes  of 
the  field. 

When  we  pass  from  the  men  to  the  commanders,  there  is 
more  to  be  said.  Lee  had  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  and 
Hood  and  Stuart  with  him,  while  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill 
and  McLaws  and  Walker  were  hastening  to  join  him. 
McClellan  had  for  corps  commanders,  Hooker  and  Sumner, 
and  Porter  and  Franklin,  and  Burnside  and  Mansfield,  while 
his  division  commanders  were  Cox,  Couch,  Doubleday, 


THE  ANTIETAM.  53 

French,  Greene,  Hatch,  Meade,  Morell,  Eichardson,  Rick- 
etfcs,  Eodman,  Sedgwick,  Slocum,  W.  F.  Smith,  Sturgis, 
Willcox,  and  Williams.  If  a  student  of  military  history, 
familiar  with  the  characters  who  figured  in  the  war  of  seces 
sion,  but  happening  to  be  ignorant  of  the  story  of  the  battle  of 
the  Antietam,  should  be  told  that  the  men  we  have  named 
held  the  high  commands  there,  he  would  say  that  with  any 
thing  like  an  equality  of  forces,  the  Confederates  must  have 
won,  for  their  leaders  were  men  who  made  great  names  in 
the  war,  while  the  Federal  leaders  were,  with  few  excep 
tions,  men  who  never  became  conspicuous,  or  became  con 
spicuous  only  through  failure.  Their  names  are  for  the  most 
part  unknown  to  the  public,  and  few  can  say  who  among  them 
are  alive  or  dead. 

In  September,  18G2,  McClellan  had  been  for  fifteen  years 
a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy,  and  for  all  but  about 
four  of  these  years  he  had  been  in  the  military  service  of 
the  United  States.  He  had  resigned  in  January,  1857,  giv 
ing  up  the  commission  of  a  captain  of  cavalry,  and  he  had 
been  raised  at  one  step  from  civil  life,  in  May,  1861,  to  the 
position  of  major-general  in  tlie  army.  He  was  a  man  of 
short  and  solid  figure,  good  carriage,  and  singularly  pleasing 
manners.  He  was  never  in  a  hurry,  and  always  seemed  to 
have  plenty  of  time  at  his  command.  He  had  shown  marked 
ability  as  an  organizer,  and  his  men  generally  felt  an  almost 
idolatrous  enthusiasm  for  him.  He  had  been  so  slow  to 
commence  operations  against  tho  army  that  had  beaten 
McDowell  in  1861,  that  many  people  had  come  to  entertain 
grave  doubts  of  his  capacity,  and  the  doubters  had  grown 
more  numerous  and  positive  since  the  failure  of  his  Pen 
insular  campaign,  though  his  shortcomings  there  did  not 
then  incur  all  the  censure  they  deserved,  because  of 
the  very  generally  entertained  belief  that  the  failure  was 
owing  to  interference  at  Washington  with  hia  plans.  After 


54  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDER1CKSBURG. 

Pope's  defeat  the  army  turned  to  him  passionately,  and  the 
people  hopefully,  and  the  time  was  now  coming  that  was  to 
test  the  question  of  his  talents. 

McClellan's  lieutenants  were  Sumner,  Burnside,  and  Frank 
lin.  Sumner  was  quite  an  old  man,  though  still  vigorous 
and  active.  He  was  not  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  but  he 
had  been  a  soldier  all  his  life,  and  he  was  rapidly  promoted 
from  a  colonelcy  of  cavalry  to  the  grade  of  major-general  of 
volunteers.  H3  was  a  most  excellent  and  every  way  respect 
able  man,  and  he  had  in  the  highest  degree  the  courage  of 
a  soldier,  but  he  was  wanting  in  the  courage  of  a  general. 
He  was  apt  to  be  demoralized  by  hard  fighting,  and  to  over 
estimate  the  losses  of  his  own  side  and  the  strength  of  the 
enemy,  and  he  seems  to  have  possessed  no  judgment  as  a 
tactician.  It  is  probable  that  his  training  as  a  cavalry  offi 
cer  had  done  him  positive  harm  as  a  leader  of  infantry. 
Franklin  had  been  a  soldier  all  his  life — that  is  to  say,  he 
had  been  first  in  his  class  at  West  Point,  and  from  1843, 
when  he  graduated,  he  had  been  serving  in  the  Topograph 
ical  Engineers,  till  May,  1831,  when  he  was  commissioned 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  Something  has  been  said 
of  him  already,  and  more  will  be  said  of  him,  when  his  part 
in  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  is  discussed.  For  the  pres 
ent  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  whatever  his  merits  may  have 
been,  he  distinctly  did  not  belong  to  the  class  of  fortunate 
and  successful  soldiers.  Burnside,  also,  was  a  West  Point 
graduate,  but  he  had  been  out  of  the  service  more  than  seven 
years  whan  the  war  broke  out.  Few  men,  probably,  have 
risen  so  high  upon  so  slight  a  foundation  as  he.  He  is  dead, 
and  what  must  be  said  of  him  is  therefore  to  be  said  with 
forbearance.  His  personal  appearance  was  striking  and  fine, 
and  his  manner  was  frank  and  captivating.  Nobody  could 
encounter  his  smile  and  receive  the  grasp  of  his  hand  with- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  55 

out  being  for  some  time  tinder  a  potent  influence.  It  is 
probably  true  that  that  man's  manners  made  his  fortune,  for 
he  remained  long  in  the  service  in  high  places,  and  yet  his 
presence  was  an  element  of  weakness  where  he  was  a  sub 
ordinate,  and  was  disastrous  when  he  held  a  great  command. 
Hooker,  too,  is  dead.  Brave,  handsome,  vain,  insubordi 
nate,  plausible,  untrustworthy,  he  had  many  of  the  merits  of 
a  lieutenant,  but  not  all,  and  he  too  failed  dismally  when  he 
was  made  commander-in-chief.  As  an  inferior,  he  planned 
badly  and  fought  well ;  as  chief,  he  planned  well  and  fought 
badly.  He  was  so  unfortunate  in  his  bearing  as  a  corps 
commander  that  his  great  chief  Sherman  was  glad  to  be  rid 
of  him,  and  he  left  the  army  in  front  of  Atlanta,  and  never 
was  set  to  work  against  troops  again.  Of  the  unfortunate 
Porter  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak.  His  vindication  at  the 
hands  of  the  Military  Commission  is  magnificent,  but  he  had 
little  to  do  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam,  and  nothing  to 
do  afterward.  The  excellent  Sedgwick  never  climbed  high 
on  the  hill  of  fame,  and  Grant's  presence  so  overshadowed 
Meade  from  the  spring  of  1864,  that  one  is  left  to  saying 
with  some  diffidence  that  he  seems  to  have  been  rather  a 
meritorious  than  a  brilliant  commander.  The  names  which 
afterward  became  more  or  less  splendid,  such  names  as  Han 
cock,  Humphreys,  Griffin,  Warren,  Barlow,  and  Miles,  be 
longed  to  men  who,  in  September,  1862,  were  brigade  com 
manders  or  not  so  high.  The  only  other  division  com 
mander  who  went  into  action  on  the  Federal  side  at  the  An 
tietam  who  calls  for  special  mention,  was  Cox,  a  useful  citizen 
of  the  Garfield  type,  a  good  soldier,  and  an  admirable  man. 
As  a  corps  commander  in  Sherman's  army,  and  afterward  as 
Governor  of  Ohio,  he  came  to  be  widely  and  favorably  known 
in  the  West,  but  he  was  almost  a  stranger  to  the  army  of  the 
Potomac,  with  which  he  only  served  for  about  two  months. 


56  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

1 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  hot  fifteenth  of  September,  while 

the  long  columns  of  the  Federal  army  were  resting  along 
the  Boonsboro'  road,  General  McClellan  passed  through 
them  to  the  front,  and  had  from  them  such  a  magnificent 
reception  as  was  worth  living  for.  Far  from  the  rear  the 
cheers  were  heard,  faintly  at  first,  and  gradually  the  sound  in 
creased  and  grew  to  a  roar  as  he  approached.  The  weary  men 
sprang  to  their  feet  and  cheered  and  cheered,  and  as  he  went 
the  cheers  went  before  him  and  with  him  and  after  him,  till 
the  sound  receding  with  the  distance  at  last  died  away. 
The  troops  moved  on  later,  slowly  and  wearily,  and  some  of 
them  were  not  in  position  till  the  next  morning. 

General  McClellan  says  that  after  a  rapid  examination  of 
the  position,  he  found  it  was  too  late  to  attack  on  Monday. 
He  does  not  say  at  what  hour  he  reached  the  front,  but,  as 
has  been  said,  it  was  well  into  the  afternoon.  Neither  does 
he  tell  us  why  he  arrived  so  late.  Besides  making  the  rapid 
examination  of  which  he  speaks,  he  seems  to  have  done 
nothing  beyond  directing  the  placing  of  the  batteries  in  the 
centre,  and  indicating  the  bivouacs  for  the  different  corps. 
This  last  was  a  simple  matter,  as  he  merely  massed  them 
near  and  on  both  sides  of  the  road  from  Keedysville  to 
Sharpsburg.  So  all  this  day,  the  fifteenth  of  September, 
Lee  stood  in  front  of  Sharpsburg  with  the  troops  of  Long- 
street  and  D.  H.  Hill  alone,  while  the  whole  army  of  the 
Potomac,  excepting  Franklin's  command  and  Morell's  divi 
sion  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  was  near  him. 

Tuesday  the  sixteenth  was  a  terribly  hot  day  in  its  early 
hours,  with  a  burning  sun  and  no  breeze,  but  at  about  eleven 
the  sun  became  overcast,  and  a  little  air  stirred  from  time  to 
time.  It  was  a  day  of  mere  idleness  throughout,  for  a  large 
part  of  the  army,1  and  no  one  but  the  gunners  had  anything 

i  The  Second  Corps,  at  any  rate,  did  not  move  that  day,  but  remained  massed 
near  Fry's  house. 


THE  ANT1ETAM.  57 

to  do  in  the  forenoon.  We  lay  about  on  the  eastern  slope  of 
the  ridge  which  interposed  between  us  and  the  valley  of  the 
Antietam,  and  occasionally  we  would  go  to  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  to  see  what  we  could  see.  There  was  plenty  to  see, 
but  unfortunately  that  was  not  all  of  it.  The  Confederate 
batteries  were  wide  awake,  and  their  practice  was  extremely 
good,  and  projectiles  flew  over  the  crest  so  thickly  that  mere 
curiosity  was  not  sufficient  to  keep  any  one  there  long. 

On  the  morning  of  this  day  Jackson  arrived  at  Sharps- 
burg  with  his  own  division,  under  J.  E.  Jones,  and  Swell's 
division,  under  Lawton.  His  troops  were  allowed  some  rest, 
and  then  his  own  division  was  placed  on  the  left  of  Hood, 
who,  being  himself  on  the  left  of  D.  H.  Hill,  prolonged  the 
Confederate  line  northward  and  westward  to  the  Hagerstown 
pike.  Jackson's  right  rested  on  the  pike.  Winder's  and 
Jones's  brigades  formed  his  front  line,  and  Taliaferro's  and 
Starke's  his  second.  Early's  brigade  of  Swell's  division  was 
formed  on  his  left,  to  guard  his  flank,  and  Hays's  brigade 
was  formed  in  his  rear.  Stuart,  with  the  cavalry,  was  still 
further  to  the  left,  near  the  Potomac.  Lawton's  and  Trim 
ble's  brigades,  of  Swell's  division,  were  left  to  rest  near  the 
Dunker  Church.  Walker,  also,  early  this  day,  crossed  the 
Potomac  on  his  return  from  Harper's  Ferry,  but  he  also 
seems  to  have  rested  till  daylight  the  next  morning,  when 
he  placed  his  two  brigades  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Con 
federate  position,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  Sharps- 
burg,  and  in  support  to  General  Tooinbs,  whose  brigade  was 
guarding  the  approach  by  the  "Bumsidc  Bridge."  These 
were  all  the  troops  which  Lee  had  with  him  all  day  on  the 
16th,  for  McLaws  did  not 'come  on  the  ground  till  sunrise 
the  next  morning,  Anderson's  division  followed  him,  and  A. 
P.  Hill  did  not  arrive  till  half -past  two  P.M.  Artillery  seems 
to  have  been  singularly  plenty  among  the  Confederates,  for 
3* 


58  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBUKG. 

D.  H.  Hill,  after  stating  that  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  he 
had  but  3,000  infantry,  proceeds  as  follows  :  "I  had,  however, 
twenty-six  pieces  of  artillery  of  my  own,  and  near  sixty 
pieces  of  Cutts's  battalion  temporarily  under  my  command."  l 
As  twenty-six  pieces  is  a  liberal  allowance  for  9,000  infantry, 
this  statement  excites  some  surprise. 

The  ground  occupied  by  the  Confederates  near  the  "  Burn- 
side  Bridge  "  was  favorable  for  their  defence.  It  consisted 
of  undulating  hills,  their  crests  commanded  in  turn  by 
others  in  their  rear.  The  bridge  itself  is  a  stone  structure 
of  three  arches,  with  a  stone  parapet  above.  This  parapet 
to  some  extent  flanks  the  approach  to  the  bridge  at  each 
end.  The  stream  runs  through  a  narrow  valley.  On  the 
right  bank  (held  by  the  Confederates),  a  steep  slope  comes 
very  near  the  edge.  In  this  slope  the  roadway  is  scarped, 
running  both  ways  from  the  bridge,  and  passing  to  the 
higher  land  above  by  ascending  through  ravines.  On  the 
bill-side  immediately  above  the  bridge  was  a  strong  stone 
fence,  running  nearly  parallel  to  the  stream.  The  turns  of 
the  roadway  were  covered  by  rifle-pits  and  breastworks  made 
of  rails  and  stone.  The  slope  was  wooded  to  a  considerable 
extent. 

For  some  reason  which  has  never  been  made  public,  the 
right  division  of  the  army,  Burnside's  command,  was  divided 
at  Sharpsburg.  Hooker's  corps  was  made  the  extreme  right 
of  the  army,  and  the  other  corps,  the  Ninth,  now  under  Cox, 
with  wrhom  Burnside  went,  was  made  the  extreme  left.  It 
was  the  understanding  of  the  time  at  Burnside's  headquar 
ters  that  Hooker  had  in  some  wray  procured  this  separate 
duty,  with  a  view  to  giving  himself  more  importance.  Burn- 
side  declined  to  assume  personal  command  of  the  Ninth 

*  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  114. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  59 

Corps  when  this  separation  took  place,  intimating  that  if  he 
should  so  assume  command,  it  would  look  like  acquiescence 
on  his  part  with  the  arrangement,  and  might  tend  to  make 
it  permanent.  Thus  Burnside's  position  became  somewhat 
anomalous.  It  is  possible  that  this  division  of  his  command 
may  have  been  the  commencement  of  the  estrangement  be 
tween  him  and  McClellan,  of  the  existence  of  which  at  a 
later  date  there  is  strong  evidence. 

General  McClellan  went  to  the  left  of  his  line  himself,  to 
see  that  the  Ninth  Corps  was  properly  posted,  his  idea  being 
that  that  force  must  be  prepared  both  to  resist  an  attack  by 
the  left  bank  of  the  stream,  and  to  carry  the  bridge  at  the 
proper  time.  It  is  believed  in  some  quarters  l  that  Burnside 
was  very  slow  in  moving  to  the  position  assigned  him,  but 
McClellan  simply  says  that  he  found  it  necessary  to  make 
considerable  changes  in  his  position,  and  that  he  directed 
him  to  advance  to  a  strong  position  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  bridge,  and  to  carefully  reconnoitre  the  approaches  to 
the  bridge. 

By  this  time  McClellan's  plan  for  the  battle  seems  to 
have  taken  definite  shape  in  his  mind.  It  was  extremely 
simple,  and  ought  to  have  been  successful.  It  was  in  brief 
to  attack  the  Confederate  left  with  the  corps  of  Hooker  and 
Mansfield,  supported  by  Sumner's,  and  if  necessaiy  by  Frank 
lin's,  and,  as  soon  as  matters  looked  favorably  there,  to  move 
the  Ninth  Corps  against  their  extreme  right,  and  whenever 
either  of  these  movements  should  be  successful,  to  advance 

1  It  is  even  asserted  that  on  coming  up  to  the  line  formed  at  the  Antietam,  on 
the  15th,  Burnside  placed  his  command  behind  some  of  the  troops  already  in  po 
sition,  instead  of  moving  at  once  to  the  ground  assigned  to  him  on  the  left,  and 
that  he  stayed  there  till  a  late  hour,  in  spite  of  repeated  orders  to  move ;  that 
again  on  the  16th  he  did  not  move  to  his  assigned  position  till  after  the  receipt 
of  repeated  urgent  orders  from  McClellan.  This  is  given  for  what  it  is  worth. 
The  success  of  our  army  was  undoubtedly  greatly  lessened  by  jealousy,  distrust, 
and  general  want  of  the  entente  cordiale. 


60  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

his  centre  with  all  the  force  disposable.  With  what  Mc- 
Clellan  knew  then,  with  all  we  know  now,  nearly  twenty 
years  after  the  battle,  the  plan  seems  to  have  been  well 
suited  to  the  position  of  affairs.  There  is  no  censure  too 
strong  for  his  delay,  but,  having  determined  or  permitted 
himself  to  delay,  he  shaped  his  programme  well  enough. 

But  for  the  success  of  this  as  well  as  every  other  military 
enterprise,  two  things  were  important,  if  not  indispensable — 
first,  that  he  should  not  tell  -his  opponent  what  he  was  going 
to  do ;  and  second,  that  he  should  do  well  the  thing  he  pro 
posed  to  do.  Able  commanders  seek  to  delude  their  oppo 
nents.  They  use  all  the  craft  which  they  possess  to  induce 
the  enemy  to  believe  that  the  blow  is  to  fall  at  some  place 
other  than  the  place  which  they  have  chosen.  If  possible, 
they  lead  the  enemy  to  strengthen  the  point  where  the 
feigned  attack  is  to  be  made,  and  to  weaken  the  point  where 
the  real  attack  is  to  be  made.  Thus  Marlborough  carried  the 
line  of  the  Mehaigne  at  Eamillies.  Thus  Thomas  deluded 
Hood  at  Nashville.  Military  history  is  full  of  such  examples. 
But  McClellan  resorted  to  no  such  artifices ;  on  the  contrary, 
he  informed  Lee  that  he  proposed  to  make  his  main  attack 
with  his  right,  and  not  only  that,  but  almost  certainly  told  him 
that  he  had  greatly  strengthened  it  for  the  purpose.  With 
Maryland  so  full  of  Confederate  sympathizers  as  it  was,  we 
cannot  doubt  that  Lee  knew  by  this  time  the  general  divi 
sion  of  McClellan's  army,  and  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  he 
knew  that  he  had  departed  from  it  to  fight  this  battle.  How 
ever  this  may  have  been,  it  seems  undeniable  that  McClellan's 
dispositions  on  the  16th  were  exactly  appropriate  to  a  plan  of 
battle  which  contemplated  a  main  attack  to  be  made  by  his 
left,  strengthened  by  troops  to  be  moved  there  under  cover  of 
the  night,  and  that  they  were  extremely  inappropriate  to  the 
plan  which  he  had  formed  and  to  which  he  adhered. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  61 

On  the  high  ground  in  the  centre  of  his  position,  between 
the  Keedysville  road  on  the  left  and  Fry's  house  on  the 
right,  McClellan  placed  several  batteries  of  long  range  guns. 
Standing  among  those  guns,  one  could  look  down  upon  nearly 
the  whole  field  of  the  corning  battle,  while  the  view  was  per 
haps  more  complete  from  the  high  ground  on  the  lef fc  of  the 
road,  where  some  of  the  Fifth  Corps  batteries  were  placed. 
From  this  point  one  could  look  to  the  right  through  the 
open  space  between  the  "East  and  West  Woods."  From  the 
further  bank  of  the  stream  in  front,  the  land  rose  gently 
toward  the  ridge  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  checkered 
with  cleared  fields  and  corn-fields,  and  traversed  by  many 
fences.  The  famous  "  sunken  road  "  was  almost  in  front  of 
the  spectator  looking  west.  It  branched  off  from  the 
northern  side  of  the  Keedysville  pike,  about  half  way  from 
the  river  to  Sharpsburg,  and  ran  in  broken  lines  to  the  Ha- 
gerstown  pike,  which  it  entered  about  half-way  between 
Sharpsburg  and  the  Dunker  Church,  but  nearer  the  latter. 

The  conformation  of  the  ground  was  such  that  these  cen 
tral  Federal  batteries  could  sweep  almost  the  whole  extent 
of  the  hostile  front.  Some  of  them  had  a  direct  fire  through 
the  space  between  the  East  and  West  Woods,  and  others  of 
them  could  enfilade  the  refused  left  wing  of  the  Confeder 
ate  army. 

About  2  P.M.  McClellan  ordered  Hooker  to  cross  the  An- 
tietam  at  the  upper  bridge  and  a  ford  near  by,  to  attack  and, 
if  possible,  turn  the  enemy's  left.  He  also  ordered  Sumncr 
to  cross  Mansfield's  Twelfth  Corps  during  the  night,  and  to 
hold  the  Second  in  readiness  to  cross  early  the  next  morn 
ing.  He  seems  to  have  devoted  the  rest  of  the  day  to  ex 
aminations  of  the  ground,  finding  fords,  clearing  ap 
proaches,  and  hastening  the  arrival  of  the  ammunition  and 
supply  trains. 


62  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

It  is  an  ungrateful  task  to  be  always  finding  fault,  but  an 
important  battle  is  to  be  described,  and  the  reasons  why  its 
results  were  what  they  were,  and  only  what  they  were,  must 
be  fully  given.  The  perniciousness  of  the  mistake  which 
McClellan  made  in  delaying  his  attack  cannot  be  too  strongly 
insisted  upon.  The  reasons  which  he  gives  for  his  delay  are 
entirely  inadequate,  and  part  of  the  use  which  he  made  of 
the  time  thus  placed  at  his  command  was  positively  dam 
aging.  But  having  delayed  his  attack  till  the  enemy  was 
largely  or  completely  concentrated,  and  having  informed  him, 
by  the  language  of  acts  which  it  was  difficult  to  misinterpret, 
where  he  meant  to  strike,  it  yet  remained  possible  to  strike 
with  vigor  and  with  concert.  Instead  of  doing  so,  he  issued 
such  orders  to  his  corps  commanders  on  the  right  as  made  it 
impossible  that  they  should  act  with  concert  early  on  the 
17th,  and  improbable  that  they  would  act  with  concert  at  all. 
Under  such  orders,  the  attacks  were  far  more  likely  to  be 
successive  than  to  be  simultaneous. 

On  Tuesday  the  16th,  at  4  P.M.,  Hooker  moved.  He 
crossed  the  Antietam  without  opposition,  at  the  points  in 
dicated.  Circling  around  until  he  faced  southward,  he  pre 
sently  came  upon  the  Confederate  pickets.  His  troops  were 
deployed  at  once,  with  Meade  in  the  centre,  Doubleday  on 
his  right,  and  Kicketts  on  the  left.  The  attack,  such  as  it 
was,  fell  upon  Hood's  two  brigades,  Meade's  division  of  Fed 
erals  being  principally  engaged.  The  advantage  seems  to 
have  been  slightly  upon  the  side  of  the  Federals,  though 
each  side  claims  to  have  forced  back  the  other.  Longstreet 
says  "Hood  drove  him  back,  but  not  without  severe  loss," 
and  Hood  admits  that  he  was  relieved  by  Lawton,  with  two 
brigades,  at  the  close  of  the  fighting,  though  he  claims  that 
this  was  to  enable  his  half -starved  men  to  cook.  The  re 
lieving  brigades  were  those  of  Trimble,  which  formed  up 


THE  ANTIETAM.  63 

next  to  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  and  Lawton's,  which  took 
position  on  its  left. 

During  the  night  Mansfield  crossed  the  Twelfth  Corps, 
following  in  the  track  of  Hooker,  and  passed  what  was  left 
of  the  night  about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Hooker.  The  Federal 
and  Confederate  pickets  on  Hooker's  front  were  exceedingly 
close  together.  Sumner's  Second  Corps,  Bumside's  Ninth 
Corps,  and  all  of  Porter's  Fifth  Corps  that  had  arrived,  re 
mained  in  bivouac.  Morell's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  ar 
rived  in  the  evening  of  the  16th.1  Franklin's  Sixth  Corps 
and  Couch's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  were  still  at  a  dis 
tance,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Crampton's  Gap.  Of  the 
Confederate  army,  all  the  divisions  were  now  in  position 
excepting  those  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  which,  as  has 
been  said,  arrived  very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th, 
and  A.  P.  Hill's,  which  arrived  after  noon  of  that  day. 

As  the  Federal  and  Confederate  armies  have  now  been 
brought  face  to  face,  it  may  be  well  to  say  what  there  is  to  be 
said  about  the  strength  of  each  army.  The  Confederates 
have  always  claimed  that  they  fought  this  battle  with  such 
vastly  inferior  numbers  that  it  deserved  to  be  considered  a 
glorious  victory  for  them.  Jackson's  soldierly  report  of  this 
battle  contains  no  boastful  assertions  upon  this  point,  and 
Early,  contrary  to  his  later  habit,  is  equally  temperate,  but 
A.  P.  Hill  declares  that  three  brigades  of  his  division,  not 
numbering  over  two  thousand  men,  with  the  help  of  his 
"  splendid  batteries,"  drove  back  Burnside's  corps  of  15,000 
men.  D.  H.  Hill,  whose  writing  in  his  report  is  especially 
offensive,  declares  that  he  opened  upon  an  "  imposing  force 
of  Yankees  "  with  five  guns  at  twelve  hundred  yards  distance, 

1  Statement  of  a  colonel.  But  Porter's  Report  says,  at  about  noon.  Morell  re 
lieved  Richardson  on  the  17th,  when  he  went  into  action  with  the  other  divisions 
•f  the  Second  Corps. 


64  ANTIETAM   AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

and  routed  them  by  artillery  fire  alone,  unaided  by  musketry. 
He  also  declares  that  the  battle  was  fought  with  less  than 
thirty  thousand  men,  and  that  if  all  their  stragglers  had  been 
up,  McClellan's  army  would  have  been  completely  crushed 
or  annihilated.  It  is  but  fair  to  him  to  say  that  his  compli 
ments  are  not  paid  to  his  opponents  alone.  He  declares 
that  "  thousands  of  thieving  poltroons  "  had  kept  away  from 
the  battle  on  his  side  "  from  sheer  cowardice."  Hood  declares 
that  his  "  two  little  giant  brigades "  became  engaged  with 
"  not  less  than  two  corps  "  of  tho  Federal  army,  "  wrestled 
with  this  mighty  force,"  and  drove  it  from  its  position  and 
forced  it  to  abandon  its  guns.  McLaws  considered  the  bat 
tle  of  Sharpsburg  a  very  great  success,  regard  being  had 
to  the  "  enormous  disparity  "  between  the  opposing  forces. 
D.  R.  Jones  uses  the  same  phrase  of  enormous  disparity. 
Longstreet  says  that  the  Confederate  forces  seemed  but  a 
handful  when  compared  with  the  hosts  thrown  against  them, 
and  permits  himself  the  following  assertion  :  "  Before  it 
was  entirely  dark,  the  hundred  thousand  men  that  had  been 
threatening  our  destruction  for  twelve  hours,  had  melted 
away  into  a  few  stragglers."  l  Lee  declares  that  this  great 
battle  was  fought  by  less  than  forty  thousand  men  on  his 
side.  Finally,  Colonel  Taylor,  in  his  "  Four  Years  with 
General  Lee,"  makes  Lee's  entire  strength  at  Sharpsburg 
35,255.2 

Apropos  of  Southern  statements  as  to  the  forces  present 
on  their  side  in  the  battles  of  the  War  of  Secession,  a  New 
England  man  who  had  served  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
said:  "A  few  more  years,  a  few  more  books,  and  it  will 


1  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  86. 

2  The  Richmond  Enquirer  account,  dated  September  23,  gives  Lee  about  sixty 
thousand,  and  McClellan  from  a  hundred  to  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand.    V. 
Eeb.  Rec.,  476. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  65 

appear  that  Lee  and  Longstreet,  and  a  one-armed  orderly, 
and  a  casual  with  a  shot-gun,  fought  all  the  battles  of  the 
rebellion,  and  killed  all  the  Union  soldiers  except  those 
who  ran  away."  The  wit  of  this  speech  will  be  most  enjoyed, 
and  its  point  most  clearly  seen,  by  those  who  are  familiar 
with  Southern  military  writings,  but  it  is  no  more  than  sim 
ple  justice  to  Colonel  Taylor  to  say,  that  in  estimating  the 
force  of  the  Federal  and  Confederate  troops  present  at 
Sharpsburg,  he  has  gone  to  sources  which  he  had  a  right  to 
consider  original,  and  that  he  has  used  his  material  fairly. 
His  total  of  35,255  Confederates  was  arrived  at  by  using  the 
official  reports  of  the  Maryland  Campaign,  published  by 
authority  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  and  as  these  reports 
are  for  the  most  part  dated  within  a  very  short  time  after 
the  battle,  they  are  entitled  to  the  credit  which  attaches  to 
evidence  which  is  substantially  contemporaneous.  He  next 
asserts  that  McClellan  states  in  his  official  report  that  ho 
had  in  action,  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam,  87,164  of  all 
arms,  and  this  is  true,  though  it  was  undoubtedly  a  careless 
utterance  of  McClellan.  His  comments,  however,  are  unfair, 
and  this  must  be  put  in  a  clear  light.  He  says,  for  instance : 
"As  a  wall  of  adamant  the  14,000  received  the  shock  of  the 
40,000,  and  the  latter,  staggered  by  the  blow,  reeled  and  re 
coiled  in  great  disorder."  This  he  says  in  speaking  of  the 
fighting  on  the  Confederate  lef  c,  and  then  he  says  :  "  The 
disproportion  in  the  centre  and  on  our  right  was  as  great  as, 
or  even  more  decided  than,  011  our  left."  And  in  summing 
up  he  says:  "These  35,000  Confederates  were  the  very 
flower  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  who,  with  indom 
itable  courage  and  inflexible  tenacity,  wrestled  for  the 
mastery  in  the  ratio  of  one  to  three  of  their  adversaries." 
This  is  calculated  to  give  not  only  an  erroneous  but  a  false 
impression.  The  battle  was  very  creditable  to  the  Confed- 


66  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBUEG. 

erates,  but  in  no  just  sense,  nor  in  any  sense  at  all,  could 
they  be  said  to  wrestle  for  the  mastery  in  the  ratio  of  one  to 
three.  So  far  is  this  from  being  true,  that  it  is  highly 
probable  that  all  the  wrestling  that  was  done  was  done  by 
nearly  equal  forces,  and  reasonably  certain  that  there  was 
not  an  hour,  nor  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  when  Lee's  lines  were 
simultaneously  pressed  by  15,000  Union  soldiers.  If  this 
be  shown,  it  will  detract  from  the  credit  of  the  Federal  com 
mander,  but  it  will  dispose  of  the  extravagant  claims  made 
for  the  Confederate  soldiers.1 

Colonel  Taylor  says  explicitly  :  "  Every  man  was  engaged. 
We  had  no  reserve."  The  first  thing  to  be  done,  therefore, 
is  to  test  the  accuracy  of  his  estimate  of  the  Confederate 
strength.  Without  undertaking  to  reject  the  statements  of 
other  Confederate  commanders  as  to  their  strength,  we  can 
not  accept  D.  K.  Jones's  statement,  which  Colonel  Taylor 
adopts,  that  "  on  that  morning  (September  17th),  my  entire 
command  of  six  brigades  comprised  only  two  thousand  four 
hundred  and  thirty  men."  There  were  twenty-seven  regi 
ments  in  these  brigades,  they  had  been  on  the  ground  since 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  so  their  stragglers  had  had 
plenty  of  time  to  come  up,  and  were  sure  to  have  done  so, 
as  the  Federal  army  had  been  following  them  all  the  way 
from  Turner's  Gap.  General  Jones  himself  says  that  two  of 
his  regiments,  the  Second  and  Twentieth  Georgia,  numbered 
403  men.  Therefore  he  must  be  understood  as  asserting 
that  twenty-five  regiments  numbered  only  2,027,  or  about 
81  men  each.  The  summer  had  been  a  hard  one  for  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  iu  is  true,  but  the  Confederate 


1  One  docs  not  look  for  humor  in  a  stern  story  like  this,  but  the  Charleston 
Courier  account  of  the  battle  contains  the  following  statement:  "  They  fought 
until  they  were  cut  to  pieces,  and  then  retreated  only  because  they  had  fired  their 
last  round."  V.  Reb.  Roc.,  474. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  67 

brigades,  which  General  Johnston  said  averaged  2,500  before 
Seven  Pines,  could  not  have  been  so  nearly  annihilated  as 
this  would  indicate,  especially  when  it  is  remembered  that 
a  very  large  part  of  the  men  who  were  wounded  at  Seven 
Pines  on  the  31st  of  May  and  1st  of  June,  and  in  the  Seven 
Days  at  the  end  of  June,  had  had  time  to  recover  and  to  re 
join  their  colors.  Moreover,  the  other  Confederate  brigades, 
thirty-three  in  number,  present  on  the  17th  September, 
averaged  over  700  men,  without  counting  their  artillery. 
We  conclude,  therefore,  that  D.  R.  Jones's  estimate  of  his 
force  is  at  least  2,000  too  low. 

It  is  further  to  be  remarked  that  it  is  highly  probable  that 
Colonel  Taylor's  figures  do  not  include  all  the  officers  pres 
ent.  Thus  D.  H.  Hill  speaks  of  having,  by  reason  of  strag 
gling,  but  3,000  infantry.  As  officers  are  not  wont  to  strag' 
gle,  infantry  probably  means  muskets.  Rodes  speaks  of 
having  less  than  eight  hundred  effective  men.  This  lan 
guage,  again,  is  more  appropriate  to  musket-bearers  than  to 
a  total  of  officers  and  men.  McLaws  reports  the  number  of 
men  in  his  four  brigades,  and  of  the  officers  in  three,  but 
say .$  that  the  number  of  officers  in  Cobb's  brigade  was  not 
known.  D.  R.  Jones  says  that  his  entire  command  of  six 
brigades  comprised  only  2,430  men.  McLaws's  report  shows 
that  in  three  of  his  brigades  the  officers  numbered  over 
eleven  per  cent,  of  the  men.  If  we  suppose  that  not  all, 
but  half  of  the  Confederate  officers,  in  reporting  their  totals, 
gave  the  number  of  muskets  only,  and  add  eleven  per  cent, 
for  officers  to  half  their  infantry  as  given  by  Colonel  Taylor, 
it  will  add  1,500  to  their  total  present  in  the  battle.  More 
over,  the  report  of  the  officer  commanding  the  Hampton 
Legion  of  Wofford's  brigade,  at  the  Antietam,  shows  that 
he  does  not  include  in  his  total  present,  ''skirmishers, 
scouts,  cooks,  and  men  barefooted,  unfit  for  duty."  If  skir- 


68  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

rnishers  and  scouts  alone  were  habitually  omitted,  this  would 
make  a  great  difference,  as  the  Confederates  were  accus 
tomed  to  use  skirmishers  very  freely. 

Finally,  many  of  the  reports  contain  such  phrases  as  so 
many  "at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,"  "on  the  morning  of 
the  17th,"  "  when  we  went  into  action."  It  is  probable  that 
this  means  that  their  numbers  were  increased  during  the 
action  by  the  arrival  of  gallant  men  who  had  been  delayed 
by  fatigue  or  by  being  footsore,  but  who  got  into  the  fight 
as  soon  as  they  could.  This  would  be  likely  to  be  the  caso 
with  many  of  the  commands,  but  particularly  with  those 
which  arrived  on  the  very  day  of  the  battle.  Taking  all  these 
things  into  consideration,  it  seems  to  be  fair  to  conclude 
that  Lee's  total  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietarn  was  not  less  than 
forty  thousand  men,  which  is  certainly  not  a  large  total  for 
thirty-nine  brigades  of  infantry  and  8,000  cavalry  and  artil 
lery.  It  gives  a  little  over  eight  hundred  officers  and  men 
to  an  infantry  brigade,  and  the  infantry  brigades  seem  to 
have  averaged  something  over  four  regiments  to  a  brigade. 
One  or  two  had  only  three,  but  many  had  five.  Those  who 
believe  that  the  Confederate  officers  habitually  and  design 
edly  understated  their  forces,  will  think  40,000  a  low  esti 
mate,1  but  it  is  offered  for  the  acceptance  of  those  who  are 
contented  to  accept  the  result  of  the  best  evidence  accessi 
ble,  with  entire  confidence  that  it  is  not  too  high.2 

1  Estimate  of  chief  clerk  in  office  of  th;?  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  made  from  recollection,  in  1805:  Sharpsburg,  total  effective  of  all 
arms,  41,500.    Taylor's  Four  Years,  etc.,  p.  158.     Field  Return  of  Army  of  North- 

.ern  Virginia,  September  22,  18G2.  Present  for  duty,  30,187.  Ib.,  p.  165.  This 
return  seems  to  include  no  cavalry  or  artillery,  and  of  course  excluded  the  loss  at 
Sharpsburg,  and  included  sunh  stragglers  as  mny  have  come  up. 

2  At  about  10  A.M.  of  the  17th,  the  writer,  having  just  received  a  severe  wound 
from  a  canister  shot  fired  by  one  of  Stuart's  batteries,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Col 
onel  (now  Senator)  Ransom,  then  commanding  the  Thirty-fifth  North  Carolina 
Regiment  of  R.  Ransom's  brigade.     As  he  was  tukeu  to  the  Confederate  rear,  he 


THE  ANTIETAM.  69 

The  next  thing  to  be  considered  is  the  number  of  the 
Federal  troops  which  the  Confederates  encountered.  It 
must  be  carefully  borne  in  mind  that  this  is  the  precise 
question.  No  matter  how  many  men  McClellan  had,  we  are 
to  determine  how  many  men  he  used.  The  credit  of  Lee 
may  be  increased,  and  the  credit  of  McClellan  diminished, 
by  proving  that  there  were  on  either  side  of  the  Antietam, 
on  September  17th,  two  Federal  soldiers  to  one  Confederate, 
but  the  question  under  discussion  is  different.  It  is  wThether 
"  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  ....  wrestled  for 
the  mastery  in  the  ratio  of  one  to  three."  Fortunately  for 
the  patience  of  those  who  are  intolerant  of  statistics,  the 
answer  is  simple  and  the  proof  is  easy.  The  answer  is 
that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  did  nothing  of  the  kind. 
It  wrestled  gallantly,  but  it  did  not  wrestle  in  the  ratio  of 
one  to  three,  or  anything  like  it.  The  proof  is  taken  from 
McClellan's  Eeport. *  He  says : 

Our  own  forces  at  the  battle  of  Antietam  were  as  follows : 

Men. 

First      Corps 14,856 

Second       4t     18,813 

Fifth          "     (one  division  not  arrived) 12,930 

Sixth         "     12,300 

Ninth        "     13,819 

Twelfth     "     10,120 

Cavalry  Division 4,3:20 


Total  in  action ., 87,164 


saw  a  small  body  of  men  marching  by  the  flank,  and  carrying  four  battle  flags. 
He  inquired  whether  it  was  the  custom  in  the  Confederate  army  for  a  regiment 
to  carry  more  than  one  set  of  colors,  and  was  informed  that  the  body  of  men  was 
a  brigade.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  most  of  the  sharp  fighting  on  that 
part  of  the  ground  had  then  been  done,  and  that  the  brigade  he  then  saw  may 
well  have  been  two  or  three  times  as  large  three  or  four  hours  before. 
1  P.  214.  Washington  :  Government  Printing  Office.  1861. 


70  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

This  assertion  of  McClellan's  was  most  unfortunate  in 
form,  and  most  untrue  in  spirit.  It  only  meant  that  the 
morning  reports  of  the  several  corps  showed  so  many  men 
present  for  duty,  and  left  entirely  untouched  the  vital  ques 
tions  : 

First. — How  many  officers  and  men  were  with  the  colors 
that  day? 

Second. — How  many  officers  and  men  really  engaged  the 
enemy  ? 

It  is  probable  that  no  one  who  did  not  actually  see  service 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  1862  can  be  brought  to 
believe  how  enormous  was  the  difference  between  the 
"present  for  duty"  of  the  morning  report  and  the  number 
of  actual  effectives,  whether  for  drill,  dress  parade,  or  bat 
tle.  The  conduct  of  military  affairs  was  incredibly  extrava 
gant  in  the  matter  of  the  use  of  men  who  were  supposed  to 
be  bearing  arms.  The  details  for  the  Quartermaster  and 
Commissary  departments  were  lavish  in  the  extreme,  and  also 
for  field  hospital  duty,  and  what  with  the  added  details  for 
headquarter  guards  and  orderlies,  for  wagoners  and  com 
pany  cooks,  for  officers'  servants  and  pioneers,  the  number 
of  men  which  a  colonel  could  take  into  action  was  vastly 
below  what  his  morning  report  would  indicate.  Different 
officers  will  estimate  the  proportion  differently,  no  doubt, 
and  probably  the  varying  character  of  superior  officers 
made  the  evil  greater  or  less  in  the  various  commands ; 
but  in  well-disciplined  regiments  in  good  divisions,  com 
manders  were  fortunate  who  could  take  into  action  four- 
fifths  of  the  "present  for  duty"  of  the  morning  report.  It 
is  probable  that  this  statement  will  be  considered  quite 
within  the  truth  by  most  officers  who  served  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  1862.  It  was  discreditable.  It  showed 
poor  discipline  to  some  extent,  and  poor  management  to  a 


THE  ANTIETAM.  71 

greater,  but  the  fact  existed.  If  one-fifth  and  no  more  bo 
taken  from  McClellan's  total,  it  will  reduce  it  below  seventy 
thousand  men.  But  as  it  is  not  probable  that  assertions  of 
this  character  will  be  accepted  by  the  Southern  men  who 
are  supporters  of  the  one-to-three  thesis,  it  is  sufficient  to 
make  them  and  to  leave  them.  They  will  be  accepted  by 
those  who  know. 

Colonel  Taylor  says :  "  Every  man  was  engaged.  We  had 
no  reserve."  Again  he  says  :  "With  consummate  skill  were 
they  manoeuvred  and  shifted  from  point  to  point,  as  differ 
ent  parts  of  the  line  of  battle  were  in  turn  assailed  with 
greatest  impetuosity."  1  This  is  all  true,  and  there  is  but 
one  word  for  the  Confederate  losses — they  were  awful.  But 
the  question  for  discussion  is,  how  many  Federal  soldiers  were 
engaged  against  them?  No  matter  how  many  men  were 
looking  on,  nor  even  how  many  were  in  the  fringes  of  the 
engagement,  the  question  is  how  many  Federals  were  wrest 
ling  with  these  thirty-five  or  forty  thousand  Confederates  ? 

The  Federal  troops  which  really  fought  at  the  battle  of 
the  Antietam  were  the  First,  Second,  Ninth,  and  Twelfth 
Corps.  This  is  proved  by  the  statement  of  losses.  These 
corps  lost  over  twenty  per  cent,  of  their  numbers,  as  given 
by  McClellan,  while  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  and  the  cav 
alry  division,  numbering,  according  to  McClellan,  29,550  men, 
lost  only  596,  or  almost  precisely  two  per  cent.;  in  other  words, 
they  were  hardly  used  at  all.  If  due  allowance  be  made  for 
the  almost  total  absence  from  the  actual  fighting  of  nearly  all 
these  commands,  and  any  allowance  be  made  for  the  notori 
ous  difference  in  McClellan's  army  between  morning  report 
totals  and  effectives  in  action,  it  will  appear  that  the  Federals 
engaged  cannot  have  outnumbered  the  Confederates  in  more 

1  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,  pp.  09,  73. 


72  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

than  the  proportion  of  three  to  two,  and  probably  did  not 
outnumber  them  so  much.  This  is  by  no  means  large  odds, 
when  the  attacking  force  has  to  deal  with  a  force  occupying 
a  strong  defensive  position,  as  the  Confederates  confessedly 
did,  and  one  where  the  ground  was  admirably  adapted  for 
the  safe  and  secret  and  rapid  transfer  of  their  troops  from  a 
less  pressed  to  a  more  pressed  portion  of  their  line.  What 
ever  difference  there  may  be  about  details,  however  severe 
may  be  the  condemnation  of  McClellan  for  not  fighting  his 
army  more  thoroughly  as  well  as  more  simultaneously,  no 
candid  person  can  examine  the  figures  without  coming  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  one-to-three  theory  is  purely  vision 
ary,  and  that  the  disproportion  fell  below  two  to  three.1 

The  night  before  the  battle  passed  quietly,  except  for 
some  alarms  on  Hooker's  front,  and  most  of  the  men  in  both 
armies  probably  got  a  good  sleep.  The  morning  broke 
gray  and  misty,  but  the  mists  disappeared  early,  and  the 
weather  for  the  rest  of  the  day  was  perfect.  As  a  great  bat 
tle  cannot  be  described  in  detail  except  at  immense  length, 
and  even  then  must  be  described  imperfectly,  there  seems 
to  be  no  better  plan  than  to  state  the  parts  into  which  a  par 
ticular  action  is  divisible,  and  then  to  give  reasonable  de 
velopment  to  the  description  of  those  parts.  Of  the  battle 
of  the  Antietam  ifc  may  be  said  that  it  began  with  the  attack 
made  by  the  First  Corps  under  Hooker  upon  the  Confeder 
ate  left.  The  next  stage  was  the  advance  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  under  Mansfield  to  the  support  of  Hooker.  The  next 
was  the  advance  of  the  Second  Corps,  under  Sumner,  and 
this  again  must  be  divided  into  three  parts,  as  Sumner's 
three  divisions  went  into  action  successively,  both  in  time 
and  place.  The  division  that  first  became  engaged  was  fur 
thest  to  the  Federal  right,  the  next  was  to  the  left,  and  the 
last  still  farther  to  the  left.  The  fourth  stage  was  the  slight 

i  See  note  p.*2lO. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  73 

use  of  a  few  troops  from  the  centre,  mostly  Franklin's,  made 
as  late  as  one  o'clock  or  thereabouts,  and  the  fifth  and  last 
was  the  fighting  of  the  Ninth  Corps  on  the  extreme  right  of 
the  Confederate  position. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  McClellan  had  virtually  told 
Lee  where  he  proposed  to  attack.  That  the  notice  given  by 
him  was  comprehended  by  the  enemy  is  shown  by  the  lan 
guage  of  Colonel  Wofford,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Hood's 
division,  who  says  :  "  It  was  now  evident  that  the  enemy  had 
effected  a  crossing  entirely  to  our  left,  and  that  he  would 
make  the  attack  on  that  wing  early  in  the  morning,  moving 
his  forces  over  and  placing  them  in  position  during  the 
night."  Colonel  Wofford's  judgment  was  correct  in  the  main, 
although  he  gave  McClellan  credit  in  advance  for  carrying  out 
his  own  plan  more  thoroughly  than  he  did.1  At  a  very  early 
hour  the  skirmishers  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Meade's 
division  of  the  First  Corps,  advanced,  and  their  advance 
was  followed  by  that  of  the  whole  corps — Meade's  division 
in  the  centre,  Doubleday's  on  its  right,  and  Eicketts's  on  its 
left.  The  advance  was  impetuous,  and  the  Confederate  re 
sistance  was  obstinate.  The  Federal  advance  was  aided  by 
the  fire  of  the  batteries  posted  by  McClellan  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Antietani,  which,  Jackson  says,  enfiladed  his  line,  and 
proved  severe  and  damaging,  and  it  received  some  assistance 
from  the  batteries  of  the  corps,  but  they  do  not  seem  to 
have  been  used  with  remarkable  skill  or  dash.  Some  of 
the  guns  were  very  roughly  handled  by  Confederates  who 
crept  around  through  the  corn  and  behind  rises  of  ground, 
and  the  chief  of  artillery  of  one  of  the  Federal  divisions 


1  See  also  the  Report  of  Colonel  S.  D.  Lee,  commanding  artillery  battalion, 
who  says  :  "  It  was  now  certain  that  the  enemy  would  attack  us  in  force  on  our 
left  at  daylight,  compelling  us  to  change  our  line,  and  give  him  an  opportunity  t« 
use  his  long  range  batteries  across  the  Antietain,  enfilading  our  new  position." 

V.— 4 


I 
74  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

seems  to  have  wanted  judgment  as  well  as  audacity.  The 
batteries  most  mentioned  were  I,  of  the  First  New  York  Ar« 
tillery  ;  B,  of  the  Fourth  Artillery  ;  D,  of  the  Rhode  Island 
Artillery  ;  a  battery  of  the  First  New  Hampshire  Artillery  ; 
F,  of  the  First  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Independent  Penn 
sylvania  Battery.  It  was  upon  Jackson  that  the  blow  fell, 
and  he  met  it  with  his  front  line,  composed  of  the  brigades 
of  Jones  and  Winder,  of  the  Stonewall  division,  and  those  of 
Lawton  and  Trimble,  and  probably  Hays,  of  Swell's  division. 
He  had  also  not  less  than  six  batteries  in  action,  and  more  or 
less  aid  from  Stuart,  whose  command  consisted  of  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery,1  from  S.  D.  Lee's  guns,  from  Hood  and  D.  H. 
Hill,  and  from  "  a  brigade  of  fresh  troops,"  which  Early  says 
came  up  to  the  support  of  Lawton  and  Hays,  but  soon  fell 
back.  It  is  impossible  to  tell  what  number  of  troops  on  each 
side  was  engaged  in  this  opening  struggle,  the  more  so  that 
Jackson  himself  says  that  "fresh  troops  from  time  to  time  re 
lieved  the  enemy's  ranks,"  which  seems  to  indicate  that  Hook 
er's  men  were  not  all  used  at  once.  As  far  as  can  be  made  out 
from  the  various  reports,  which  are  singularly  wanting  on  both 
sides  in  clear  topographical  indications,  the  fighting  began 
not  far  from  the  western  edge  of  the  East  Woods,  and  resulted, 
after  very  severe  losses  on  both  sides,  in  the  gradual  with 
drawal  of  the  Confederates  to  the  West  Woods.  The  stoiy 
might  be  told  with  far  greater  fulness  and  completeness,  but 
for  the  defective  character  of  the  reports  in  the  particular  to 
which  allusion  has  been  made.  They  are  very  numerous,  and 
many  of  them  are  not  short,  but  they  hardly  ever  tell  to  what 
point  of  the  compass  the  faces  of  the  troops  were  turned, 


l  Colonel  Hoffman,  commanding  the  second  brigade  of  the  first  division  of  the 
First  Corps,  saw  a  large  force  of  cavalry  evidently  attempting  to  attack  in  flunk. 
Lieutenant  Woodruff,  commanding  Battery  I,  First  Artillery,  also  speaks  of  the 
enemy's  using  cavalry  near  his  position. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  75 

and  the  indefinite  article  is  constantly  used.  A  lane,  a  road, 
a  fence,  a  wall,  a  house,  a  corn-field,  a  piece  of  woods,  such 
are  the  constantly  recurring  phrases  which  constantly  baffle 
and  disappoint  the  curious  student. 

To  go  a  little  more  into  detail.  Hooker's  command  seems 
to  have  passed  the  night  of  the  IGth  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
north  of  Sharpsburg,  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  point 
on  the  Hagerstown  pike  where  the  Williamsport  road 
branches  off.  A  signal  station  was  established  that  night, 
close  to  the  Hagerstown  pike,  and  near  Hooker's  headquar 
ters.  Hooker's  forces  seern  to  have  been  vastly  less  than 
the  14,85G  accorded  to  him  in  McClellan's  Eeport.  He  had 
ten  brigades.  Bicketts,  who  commanded  his  Second  Divi 
sion,  comprising  three  of  them,  says  he  took  into  action 
3,158  men.  Phelps,  who  commanded  the  First  Brigade  of 
the  First  Division,  says  he  had  425  men.  If  we  take  the 
average  strength  of  these  four  brigades,  and  compute  the 
strength  of  the  corps  from  i!;,  Hooker's  infantry  will  fall 
below  nine  thousand  men.  Doubleday's  division  was  formed 
astride  of  the  turnpike;  Gibbon's  brigade,  supported  by 
Patrick's,  advanced  along  the  west  side  of  the  Hagerstown 
pike,  while  Hoffman's  right  just  reached  the  pike.  Gib 
bon's  front  line  contained  the  Second  and  Sixth  Wisconsin ; 
but  the  resistance  he  encountered  as  he  advanced  caused 
him  to  bring  forward  around  his  right  the  Seventh  Wis 
consin  and  the  Nineteenth  Indiana,  which  obtained  to  some 
extent  a  flank  fire  along  his  front.  Patrick  supported  him, 
and  Phelps  formed  up  on  his  left,  and  the  line  was  con 
tinued  to  the  left  by  Hoffman.  Meade  formed  Hooker's 
centre,  and  Bicketts  his  left.  The  Federal  troops  gained 
some  ground,  and  as  they  advanced  Hooker's  line  seems  to 
have  gradually  advanced  its  left,  until  it  came  nearer  to  be 
ing  parallel  to  the  pike  than  at  right  angles  to  it.  His  right 


76  ANTIETAM  AND   FREDERICKSBURG. 

gained  ground  but  little,  but  gradually  his  left  and  centre 
drove  the  Confederates  into  the  West  Woods,  of  which 
Ricketts  even  claims  to  have  gained  the  edge.  Ricketts  ad 
vanced  with  his  Third  brigade  in  the  centre,  and  the  First 
and  Second  in  echelon  to  the  rear,  to  the  right  and  left 
respectively.  The  advance  had  been  stubbornly  contested 
throughout,  but  when  the  command  approached  the  West 
Woods,  a  more  terrible  struggle  took  place.  The  Confeder 
ates  appear  to  have  then  brought  into  action  the  whole  of 
Jackson's  two  divisions,  with  the  exception  of  Early's  bri 
gade,  and  to  have  used  Stuart's  cavalry  and  artillery  both. 
The  two  lines  almost  tore  each  other  to  pieces.  Ricketts 
lost  a  third  of  his  division,  having  153  killed  and  898 
wounded.  Phelps's  brigade  lost  about  forty-four  per  cent. 
Gibbon's  brigade  lost  380  men.  On  the  Confederate  side 
the  carnage  was  even  more  awful.  General  Starke,  com 
manding  the  Stonewall  division,  and  Colonel  Douglas,  com 
manding  Lawton's  brigade,  were  killed.  General  Lawton, 
commanding  Swell's  division,  and  Colonel  Walker,  command 
ing  a  brigade,  were  severely  wounded.  More  than  half  of  the 
brigades  of  Lawton  and  Hays  were  either  killed  or  wounded, 
and  more  than  a  third  of  Trimble's,  and  all  the  regimental 
commanders  in  these  brigades,  except  two,  were  killed  or 
wounded.1  No  better  evidence  of  the  exhaustion  of  both 
sides  need  be  given  than  Jackson's  own  statement :  "  Jack 
son's  division  and  the  brigades  of  Lawton,  Hays,  and  Trim 
ble  retired  to  the  rear,  and  Hood,  of  Longstreet's  command, 
again  took  the  position  from  which  he  had  before  been 
relieved." !  Hood  had  but  two  brigades,  and  Jackson's  two 
divisions  and  Hooker's  three  must  have  been  nearly  anni 
hilated,  if  Hood  could  take  the  place  of  the  one  and  make 

i  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  10a  a  Ibid. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  77 

head  against  the  other.  If  Jackson's  and  Hooker's  had  been 
the  only  forces  present,  there  would  have  been  a  lull  from 
necessity,  and  probably  an  end  of  the  battle,  but  D.  H.  Hill, 
with  five  brigades,  was  close  to  Jackson's  right,  McLaws, 
with  four,  was  coming  up  in  his  rear,  and  several  other  Con 
federate  brigades  were  near  or  hastening  toward  his  part 
of  the  field,  while  Mansfield's  Twelfth  Corps  was  near 
Hooker.  If  troops  moved  as  chessmen  are  moved,  if  corps 
and  divisions  went  into  action  as  complete  wholes,  the  story 
of  a  battle  could  be  told  with  more  precision,  but  it  is  not 
only  not  so,  but  as  far  as  possible  from  being  so.  The  com 
binations  of  a  battle-field  are  almost  as  varying,  and  far  less 
distinctly  visible  and  separable  than  those  of  a  kaleidoscope. 
A  supporting  force  sends  forward  a  regiment,  or  a  battery,  or 
a  brigade,  or  a  division,  or  sends  detachments  to  various 
points  to  fill  gaps  and  strengthen  parts  of  the  line  which  are 
especially  threatened,  or  it  advances  as  a  whole,  but  even  in 
the  last  case  the  accidents  of  the  ground,  the  superior  disci 
pline  or  enthusiasm  or  handling  of  the  men,  or  the  more  or 
less  controlling  fire  of  the  enemy,  make  the  advance  of  a 
large  body  irregular.  General  Patrick,  commanding  the 
Third  Brigade  of  the  First  Division  of  Hooker's  corps,  says 
that  the  Twelfth  Corps  came  in  in  succession  and  at  consid 
erable  intervals.  It  is  probably  not  known,  and  not  knowa- 
ble,  at  what  hour  or  at  what  point  the  First  Corps  received 
its  first  assistance  from  the  Twelfth. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  Mansfield's  Twelfth  Corps 
passed  the  latter  part  of  the  night  of  the  16th  September 
about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Hooker.  There  are  various  state 
ments  as  to  the  time  when  Mansfield  was  ordered  forward, 
but  it  is  quite  clear  that  his  whole  corps  was  engaged  by,  if 
not  before,  7.30  A.M.  Before  he  reached  Hooker's  position 
he  received  information  that  Hooker's  reserves  were,  all  en- 


78  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

gaged,  and  that  he  was  hard  pressed.  He  himself  was  killed 
during  the  deployment  of  his  corps,  while  examining  the 
ground  in  front.  General  Williams  succeeded  to  the  com 
mand.  There  were  in  the  Twelfth  Corps  two  divisions.  Of 
the  first,  Crawford  now  took  command.  He  had  the  bri 
gades  of  Knipe  and  Gordon.  Greene  commanded  the  sec 
ond  division,  composed  of  the  brigades  of  Tyndale,  Stain- 
rook,  and  Goodrich.  The  reports  of  the  Twelfth  Corps 
division  and  brigade  commanders  make  it  plain  that  it 
went  into  action  with  only  about  seven  thousand  men,  in 
stead  of  tho  ten  thousand  odd  with  which  McClellan  credits 
it.1  Very  early  in  the  advance,  one  brigade  of  Greene's 
division  was  sent  to  the  right  to  Doubleday.  In  the  deploy 
ment,  the  First  Division  was  to  the  right  and  front,  with 
Knipe's  brigade  on  the  right  and  Gordon's  on  the  left. 
Greene's  division  was  on  the  left  of  the  First  Division.  The 
attack  was  opened  by  Knapp's,  Cothran's,  and  Hampton's 
batteries.  The  divisions  moved  together,  but  the  First  Di 
vision  was  somewhat  earlier  in  getting  into  action.  As  the 
First  Division  advanced,  it  found  Hooker's  men  badly  cut  up 
and  slowly  retreating  from  the  historic  cornfield,  which  lay 
between  the  pike  and  the  East  Woods,  and  the  Confederates 
occupying  almost  all  the  cornfield.  There  are  good  grounds 
for  believing  that  the  Twelfth  Corps  received  no  assistance, 


1  Greene  says  his  three  brigades  numbered  2,504.  Gordon  had  2,210.  Williams 
Bays  his  loss  of  1,744  was  twenty-five  per  cent,  of  his  total.  This  would  leave 
2,2G2  for  Crawford's  brigade,  commanded  by  Knipe.  The  regiments  of  this 
corps  varied  much  in  size,  as  appears  from  the  Reports.  The  Sixty-sixth  Ohio 
took  in  120  ;  Third  Maryland,  148 ;  One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Pennsylvania,  Six 
tieth  New  York,  and  Seventy-eighth  New  York,  each  less  than  250 ;  Third  Dela 
ware,  126  ;  while  the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  took  in  443  rank  and  file.  Knipe's 
and  Gordon's  brigades  were  made  very  large  by  the  presence  in  them  of  five  per 
fectly  new  regiments,  the  Thirteenth  New  Jersey,  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh 
New  York,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fourth,  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
fifth,  and  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-eighth  Pennsylvania. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  79 

or  next  to  none,  from  the  First  Corps.  The  admirable  troops 
of  Gordon's  brigade,  which  contained  the  Second  Massachu 
setts,  Third  Wisconsin,  and  Twenty-seventh  Indiana,  suc 
ceeded  in  clearing  the  cornfield,  apparently  with  some  aid 
from  Greene's  men,  who  would  seem  to  have  obtained  an 
enfilading  fire  along  their  front.  Knipe's  brigade  was  less 
successful,  but  Greene  did  well  on  the  left.  He  seems  to 
have  found  some  of  the  enemy  so  far  to  the  east  as  the  East 
Woods,  though  this  is  not  easy  to  believe,  but  whatever  force 
he  encountered  he  succeeded  in  driving  back,  and  entering 
open  ground,  partly  covered  with  corn,  and  moving  to  his 
left  and  front,  he  overcame  all  opposition  and  entered  the 
woods  near  the  Dunker  Church  at  about  eight  o'clock. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  fighting  of  this  second  stage  of 
the  battle  was  between  the  Federal  Twelfth  Corps  and  the 
remains  of  the  First  Corps,  and  Hood's  Confederate  division 
and  such  other  troops  as  could  then  be  got  together  on  their 
left  and  right.  The  Federal  pressure  had  caused  all  of  the 
Confederate  line  which  was  to  the  left  of  D.  H.  Hill  to  fight 
nearly  or  quite  at  right  angles  to  his  line.  It  may  have  been 
at  this  time  and  place  that  the  disparity  of  numbers  was 
greatest.  The  usual  difficulty  of  determining  just  what 
troops  are  engaged  at  a  particular  time  is  illustrated  by 
the  contradiction  between  Hood  and  Jackson.  Jackson,  as 
has  been  stated,  speaks  of  Hood's  going  to  the  front  when 
his  own  division  and  the  three  brigades  of  Ewell's  division 
retired  to  the  rear.  Hood,  on  the  other  hand,  says :  !  "At 
six  o'clock  I  received  notice  from  Lawton  that  he  would  re 
quire  all  the  assistance  I  could  give  him.  A  few  minutes 
after,  a  member  of  his  staff  reported  to  me  that  he  was 
wounded,  and  wished  me  to  come  forward  as  soon  as  possi- 

i  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  212. 


80  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ble.  Being  in  readiness,  I  at  once  marched  out  on  the  field, 
in  line  of  battle,  and  soon  became  engaged  with  an  immense 
force  of  the  enemy,  consisting  of  not  less  than  two  corps  of 
their  army."  If  Hood  is  right — and  he  is  corroborated  by 
his  brigade  commander,  Wofford,  who  says :  "  Our  brigade 
was  moved  forward  at  sunrise  to  the  support  of  General 
Lawton," — Jackson  met  Hooker  with  over  two  thousand 
men  more  than  he  has  been  credited  with,  and  the  fif 
teen  brigades  of  the  First  and  Twelfth  Corps  encountered 
the  divisions  of  Jackson,  Ewell,1  and  Hood,  with  such  aid  as 
Stuart  from  their  left  and  D.  H.  Hill2  from  their  right 
could  give  them.  It  also  appears  that  G.  T.  Anderson's 
brigade  of  D.  B.  Jones's  division  was  there.  3 

The  general  result  of  the  second  stage  of  the  battle  seems 
to  have  been  that  by  nine  A.M.  the  Federals  held  parts  of  a 
line  extending  from  the  woods  near  Miller's  house  on  their 
right  to  the  Dunker  Church  on  the  left,  though  Knipe  on 
the  extreme  right  does  not  seem  to  have  had  a  firm  hold  on 
his  ground.  The  Federals  had  gained  a  good  deal  of  ground, 
but  they  were  about  fought  out,  and  if  they  could  hold  what 
they  had  gained,  it  was  probably  the  utmost  they  could  do, 
especially  as  their  leaders  had  failed  to  see  and  appreciate 
the  importance  of  seizing  and  holding  a  height  to  the  west 
of  where  Hooker's  right  had  rested,  the  possession  of  which 
would  have  enabled  them  to  take  in  flank  and  partly  in  re 
verse  the  whole  of  the  wooded  and  rocky  ground  which  they 
had  thus  far  failed  to  carry,  and  which  was  to  remain  in  pos 
session  of  the  enemy  till  the  close  of  the  battle. 

We  have  said  that  the  Twelfth  Corps  held  parts  of  a  line 
extending  from  the  neighborhood  of  Miller's  house  to  the 
Dunker  Church.  The  statement  requires  development.  The 

1  Early's  brigade  was  absent,  but  another  unnamed  brigade  was  present. . 

2  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  115.  3  Ibid.,  318. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  81 

truth  is  that  the  position  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  when  Sum- 
ner  began  to  arrive  was  very  peculiar.  The  First  Division 
was  established  well  to  the  north  of  the  Dunker  Church, 
perhaps  half  a  mile  from  it,  and  it,  or  much  of  it,  was  facing 
south.  The  Second  Division  had  effected  a  lodgment  in  the 
woods  about  the  Dunker  Church,  and  it,  or  much  of  it,  was 
facing  north  or  northwest.  There  were  practically  no  troops 
at  all  on  the  ground  over  which  Sedgwick  presently  advanced 
with  the  front  of  a  deployed  brigade,  or  still  further  to  the 
north,  for  the  statements  are  positive  that  there  was  a  stiff 
post  and  rail  fence  on  both  sides  of  the  pike  in  the  part  of 
the  field  where  Crawford's  men  were,  and  it  is  certain  that 
all  or  most  of  Sedgwick's  men  encountered  no  such  obsta 
cle.  At  somewhere  about  nine  o'clock,  the  Twelfth  Corps 
seems  to  have  about  lost  all  aggressive  force.  Knipc's 
brigade  on  the  extreme  right  was  retiring,  part  of  Gordon's 
brigade  was  preparing  to  advance,  and  Greene's  division, 
with  a  mere  handful  left  from  Kicketts's,  was  hanging  on  to 
the  corner  of  the  woods  about  the  Dunker  Church,  and  pour 
ing  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  right  and  rear  of  Hood's  right 
brigade.  At  this  time  the  advance  of  the  Second  Corps  was 
announced. 

On  September  17th,  Sumner's  Corps,  the  Second,  com 
prised  three  divisions.  The  First,  under  Kichardson,  con 
tained  three  brigades,  commanded  by  Meagher,  Caldwell, 
and  J.  R.  Brooke  ;  the  Second,  under  Sedgwick,  contained 
three  brigades,  commanded  by  Gorman,  Howard,  and  Dana  ; 
the  Third,  under  French,  contained  three  brigades,  com 
manded  by  Kimball,  Morris,  and  Weber.  The  corps  con 
tained  some  poor  but  many  very  excellent  soldiers.  The  hard 
fate  which  its  Second  Division  met  in  this  battle  may  be  an 
excuse  for  stating  that  up  to  May  10,  18G4,  the  Second  Corps 
never  lost  a  gun  nor  a  color,  and  that  it  was  then  and  had 


82  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

long  been  the  only  corps  in  the  army  which  could  make  that 
proud  claim.  General  Sumner  received  orders  on  the  16th 
to  hold  his  corps  in  readiness  to  march  an  hour  before  day 
light,  to  support  Hooker,  but  his  orders  to  march  were  not 
received  till  7.20  A.  M.  on  the  17th.  He  put  Sedgwick  in 
motion  immediately,  and  French  followed  Sedgwick,  but 
Kichardson  was  not  moved  till  an  hour  later,  when  the  Gen 
eral  commanding  ordered  him  to  move  in  the  same  direc 
tion.  It  is  probable  that  this  delay  was  caused  by  the  need 
of  having  Morell  occupy  the  ground  which  he  was  about  to 
vacate.  It  would  seem  that  this  simple  operation  should 
have  been  attended  to  earlier,  but,  whatever  the  cause  may 
have  been,  Eichardson  was  delayed.  The  marching  and 
fighting  of  the  three  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  were  so 
distinct  that  they  must  be  described  separately. 

The  three  brigades  of  Sedgwick's  division  crossed  the 
stream  at  the  same  ford  at  which  the  First  and  Twelfth 
Corps  had  crossed  it,  and,  moving  by  the  flank  in  three  col 
umns,  entered  the  East  Woods.  These  were  a  grove  of  noble 
trees,  almost  entirely  clear  of  underbrush.  There  were 
sorry  sights  to  be  seen  in  them,  but  the  worst  sight  of  all 
was  the  liberal  supply  of  unwounded  men  helping  wounded 
men  to  the  rear.  When  good  Samaritans  so  abound,  it  is  a 
strong  indication  that  the  discipline  of  the  troops  in  front  is 
not  good,  and  that  the  battle  is  not  going  so  as  to  encourage 
the  half-hearted.  The  brigades  entered  these  woods  from 
the  south,  and  marched  northward,  and  then  were  faced  to 
the  left,  and  thus  formed  a  column  of  three  deployed  bri 
gades,  Gorman's  leading,  next  Dana's,  next  Burns's,  com 
manded  that  day  by  Howard.  The  column  was  now  facing 
west,  parallel  to  the  Hagerstown  pike,  and  separated  from  it 
by  the  famous  cornfield.  The  corn  was  very  high  and  very 
strong.  There  was  a  short  halt  while  a  fence  which  formed 


THE  ANTIETAM.  83 

the  eastern  boundary  of  the  cornfield  was  thrown  down. 
Then  the  column  marched  straight  forward,  through  the 
corn,  and  into  the  open  ground  beyond.  Few  troops  were 
in  sight.  So  far  as  the  men  of  Sedgwick's  division  could  see, 
they  were  to  have  the  fighting  all  to  themselves.  As  they 
advanced,  Crawford's  division  retired,  so  Crawford  says,  but 
Knipe,  of  his  division,  claims  to  have  advanced  with  Sedg- 
wick.  If  he  did,  Sedgwick's  men  did  not  know  it.  Acci 
dents  of  the  ground  hid  from  their  view  such  of  Greene's 
and  Ricketts's  men  as  remained  at  the  left  front.  So  far  as 
they  could  see,  their  advance,  at  least  from  the  pike,  was 
made  all  alone.  Williams  himself  reports  that  soon  after 
news  of  Sumner's  advance  was  received,  the  firing  on  both 
sides  wholly  ceased. 

General  Sumner  rode  forward  gallantly  with  his  advance. 
He  found  Hooker  wounded,  and  his  corps  not  only  repulsed, 
but  gone, — routed,  and  dispersed.  He  says  himself : l  "  I  saw 
nothing  of  his  corps  at  all  as  I  was  advancing  with  my  com 
mand  on  the  field.  There  were  some  troops  lying  down  on 
the  left,  which  I  took  to  belong  to  Mansfield's  command. 
.  .  .  General  Hooker's  corps  wras  dispersed.  There  is 
no  question  about  that.  I  sent  one  of  my  own  staff  officers 
to  find  where  they  were,  and  General  Eicketts,  the  only 
officer  we  could  find,  said  that  he  could  not  raise  three  hun 
dred  men  of  the  corps." 

Sedgwick's  division  emerged  from  the  cornfield  into  the 
open  ground  near  the  pike,  and  swept  steadily  forward. 
There  were  no  fences  at  the  part  of  the  pike  where  they 
crossed  it  to  delay  them.  Their  march  was  rapid,  and  nearly 
directly  west.  There  was  very  little  distance  between  the 
lines.  The  recollections  of  the  survivors  range  from  fifty 

»  C.  C.  W.,  i.,  368. 


84  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

feet  to  thirty  paces.  Not  a  regiment  was  in  column — there 
was  absolutely  no  preparation  for  facing  to  the  right  or  left 
in  case  either  of  their  exposed  flanks  should  be  attacked. 
The  total  disregard  of  all  ordinary  military  precaution 
in  their  swift  and  solitary  advance  was  so  manifest  that  it 
was  observed  and  criticised  as  the  devoted  band  moved  on. 
A  single  regiment  in  column  on  both  flanks  of  the  rear  bri 
gade  might  have  been  worth  hundreds  of  men  a  few  minutes 
later,  might  indeed  have  changed  the  results  of  the  battle. 
As  the  column  pressed  forward  into  the  space  between  the 
pike  and  the  West  Woods,  its  left  just  reaching  the  Dunker 
Church,  it  came  under  sharp  artillery  fire,  and  met  with 
some  loss.  The  lines  were  so  near  together  that  the  projec 
tile  that  went  over  the  heads  of  the  first  line  was  likely  to 
find  its  billet  in  the  second  or  third.  The  swift  shot  were 
plainly  seen  as  they  came  flying  toward  us.  They  came  from 
Stuart's  unseen  guns,  planted  beyond  the  woods  on  or  near 
the  high  ground  which  the  Federal  troops  ought  to  have  oc 
cupied.  As  the  division  entered  the  West  Woods,  it  passed 
out  of  fire,  and  it  moved  safely  through  them  to  their  western 
edge.  There  there  was  a  fence,  and,  bordering  it  on  the 
outside,  a  common  wood  road.  The  brigade  of  Gorman,  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  Dana,  climbed  this  fence,  and  then  their 
lines  were  halted.  For  some  cause  unknown,  the  left  of  the 
two  brigades  almost  touched,  while  the  line  of  Gorman's 
brigade  diverged  from  the  line  of  Dana's,  so  that  there  was  a 
long  interval  from  the  right  of  the  former  to  the  right  of  the 
latter.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  third  line  even  entered 
the  West  Woods.  If  they  did,  they  did  not  stay  there  long. 
There  was  a  little,  and  only  a  little,  musketry  firing  while  the 
troops  were  in  this  position,  but  the  Confederate  guns  to 
the  right  front  of  Sedgwick's  position  were  active  and  effi 
cient,  firing  now  canister. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  85 

As  Sedgwick's  troops  have  now  been  led  to  the  furthest 
point  of  their  advance,  which  was  also  the  furthest  point 
reached  by  any  Federal  troops  in  the  right  attack,  it  is  time 
to  say  a  word  about  the  ground,  and  about  the  Confederate 
troops  which  were  collected  to  oppose  them,  but  it  is  to  be 
remembered  that  Sedgwick  was  quite  alone.  No  Federal 
troops  were  on  his  right  or  left,  nor  near  his  rear.  Hooker's 
corps  was  non-existent.  The  Twelfth  Corps  was  all  of  it 
weary,  and  much  of  it  withdrawn  to  a  considerable  distance, 
and  French  had  not  come  up. 

There  runs  through  the  West  Woods  to  the  Dunker 
Church  a  little  wood  road,  which  leaves  the  open  ground  to 
the  west  of  the  West  Woods,  not  far  from  where  Sedgwick's 
left  rested.  In  these  woods,  and  especially  to  the  left  of  the 
ground  over  which  Sedgwick  passed,  there  were  many  in 
equalities  of  surface,  and  many  ledges  of  limestone  which 
cropped  out,  and  thus  excellent  cover  was  afforded  to  troops 
on  the  left  of  the  Federals,  and  such  of  their  opponents  as 
might  be  in  the  little  road  were  so  concealed  that  nothing 
but  their  bayonets  revealed  their  presence.  WThy  French 
was  so  far  from  Sedgwick  is  not  explained,  but,  as  will  pres 
ently  appear,  he  first  engaged  the  enemy  in  the  -vicinity  of 
Bullet's  house,  about  half  a  mile  east  of  the  Dunker  Church, 
and  considerably  more  than  that  from  the  ground  where 
Sedgwick's  three  brigades  were  halted. 

It  seems  to  be  certain  that  Law's  and  WofFord's  brigades 
had  been  "almost  annihilated,"  as  WofFord  says,  by  their 
fight  with  the  First  and  Twelfth  Corps,  and  that  they  were 
withdrawn  by  General  Hood  just  before  Sedgwick  reached 
them.  This  must  have  been  at  or  shortly  after  nine  o'clock, 
and  accounts,  in  part  at  least,  for  the  cessation  of  firing 
which  Williams  observed,  and  the  comparative  silence  which 
accompanied  Sedgwick's  advance.  General  Jackson  was  the 


86  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ranking  officer  on  the  Confederate  left.  He  had  sent  word 
to  Early,  who  had  been  sent  with  his  brigade  to  support 
Stuart,  to  return  and  take  command  of  Swell's  division,  in 
place  of  Lawton,  disabled.  Early  returned,  with  all  of  his 
brigade  but  one  very  small  regiment,  at  just  this  time,  and 
found  near  the  Dunker  Church  a  portion  of  Jackson's  divi 
sion,  which  formed  on  his  left.  Presently  Confederate  rein 
forcements  began  to  arrive  from  their  right,  as  "another 
heavy  column  of  Federal  troops  (i.e.,  Sedgwick's  division) 
was  seen  moving  across  the  plateau  on  his  left  flank."  The 
reinforcements  consisted  of  Semmes's,  Anderson's,  Barks- 
dale's,  Armistead's,  Kershaw's,  Manning's,  Cobb's,  and  Han 
som's  brigades,  some  of  which  had  been  hurried  across  from 
the  Confederate  right. 

Early's  line  was  formed  perpendicular  to  the  Hagerstown 
road,  and  his  troops  were  concealed  and  protected  by  the 
rise  in  the  ground.  It  is  altogether  probable  that  many  of 
them  were  in  the  little  wood  road  which  has  been  mentioned. 
The  approach  of  a  Federal  battery,  which  might,  if  Early's 
line  had  been  seen,  have  raked  his  flank  and  rear,  caused 
him  to  throw  back  his  right  flank  quietly  under  cover  of  the 
woods,  so  as  not  to  have  his  rear  exposed  in  the  event  of  his 
presence  being  discovered,  and  threatening  movements  of 
the  Federal  infantry  caused  him  to  move  his  own  brigade 
by  the  right  flank,  while  he  directed  Colonel  Grigsby,  who 
commanded  what  was  left  of  Jackson's  division,  to  move  his 
command  back  in  line  so  as  to  present  front  to  the  enemy. 
The  reinforcements,  as  they  came  up,  formed  line  facing  the 
west  face  of  the  West  Woods,  and  filled  the  wood  road  on 
Sedgwick's  lef  fc.  Sumner  had  marched  his  second  division 
into  an  ambush.  There  were  some  ten  Confederate  brigades 
on  his  front  and  flank  and  working  rapidly  round  the  rear 
of  his  three  brigades.  The  result  was  not  doubtful.  His 


THE  ANTIETAM.  87 

fine  division,  containing  such  sterling  regiments  as  the  First 
Minnesota  and  the  Fifteenth,  Nineteenth,  and  Twentieth 
Massachusetts,  was  at  the  mercy  of  their  enemy.  The  fire 
came  upon  them  from  front  and  flank  and  presently  from 
the  rear.  Change  of  front  was  impossible.  The  only  fire 
delivered  by  the  Twentieth  Massachusetts  regiment  of  the 
second  line  was  delivered  faced  by  the  rear  rank.  In  less 
time  than  it  takes  to  tell  it,  the  ground  was  strewn  with  the 
bodies  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  while  the  unwounded  were 
moving  off  rapidly  to  the  north.  So  completely  did  the 
enemy  circle  round  them  that  a  strong  body  of  Confederates 
marched  straight  up  northward  through  the  open  fields  be 
tween  the  West  Woods  and  the  Hagerstown  pike.  Nearly 
two  thousand  men  were  disabled  in  a  moment. 

The  third  line,  the  Philadelphia  brigade,  so  called,  was 
the  first  to  go.  Sumner  tried  to  face  it  about  preparatory 
to  a  change  of  front,  but,  under  the  fire  from  its  left,  it 
moved  off  in  a  body  to  the  right  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to  re 
strain  it.  The  first  and  second  lines  held  on  a  little  longer, 
but  their  left  soon  crumbled  away,  and  then  the  whole  of 
the  two  brigades  moved  off  to  their  right,  where  a  new  line 
was  presently  formed.  Federal  batteries  proved  very  ser 
viceable  in  checking  the  Confederates  at  this  juncture. 
The  new  line  was  formed,  facing  south,  at  no  very  great 
distance  northward  of  the  point  where  the  right  of  the  lines 
had  rested.  As  disaster  fell  upon  Sedgwick,  Williams  was 
ordered  by  Sumner  to  send  forward  all  of  his  command  im 
mediately  available.  He  sent  forward  Gordon.  Gordon 
advanced,  but  it  was  too  late.  The  troops  for  whom  his 
support  was  intended  were  no  longer  in  position.  Ho 
reached  the  fence  by  the  turnpike,  and  suffered  heavy  loss, 
but  was  forced  to  retire  after  a  stubborn  contest.  Greene,  at 
about  the  same  time,  reformed  his  line,  refused  his  right, 


88  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

sent  forward  skirmishers,  and  sent  to  his  corps  commander 
for  aid.  None  coming,  he  eventually  retired  from  or  was 
forced  out  of  his  advanced  position,  though  this  did  not 
happen  till  much  later  in  the  day. 

Thus,  by  about  ten  o'clock,  the  successes  of  the  morning 
were  lost.  Our  lines  had  been  withdrawn  almost  altogether 
to  the  east  of  the  turnpike,  though  we  had  more  or  less  of  a 
lodgment  near  the  Dunker  Church,  and  some  of  Sedgwick's 
men  were  west  of  the  turnpike  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Miller  house,  or  nearly  as  far  north.  Two  corps  and  one 
division  of  the  Federal  army  had  been  so  roughly  handled 
that  but  small  account  could  be  made  of  them  in  estimating 
the  available  force  remaining.  Most  of  these  troops  had 
damaged  the  enemy  in  good  proportion  to  the  damage  they 
had  themselves  received,  but  there  was  no  such  consolation 
for  Sedgwick's  men.  Their  cruel  losses  were  entirely  un- 
compensated.  There  is  110  reason  for  believing  that  they 
had  inflicted  any  appreciable  injury  upon  the  enemy.  The 
Fifteenth  and  the  Twentieth  Massachusetts  had  been  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  but  their  fate  at  Sharpsburg  was  harder  yet. 

"What  General  Sumner  may  have  expected  or  even  hoped 
to  accomplish  by  his  rash  advance,  it  is  difficult  to  conjec 
ture.  It  is  impossible  that  he  can  have  been  ignorant  that 
French  had  not  come  up  upon  his  left.  His  old  cavalry 
training  may  possibly  have  planted  in  his  mind  some  notions 
as  to  charging  and  cutting  one's  way  out,  and  he  may  have 
had  a  shadowy  idea  that  he  could  with  infantry  as  well  not 
only  charge  but  cut  his  way  out,  should  they  chance  to  be 
surrounded.  Indeed  there  is  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  given  February  18, 
1863,  a  very  significant  statement :  "  My  intention  at  the 
time  was,"  he  says,  "  to  have  proceeded  entirely  on  by  their 
left  and  moved  down,  bringing  them  right  in  front  of  Burn- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  89 

side,  Franklin,  and  Porter."  With  French  properly  closed 
up,  so  as  to  take  care  of  his  flank  and  rear,  and  Sedgwick 
properly  formed,  such  an  enterprise  might  have  «Lad  some 
chance  of  success  against  an  army  weakened  by  the  long  and 
hard  struggle  against  Hooker  and  Williams,  but  with  French 
at  a  distance,  and  Sedgwick  formed  as  he  was,  the  attempt 
was  madness.  There  is  nothing  more  helpless  than  a  col 
umn  of  long  lines  with  short  intervals  between  them,  if  they 
have  anything  to  do  other  than  to  press  straight  forward  with 
no  thought  of  anything  but  the  enemy  before  them.  They 
cannot  take  care  of  their  own  flanks,  and  if  they  are  attacked 
there,  disaster  is  certain. 

The  jubilant  assertions  of  the  Confederate  officers  in  re 
gard  to  their  repulse  of  Sedgwick's  division  are  not  more 
than  the  facts  warrant.  They  did  "  drive  the  enemy  before 
them  in  magnificent  style,"  they  did  "  sweep  the  woods  with 
perfect  ease,"  they  did  "  inflict  great  loss  on  the  enemy," 
they  did  drive  them  "  not  only  through  the  woods,  but 
(some  of  them,  at  any  rate)  over  a  field  in  front  of  the  woods 
and  over  two  high  fences  beyond,  and  into  another  body  of 
woods  (i.e.,  the  East  Woods)  over  half  a  mile  distant  from  the 
commencement  of  the  fight."  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  it  was  almost  as  easy  to  drive  Sedgwick's  men,  in  the 
unfortunate  position  in  which  they  found  themselves,  as  to 
drive  sheep,  and  that,  besides  the  immense  advantages  which 
Suniner's  blunder  gave  the  Confederates,  they  probably  con 
siderably  outnumbered  the  forces  they  encountered.  As  well 
as  can  be  made  out  from  the  Confederate  reports,  they  must 
have  used  nearly  ten  thousand  men  against  Sedgwick's  divi 
sion  and  what  was  left  of  the  First  and  Twelfth  Corps,  in  this 
vigorous  onset.1  Sedgwick's  division  may  be  said,  from  the 

1  Early's  brigade,  about  l.OUO  ;  remains  of  Jackson's  division,  under  Grigsby 
and  Stafford,  (JUO  (conjectured) ;  McLuws's  four  brigades,  Bemmes,  Barksdale, 


90  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

best  information  accessible,  to  have  gone  into  action  not 
over  five  thousand  strong,  and  it  was  absolutely  alone  from 
the  time  it  crossed  the  Hagerstown  pike,  and  the  troops 
that  helped  to  check  the  pursuing  Confederates  were  not 
numerous,  and  were  not  engaged  till  the  repulse  was  com 
plete. 

General  McClellan  reports  the  loss  of  Sedgwick's  division 
as  355  killed,  1,579  wounded,  and  321  missing,  a  ghastly  total 
of  2,255.  The  Twelfth  Corps  lost  1,744,  Greene's  division 
losing  651,  Gordon's  brigade  649,  and  Crawford's  (commanded 
by  Knipe),  427 ;  being  one  in  four  of  all  of  the  division  who 
were  present.  The  Third  Wisconsin,  of  Gordon's  brigade, 
lost  very  nearly  sixty  per  cent. 

When  the  Confederates  fell  back,  after  their  sharp  pursuit 
of  the  retreating  Federals,  for  want  of  immediate  support, 
their  line  was  formed  in  the  West  Woods,  with  the  brigades 
of  Eansom,  Armistead,  Early,  Barksdale,  Kershaw,  and 
Cobb,  with  Semmes  in  reserve.  Bead's  and  Carleton's  bat 
teries  were  with  them,  but  they  were  so  cut  up  by  the  Fed 
eral  artillery  that  they  were  ordered  back.  The  fire  of  the 
Federal  artillery  upon  this  part  of  the  Confederate  line  was 
terrific,  but  almost  harmless,  because  of  the  perfect  shelter 
which  the  ground  afforded  to  infantry.  The  Confederate 
force  so  assembled  was  judged  to  be  too  weak  to  warrant  a 
second  advance. 

Under  orders  from  McClellan,  Franklin,  commanding  as 
before  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Couch's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  at  half -past  five  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  put 
Couch  in  motion  for  Maryland  Heights,  and  moved  with  his 


Kershaw,  Cobb,  3,000;  Anderson's  brigade,  600;  Walker's  two  brigades,  3,200; 
co-operation  from  Stuart  and  D.  H.  Hill  (conjectured),  1,600.  This  leaves  out 
Armistead,  whose  brigade  was  one  of  six  numbering  "  some  "  three  or  four  thou 
sand. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  91 

own  corps  from  Pleasant  Valley  toward  the  battle-field. 
Smith's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  led  the  column,  fol 
lowed  by  Slocuni  with  the  other  division.  Smith  came  near 
the  field  before  10  A.M.,  and  at  first  took  position  in  a  wood 
on  the  left  of  the  stone  bridge,  but  was  presently  ordered  to 
the  right,  to  the  support  01  Sumner,  who  was  then  fiercely 
engaged  and  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy,  that  is  to  say,  at 
about  the  time  when  Sedgwick's  division  gave  way.  The 
leading  brigade,  under  Hancock,  moved  rapidly  forward  to 
support  two  of  Sumner's  batteries,  which  the  Confederate 
skirmishers  had  approached  closely.  He  formed  a  line  of 
guns  and  infantry,  with  Cowan's  battery  of  three-inch  guns 
on  the  right,  Frank's  twelve-pounders  in  the  centre,  and 
Cothran's  rifled  guns  on  the  left.  He  placed  the  Forty- 
ninth  Pennsylvania  on  the  right  of  Cowan,  the  Forty-third 
New  York  and  a  part  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Thirty-seventh 
Pennsylvania  between  Cowan  and  Frank,  and  the  Sixth 
Maine  and  the  Fifth  Wisconsin  between  Frank  and  Cothran. 
His  line  was  parallel  to  the  line  of  woods  in  front,  and  within 
canister  distance.  The  enemy  placed  two  batteries  opposite 
him  and  in  front  of  the  woods,  and  opened  fire.  He  ob 
tained  from  Sumner  the  Twentieth  Massachusetts  of  Sedg 
wick's  division  to  place  in  the  woods  on  the  extreme  right  of 
his  line.  With  the  fire  of  his  guns  and  his  infantry  he 
drove  away  the  threatening  skirmishers,  and  silenced  the 
Confederate  batteries.  He  took  possession  of  some  build 
ings  and  fences  in  his  front,  and  there  his  brigade  remained. 
His  loss  was  very  slight.  The  enemy  in  his  front  was  con 
trolled  in  some  measure  by  the  presence  and  action  on  his 
left  of  the  Third  (Irwin's)  Brigade  of  Smith's  division. 

Brooks,  with  Smith's  Second  Brigade,  went  first  to  Sum 
ner's  right,  but  was  presently  sent  to  French,  and  his  ex 
periences  may  better  be  told  in  connection  with  those  of 


92  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDSRICKSBURG. 

French's  division.  Irwin's  Brigade,  the  Third  of  Smith's  di 
vision,  was  placed  by  Smith  on  the  left  of  Hancock,  and  it 
was  on  his  left  that  Brooks  came  up  when  he  was  sent  to 
French.  The  clearness  of  the  narrative  will  be  promoted  by 
telling  first  the  stoiy  of  French's  advance,  and  then  that  of 
what  Brooks  and  Irwin  did  when  they  came  up  to  his  aid. 

General  French  commanded  the  Third  Division  of  the 
Second  Corps,  composed  of  the  brigades  of  Kiroball,  Morris, 
and  "Weber.  Morris's  troops  were  new  men,  and  under  fire  for 
the  first  time.  The  division  followed  Sedgwick's  division 
across  the  ford,  immediately  in  its  rear.  It  marched  about 
a  mile  from  the  ford,  then  faced  to  the  left,  and  moved  in 
three  lines  toward  the  enemy,  "Weber's  brigade  in  front, 
next  Morris's,  and  then  Kimball's.  It  advanced  steadily 
under  a  fire  of  artillery,  drove  in  the  Confederate  skirmish 
ers,  and  encountered  their  infantry  in  some  force  at  the 
group  of  houses  on  Kullet's  farm.  From  their  position 
about  these  houses,  Weber's  brigade  gallantly  drove  the 
enemy.  Kullet's  house  is  about  half  a  mile  from  the  Dun- 
ker  Church,  and  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  troops 
which  marched  toward  that  house  from  the  ford  would  take 
quite  a  different  route  from  that  followed  by  troops  which 
marched  from  the  same  ford  through  the  East  Woods  to  the 
West  WToods.  Why  French  so  separated  himself  from  Sedg- 
wick  does  not  appear.  Whether  it  was  by  accident  or  under 
orders,  it  proved  a  most  unfortunate  divergence. 

D.  H.  Hill's  five  Confederate  brigades  formed  the  left 
centre  of  the  Confederate  line,  between  (and  in  front  of) 
Sharpsburg  on  the  south  and  the  Dunker  Church  on  the 
north.  They  had  not  been  mere  spectators  of  the  morning 
fighting,  as  so  many  of  the  Southern  reports  would  lead  one 
to  suppose.  On  the  contrary,  Eipley's  brigade,  the  left 
brigade  of  D.  H.  Hill's  command,  was  ordered  at  about  8 


THE  ANTIETAM.  93 

A.M.  to  close  in  to  its  left  and  advance.  It  became  engaged 
almost  as  far  north  as  the  southern  edge  of  the  East  Woods, 
between  that  line  and  the  burning  buildings.  Colquitt's 
brigade  went  into  the  same  fight  on  the  right  of  Bipley. 
He  says  this  was  at  about  7  A.M.,  and  that  Ripley  was  en 
gaged  when  his  brigade  entered  the  fight.  He  probably 
puts  the  hour  too  early.  Garland's  brigade,  under  McBae, 
formed  on  the  right  of  Colquitt,  but  its  severe  losses  at 
South  Mountain,  where  its  commander  was  killed,  had  de 
moralized  it,  and  one  of  its  captains  in  the  midst  of  the 
fighting  cried  out,  "They  are  flanking  us,"  and  thereupon 
a  general  panic  ensued  and  the  troojjs  left  the  field  in  con 
fusion.  At  about  9  A.M.,  Bodes  was  ordered  to  move  to  the 
left  and  front,  to  assist  Kipley,  Colquitt,  and  McKae.  He 
says  that  he  had  hardly  begun  the  movement  before  he  saw 
that  Colquitt  and  McRae  had  met  with  a  reverse,  and  that 
the  best  thing  he  could  do,  for  them  and  for  all  parties, 
would  be  to  form  a  line  in  "rear  of  them  and  endeavor  to 
rally  them  before  attacking  or  being  attacked.  General 
Hill  entertained  the  same  view,  and  a  line  was  formed  in  the 
hollow  of  an  old  and  narrow  road,  just  beyond  an  orchard, 
and  east  of  the  Hagerstown  road.  Some  of  Colquitt's  men 
formed  onRodes's  left,  bringing  the  line  to  the  road,1  and  G. 
B.  Anderson's  brigade  formed  on  his  right.  The  men  busily 
improved  their  position  by  piling  rails  along  their  front. 
While  they  wrere  so  employed,  the  Federals  deployed  in 
their  front  "in  three  beautiful  lines,"  Bodes  says,  "all 
vastly  outstretching  ours,  and  commenced  to  advance 
steadily,"  "  with  all  the  precision  of  a  parade  day,"  Hill  says. 

1  Roiles  says  that  "  a  small  portion"  of  Colquitt's  brigade  occupied  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  yards.  Every  military  man  knows  that  this  would  require  up 
ward  of  four  hundred  men  in  the  usual  two  rank  formation.  If  "  a  small  por 
tion  "  of  a  brigade  exceeded  four  hundred  after  a  severe  repulse,  the  whole  bri 
gade  before  the  repulse  was  probably  more  than  one-fifth  of  three  thousand. 


94  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Both  Kodes  and  Hill  lament  their  almost  total  want  of  artil 
lery,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  occur  to  Hill  to  explain  where 
the  eighty-six  guns  had  gone  which  he  says  he  had  on  the 
morning  of  the  17th. 

These  troops,  this  small  force  in  the  sunken  road,  were 
some  of  the  troops  which  resisted  the  advance  of  French, 
when  he  moved  forward  in  the  three  beautiful  lines  which 
Bodes  and  Hill  saw.  It  is  probable  that  they  were  not 
alone  there  ;  indeed  D.  H.  Hill  himself  speaks  of  a  certain 
Walker's  brigade  as  uniting  with  Ripley's,  and  forming  near 
the  old  road  and  to  his  left  of  it.  It  is  not  easy  to  identify 
the  brigade  spoken  of  as  Walker's.  It  certainly  was  not 
one  of  Hill's,  and  may  possibly  have  been  the  brigade  of 
Walker's  division  formerly  commanded  by  himself,  and  this 
day  first  by  Manning  and  then  by  Hall.1  The  too  com 
mon  practice  of  Confederate  generals  of  declaring  that  tho 
fighting  done  by  many  was  done  by  few,  makes  much  pa 
tient  study  necessary  to  determine  what  troops  they  used  at 
a  particular  time  and  place. 

While  Weber,  of  French's  division  (the  Third)  of  the 
Second  Corps,  was  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemy  near  Kul- 
let's  house,  French  received  an  order  from  Suinner  to  push 
on  with  vigor  to  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  attack  on 
the  right.  A  part  of  the  troops  which  had  turned  Sedg- 
wick's  left  moved  forward,  and  brought  a  strong  pressure  to 
bear  on  Weber.  Under  the  orders  received  by  French  from 
Sumner,  Kimball's  brigade  hastened  to  the  front,  leaving 
Morris's  new  troops  to  act  as  a  reserve,  and  formed  up  on 
the  left  of  Weber.  There  is  no  doubt  that  French's  division 
did  some  very  severe  fighting,  and  met  and  repulsed  succes- 

1  Joseph  Walker  commanded  Jenkins's  brigade  of  D.  R.  Jones's  division  :'n  the 
Antiotam  fight.  He  was  with  Kemper  and  Drayton,  south  of  the  town,  in  the 
afternoon.  He  may  possibly  have  been  with  D.  H.  Hill  for  a  while. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  95 

sive  attacks  on  its  left,  front,  and  right,  but  it  did  not  suc 
ceed  in  driving  the  Confederates  out  of  the  old  road.  The 
smartest  push  made  by  the  Confederates  was  on  Kirnball's 
left,  and  Kiniball's  losses  were  very  heavy,  amounting  to 
about  seven  hundred  out  of  about  fourteen  hundred  in  three 
of  his  regiments,  the  Eighth  Ohio,  One  Hundred  and  Thirty- 
second  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Fourteenth  Indiana.  The 
three  new  regiments  of  Morris'  brigade  lost  529.  The 
whole  division  had  1,614  men  killed  and  wounded,  besides 
203  missing.  Their  gallant  fighting  did  not  accomplish 
much,  as  Federal  and  Confederate  accounts  agree  that  they 
finally  took  position  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill  which  looked 
down  upon  the  old  road.  The  Confederates  had  great  ad 
vantages  of  position,  as  the  old  road  and  the  rails  piled  be 
fore  it  placed  them,  as  it  were,  in  a  fort,  and  they  got  some 
guns  into  a  place  from  which  they  were  able  to  partially 
enfilade  the  Federal  line. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  when  Smith's  division  (the 
Second)  of  the  Sixth  Corps  came  on  the  ground,  the  Third 
Brigade,  under  Irwin,  was  sent  to  the  left  of  Hancock's 
brigade  of  the  same  corps.  This  was  at  about  10  A.M. 
Brooks,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade  of  the  same  divi 
sion,  was  sent  to  the  left  of  Irwin  and  to  the  right  of  French's 
division.  Brooks  found  the  enemy  before  him  checked, 
and  seems  to  have  had  little  to  do,  but  Irwin  was  instantly 
ordered  into  action  by  his  division  commander.  Irwin  had 
some  success  at  first,  but  presently  two  of  his  regiments,  the 
Thirty-third  and  Seventy-seventh  New  York,  got  into  serious 
trouble,  and  were  obliged  to  face  by  the  rear  rank,  and  suf 
fered  heavily  before  they  got  out.  The  advance  of  this  bri 
gade  carried  them  forward  so  far  that  they  came  abreast  of 
the  Dunker  Church.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  if  Irwin's  ad 
vance  had  been  supported,  a  decisive  advantage  might  have 


96  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

been  gained.  That  it  was  not,  appears  to  have  been  owing 
to  the  fact  that  its  division  commander,  Smith,  as  soon  as 
Irwin's  brigade  was  established  in  its  position,  found,  on 
sending  back  for  Brooks's  brigade  to  act  as  a  support,  that 
it  had  been,  "without  his  knowledge  or  consent,  ordered 
away."  General  Smith  complains  bitterly  and  with  great 
force  of  this  proceeding,  saying  :  "  It  is  not  the  first  or  the 
second  time  during  a  battle  that  my  command  has  been  dis 
persed  by  orders  from  an  officer  superior  in  rank  to  the  gen 
eral  commanding  this  corps,  and  I  must  assert  that  I  have 
never  known  any  good  to  arise  from  such  a  method  of  fight 
ing  a  battle,  and  think  the  contrary  rule  should  be  adopted, 
of  keeping  commands  intact."  It  is  probable  that  it  was  at 
about  the  time  at  which  French's  men  and  some  of  Smith's 
were  withdrawn  from  the  points  of  their  extreme  advance, 
and  formed  in  the  rear  of  crests,  that  the  remnants  of  Rick- 
ett's  division  of  the  First  Corps  and  of  Greene's  division  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps  gave  up  their  hold  of  the  woods  about 
the  Dunker  Church,  if,  indeed,  they  were  there  so  long. 
Ricketts  almost  certainly  retired  earlier,  but  Greene's  posi 
tive  assertion  that  he  did  not  retire  till  he  was  driven  away, 
at  about  1.30  P.M.,  is  entitled  to  respect,  though  it  is  a  hard 
saying. 

The  usual  difficulty  of  determining  with  what  troops  the 
Confederates  met  a  given  attack  is  rather  greater  than  usual 
in  the  matter  of  French's  attack.  There  is  very  little  definite 
information  accessible.  Something  has  already  been  said  on 
this  point.  D.  H.  Hill  writes  as  if  there  were  only  a  few  men 
in  and  near  the  old  road  when  French  advanced,  but  he  says, 
and  seems  to  say  that  it  was  before  his  fight  ended,  that  R. 
H.  Anderson  reported  to  him  "with  some  three  or  four  thou 
sand  men  as  reinforcements  to  his  command."  As  language 
is  commonly  used,  this  would  imply  that  his  own  command 


THE  ANTIETAM.  97 

was  considerably  in  excess  of  three  or  four  thousand,  and  yet 
he  declares  that  in  the  morning  he  h#d  but  three  thousand  in 
fantry,  and  that  in  the  early  fighting  three  of  his  five  brigades 
were  broken  and  much  demoralized.  However  this  may  be, 
Anderson's  men  were  directed  to  form  behind  Hill's,  and 
must  have  been  under  fire,  whether  engaged  or  not,  for  An 
derson  himself  was  presently  wounded,  and  the  command 
devolved  on  Pryor,  one  of  his  brigade  commanders. 

One  of  the  most  puzzling  questions  which  the  battle  of  the 
Antietam  presents  to  the  student  is  the  question  just  where 
the  divisions  of  French  and  Richardson  fought.  General 
McClellan  and  those  who  have  followed  him  write  so  as  to 
produce  the  impression  that  the  "sunken  road"  where 
French  found  the  enemy  posted,  and  the  cornfield  in  rear  of 
it,  where,  he  says,  were  also  strong  bodies  of  the  enemy, 
were  the  same  sunken  road  and  cornfield  where  Richardson's 
division  found  the  enemy  posted.  This  is  not  the  case, 
though  it  has  a  basis  of  truth.  Richardson  confessedly  went 
in  on  the  left  of  French,  and  it  was  French's  left  brigade 
which  encountered  the  enemy  in  the  sunken  road.  Richard 
son's  men  first  met  the  enemy  to  the  (Federal)  left  of  Rul- 
let's  house,  and  it  is  stated  that  there  was  soon  a  space, 
near  Rullet's  house,  between  French's  left  and  Richardson's 
right.  Richardson's  advance  got  possession  of  Piper's  house, 
which  is  two-thirds  of  a  mile  south  and  west  from  Rullet's, 
and  two-thirds  of  a  mile  south  and  east  of  the  Dunker 
Church,  and  very  near  the  Hagerstown  road.  It  is  in  the 
angle  between  that  road  and  an  old  sunken  road  which 
runs  northwesterly  to  the  former  from  the  Keedysville  pike, 
entering  the  latter  about  half  way  between  Sharpsburg  and 
the  river,  and  McClellan  says  that  the  sunken  road  where 
French  fought  runs  in  a  northwesterly  direction.  The  map 
shows  that  the  ground  between  the  East  Woods  on  the  north, 
V.— 5 


98  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

the  Hagerstown  pike  on  the  west,  and  the  Keedysville  pike 
on  the  south,  measuring  about  a  mile  and  a  third  from 
north  to  south,  is  intersected  by  numerous  roads,  the  lines 
of  which  are  somewhat  broken,  and  it  is  probable  that  the 
assertions  of  the  various  reports  could  not  be  accurately  fitted 
to  the  ground  without  the  actual  presence  there  of  an  assem 
blage  of  officers  from  both  sides,  such  as  Mr.  Batchelder 
succeeding  in  collecting  at  Gettysburg. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  report  of  the  Confederate 
General  Eodes,  which  is  quite  full,  seems  to  be  distinctly  in 
favor  of  the  theory  of  the  identity  of  the  two  roads,  but  the 
general  current  of  the  testimony,  and  especially  McClellan's 
assertion  that  Richardson's  right  brigade  advanced  nearly  to 
the  crest  of  the  hill  overlooking  Piper's  house,  are  so  strongly 
the  other  way,  that  the  topography  of  this  part  of  the  field 
requires  particular  examination.  About  half  way  between 
Bullet's  house  and  Piper's  house  a  road  runs  across  from 
the  Hagerstown  pike  to  the  Keedysville  pike  in  a  broken 
line  of  six  parts — first  a  little  north  of  east,  then  southeast, 
then  southwest,  then  southeast  again,  then  nearly  south, 
and  again  southeast.  The  longest  straight  portion  of  this 
road,  perhaps  a  third  of  a  mile  long,  would  appear  to  an  ob 
server  in  McClellan's  position  to  run  in  a  northwesterly 
direction.  Troops  passing  Eullet's  house  and  marching 
southwest  would  reach  the  portion  of  this  road  nearest  the 
Hagerstown  pike.  Troops  marching  in  the  same  direction, 
but  from  a  point  somewhat  farther  east,  would  come  upon 
its  sharpest  zigzags,  and  then  would  reach  the  ridge  over 
looking  Piper's  house.  Moreover,  Piper's  house  is,  as 
nearly  as  can  be  measured  on  the  map,  a  little  less  than  six 
hundred  yards  south  of  the  part  of  the  road  next  the  Ha 
gerstown  pike.  This  agrees  very  well  with  McClellan's  state 
ment  that  Piper's  house  was  several  hundred  yards  in  ad- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  99 

vance  of  the  sunken  road.  It  may  therefore  be  accepted  as 
established  that  the  troops  of  the  First  and  Third  Divisions 
of  the  Second  Corps,  French's  and  Richardson's,  fought  for 
and  on  and  across  the  same  road,  but  that  this  road  was  one 
possessing  the  singular  angularities  which  have  been  men 
tioned.  It  will,  of  course,  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  that 
Richardson's  men  advanced  on  the  left  of  French's,  that  is 
to  say,  a  little  to  the  east  and  a  good  deal  to  the  south. 

Richardson's  (First)  division  of  the  Second  Corps  com 
prised  the  brigades  of  Meagher,  Caldwell,  and  Brooke.  It 
crossed  the  Antietam  at  9.30  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  at 
the  same  ford  where  the  other  divisions  of  the  corps  had 
crossed  it.  It  moved  southward  on  a  line  nearly  parallel  to 
the  stream.  In  a  ravine  behind  the  high  ground  overlook 
ing  Rullet's  house,  the  command  was  formed,  with  Mea- 
gher's  brigade  on  the  right  and  Caldwell's  on  the  left,  and 
Brooke's  in  support.  Meagher's  brigade  advanced  nearly  to 
the  crest  of  the  hill  overlooking  Piper's  house,  and  found 
the  enemy  in  strong  force  in  the  sunken  road  in  its  front. 
After  some  sharp  fighting,  with  considerable  loss  on  both 
sides,  Caldwell's  brigade  was  marched  up  behind  it  and 
took  its  place,  the  two  brigades  breaking  by  company,  the 
one  to  the  front  the  other  to  the  rear.  Meagher's  brigade 
went  to  the  rear  to  replenish  its  cartridge-boxes,  and  Brooke's 
brigade  remained  as  a  support  to  Caldwell.  When  the 
smart  push  on  Kimball's  left,  before  referred  to,  was  made 
by  the  Confederates,  Brooke  hurried  into  action  three  of  his 
regiments,  the  Fifty-second  New  York,  Second  Delaware, 
and  Fifty-third  Pennsylvania,  and  they,  with  some  troops 
from  the  left  of  French's  division,  the  Seventh  Virginia  and 
One  Hundred  and  Thirty-second  Pennsylvania,  dislodged 
the  enemy  from  the  cornfield  on  their  right  rear,  and  re 
stored  the  line.  At  about  this  time  Caldwell's  left  was 


100  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

threatened  by  a  movement  toward  its  left  and  rear,  which 
the  Confederates  were  found  to  be  making  under  cover  of  a 
ridge.  Colonel  Cross  promptly  changed  front  to  the  left  and 
rear  with  his  regiment,  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire,  and  thus 
brought  his  line  to  be  parallel  with  the  line  of  the  flanking 
force.  There  was  a  spirited  race  between  the  Federals  and 
Confederates,  the  goal  being  some  high  ground  on  the  Icf b 
rear  of  the  Federal  position.  Cross  not  only  won  the  race 
and  gained  the  coveted  position,  but,  aided  by  the  Eighty- 
first  Pennsylvania,  inflicted  severe  punishment  upon  his 
competitor.  Brooke  moved  forward,  to  fill  the  space  which 
Cross's  detachment  had  vacated  on  the  left  of  Caldwell,  tho 
two  regiments  left  to  him  after  detaching  to  the  right,  viz. : 
the  Fifty-seventh  and  Sixty-sixth  New  York.  Caldwell  and 
Brooke,  thus  united,  pressed  forward  gallantly,  and  gained 
possession  of  Piper's  house.  Colonel  Barlow  particularly 
distinguished  himself  in  these  operations  of  Eichardson's 
division.  He  had  under  his  charge  the  two  right  regiments 
of  Caldwell's  brigade,  the  Sixty-first  and  Sixty-fourth  New 
York.  As  Caldwell's  line  was  forcing  its  way  forward,  he 
saw  a  chance  and  improved  it.  Changing  front  forward,  he 
captured  some  three  hundred  prisoners  in  the  sunken  road 
to  his  right,  with  two  colors.  He  gained  this  advantage  by 
obtaining  an  enfilading  fire  on  the  Confederates  in  the  road, 
and  it  seems  to  have  been  owing  entirely  to  his  own  quick 
ness  of  perception  and  promptness  of  action,  and  not  to  the 
orders  of  any  superior  officer.  He  was  also  favorably  men 
tioned  for  his  action  in  helping  to  repel  another  attempt  of 
the  enemy  to  flank  Caldwell  on  his  right,  and  also  for  con 
tributing  largely  to  the  success  of  the  advance  which  finally 
gave  the  Federals  possession  of  Piper's  house.  This  was  the 
end  of  the  serious  fighting  on  this  part  of  the  line.  Musketry 
firo  ceased  at  about  1  P.M.  Richardson,  still  holding  Piper's 


THE  ANTIETAM.  101 

house,  withdrew  his  line  to  the  crest  of  a  hill,  and  at  about 
the  same  time  received  a  mortal  wound.  Why  he  withdrew 
his  line,  and  whether  his  wound  was  the  cause  of  the  cessa 
tion  of  operations  at  this  part  of  the  ground,  does  not  appear. 
Hancock  was  placed  in  command  of  his  division.  A  sharp 
artillery  contest  followed  the  withdrawal  of  Eichardson's 
line,  in  which  a  section  of  Eobertson's  horse  battery  of  the 
Second  Artillery  and  Graham's  battery  of  brass  guns  of  the 
First  Artillery  were  engaged  on  the  Federal  side.  Mea- 
gher's  brigade,  now  under  Burke,  returned  to  the  front,  with 
cartridge-boxes  refilled,  and  took  position  in  the  centre  of 
the  line.  French  sent  something  less  than  two  regiments  to 
the  support  of  Richardson's  division,  and  they  were  placed 
between  Caldwell's  and  Burke's  (Meagher's)  brigade. 

It  so  happened  that  at  this  time  Hancock's  application  for 
artillery  for  the  division  of  which  he  had  assumed  command, 
could  not  be,  or  was  not,  complied  with.  The  length  of  the 
line  which  he  was  obliged  to  hold  prevented  him  from  form 
ing  more  than  one  line  of  troops,  and,  from  his  advanced 
position,  that  line  was  partially  enfiladed  by  batteries  on 
the  Confederate  left,  which  were  hidden  from  the  Federal 
batteries  by  the  West  Woods.  He  therefore  felt  himself  too 
weak  to  attack.  He  aided  in  frustrating  an  attack  toward  or 
beyond  his  left,  by  obtaining  from  Franklin  Hexamer's  bat 
tery,  and  when  Hexamer  had  expended  his  ammunition,  the 
very  gallant  and  accomplished  Lieutenant  Woodruff  relieved 
him  with  Battery  I  of  the  First  Artillery. 

There  is  little  more  to  be  said  of  the  operations  on  the 
Federal  right.  The  serious  fighting  there  ended  at  about  1 
o'clock.  In  the  afternoon,  between  4  and  5,  the  Seventh 
Maine  performed  a  very  brilliant  exploit.  It  belonged  to 
Irwin's  brigade  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  was  in  the  centre  of  Smith's  division,  which  was  to  the 


102  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

right  of  French's  division.  It  was  ordered  out  to  drive  away 
some  skirmishers,  and  performed  the  task  not  only  gallantly 
but  brilliantly,  encountering  Texas,  Georgia,  Mississippi,  and 
Louisiana  troops  of  Hood's  division,  and  losing  half  the  men 
it  moved  out  with. 

The  Federal  account  of  the  operations  of  Richardson's 
division  is  only  slightly  illuminated  by  the  Confederate  ac 
counts.  General  Lee  says  in  substance  that  the  attack  on 
the  centre  was  met  by  part  of  Walker's  division,  G.  B.  An 
derson's  brigade,  Rodes's  brigade,  and  artillery,  with  R.  H. 
Anderson  formed  in  support ;  that,  Rodes  being  erroneously 
withdrawn,  the  Federals  pressed  in,  broke  G.  B.  Anderson's 
brigade,  mortally  wounded  him,  and  wounded  General  R. 
H.  Anderson  and  General  Wright,  but  did  not  follow  up 
their  advantage,  and,  after  an  hour  and  a  half,  retired ;  that 
another  attack,  made  further  to  his  right,  was  repulsed  by 
artillery,  i.e.,  Miller's  guns,  supported  by  a  part  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's  troops.  It  is  rather  a  matter  of  ingenuity  than 
of  importance  to  make  the  Confederate  and  Federal  accounts 
of  the  later  morning  fighting  dovetail.  The  right  attack 
spent  its  force  when  Sedgwick  was  repulsed.  Up  to  that 
time  there  had  been  close  connection  of  place  and  some 
connection  of  time  between  the  movements  of  the  First, 
Twelfth,  and  Second  Corps,  but  after  that  the  attacks  were 
successive  both  in  time  and  place ;  and  good  as  were  some 
of  the  troops  engaged,  and  gallant  as  was  some  of  the  right 
ing,  the  movements  of  French's  and  Richardson's  divisions 
excite  but  a  languid  interest,  for  such  use  as  was  made  of 
these  troops  was  not  of  a  kind  to  drive  Hill  and  Hood  and 
Jackson  and  Longstreet  and  Lee  from  a  strong  position 
from  which  six  divisions  of  the  Federal  army  had  already  re 
coiled,  and  recoiled  in  a  condition  which  left  them  for  the 
moment  almost  incapable  of  further  service. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  103 

As  is  usual  in  Confederate  reports,  Barlow's  success  is 
accounted  for  on  the  ground  that  it  was  owing  to  a  singular 
error  on  the  part  of  an  individual,  and  not  to  good  general 
ship  or  good  soldiership  on  the  Federal  side.  It  was  not 
till  Hotchkiss  and  Allan  began  to  write  that  there  was 
much  Southern  recognition  of  the  fact  that  Federal  merit 
and  Confederate  demerit  might  have  something  to  do  with 
a  Federal  success.  After  French's  advance  had  lost  its  mo 
mentum,  and  after  a  charge  attempted  by  Eodes  and  Col- 
quitt  had  failed  so  entirely  that  Eodes  barely  prevented 
his  men  from  falling  back  to  the  rear  of  the  sunken  road, 
Eodes  noticed  troops  going  in  to  the  support  of  Anderson 
(G.  B.),  or  to  his  right.  He  says  that  he  saw  that  some  of 
them,  instead  of  passing  on  to  the  front,  stopped  in  the  hol 
low  immediately  in  his  rear,  and  that  he  went  to  them  and 
found  that  they  belonged  to  General  Pryor's  brigade.  Gen 
eral  Pryor  was  one  of  E.  H.  Anderson's  brigadiers.  The  fire 
on  both  sides  was  now  desultory  and  slack,  that  is  to  say,  as 
above  stated,  French's  attack  had  spent  its  force,  and  his 
men  had  retired  behind  high  ground.  General  Eodes  found 
General  Pryor  in  a  few  moments,  and  told  him  how  his  men 
were  behaving,  and  General  Pryor  immediately  ordered  them 
forward.  General  Eodes  returned  to  his  command  in  the 
sunken  road,  and  met  the  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Sixth 
Alabama,  looking  for  him.  That  officer  reported  to  him 
that  the  right  of  his  regiment  was  subjected  to  a  terrible  en 
filading  fire,  which  the  enemy  were  enabled  to  deliver  by 
reason  of  their  gaining  somewhat  on  G.  B.  Anderson.  This 
undoubtedly  means  that  the  pressure  of  Eichardson's  advance 
was  beginning  to  be  felt.  Eodes  ordered  his  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  to  hasten  back,  and  to  throw  his  right  wing  back 
out  of  the  old  road.  "  Instead  of  executing  the  order,  he 
moved  briskly  to  the  rear  of  the  regiment,  and  gave  the  com- 


104:  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

mand,  '  Sixth  Alabama,  about-face,  forward,  march.'  Major 
Hobson,  of  the  Fifth,  asked  him  if  the  order  was  intended 
for  the  whole  brigade.  He  replied,  'Yes,'  and  thereupon  the 
Fifth,  and  immediately  the  other  troops  on  their  left,  re 
treated."  l  Kodes  says  that  a  duty  to  a  wounded  comrade 
kept  him  from  seeing  this  retrograde  movement  till  it  was 
too  late  to  rally  his  men,  and  that  his  attention  to  his  com 
mand  was  further  delayed  by  a  wound  which  he  at  first 
thought  was  serious,  but  presently  found  to  be  slight.  When 
he  again  turned  to  his  brigade,  he  discovered  it  "  retreating 
in  confusion,"  and  hastened  to  intercept  it  at  the  Hagerstown 
road,  and  there  found  that,  with  the  exception  of  about  forty 
men,  the  brigade  had  completely  disappeared.  G.  B.  An 
derson  was  killed  at  this  time,  and  as  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Alabama  belonged  to  Eodes's  brigade,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  this  disaster  was  the  Federal  success  gained  by 
Caldwell's  brigade,  and  especially  by  Barlow's  two  regiments. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  brigades  of  Featherston  and 
Pryor,  of  E.  H.  Anderson's  division,  shared  in  the  fighting 
at  the  sunken  road.  When  Pryor  went  forward  at  about  10 
A.M.,  Featherston  followed  him.  He  passed  a  barn  (which 
was  probably  one  of  the  outbuildings  of  the  Piper  house), 
and  proceeded  several  hundred  yards,  and  there  found  in  a 
road  beyond  the  first  cornfield  after  passing  the  barn,  the 
brigade  of  Pryor  and  a  brigade  of  North  Carolina  troops. 
As  the  old  road  is  from  four  hundred  and  fifty  to  six  hun 
dred  yards  from  Piper's  house,  and  as  G.  B.  Anderson's  bri 
gade  was  all  from  North  Carolina,  while  Kodes  and  Colquitt 
to  the  left  had  no  North  Carolina  regiments,  it  is  clear  that 
Featherston  came  up  in  rear  of  the  right  of  the  line  in  the 
road.  He  claims  that  his  men  passed  over  Pryor's  and  the 

*  A.  N.  Va.,  ii..  34S. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  105 

North  Carolinians,  and  encountered  the  enemy  three  hun 
dred  yards  further  to  the  front.  He  was  presently  ordered 
to  fall  back,  and  found  great  confusion  in  the  road,  from  the 
mingling  of  different  brigades,  and  continued  to  fall  back 
till  he  reached  the  barn.1  There  the  command  was  rallied, 
and  thence  it  advanced  into  the  cornfield  in  front  of  the 
barn,  where  the  enemy  was  met.  That  is  to  say,  the  Feder 
als  had  nearly  reached  Piper's  house.  A  desperate  fight  en 
sued,2  and  was  ended  by  his  being  ordered  to  fall  back  to 
his  original  position,  on  account  of  a  terrific  cross  fire  of 
artillery.  This,  being  interpreted,  probably  means  simply 
that  the  Federals  were  stronger  or  fought  better  than  the 
Confederates  at  this  time  and  place,  and  it  may  well  havo 
been  at  this  time  that  Cross  and  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire 
captured  the  colors  of  the  Fourth  North  Carolina  of  G.  B. 
Anderson's  brigade.  It  would  be  tedious  to  follow  the 
operations  of  the  centre  into  much  more  detail,  and  it  would 
not  be  worth  the  while.  It  may  be  said  briefly  that  Willcox, 
as  well  as  Featherston  and  Pryor,  of  R.  II.  Anderson's  divi 
sion,  undoubtedly  took  part  in  the  fighting  in  the  centre, 
and  that  the  stories,  of  which  the  Confederate  reports 
are  so  full,  of  Federal  advances  made  late  in  the  day  and 
heroically  repulsed,  are  only  highly  colored  accounts  of 
the  coining  up  of  the  brigades  of  Slocum's  division  of 
Franklin's  Corps  to  the  places  assigned  them,  and  of  the 
gentle  pressure  which  Pleasonton  was  able  to  exert  with  the 
guns  of  his  horse  artillery  and  their  infantry  supports  from 
the  regular  brigade. 

1  The  report  is  made,  not  by  Featherston,  but  by  a  Captain  of  the  Sixteenth 
Mississippi,  of  Featherston's  brigade. 

2  It  might  well  be  called  a  desperate  fight,  if  all  the  regiments  of  Featherston'a 
brigade  suffered  as  much  as  the  Sixteenth  Mississippi,  whose  commanding  officer 
reports  for  the  brigade.      It  lost  one  hundred  and  forty-four  out  of  two  hundred, 
nnd  twenty-eight. 


106  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Slocum,  with  the  First  Division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  reached 
the  field  by  or  before  noon.  The  brigades  of  Newton  and 
Torbert  were  immediately  formed  in  column  of  attack,  to 
carry  the  woods  about  the  Dunker  Church.  The  brigade  of 
Bartlett  was  to  form  the  reserve  for  this  column,  but  Frank 
lin  found  that  Sumner  had  ordered  it  to  keep  near  his  right, 
and  he  waited  for  it  to  return ;  but  first  Sumner  and  then 
McClellan  interfered,  and  the  attack  was  not  made.  Wisely 
or  unwisely,  Sumner  paralyzed  the  action  of  Franklin's 
Corps,  first  detaching  from  Smith  and  then  from  Slocurn. 
Slocum's  fine  division  was  so  little  used  that  its  total  loss 
was  only  sixty-five. 

Pleasonton,  in  the  morning  of  this  day,  after  fighting  had 
begun  on  his  right,  advanced  his  skirmishers  on  the  Keedys- 
ville  pike,  cleared  his  front,  and  caused  the  batteries  of  Tid- 
ball,  Gibson,  Eobertson,  and  Hains  to  open  fire,  having  a 
direct  fire  in  front,  and  obtaining  an  enfilade  fire  along  the 
front  of  Sumner,  a  mile  away,  and  giving  some  aid  to  the 
Ninth  Corps,  which  was  at  a  greater  distance  on  his  left.  At 
a  later  hour,  he  used  the  batteries  of  Randol  and  Kuserow, 
and  supported  them  with  five  small  battalions  of  regulars 
under  Captain  Hiram  Dryer.  In  the  afternoon,  between  three 
and  four,  he  saw  a  Confederate  line,  "fully  a  mile  long,"  bear 
ing  down  on  Richardson,  and  directed  the  fire  of  eighteen 
guns  upon  it,  and  in  twenty  minutes  saw  the  "immense  line 
first  halt,  deliver  a  desultory  fire,  and  then  break  and  run  to 
the  rear  in  the  greatest  confusion  and  disorder."  A  line  a 
mile  long  is  not  an  immense  line,  as  it  would  only  consist  of 
about  five  thousand  men,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  identify  the 
Confederate  advance  to  which  Pleasonton  refers.  At  4  P.M. 
he  asked  Porter  for  infantry  to  support  his  guns  in  an  ad 
vance,  but  the  request  was  not  granted,  as  Porter  had  no 
troops  to  spare. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  107 

The  attentive  reader  will  remember  that  McClellan  says  it 
was  his  plan  to  attack  the  enemy's  left,  and  as  soon  as  mat 
ters  looked  favorably  there,  to  move  the  corps  of  Burnside 
against  the  enemy's  extreme  right,  but  as  he  states  in  a  later 
paragraph  of  his  report  that  the  attack  on  the  right  was  to 
have  been  supported  by  an  attack  on  the  left,  and  that  pre 
paratory  to  this  attack,  on  the  evening  of  the  16th,  the  Ninth 
Corps  was  moved  forward  and  to  the  left,  and  took  up  a 
position  nearer  the  bridge,  he  must  be  understood  to  mean 
rather  that  he  intended  that  these  attacks  should  be  simul 
taneous  than  that  they  should  be  successive.  Independent 
of  any  utterance  of  McClellan  upon  the  subject,  no  one  who 
credited  him  with  a  share  of  military  ability  could  believe 
that  he  could  have  contemplated  leaving  a  corps  of  four 
divisions  idle  for  hours  upon  his  left,  while  he  attacked  on 
the  right  with  three  corps,  held  the  centre  with  a  fourth 
corps  and  his  cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  and  had  another 
strong  corps  hastening  up  to  the  rear  of  his  line.  This, 
however,  is  precisely  what  he  did  do,  whatever  his  orders 
may  have  been,  and  it  is  one  of  the  vexed  questions  of  this 
battle  whether  Burnside  failed  McClellan  and  virtually  lost 
the  battle  for  him,  or  rather  kept  it  from  being  a  great  vic 
tory,  and  whether  McClellan  was  or  was  not  satisfied  with 
Burnside  at  the  time.  With  the  abundant  knowledge  which 
has  long  been  accessible,  there  cannot  be  a  shadow  of  a  doubt 
that  if  the  Ninth  Corps  had  been  thrown  vigorously  into 
action  early  on  the  17th,  Lee's  army  must  have  been  shat 
tered,  if  not  destroyed.  There  is  as  little  doubt  that  Mc 
Clellan  was  dissatisfied  with  Burnside  when  he  published 
his  report,  but  his  report  is  dated  August  4,  1863,  nine  months 
after  Burnside  had  taken  his  place  as  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  when  McClellan  was  very  promi 
nent  as  an  injured  hero,  and  not  very  unlikely  to  be  the  next 


108  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

President  of  the  United  States.  As  for  McClellan's  feeling 
at  the  time,  there  is  in  existence  the  strongest  and  most  re 
spectable  testimony  to  the  effect  that  a  week  after  the  battle, 
McClellan  and  Burnside  appeared  to  be  on  terms  of  the  most 
intimate  friendship,  and  that  some,  at  least,  of  those  best 
qualified  to  judge,  believed  that  Burnside's  part  in  the  bat 
tle  had  McClellan's  unqualified  approval.  Those  who  know 
McClellan  thoroughly  are  the  only  persons  who  are  qualified 
to  judge  whether  he  may  have  then  been  acting  a  part,  and 
treating  Burnside  as  he  might  not  have  treated  him  if  he  had 
not  felt  his  own  position  to  be  one  of  delicacy  and  instabil 
ity  ;  but  as  this  volume  is  an  account  of  some  great  cam 
paigns,  and  not  a  study  of  psychology,  it  is  sufficient  to  state 
the  fact  that  McClellan  subsequently  disapproved  of  Burn- 
side's  action,  without  undertaking  to  settle  the  question  just 
when  the  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  arose  in  his  mind — still 
less  whether  he  concealed  it  when  he  first  felt  it.  Those 
who  believe  that  Burnside  was  a  faithful,  intelligent,  and 
brave  soldier,  will  probably  retain  a  different  opinion  of  his 
conduct  at  the  Antietam  from  that  of  those  who  believe  that 
his  presence  was  an  element  of  weakness,  or  worse,  wherever 
and  whenever  he  held  an  important  command. 

The  Ninth  Corps  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  contained 
four  divisions,  those  of  Willcox,  Sturgis,  andEodman,  and  the 
Kanawha  division,  temporarily  attached  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  under  General  Cox.  Willcox's  First  Division  com 
prised  the  brigades  of  Christ  and  Welsh ;  Sturgis's  Second, 
those  of  Nagle  and  Ferrero ;  Eodnian's  Third,  those  of  Fair- 
child  and  Harland;  the  Kanawha  division  comprised  the 
brigades  of  Crook  and  Ewing  As  has  already  been  stated, 
Cox  had  the  personal  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps  this  day, 
and  Scammon  took  command  of  his  division.  The  position 
of  the  Ninth  Corps  before  the  battle  has  already  been  stated 


THE  ANTIETAM.  109 

in  general  terms.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  the  whole 
corps,  except  Willcox's  division,  was  moved  forward  and  to 
the  left  to  the  rear  slope  of  the  ridges  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Antietam,  its  centre  being  nearly  opposite  the  stone  bridge. 
The  following  positions  were  assigned  to  the  divisions  :  the 
right  front  of  the  position  to  be  occupied  by  Crook's  brigade, 
supported  by  Sturgis's  division ;  a  commanding  knoll  in  the 
centre  to  be  occupied  by  Benjamin's  battery  (E,  Second  Ar 
tillery)  of  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  ;  Rodman's  division  was 
to  occupy  the  left  front,  supported  by  Ewing's  brigade; 
Willcox's  division  and  the  rest  of  the  artillery  were  to  be 
held  in  reserve.  Durell's  battery  was  sent  forward  early  the 
next  morning  to  the  right  of  the  general  position,  and  took 
part  with  Benjamin's  battery  in  a  brisk  artillery  fight  which 
commenced  soon  after  daybreak.  General  Toombs  held  the 
ground  on  the  opposite  side,  with  two  Georgia  regiments, 
the  Second  and  Twentieth,  four  hundred  and  three  muskets 
strong.  He  placed  these  men  upon  the  margin  of  the  river, 
in  rather  open  order,  occupying  a  narrow  wood  just  above  the 
bridge,  which  he  calls  an  important  and  commanding  posi 
tion.  The  Twentieth  Georgia  was  posted  with  its  left  near  the 
Sharpsburg  end  of  the  bridge,  extending  down  the  stream, 
and  the  Second  Georgia  on  its  right,  prolonging  the  line  down 
to  a  point  where  a  neighborhood  road  approaches  a  ford 
about  six  hundred  yards  to  the  right  and  rear  of  the  position. 
Subsequently,  the  Fiftieth  Georgia,  numbering  (Toombs  says 
he  should  suppose)  scarcely  one  hundred  muskets,  reported 
to  him,  and  was  placed  on  the  right  of  the  Second  Georgia, 
to  guard  a  blind  plantation  road  leading  to  another  ford. 
He  had  one  more  company,  not  named,  and  Ewbank's  bat 
tery,  and  also,  at  a  distance  in  his  rear,  Richardson's  battery 
of  his  own  brigade.  General  Toombs  says  that  the  position 
was  not  strong,  the  ground  descending  gently,  and  the  nar- 


110  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

row  strip  of  woods  upon  it  affording  slight  cover.  This 
language  underestimates  the  strength  of  the  position,  but 
this  point  need  not  be  insisted  on,  for  Tooinbs's  next  state 
ment  shows  what  a  bad  place  it  was  for  carrying  a  bridge, 
whatever  the  slope  of  the  ground  and  whether  the  woods  were 
thin  or  thick.  "  Its  chief  strength  lay  in  the  fact  that,  from 
the  nature  of  the  ground  on  the  other  (i.e.,  Federal)  side,  the 
enemy  were  compelled  to  approach  mainly  by  the  road, 
which  led  up  the  river  for  near  three  hundred  paces,  paral 
lel  with  my  line  of  battle,  and  distant  therefrom  from  fifty 
to  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet,  thus  exposing  his  flank  to  a 
destructive  fire  the  most  of  that  distance."  '  General  Cox 
says  that  the  position  afforded  the  most  perfect  natural  and 
artificial  cover.  Most  of  D.  E.  Jones's  division  was  in- 
Tooinbs's  rear  or  to  his  left. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  McClellan  ordered 
Burnside  to  hold  his  men  in  readiness  to  assault  the  bridge, 
and  to  await  further  orders.  The  order  reached  Burnside 
at  about  7  A.M.,  and  the  command  promptly  moved  forward 
and  took  the  positions  directed  the  previous  evening.  Be 
sides  the  advance  of  Durell's  and  Benjamin's  batteries, 
already  mentioned,  the  batteries  of  McMullin,  Clark,  Muhl- 
enberg,  and  Cook  were  placed  on  the  heights  to  right  and 
left,  and  somewhat  further  forward  than  Benjamin's  bat 
tery.  A  section  of  Simmons's  20-pounders  was  temporarily 
attached  to  Benjamin's  battery.  For  some  two  hours  after 
the  receipt  of  the  order,  Burnside  and  Cox  stood  together 
on  the  knoll  where  Benjamin's  battery  was  placed.  From 
that  point  they  looked  down  between  the  lines  of  battle  on 
their  right,  as  if  they  were  looking  along  the  sides  of  a 
street.  They  saw  the  Confederates  taking  advantage  of 

»  A.  N.Va.,  ii.,  323. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  HI 

walls  and  fences,  and  the  Federals  uncovered  and  in  the 
open.  They  saw  the  Federal  lines  halt,  open  fire,  and  gradu 
ally  melt  away,  or  straggle  to  the  rear.  They  saw  that  the 
right  attack  had  failed  before  they  got  orders  to  cross. 

At  eight  o'clock,  McClellan  says,  an  order  was  sent  to 
Burnside  to  carry  the  bridge,  gain  possession  of  the  heights 
beyond,  and  to  advance  along  their  crest  upon  Sharpsburg 
and  its  rear.  There  is  excellent  reason  for  believing  that 
this  order,  whenever  issued,  did  not  reach  Burnside  till 
about  nine.  He  immediately  communicated  it  to  Cox,  and 
ordered  him  to  carry  it  out.  Cox  immediately  left  him, 
took  personal  direction  of  the  troops,  and  did  not  see  him 
again  till  about  3  P.M.,  when  he  crossed  the  bridge  to  hasten 
the  movements  of  Willcox's  division  under  circumstances 
which  will  be  mentioned  hereafter.  Crook's  brigade  was 
ordered  to  advance,  covered  by  the  Eleventh  Connecticut 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  supported  by  the  division  of 
Sturgis,  and  attempt  to  carry  the  bridge  by  assault.  The 
plan  was  to  carry  the  bridge  by  a  rush  of  two  columns  of 
fours,  the  one  to  move  to  the  right  and  the  other  to  the  left 
BO  soon  as  they  should  get  across.  Rodman's  division  was 
to  endeavor  to  cross  by  a  ford  a  third  of  a  mile  below  the 
bridge.  The  commands,  once  across,  were  to  carry  the 
heights  above  and  there  unite. 

Crook,  in  some  unexplained  manner,  missed  his  way  to  the 
bridge  and  reached  the  stream  above  it,  and  came  under  so 
heavy  a  fire,  of  both  infantry  and  artillery,  that  he  was  obliged 
to  halt  and  open  fire.  A  new  storming  party  had  to  be  or 
ganized  from  Sturgis's  division,  which  reached  the  bridge  first. 
The  Second  Maryland  and  Sixth  New  Hampshire  were  told 
off  for  the  work.  They  charged  at  the  double-quick  with 
fixed  bayonets,  but  the  concentrated  fire  on  the  bridge  was 
too  much  for  them,  and  after  repeated  brave  efforts  they  were 


112  ANTIETAM   AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

•withdrawn.  The  Fifty-first  New  York  and  Fifty-first  Pennsyl 
vania  were  ordered  up.  They  were  followed  and  supported 
by  the  Thirty-fifth  and  Twenty-first  Massachusetts,  and  at  the 
same  time  Crook  obtained  a  direct  fire  from  two  heavy  guns 
upon  the  Confederates  at  the  further  end  of  the  bridge. 
Aided  by  these  guns,  and  charging  brilliantly,  the  fresh 
troops  carried  the  bridge,  and  the  division  of  Sturgis  and  the 
brigade  of  Crook  immediately  followed  them  across.  The 
loss  before  the  bridge  was  carried  exceeded  five  hundred  men, 
including  Colonel  Kingsbury  killed,  and  a  number  of  very 
valuable  officers.  In  the  meanwhile,  Ewing's  brigade  and 
Rodman's  division,  after  losing  some  time  in  searching  for  a 
ford,  under  fire — guides  proving  worthless  or  worse — found 
the  ford,  crossed  it,  and  took  up  the  position  assigned  them, 
and  thus  at  1  P.M.  or  thereabouts,  the  three  divisions  of  the 
corps  across  the  Antietam  occupied  exactly  their  intended 
relative  positions,  except  that  Crook  was  behind  Sturgis  in 
stead  of  in  front  of  him.  Unfortunately  it  was  one  o'clock, 
the  fighting  on  the  Federal  right  was  practically  over,  and 
A.  P.  Hill  was  drawing  very  near.  This  was  bad,  but  it  was 
not  the  worst  of  it.  Sturgis  had  expended  his  ammunition, 
and  he  now  reported  that  his  division  was  totally  unfit  for  a 
forward  movement.  He  was  taken  at  his  word,  and  Willcox's 
division  was  ordered  to  relieve  him.  It  seems  to  have  been 
assumed  that  there  was  no  ford  in  the  vicinity,  and  Willcox's 
men  crossed  the  bridge.  This  proved  slow  work,  though 
the  command  showed  reasonable  alacrity.  The  movement 
was  completed  at  about  three  o'clock,  General  Burnside 
himself  coming  over  to  hasten  it,  and  Sturgis's  division  was 
placed  in  reserve  at  the  head  of  the  bridge.  All  this  time  the 
Confederates  kept  up  a  severe  and  damaging  artillery  fire. 
Two  rifled  guns  of  Moody's  battery,  and  a  section  of  the 
Washington  Artillery,  with  much  aid  from  the  batteries  of 
Longstreet's  command,  were  firing  upon  the  Federals. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  113 

At  about  three  o'clock,  the  whole  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  ex 
cept  Sturgis's  division,  was  put  in  motion.  The  general 
scheme  of  the  advance  was  that  Willcox,  supported  by  Crook, 
should  move  on  Sharpsburg,  and  that  Rodman,  supported 
by  Scammon  with  Ewing's  brigade,  should  follow  the  move 
ment,  first  dislodging  the  enemy  in  their  front,  and  then 
changing  direction  to  the  right,  so  as  to  bring  the  left  wing 
in  echelon  on  the  left  of  Willcox.  The  artillery  of  the  corps 
partly  covered  the  advance.  The  right  wing  advanced  rap 
idly,  but  the  left  met  with  more  resistance.  The  appear 
ance  of  the  Confederate  line,  the  number  of  their  batteries 
and  battle-flags,  all  indicated  a  force  fully  equal  to  that  of 
the  Federals.  Toombs's  men  had  been  reinforced  by  the 
arrival  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Georgia,  and  five 
companies  of  the  Eleventh  Georgia,  but  the  Second  and 
Twentieth  Georgia  were  sent  to  the  rear.  With  these  troops 
and  some  of  Kearse's  regiment,  and  a  part  of  the  Twentieth 
Georgia,  which  had  returned  with  a  fresh  supply  of  car 
tridges,  Toombs  formed  on  D.  K.  Jones's  right. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Federal  force  was  so  successful  as 
to  drive  in  the  Confederate  skirmishers,  capture  Mclntosh's 
battery  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division  (which  had  been  sent  for 
ward  by  Hill),  and  press  their  advance  to  the  southern  sub 
urbs  of  the  town.  The  resistance  on  the  other  flank,  how 
ever,  delayed  the  Federal  left  wing,  and  thus  there  was  an 
interval  between  the  two  wings  which  grew  wider  as  the 
right  advanced.  This  interval  proved  fatal  to  the  enterprise 
on  the  Federal  left.  At  half-past  two,  A.  P.  Hill's  division, 
having  made  a  march  of  seventeen  miles  in  seven  hours, 
arrived  upon  the  field.  Mclntosh's  battery  had  been  sent 
forward  to  strengthen  D.  B.  Jones's  right,  the  brigades 
of  Pender  and  Brockenbrough  were  placed  on  the  extreme 
right,  and  Branch,  Gregg,  and  Archer,  to  their  left,  con- 


114  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

nected  and  completed  the  line,  joining  hands  with  Toombs 
and  D.  E.  Jones.  Braxton's  battery  was  placed  on  a  com 
manding  point  on  Gregg's  right,  and  Crenshaw's  and  Pe- 
gram's  on  a  hill  to  the  left.  Toombs  and  Archer  charged, 
while  the  other  troops  held  their  ground  and  fired  sharply. 
Mclntosh's  battery  was  retaken,  and  the  Federal  line  re 
pulsed.  Hill  lost  one  brigadier-general  killed,  and  three 
hundred  and  forty-six  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded. 
He  says  himself  that  he  was  not  a  moment  too  soon,  and 
that  the  Federals  had  broken  through  D.  E.  Jones's  divi 
sion,  and  were  in  the  full  tide  of  success.  He  was  himself 
most  fortunate  in  the  time  and  place  of  his  arrival,  as  Sum- 
ner  was  on  the  31st  of  May  at  Fair  Oaks.  He  struck  Eod- 
man  in  flank,  killed  him,  and  caused  his  division  to  break. 
The  nature  and  character  of  the  attack  made  it  necessary  to 
change  Scammon's  front,  bring  up  Sturgis,  and  withdraw 
the  left  of  "Willcox.  That  of  twenty-two  hundred  and  twenty- 
two  casualties  in  the  Ninth  Corps  only  one  hundred  and 
twenty-three  were  missing,  may  be  accepted  as  proof  that 
the  breaking  of  Eodman's  division  was  not  of  a  discreditable 
character,  and  that  the  disaster  was  promptly  repaired. 

Thus  the  battle  of  the  Antietam,  so  far  as  it  is  really  in 
teresting,  came  to  an  end.  To  complete  the  story  of  the 
fighting  on  the  south  and  southeast  of  the  town,  a  few  de 
tails  may  be  added.  It  seems  that  when  D.  E.  Jones's  divi 
sion  was  broken,  Kemper  gave  way  first,  then  Drayton  and 
Jenkins,  and  that  Pickett's  Virginia  brigade,  commanded 
by  Garnett,  and  Evans's  South  Carolina  brigade,  were  then 
ordered  back.  The  repulse  must  have  been  very  complete, 
for  Colonel  Hunton  of  the  Eighth  Virginia,  of  Pickett's  bri 
gade,  found  near  the  town  troops  scattered  in  squads  from 
various  parts  of  the  army,  so  that  it  was  impossible  to  dis 
tinguish  men  of  the  different  commands.  It  appears  that 


THE  ANTIETAM.  115 

even  in  the  Southern  army  human  frailty  was  not  unknown, 
for  the  colonel  commanding  Jenkins's  brigade  of  D.  R. 
Jones's  division  reports  that  the  First  South  Carolina  went  in 
with  one  hundred  and  six  rank  and  file,  had  forty  killed  and 
wounded,  and  only  one  officer  and  fifteen  men  at  evening 
roll-call,  and  adds  that  "  such  officers  are  a  disgrace  to  the 
service,  and  unworthy  to  wear  a  sword,"  while  Colonel  Mc- 
Master,  commanding  Evans's  brigade,  says  that  some  of  the 
Holcorabe  Legion  and  Seventeenth  South  Carolina,  of  his 
brigade,  "  in  spite  of  my  efforts,  broke  and  ran." 

As  one  reads  many  of  the  Southern  reports,  he  finds  the 
doubt  growing  upon  him  whether  they  were  made  primarily 
for  the  information  of  the  superior  officers  who  were  entitled 
to  receive  them,  or  for  publication  in  local  newspapers  and 
the  glorification  of  the  writers.  This  is  especially  true  of 
the  commanders  of  batteries  and  artillery  battalions.  They 
all  "  check  the  Federal  advance,"  "  drive  large  bodies  of  in 
fantry  from  view,"  "  break  their  ranks,"  "  drive  them  to 
cover,"  cause  them  to  "  recoil,"  "  break  them  and  throw  them 
into  great  confusion,"  etc.,  etc.,  etc.,  till  one  is  led  to  wonder 
at  the  folly  of  the  Southern  leaders  in  exposing  their  infan 
try  at  all.  With  artillery  so  efficient  and  sufficient,  and  such 
admirable  cover  as  the  ground  afforded,  it  would  seem  that 
they  might  as  well  have  kept  their  infantry  out  of  sight, 
and  spared  themselves  the  ten  thousand  casualties  which 
thinned  their  ranks  at  Sharpsburg.  Thus  it  is  stated  that 
the  batteries  of  Hood's  division  were  used  mainly  in  resist 
ing  the  attack  of  the  Ninth  Corps.  It  would  appear  that 
Garden's  guns  and  a  section  of  Squires's  rifles  drive  back  the 
enemy  advancing  from  the  Burnside  bridge  ;  that  this  force, 
with  Brown's  battery  and  Squires's  two  howitzers  added, 
break  the  Federals  a  second  time,  when  they  have  got  up  to 
within  one  hundred  yards  ;  that  only  three  Confederate  guna 


116  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

are  then  left  fit  for  action,  but  Bamsey's  battery  then  comes 
up,  with  Keilly's  two  rifles,  opens  fire,  and  soon  breaks  the 
Federals  again.  Going  a  little  further  to  the  Confederate 
right,  we  find  the  batteries  of  Longstreet's  corps,  notably 
Miller's,  checking  the  Federal  advance.  A.  P.  Hill  and  his 
chief  of  artillery  are  less  blind  to  the  doings  of  the  infantry. 
A.  P.  Hill  says  that  the  three  brigades  of  his  division  ac 
tively  engaged,  with  the  help  of  his  "  splendid  batteries," 
drove  back  Burnside's  corps  of  15,000  men.  The  wonderful 
sight  which  D.  H.  Hill  saw,  when  he  caused  three,  or  prob 
ably  five  guns  to  open  on  an  "imposing  force  of  Yankees" 
at  twelve  hundred  yards  distance,  and  routed  them  by  artil 
lery  fire  alone,  unaided  by  musketry,  has  already  been  men 
tioned.  It  hardly  need  be  added  that  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  seldom,  if  ever,  retire  till  they  are  out  of  ammunition. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Confederate  batteries  were  extremely 
well  taken  care  of  by  their  infantry,  as  a  rule,  and  that  they 
very  seldom  lost  a  gun.  At  Sharpsburg  they  were  wise  very 
generally  in  abstaining  from  costly  and  useless  "artillery 
duels,"  and  in  directing  their  fire  upon  the  Federal  in 
fantry,  but  they  did  not  do  all  the  fighting  that  was  done 
there  by  the  Confederates. 

There  are  many  questions  presented  by  the  action  of  the 
Ninth  Corps  at  Sharpsburg,  some  of  them  affecting  the  con 
duct  of  Burnside  and  Cox  principally,  others  which  rather 
affect  McClellan,  but  as  this  volume  is  intended  more  for  a 
narrative  than  for  a  critical  discussion,  they  will  hardly  be 
more  than  stated — the  questions  of  the  former  class  in  this 
place,  and  those  of  the  latter  a  little  later.  The  question  of 
Burnside's  loyalty  is  too  large  a  one  for  discussion  here. 
Thus  much  is  plain,  he  could  not  be  disloyal  to  McClellan 
without  being  disloyal  to  his  country.  But  between  the  ut 
most  putting  forth  of  the  powers  of  an  able  and  energetic 


THE  ANTIETAM.  117 

man,  and  the  lukewarm  use  of  the  powers  of  a  commonplace 
and  sluggish  man,  there  is  a  vast  difference,  and  the  small 
results  accomplished  by  Burnside  on  McClellan's  left  may 
readily  be  understood  without  any  imputation  of  disloy 
alty  by  those  who  think  that  they  see  in  his  whole  career 
that  he  had  mistaken  his  vocation,  and  that  it  was  a  misfor 
tune  for  the  country  that  he  was  ever  promoted  beyond  the 
rank  of  colonel.  There  are  those  who  judge  him  very 
harshly,  but  wars  are  unfortunately  apt  to  produce  sharp 
jealousies  and  enmities  among  soldiers,  and  the  explanation 
afforded  by  the  theory  of  limited  capacity  may  well  be  pre 
ferred  to  that  based  on  the  suggestion  of  bad  faith. 

The  peculiar  position  of  Burnside  and  Cox  wTas  probably  a 
drawback  to  the  efficiency  of  the  corps.  Burnside  became 
a  mere  receiver  and  transmitter  of  orders  to  the  commander 
of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  may  easily  be 
believed  that  so  good  a  soldier  as  Cox  would  have  shown 
more  activity  and  accomplished  more,  if  he  had  felt  himself 
really  the  commander  of  the  Ninth  Corps.  With  Burnside 
close  to  him,  he  probably  felt  as  if  he  were  the  mere  tactical 
leader  of  the  corps,  not  thinking  for  it,  but  simply  seeing 
that  it  executed  the  orders  which  came  to  him  from  or 
through  Burnside.  It  is  possible  on  this  theory  to  explain 
the  puzzling  facts  that  so  little  was  known  of  the  ground 
which  Burnside  had  been  ordered,  before  2  P.M.  of  the  16th, 
to  carefully  reconnoitre,  that  Crook  actually  missed  his  way 
to  the  very  bridge  which  he  was  to  carry  by  assault,  and  that 
nothing  or  next  to  nothing  seems  to  have  been  known  about 
the  fords  till  they  were  searched  for  under  fire.  Why,  when 
the  difficulties  of  the  ground  must  have  been  so  apparent,  the 
bridge  was  not  turned  by  the  lower  fords,  the  existence  of 
which  at  least  was  known,  instead  of  being  carried  with  such 
loss  of  time  and  men,  does  not  appear,  and  it  is  as  hard  to  ex- 


118  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

plain  why,  when  "Willcox  was  sent  across,  his  troops  were  not 
sent  partly  by  the  ford  which  Burriside  says J  Crook  found, 
and  partly  by  the  bridge,  instead  of  all  by  the  bridge.  Why, 
in  brief,  did  it  take  Burnside's  four  divisions,  with  their 
powerful  artillery,  from  six  to  seven  hours  to  get  across  the 
stream  and  form  line  upon  the  heights  above  ?  Finally,  how 
did  it  happen  that  when  the  three  divisions  with  their  guns 
had  crossed  and  formed  and  begun  their  advance,  no  such 
tactical  precautions  were  taken  as  to  enable  them  to  present 
a  front  in  a  moment  to  a  flank  attack  on  the  left?  Prob 
ably  it  was  not  thought  of;  probably  all  attention  was 
concentrated  on  the  enemy  in  front  and  on  the  right.  The 
scales  were  inclining  rapidly  in  favor  of  the  North. 
Sharpsburg  was  almost  occupied,  Lee's  line  of  retreat 
gravely  compromised.  A  Confederate  battery  had  been 
taken,  a  Confederate  brigade  and  division  had  been  driven 
in.  It  must  have  been  because  all  eyes  were  turned  in  this 
direction  that  the  advance  of  A.  P.  Hill  was  not  seen.  If  it 
had  been,  nothing  would  have  been  easier  than  to  form  up 
the  first  brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division  to  meet  it,  and 
with  a  fresh  brigade  so  formed,  and  a  battery  or  two  to  aid, 
Hill's  five  brigades,  weary  with  their  rapid  march  of  seven 
teen  miles,  would  have  found  a  good  deal  of  serious  work 
laid  out  for  them  before  they  could  join  in  the  main  battle 
against  the  victorious  Ninth  Corps.2  But  it  was  not  to  be, 
and  for  the  second  time  that  day  a  Federal  division  was 
broken  for  want  of  protection  to  its  flank.  It  is  hardly  too 


>  c.  c.  w.,  i.,  640. 

2  The  instructed  reader  will  not  need  to  be  reminded  of  the  care  of  their  flanks 
taken  by  great  commanders.  Napoleon's  detaching  Lobau  to  his  right  at  Water 
loo  is  a  familiar  instance.  The  whole  Federal  army  knew  of  the  capture  of  Har 
per's  Ferry.  It  was  most  probable  that  some  of  the  Confederates  would  hasten 
from  there  to  Sharpsburg  by  the  bridge  at  the  iron  works,  and  so  come  on  tho 
left  of  the  Ninth  Corps. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  119 

much  to  say  that  for  the  second  time  that  day  a  victory  was 
lost  for  want  of  protection  to  the  flank  of  a  division. 

Tactically,  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  was  a  drawn  battle, 
with  the  advantage  inclining  slightly  to  the  side  of  the  Fed 
erals,  who  gained  some  ground  and  took  more  trophies  than 
they  lost.  The  Confederates,  however,  held  most  of  the 
ground  on  which  they  fought,  and  held  it  not  only  to  the 
close  of  the  battle,  but  for  more  than  twenty-four  hours 
after,  and  then  retired,  unmolested  and  in  good  order. 
The  steady  tramp  of  their  retreating  columns,  like  the 
steady  flowing  of  a  river,  was  heard  all  through  the  still 
night  of  the  18th  of  September,  as  they  streamed  along  the 
road  to  the  Shepherdstown  ford  of  the  Potomac.  But,  for 
an  invading  army,  a  drawn  battle  is  little  less  than  a  lost 
battle,  and  so  it  was  in  this  case.  Lee  drew  off  successfully 
and  defiantly,  but  the  invasion  of  Maryland  was  at  an  end. 

Of  McClellan's  conduct  of  this  battle  there  is  little  to  bo 
said  in  the  way  of  praise  beyond  the  fact  that  he  did  fight 
it  voluntarily,  without  having  it  forced  upon  him.  After 
his  interminable  delays  upon  the  Peninsula,  his  action  at 
South  Mountain  and  Sharpsburg  shows  progress.  He 
formed  a  plan  of  battle  which  was  respectable  but  rather 
vague,  and  could  not  have  been  called  brilliant,  even  if  it 
had  been  crowned  with  brilliant  success.  He  fought  his 
battle  one  day  too  late,  if  not  two.  His  orders  were  not 
well  adapted  to  the  success  of  his  plan,  and  he  did  very  lit 
tle  in  the  way  of  compelling  the  execution  of  the  orders 
which  he  did  give.  He  passed  the  whole  day,  till  toward 
the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  when  all  the  fighting  was  over, 
on  the  high  ground  near  Fry's  house,  where  he  had  some 
glasses  strapped  to  the  fence,  so  that  he  could  look  in  dif 
ferent  directions.  He  made  absolutely  no  use  of  the  mag 
nificent  enthusiasm  which  the  army  then  felt  for  him.  By 


120  ANTIETAM  AND  FRBDERICKSBURG. 

the  use  which  he  made  of  the  First  Corps  on  the  16th,  he 
told  Lee  where  the  blow  was  to  fall.  By  his  orders  in  re 
gard  to  the  Twelfth  and  Second  Corps,  he  made  it  certain 
that  the  three  corps  would  not  act  in  unison  the  next  morn 
ing.  By  giving  the  charge  of  his  main  attack  to  Sumner, 
he  placed  the  lives  of  tens  of  thousands  and  the  destiny  of  a 
great  day  of  battle,  with  all  its  far-reaching  issues,  in  the 
hands  of  an  excellent  elderly  man  who  eighteen  months  be 
fore  had  had  no  wider  experience  than  that  of  a  colonel  of 
cavalry,  instead  of  in  the  hands  of  the  man  whom  the  Presi 
dent  had  made  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
He  let  Burnside  have  his  own  way  so  completely  on  the  left, 
that  his  divisions  were  not  ready  to  advance  upon  the  enemy 
till  seven  hours  after  the  order  was  sent  to  him  to  carry  the 
bridge  and  move  on  Sharpsburg.  Finally,  and  what  one  is 
tempted  to  call  worst  of  all,  because  it  was  the  throwing 
away  of  an  almost  certainly  winning  card  at  the  end  of  a 
game  which  he  had  so  far  lost  by  error  after  error,  he 
made  so  little  use  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  that  the 
total  losses  of  their  four  divisions  and  of  the  artillery 
reserve  was  less  than  six  hundred  men.  It  has  been 
seen  that  all  his  movements  of  troops  were  without  con 
nection  and  were  successive.  The  First  Corps  finished  its 
fighting  before  the  Twelfth  Corps  became  engaged.  One  of 
the  best  soldiers  in  the  Twelfth  Corps  has  recently  asserted 
with  e'mphasis  that  the  Twelfth  Corps  received  no  assistance 
from  the  First,  "none  whatever,"  and  his  evidence  must  be 
accepted  so  far  as  the  first  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps 
(in  which  he  held  a  command),  is  concerned.  The  Second 
Corps  went  in  when  the  Twelfth  Corps  had  about  finished ; 
its  leading  division  went  forward  entirely  alone  and  re 
ceived  its  punishment  entirely  alone.  It  might  as  well  have 
been  in  another  county  for  any  direct  aid  it  received  from 


THE  ANTIETAM.  121 

the  rest  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  other  two  divi 
sions  of  the  Second  Corps  became  engaged  later,  and  not 
quite  simultaneously,  and  not  with  close  connection.  The 
Ninth  Corps  got  actively  to  work  some  hours  later  still. 
The  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  not  only  not  used,  either  of 
them,  as  a  whole,  but  only  used  at  all  by  breaking  them  up 
into  pieces  no  one  of  which  exceeded  a  division,  if  indeed 
it  can  with  fairness  be  asserted  that  any  whole  division  of 
these  corps  was  used  as  a  unit,  or  anything  like  it. 

The  time  when  Lee  was  probably  in  the  greatest  danger 
was  when  Franklin  had  come  up  in  the  rear  of  the  centre. 
The  loss  of  life  in  Jackson's  two  divisions  and  in  the  divi 
sions  of  Hood  and  D.  H.  Hill  had  been  awful.  There  was  a 
good  deal  of  fight  left  in  the  Second  Corps,  Franklin's  corps 
was  almost  fresh,  and  all  of  Porter's  was  entirely  so,  while 
Pleasonton  had  a  considerable  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery 
ready  to  take  a  hand.  There  is  a  story — probably  apocry 
phal,  for  it  is  not  like  Jackson — that  he  said,  when  his  men 
finally  entered  the  West  Woods,  "  We  will  .die  here."  There 
is  no  question  that  after  the  Federals  had  crossed  the 
sunken  road,  the  danger  to  Lee  was  extreme.  D.  H.  Hill 
says  that  there  were  no  troops  left  to  hold  the  centre  except 
a  few  hundred  rallied  from  various  brigades,  that  the 
Yankees  had  got  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  hill 
which  commanded  Sharpsburg  and  the  Confederate  rear. 
"  Affairs  looked  very  critical."  *  Franklin  wished  to  attack, 
and  made  his  preliminary  dispositions  for  doing  so,  but 
Sumner  first  and  then  McClellan  forbade  the  resumption  of 
offensive  operations.  It  is  probable,  almost  to  the  point  of 
certainty,  that  if  a  good  part  of  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps 
and  all  the  Sixth  Corps,  animated  by  the  personal  presence 


1  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  117. 

V.— 6 


122  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

of  McClellan,  had  attacked  vigorously  in  the  centre,  and 
Burnside  on  the  Federal  left,  leaving  part  of  Porter's  Corps 
and  Pleasonton's  command  to  hold  the  centre  and  cover 
the  trains,  the  result  would  have  been  the  practical  annihila 
tion  of  Lee's  army.  But  Sumner,  brave  as  he  was  person 
ally,  was  demoralized  by  the  hard  fighting,  loss  of  life, 
stubborn  defence,  and  dashing  offensive  action  which  he 
had  witnessed,  and  he  displayed  the  same  wrant  in  his  nature 
which  he  had  displayed  before  at  Fair  Oaks.  McClellan, 
too,  made  the  same  mistake  which  he  had  made  before  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  and  accepted  the  judgment  of  his  lieutenant 
instead  of  deciding  for  himself.  Both  McClellan  and  Sum 
ner  exhibited  their  deficiency  in  those  qualities  which  ap 
pear  to  be  Grant's  most  valuable  endowments — absolutely 
clear  perception  of  the  end  to  be  attained,  absolute  insensi 
bility  to  cost  so  long  as  the  end  appears  attainable,  and 
never  forgetting  and  always  acting  upon  the  theory  that 
when  both  sides  are  about  exhausted,  then  is  the  time  to 
push,  and  that  he  who  pushes  then  will  find  the  other  side 
give  way.  In  criticising  McClellan,  however,  such  weight 
as  it  deserves  is  to  be  given  to  his  extraordinary  estimate  of 
his  adversary's  numbers,  but  it  is  true,  as  has  already  been 
suggested,  that  if  he  believed  his  own  statements,  prudence 
of  the  commonest  kind  would  have  forbidden  any  attack  at 
all.  Only  one  word  more  remains  to  be  said  about  McClellan, 
and  that  is  that  the  instant  he  decided  not  to  resume  offen 
sive  operations  on  the  right  centre  and  right,  he  should 
have  used  every  man  and  gun  he  could  possibly  spare  from 
Porter  and  Franklin  to  co-operate  in  the  attack  of  the  Ninth 
Corps,  by  moving  out  to  the  south  of  the  Keedysville  pike, 
where  Pleasonton's  horse  artillery  and  Sykes's  regulars  had 
made  an  opening  for  an  energetic  movement  to  the  left 
front  of  the  Federal  centre. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  123 

Porter  has  been  blamed  for  his  inaction  at  the  Antietam, 
but  absolutely  without  reason.  The  commander  of  one  of 
several  corps  acting  together  cannot  do  as  he  likes,  or  ac 
cording  to  his  individual  judgment.  He  must  take  his 
orders  from  the  commander-in-chief,  and  this  is  precisely 
what  Porter  did.  A  considerable  part  of  Sykes's  division  of 
his  corps  was  used  by  Pleasonton,  under  orders  from 
McClellan,  to  support  the  horse-artillery  and  cavalry  imme 
diately  in  front  of  Sharpsburg,  and  they  not  only  performed 
this  duty,  but  drove  the  Confederate  skirmishers  back  to 
their  reserves.  Miller's  battery  and  Warren's  brigade  were 
sent  to  Burnside  on  the  left,  and  two  brigades  of  Morell's 
division  were  sent  to  Sumner  on  the  right.  These  detach 
ments  were  not  carried  into  action,  but  their  absence  re 
duced  Porter's  command  to  4,000  men,  and  so,  when  later  in 
the  afternoon  Pleasonton  asked  him  for  a  division  to  press 
a  success  he  fancied  he  had  won,  Porter  not  only  could  not, 
under  his  orders,  comply  with  his  request,  but  actually  had 
not  the  division  to  send  him.  His  duty  was,  with  what 
troops  were  left  him,  to  guard  the  artillery  and  trains  and 
the  line  of  retreat,  supply,  and  communication  of  the  army, 
and  not  to  risk  the  safety  of  the  centre  and  perhaps  imperil 
the  result  of  the  day,  by  complying  with  the  request  of  an 
officer  who  was  not  even  a  corps  commander,  who  was  his 
inferior  in  rank,  and  whose  request  had  not  received  the 
approval  of  the  general  commanding.  His  duty  at  the 
Antietam  must  have  been  trying  and  mortifying,  but  he  did 
it  faithfully. 

In  painful  contrast  to  the  passive  attitude  of  the  princi 
pal  Federal  army  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  is  the  un 
doubted  fact  that  the  indomitable  Lee  and  Jackson,  un 
affected  by  the  terrible  losses  which  their  troops  had 
suffered,  actually  the  one  ordered  and  the  other  attempted 


124  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

to  execute  that  afternoon  a  turning  movement  on  the  Fed 
eral  right.  Stuart  had  the  advance  in  this  movement,  and 
he  was  reinforced  by  the  Forty-eighth  North  Carolina  of 
Walker's  division,  and  the  light  Latteries  of  French  and 
Branch,  and  perhaps  by  Semmes's  brigade,  though  this  is 
not  clear.  The  Federal  artillery  was  found  so  judiciously 
established  in  their  front,  and  so  near  to  the  Potomac,  that 
it  was  thought  inexpedient  to  hazard  the  attempt.  It 
should  also  be  stated  in  this  connection  that  the  plan  of  a 
general  Confederate  advance  in  the  afternoon  was  at  least 
considered,  but  the  idea  was  abandoned  because  the  strength 
of  McClellan's  position,  the  field  of  fire  offered  to  his  artil 
lery,  the  presence  of  his  fresh  troops,  and  the  fact  that  a 
Confederate  advance  would  enforce  concentration  upon  his 
reserves,  while  the  Confederates  had  no  reserves  and  were 
much  exhausted,  both  men  and  ammunition,  all  combined 
to  make  it  appear  injudicious. 

As  the  sun  sank  to  rest  on  the  17th  of  September,  the 
last  sounds  of  battle  along  Antietam  Creek  died  away.  The 
cannon  could  at  last  gfow  cool,  and  unwounded  men  and 
horses  could  enjoy  rest  and  food,  but  there  were  thousands 
already  sleeping  the  sleep  that  knows  no  waking,  and  many 
times  as  many  thousands  who  were  suffering  all  the  agonies 
that  attend  on  wounds.  The  corn  and  the  trees,  so  fresh 
and  green  in  the  morning,  were  reddened  with  blood  and 
torn  by  bullet  and  shell,  and  the  very  earth  was  furrowed 
by  the  incessant  impact  of  lead  and  iron.  The  blessed 
night  came,  and  brought  with  it  sleep  and  forgetfulness  and 
refreshment  to  many ;  but  the  murmur  of  the  night  wind, 
breathing  over  fields  of  wheat  and  clover,  was  mingled  with 
the  groans  of  the  countless  sufferers  of  both  armies.  Who  can 
tell,  who  can  even  imagine,  the  horrors  of  such  a  night, 
while  the  unconscious  stars  shone  above,  and  the  uncon- 


THE  ANTIETAM.  125 

scions  river  went  rippling  by  ?  A  very  gallant  officer,  who 
had  played  out  his  part  well,  though  drooping  over  his  horse's 
neck  with  the  weakness  of  oncoming  typhoid  fever,  lost  his 
senses  as  the  shadows  deepened,  and  groped  about  the  bat 
tle-field  all  night,  so  far  as  his  failing  strength  would  let 
him,  turning  up  to  the  stars  the  faces  of  the  dead  men,  to 
try  to  find  his  missing  brother.  But  death  is  merciful,  and 
comes  to  the  relief  of  many  ;  and  man  is  merciful,  and  the 
wounded  had  not  very  long  to  wait  for  care. 

One  question  calls  for  some  discussion,  and  it  may  as  well 
receive  attention  here.  The  question  is,  Did  the  Southern 
men  fight  better  than  the  Northern  men,  and  if  they  did, 
why  did  they  ?  These  questions  are  interesting,  but  they  are 
also  difficult,  and  they  should  be  answered  with  diffidence. 
What  is  said  here  is  offered  rather  as  a  contribution  to  the 
discussion  of  the  subject,  than  as  an  absolute  solution  of  the 
problem.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  proposition  that 
greater  results  were  habitually  achieved  by  a  certain  num 
ber  of  thousands  or  tens  of  thousands  of  Lee's  army  than 
by  an  equal  number  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The 
reason  for  this  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  difference  of 
patriotic  zeal  in  the  two  armies.  The  first  reason  probably 
was  that  the  different  modes  of  life  at  the  South  and  at  the 
North  made  the  Southern  soldiers  more  fond  of  fighting  than 
the  Northern  men.  Not  to  mention  the  intenser  and  more 
passionate  character  of  the  Southerner  as  compared  with 
that  of  the  Northerner,  the  comparatively  lawless  (not  to 
speak  invidiously)  life  at  the  South,  where  the  population 
was  scattered,  and  the  gun  came  ready  to  the  hand,  made 
the  Southern  man  an  apter  soldier  than  the  peaceful,  pros 
perous,  steady-going  recruit  from  the  North.  The  South 
erners  showed  that  they  felt  the  gaudium  certaminis.  With 
the  Northerners  it  was  different.  They  were  ready  to  obey 


126  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

orders,  they  were  ready  to  do  the  work  to  which  they  had  set 
their  hands,  they  were  ready  to  die  in  their  tracks  if  need  be, 
but  they  did  not  go  to  battle  as  to  a  feast.  With  officers  and 
men  it  was  the  same.  They  did  not  like  fighting.  Sheridan, 
Hancock,  Humphreys,  Kearny,  Ouster,  Barlow,  and  such  as 
they,  were  exceptions,  but  the  rule  was  otherwise. 

Another  reason  may  probably  be  found  in  the  needy  con 
dition  which  was  common  among  the  Southerners.  Their 
stomachs  were  not  seldom  empty,  their  backs  and  feet  ill- 
clothed  and  ill-shod,  while  the  Northern  soldiers  were 
abundantly  provided  with  everything.  "  I  can  whip  any  army 
that  is  followed  by  a  flock  of  cattle,"  said  Jackson,  and  it  was 
a  pregnant  saying.  A  sermon  might  be  preached  upon  that 
text.  It  is  known  that  the  Southerners  were  eager  to  take 
everything  of  value  from  the  persons  of  the  corpses  which 
came  into  their  possession,  even  to  boots,  shoes,  and  cloth 
ing,  and  they  were  far  from  nice  in  their  treatment  of  their 
prisoners.  A  field  won  meant  to  them  not  only  a  field  won, 
but  clothing  for  body  and  feet,  food,  money,  watches,  and 
arms  and  equipments  as  well.  To  the  Northerners  a  field 
won  meant  simply  a  field  won.  In  this  difference  it  is  almost 
certain  there  existed  a  powerful  motive  to  stimulate  the  avid 
ity  with  which  the  Southerners  went  into  action.  The  South 
erners  were  not  only  gallant  soldiers,  but  they  were  keen  plun 
derers  as  well.  This  is  no  fanciful  statement.  In  this  veiy 
battle  of  the  Antietarn,  a  medical  officer  of  Sedgwick's  division 
was  shot  dead  as  he  was  tending  a  wounded  man  of  his  regi 
ment  close  to  the  front  line,  and  his  body  was  plundered 
almost  before  the  breath  left  it,  and  thus  a  watch  which  he  was 
carrying  till  an  opportunity  should  present  itself  for  returning 
it  to  the  relatives  of  its  dead  owner,  a  field  officer  of  a  Georgia 
regiment  who  died  in  our  hands,  went  back  into  the  Confed« 
eracy  in  a  way  which  was  neither  expected  nor  desired. 


THE  ANTIETAM.  127 

Enough  has  already  been  written  to  show  that  this  was  a 
bloody  battle,  with  terrible  losses  to  some  of  the  commands 
engaged.  General  McClellan  reported  that  he  lost,  on  the  16th 
and  17th,  2,010  killed,  9,416  wounded,  and  1,043  missing,  a 
total  of  12,469.  Sedgwick's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  were 
tlia  principal  sufferers  in  his  army.  Their  total  loss  was 
2,255,  of  whom  355  were  killed.  The  Confederate  loss  was 
not  known  with  accuracy.  McClellan  reported  that  2,700  of 
their  dead  were  counted  and  buried  by  his  officers,  and 
that  a  portion  had  been  previously  buried  by  their  comrades. 
From  the  losses  they  report,  it  is  probable  that  their  total 
loss  must  have  at  least  equalled  the  Federal  loss.  But,  as 
Swinton  says,  it  is  needless  to  sound  deeper  in  this  sea  of 
blood.  McClellan  captured  a  good  many  prisoners  and 
colors  and  a  few  guns. 

General  McClellan  decided  not  to  renew  the  attack  on  the 
18th.  It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  state  his  reasons.  It  has 
been  already  strongly  urged  that  he  ought  to  have  fought  out 
the  battle  on  the  17th,  and  there  do  not  appear  to  have  ex 
isted  any  better  reasons  for  energetic  action  on  the  following 
day,  except  that  two  divisions  then  joined  him  after  a  hard 
march.  The  fault  was  in  the  man.  There  was  force  enough 
at  his  command  either  day,  had  he  seen  fit  to  use  it.  The 
most  important  change  in  the  position  of  troops  which  took 
place  on  the  18th  was  the  movement  of  MorelPs  division  of 
the  Fifth  Corps.  In  answer  to  some  far  from  plucky  repre 
sentations  of  Burnside,  McClellan  directed  that  Morell's 
division  should  be  placed  on  the  east  side  of  the  Antietam, 
near  Burnside's  Bridge.  "  Late  in  the  afternoon,"  he  says, 
"I  found  that,  although  he  had  not  been  attacked,  General 
Burnside  had  withdrawn  his  own  corps  to  this  side  of  the 
Antietam,  and  sent  over  Morell's  division  alone  to  hold  the 
opposite  side."  General  McClellan  lets  this  extraordinary 


128  ANTIETAM   AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

proceeding  pass  without  comment.  Humphreys's  division  of 
new  troops,  marching  with  commendable  rapidity  from 
Frederick,  arrived  on  the  18th,  and  took  Morell's  place. 
Conch,  also,  having  nearly  reached  Maryland  Heights,  was 
countermarched,  pressed  forward,  and  reached  the  field 
early  the  same  day.  Orders  were  given  by  McClellan  for  a 
renewal  of  the  attack  at  daylight  on  the  19th,  but  at  day 
light  on  the  19th  Lee  was  gone. 

On  the  19th,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  ordered  to  support  the 
cavalry.  It  was  found  that  the  Confederates  beyond  the 
river  had  artillery  well  posted  to  cover  the  fords.  Porter 
determined  to  clear  the  fords  and  to  try  to  capture  some 
guns.  He  lined  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Potomac  with  skir 
mishers  and  sharpshooters,  supported  them  by  the  divisions 
of  Morell  and  Sykes,  and  by  guns  so  posted  as  to  command 
the  opposite  bank.  Volunteers  from  the  Fourth  Michigan, 
One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania,  and  Eighteenth 
and  Twenty-second  Massachusetts,  crossed  the  river  under 
the  charge  of  General  Griffin.  Sykes  was  ordered  to  ad 
vance  a  similar  party,  but  by  some  misunderstanding  the 
orders  did  not  reach  him  seasonably.  The  attempt  was 
made  at  dark,  and  resulted  in  the  capture  of  five  guns  and 
some  of  their  appurtenances.  Among  the  guns  taken  was 
one  of  Battery  D  of  the  Fifth  Artillery,  which  had  been  lost 
at  the  first  Bull  Eun.  A  reconnoissance  in  force  was  sent 
across  the  river  the  following  morning,  at  seven  o'clock, 
tinder  Morell  and  Sykes.  The  cavalry  ordered  to  co-ope 
rate,  failed  to  do  so,  and  the  enterprise  was  unsuccessful. 
The  troops  were  attacked  sharply,  and  driven  back  across 
the  river  with  considerable  loss,  the  loss  falling  principally 
upon  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania.1 

1  It  lost  in  all  282  out  of  800,  of  whom  04  were  killed.  It  had  been  in  the  ser 
vice  just  three  weeks.  It  was  known  as  the  "  Corn  Exchange  Regiment." 


THE  ANTIETAM.  129 

Nine  or  ten  Confederate  brigades  took  part  in  this  affair, 
and  the  Confederates  seem  to  believe  that  it  ended  with  "  an 
appalling  scene  of  the  destruction  of  human  life."  '  Jack 
son,  whose  words  these  are,  must  have  been  imposed  upon 
by  A.  P.  Hill,  who  had  charge  of  the  operation,  and  whose 
report  contains  these  assertions :  "  Then  commenced  the 
most  terrible  slaughter  that  this  war  has  yet  witnessed. 
The  broad  surface  of  the  Potomac  was  blue  with  the  float 
ing  bodies  of  our  foe.  But  few  escaped  to  tell  the  tale.  By 
their  own  account,  they  lost  3,000  men  killed  and  drowned 
from  one  brigade  alone."  2 

Or  art  thou  drunk  with  wine,  Sir  Knight, 
Or  art  thyself  beside  ? 

The  reader  with  a  taste  for  figures  will  observe  that  this 
tale  of  deaths  in  one  brigade  alone  wants  only  ten  of  being 
a  thousand  more  than  all  the  men  killed  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  16th  and  17th  of  September. 

The  movements  of  the  two  armies  in  the  seven  weeks 
which  followed  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  do  not  require 
minute  description.  Both  armies  needed  rest.  Lee  gradu 
ally  withdrew  his  troops  to  the  vicinity  of  Bunker  Hill  and 
Winchester,  and  busied  himself  to  some  extent  with  the  de 
struction  of  those  railroads  which  would  have  been  of  assist 
ance  to  the  Federals  in  the  occupation  of  the  Valley.  His 
army  seems  to  have  increased  rapidly,  so  that  it  numbered 
on  the  20fch  of  October  67,805  officers  and  men  of  the  three 
arms.  McClellan  devoted  his  attention  to  guarding  the 
line  of  the  Potomac,  and  to  the  equipment  and  reorganiza 
tion  of  his  command.  There  is  truth  in  his  statement  that 
he  succeeded  to  the  command  of  a  force  a  large  part  of 
which  had  been  badly  beaten,  and  was  in  all  respects  in  a 


A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  105. 

6- 


130  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

poor  condition.  In  the  respect  of  hard  marching  and  hard 
fighting,  its  experiences  had  been  less  hard  than  those  of  the 
Confederates.  He  said  that  the  means  of  transportation  at 
his  disposal  were  inadequate  to  furnish  a  single  day's  sup 
ply  of  subsistence  in  advance,  and  that  he  thought  it  im 
proper  to  place  the  Potomac,  a  stream  liable  to  rise  sud 
denly,  between  himself  and  his  base  of  supplies.  He  wanted 
horses,  shoes,  clothing,  and  blankets,  and  he  wanted  all  the 
"  old  troops  that  could  possibly  be  dispensed  with  around 
Washington  and  other  places,"  and  he  repeated  his  assertion 
that  in  the  recent  battles  the  enemy  was  greatly  superior  in 
number.  Indeed,  his  tone  leaves  much  to  be  desired.  He 
was  far  more  ready  to  seek  excuses  for  doing  nothing  than 
to  make  what  he  had  go  as  far  as  possible.  It  never  seems 
to  occur  to  him  that  the  wants  he  felt  were  felt  by  Lee  in  a 
greater  degree.  Why  he  could  not  supply  himself,  though 
across  the  Potomac,  so  long  as  he  held  Harper's  Ferry,  he 
does  not  say.  He  even  permitted  himself,  on  September 
23d,  to  make  the  pitiful  assertion  "  General  Sunnier  with 
his  corps  and  Williams's  occupies  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  sur 
rounding  heights.  I  think  he  will  be  able  to  hold  his  posi 
tion  till  reinforcements  arrive."  If  there  was  a  doubt  about 
the  ability  of  the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps,  with  Maryland 
Heights  in  their  possession,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  to  back  them,  to  hold  their  position,  it  was 
time  for  McClellan  to  place  his  army  in  a  fortified  camp. 

By  the  Gth  of  October  the  President  had  become  impa 
tient,  so  much  so  that  Halleck,  the  General-in-Chief,  was 
instructed  to  telegraph  McClellan  as  follows  :  "  The  Presi 
dent  directs  that  you  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to 
the  enemy  or  drive  him  south.  .  .  ."  This,  however, 
did  not  move  McClellan,  and  on  the  10th  of  October  Stuart 
crossed  the  Potomac,  above  Wllliainsport,  with  orders  to 


THE  ANTIETAM.  131 

"  endeavor  to  ascertain  the  position  and  designs  of  the  ene 
my."  He  penetrated  as  far  as  Chambersburg,  which  he 
occupied  for  a  time,  destroyed  public  property,  made  the 
entire  circuit  of  the  Federal  army,  and  recrossed  the  Poto 
mac,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy,  without  any  material 
loss.  Thus  for  the  second  time  a  force  of  Confederate  cav 
alry  rode  all  around  McClellan's  army.  The  latter  exploit  was 
the  more  noteworthy,  and  the  more  discreditable  to  McClel- 
lan,  because  the  raid  was  made  on  Union  territory. 

There  was  undoubtedly  great  delay  in  the  arrival  of  sup 
plies,  and  as  the  story  is  told,  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the 
temptation  to  believe  that  the  delays  were  unnecessary,  and 
would  not  have  existed  had  headquarters  at  Washington 
been,  not  to  say  friendly  to  McClellan,  but  loyal  to  the  gen 
eral  commanding.  At  last,  however,  near  the  end  of  Octo 
ber,  affairs  were  in  such  condition  that  McClellan  began  to 
put  his  troops  in  motion.  He  determined  to  select  the  lino 
east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  to  guard  the  upper  Potomac  by 
leaving  the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Harper's  Ferry,  with  three 
brigades  of  infantry  and  some  cavalry  extending  up  the 
river  to  Cumberland  and  Hancock.  The  crossing  com 
menced  on  the  26th  of  October,  and  was  not  completed  till 
the  2d  of  November.  Heavy  rains  and  the  distribution  of 
supplies  that  arrived  late,  delayed  the  movement.  The 
army  advanced  parallel  to  the  Blue  Kidge,  taking  Warren- 
ton  as  the  point  of  direction,  and  seizing  the  passes  to  the 
westward  as  it  advanced,  and  guarding  them  as  long  as  they 
would  enable  the  Confederates  to  trouble  its  communications 
with  the  Potomac.  It  depended  upon  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Berlin  for  supplies  until  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad  was 
reached.  That  reached,  the  passes  in  rear  were  to  be  aban 
doned,  supplies  were  to  be  drawn  from  Washington  by  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  and  the  Manassas  Gap 


132  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Bailroad,  and  the  army  massed  for  action  or  for  movement 
in  any  direction.  It  is  as  well  to  give  McClellan's  expecta 
tions  in  his  own  words,  especially  as  his  words  are  both  sur 
prising  and  somewhat  hard  to  understand. 

It  was  ray  intention  if,  upon  reaching  Ashby's  or  any  other  pass,  I 
found  that  the  enemy  were  in  force  between  it  and  the  Potomac  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  to  move  into  the  Valley  and  endeavor  to 
gain  their  rear. 

I  hardly  hoped  to  accomplish  this,  but  did  expec.t  that  by  striking 
in  between  Culpeper  Court  House  and  Little  Washington,  I  could 
either  separate  their  army  and  beat  them  in  detail,  or  else  force  them  to 
concentrate  as  far  back  as  Gordonsville,  and  thus  place  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  position  either  to  adopt  the  Fredericksburg  line  of  ad 
vance  upon  Richmond,  or  to  be  removed  to  the  Peninsula,  if,  as  I  ap 
prehended,  it  were  found  impossible  to  supply  it  by  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad  beyond  Culpeper. 

These  sentences  are  a  tempting  theme,  but  want  of  space 
makes  it  inconvenient  to  consider  them,  and  McClellan  did 
not  have  the  opportunity  to  show  whether  his  expectations 
were  well  founded.  Late  on  the  night  of  the  7th  Novem 
ber,  he  received  an  order  relieving  him  from  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  directing  him  to  turn  it 
over  to  General  Burnside.  The  position  in  which  he  left 
the  army,  and  the  position  which  Lee's  army  then  occupied, 
may  well  be  stated  when  the  story  of  General  Bumside's 
career  as  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  taken  up. 

To  relieve  McClellan  of  his  command  so  soon  after  he  had 
forced  Lee  out  of  Maryland,  was  hard  measure.  He  had 
succeeded  to  the  command  when  Pope  had  been  very  badly 
beaten,  and  when  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  guns  had  been 
plainly  audible  at  Washington.  He  had  rapidly  raised  the 
troops  from  a  condition  of  much  discouragement  and  de 
moralization,  and  made  of  them  a  compact  and  efficient 


THE  ANTIETAM.  133 

force.  Within  ten  days  after  he  left  Washington,  he  had 
led  this  army  against  Lee's  rear  guard  in  the  South  Moun 
tain  passes,  and  had  driven  it  from  them,  and  had  fought  a 
great  battle  against  Lee's  entire  army,  in  which  he  had  so  far 
gotten  the  advantage  that  the  Confederate  invasion  of  Mary 
land  had  come  to  an  immediate  end.  He  had  since  those 
battles  gradually  advanced  his  army  to  a  position  in  which 
it  both  interposed  itself  between  Lee  and  the  Capital,  and 
was  at  least  fairly  well  placed  for  offensive  action.  And 
yet  it  can  hardly  be  wondered  at  that  he  lost  his  place.  His 
interminable  and  inexcusable  delays  upon  the  Peninsula 
afforded  just  ground  for  dissatisfaction,  and  they  seemed,  to 
say  no  more,  to  be  followed  by  similar  delays  upon  the 
Potomac.  He  had  done  much  to  justify  the  charge  that 
he  was  a  political  general.  He  had  probably  offended  many 
influential  men  of  the  perfervid  type  of  Charles  Surnner  and 
Governor  Andrew.  His  correspondence  with  Washington 
had  been  often  uncomfortable,  sometimes  acrimonious,  and 
once  at  least  unwarrantable.  The  mildest  of  Secretaries  of 
War  was  not  likely  to  forget  the  sentence,  "You  have  done 
your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army,"  which  closed  his  despatch 
of  June  28  to  Secretary  Stanton,  and  Secretary  Stanton  was 
far  from  being  the  mildest  of  Secretaries  of  War.  The  evil 
habit  then  prevailed  among  civilians  in  high  places  of  en 
couraging  communications  from  the  Adullamites  of  the  army, 
and  detraction  was  probably  unceasing  among  the  mauvaises 
langues  of  the  time.  Hooker  was  open  in  his  denunciations  of 
McClellan  as  "  a  baby,"  and  such  things  as  Hooker  said  openly 
others  probably  said  with  more  prudence.  So  the  "  young 
Napoleon,"  the  popular  idol  of  1861,  was  removed  from  the 
command  of  the  army  for  which  he  had  done  so  much,  and 
while  it  seems  that  hard  ineasiire  was  meted  to  him,  there  is 
more  ground  for  sympathy  than  there  is  for  wonder. 


134  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

These  pages  contain  many  outspoken  criticisms  of  his 
military  career.  They  are  the  expression  of  conclusions  ar 
rived  at  with  deliberation  by  one  who  began  as  a  passionate 
enthusiast  for  him,  who  has  made  his  campaigns  the  subject 
of  much  study  and  thought,  and  who  has  sought  only  to 
compare  the  facts  of  those  campaigns  with  the  established 
principles  of  the  military  art.  There  is  no  occasion  to  re 
peat  those  criticisms  here,  but  it  may  be  well  to  add  to 
them  what  the  writer  has  said  in  another  place  in  print,  that 
there  was  in  McClellan  a  sort  of  incapacity  of  doing  any 
thing  till  an  ideal  completeness  of  preparation  was  reached, 
and  that  the  prevalence  of  the  connnander-in-cJiief  idea  was 
always  pernicious  to  him,  so  that,  from  first  to  last,  he  never 
made  his  personal  presence  felt  on  a  battle-field.  With  the 
further  remark  that  he  seems  to  have  been  totally  devoid  of 
ability  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  the  numerical  strength  of 
his  opponent,  our  adverse  criticisms  come  to  an  end,  and  it 
is  a  relief  to  keep  silence  no  longer  from  good  words. 

It  is  little  to  say  that  his  character  was  reputable,  but  it 
is  true.  He  was  a  courteous  gentleman.  Not  a  word  was 
ever  said  against  his  way  of  life  nor  his  personal  integrity. 
No  orgies  disgraced  headquarters  while  he  was  in  command. 
His  capacity  and  energy  as  an  organizer  are  universally  re 
cognized.  He  was  an  excellent  strategist  and  in  many 
respects  an  excellent  soldier.  He  did  not  use  his  own  troops 
with  sufficient  promptness,  thoroughness  and  vigor,  to 
achieve  great  and  decisive  results,  but  he  was  oftener  suc 
cessful  than  unsuccessful  with  them,  and  he  so  conducted 
affairs  that  they  never  suffered  heavily  without  inflicting 
heavy  loss  upon  their  adversaries.  It  may  appear  a  strange 
statement  to  follow  the  other  matter  which  this  volume  con 
tains,  out  it  is  none  the  less  true,  that  there  are  strong  grounds 
for  believing  that  he  was  the  best  commander  the  Army  of 


THE  ANTIETAM.  135 

the  Potomac  ever  had.  No  one  would  think  for  a  moment  of 
comparing  Pope  or  Burnside  or  Hooker  with  him.  The  great 
service  which  Meade  rendered  his  country  at  Gettysburg, 
and  the  elevated  character  of  the  man,  are  adverse  to  too 
close  a  scrutiny  of  his  military  ability.  As  for  Grant,  with 
his  grim  tenacity,  his  hard  sense,  and  his  absolute  insensi 
bility  to  wounds  and  death,  it  may  well  be  admitted  that 
he  was  a  good  general  for  a  rich  and  populous  country  in  a 
contest  with  a  poor  and  thinly  peopled  land,  but  let  any 
educated  soldier  ask  himself  what  the  result  would  have 
been  if  Grant  had  had  only  Southern  resources  and  Southern 
numbers  to  rely  on  and  use,  and  what  will  the  answer  be? 
"While  the  Confederacy  was  young  and  fresh  and  rich,  and 
its  armies  were  numerous,  McClellan  fought  a  good,  wary, 
damaging,  respectable  fight  against  it.  He  was  not  so  quick  in 
learning  to  attack  as  Joe  Johnston  and  Lee  and  Jackson  were, 
but  South  Mountain  and  the  Antietam  showed  that  he  had 
learned  the  lesson,  and  with  longer  possession  of  command, 
greater  things  might  fairly  have  been  expected  of  him.  Not 
to  mention  such  lamentable  failures  as  Fredericksburg  and 
Chancellorsville,  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  with  him  in  com 
mand,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  never  have  seen  such 
dark  days  as  those  of  the  Wilderness  and  Cold  Harbor.  At  the 
same  time  it  must  be  admitted  that,  in  such  a  war  as  the  War 
of  Secession,  it  would  probably  have  been  impossible  to  retain 
in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  a  man  who  was  not 
only  a  Democrat,  but  the  probable  Democratic  candidate  for 
the  Presidency  at  the  next  election,  and  that  his  removal  was 
therefore  only  a  question  of  time.  A  growing  familiarity  with 
his  history  as  a  soldier  increases  the  disposition  to  regard  him 
with  respect  and  gratitude,  and  to  believe,  while  recognizing 
the  limitations  of  his  nature,  that  his  failure  to  accomplish 
more  was  partly  his  misfortune  and  not  altogether  his  fault. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FREDERICKSBURG. 

WHEN  General  McClellan  was  relieved,  he  had  already 
given  the  orders  for  the  movements  of  the  8th  and  9th  No 
vember.  These  orders  were  carried  into  effect  without 
change,  and  when  General  Burnside  assumed  command,  on 
the  9th,  general  headquarters  and  the  bulk  of  the  army  were 
at  Warrenton,  with  the  Ninth  Corps  advanced  to  the  line  of 
the  Eappahannock,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Waterloo,  and 
the  cavalry  farther  in  advance  to  the  front  and  left.  The 
Sixth  Corps  was  at  New  Baltimore,  about  six  miles  in  rear 
of  Warrenton.  The  Eleventh  Corps  and  Sickles's  division  of 
the  Third  Corps,  which  had  by  this  time  joined  the  army 
from  Washington,  were  posted,  the  former  in  the  triangle 
formed  by  New  Baltimore,  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Gaines 
ville,  and  the  latter  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  from  Man- 
assas  Junction  to  Warrenton  Junction.  Longstreet's  Corps 
of  the  Confederate  army  had  been  moved  across  the  Blue 
Eidge  as  soon  as  McClellan's  intentions  were  developed,  and 
was  by  this  time  at  Culpeper  Court  House.  One  of  Jack 
son's  divisions  had  also  been  moved  to  the  east  side  of  the 
Blue  Eidge,  but  the  others,  those  of  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill, 
appear  to  have  remained  in  the  Valley,  between  Winchester 
and  Strasburg.  It  was  by  mutual  agreement  between  Burn- 
side  and  McClellan  that  the  latter  remained  in  command  of 
tho  army  till  the  9th,  and  that  his  orders  for  the  concentra- 


FREDERICKSBURG.  137 

tion  of  the  army  near  Warrenton  were  carried  out  without 
change. 

Soon  after  Burnside  assumed  command,  he  submitted  a 
plan  of  operations  to  Halleck,  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
him.  Halleck  did  not  approve  the  plan,  and  came  himself 
to  Burnside's  headquarters  at  Warrenton,  where  they  had 
long  consultations  on  the  12th  and  13th.  They  failed  to 
agree,  and  the  matter  was  left  to  the  decision  of  the  Presi 
dent.  (On  the  14th^ Halleck  telegraphed  Burnside  that  the 
President  assented  to  his  (Burnside's)  plan.  This  plan  was, 
in  brief,  to  impress  upon  the  enemy  the  belief  that  he  was 
to  attack  Culpeper  or  Gordonsville,  and  at  the  same  time 
Accumulate  a  four  or  five  days*  supply  of  food  and  forage; 
then  to  nuiko  a  rapid  move  of  the  whole  force  to  Fredericks- 
burg,  with  a  view  to  a  movement  upon  Richmond  from  that 
point.  This  plan  of  Burnside's  went  into  considerable  de 
tail  ;  it  was  delivered  to  the  chief  of  staff  in  Washington  on 
the  llth.  It  contained  the  statement,  not  made  very  promi 
nent,  thuj;  pontoon  trains  enough  to  span  the  Eappahannock 
with  two  tracks  should  precede  a  train  of  wagons  which  he 
said  it  was  necessary  should  start  at  once  from  Washington 
or  from  Alexandria,  by  way  of  Dumfries,  with  small  rations, 
and  a  herd  of  beef  cattle.  General  Burnside  says  that,  in 
his  personal  interview  with  Halleck,  he  told  him  that  he 
relied  upon  him  to  see  that  such  parts  of  his  plan  as  re 
quired  action  in  Washington  should  be  carried  out,  and  that 
Halleck  told  him  that  everything  required  by  him  should 
receive  his  attention,  and  that  he  would  at  once  order  by 
telegraph  the  pontoon  trains  spoken  of  in  his  plan,  and 
would,  upon  his  return  to  Washington,  see  that  they  were 
promptly  forwarded.  Moreover,  Halleck's  telegraph,  in 
forming  Burnside  of  the  President's  assent  to  his  plan,  con 
tained  these  words :  "He  thinks  it  (i.e.,  Burnside's  plan)  will 


138  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

succeed  if  yon  move  rapidly,  otherwise  not."  Bumside  re 
ceived  the  despatch  of  the  14th  on  the  same  day,  at  11  A.M., 
and  at  once  issued  orders  for  the  different  commands  to 
move.  His  army  was  now  divided  into  three  "  grand  divi 
sions."  The  Eight  Grand  Division,  under  Sumner.  composed 
of  the  Second  and  Ninth  Corps,  started  at  daylight  on  the 
morning  of  the  15th,  the  Centre  and  Left  Grand  Divisions  and 
the  cavalry  on  the  16th.  General  Franklin  commanded  the 
Left  Grand  Division,  composed  of  the  First  and  Sixth  Corps, 
and  General  Hooker  the  Centre  Grand  Division,  composed  of 
the  Third  and  Fifth  Corps.  A  numerous  artillery  accom 
panied  each  division  in  these  grand  divisions.  The  total 
present  for  duty  of  the  army  on  the  10th  of  November  is 
said  to  have  been  127,574  officers  and  men. 


General  Simmer's  command  reached  Falrnouth,  opposite 
Fredericksburg,  on  the  17th.  General  Franklin,  on  the 
18th,  concentrated  his  command  at  Stafford  Court  House, 
ten  miles  northeast  of  Fredericksburg,  and  near  Acquia 
Creek,  an  affluent  of  the  Potomac.  General  Hooker's  com 
mand  moved  to  Hartwood,  ten  miles  or  less  northwest  of 
Fredericksburg,  arriving  there  on  the  19th.  The  cavalry 
was  in  the  rear,  and  covering  the  fords  of  the  Kappahannock 
further  up  the  stream. 

/~  General  Burnside's  whole  plan  was  based  upon  the  expec 
tation  of  an  immediate  occupation  of  Fredericksburg.  Once 
there,  he  proposed  to  organize  his  wagon  trains  and  fill 
them  with  at  least  twelve  days'  provisions,  and  then  make  a 
rapid  and  direct  movement  upon  Eichmond.  As  events 

1  shaped  themselves,  it  has  become  unnecessary  to  consider 
his  chances  of  success  in  pursuing  this  plan.  Grant's  cam 
paign  of  1864  will  readily  supply  abundant  illustration  to 
;  the  instructed  reader.  The  promised  pontoons  did  not  arriva 
till  the  25th,  eight  days  after  Sumner  reached  the  river.  As 


FREDERICKSBURG.  139 

this  is  a  history  of  what  was  done  and  not  of  wrhat  might  ) 
have  been  done,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  endeavor  to  deter-  / 
mine  where  the  blame  should  be  laid,  but,  in  justice  to 
Burnside,  it  should  be  said  that  the  fault  does  not  appear  to 
have  boon  his.  General  Sunnier  proposed,  as  soon  as  ho 
^arrived,  to  cross  a  portion  of  his  force  over  the  fords,  with  a 
view  to  taking  Fredericksburg,  but  Burnside  decided  that  it 
was  impracticable  to  cross  large  bodies  there,  and  he  was 
afraid  to  cross  small  bodies.  It  is  almost  certain  that  in  so 
deciding  ho  made  a  serious  mistake.  There  was  a  Confed 
erate  garrison  at  Fredericksburg,  but  its  strength  is  un 
known.  On  the  15th  of  November,  Lee  sent  a  regiment  of 
infantry  and  one  battery  to  reinforce  it.  It  is  not  stated 
when  they  arrived,  but  as  the  Fifteenth  Virginia  Cavalry, 
four  companies  of  Mississippi  infantry,  and  Lewis's  battery, 
were  there  when  Stunner  arrived,  it  is  probable  that  the  re 
inforcements  arrived  there  before  he  did.  Yet  fifteen  bri 
gades  and  thirteen  batteries  are  a  powerful  force,  and  as  the 
Eight  Grand  Division  contained  over  twenty  New  England 
regiments,  it  is  a  fair  presumption  that  Yankee  craft  was  not 
wanting,  and  that  if  there  had  been  an  earnest  will  to  cross 
the  Rappahannock,  the  way  would  have  been  found,  and 
that  the  landing  once  effected,  there  was  force  enough  to 
make  it  certain  that  there  would  have  been  no  letting  go  of 
the  hold.  It  is  both  possible  and  probable  that  if  Burn- 
side  had  permitted  Sumner  to  cross  the  Bappahannock  on 
the  17th  of  November,  the  costly  and  useless  sacrifices  of 
the  llth  and  13th  December  might  have  been  spared.  But 
Sumner  was  not  allowed  to  cross,  and  the  very  day  that  he 
reached  Falmouth,  Lee,  hearing  of  his  movement,  sent  Me-  {' 
Laws's  and  Eansom's  divisions,  accompanied  by  W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  Lane's  battery,  to  the  town. 
Further  instructed  by  a  forced  reconnoissance  made  by 


140  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Stuart,  he  put  the  rest  of  Longstreet's  corps,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  19th,  in  motion  for  the    same  point.     Thus  it 
\    happened  that  before  the  pontoons  arrived,  the  Confederates 
j  had  concentrated  a  large  force  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
;  river,  and  Burnside  thought  that  it  had  become  "  necessary 
to  make  arrangements  to  cross  in  the  face  of  a  vigilant  and 
formidable  foe."     It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  him 


to  inquire  whether  Lee*s  army  was  all  in  front  of  him,  and. 
if  not,  where  the  rest  of  them  were,  and  if  it  was  not  possi 
ble  for  him,  with  his  large  army,  to  turn  the  strong  position 
in  his  front,  and  at  the  same  time  interpose  himself  between 
jjongstreet  and  Jackson,  between  the  First  and  Second  Corps 
x^of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.     As  a  matter   of  fact, 
(     Jackson  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  Orange  Court  House, 
\    nearly  forty  miles  west  of  Fredericksburg,  till  about  the 
|   26th  of  November,  when  he  was  directed  to  advance  toward 
1  Fredericksburg.     D.  H.  Hill's  division  was   sent   to   Port 
s  Royal,  on  the  Rappahannock,  a  considerable  distance  be 
low  Fredericksburg,  upon  a  report  that  Federal  gunboats 
had  appeared  in  the  river,  and  the  rest  of  Jackson's  Corps 
was  so  disposed  as  to  support  Hill  or  Longstreet  as  occasion 
might  require.     Lee's  cavalry,  under  Hampton  and  W.  H. 
F.    Lee,   guarded  the  river   above   and  below    the    town. 
Nothing  of  importance  occurred  on  either  side  during  the 
last  days  of  November  and  the   first  days  of  December. 


xBurnside  busied  himself  in  accumulating  supplies  and  pre- 
paring  for  the  movement  which  he  had  determined  to  make, 
and  Lee  in  strengthening  his  lines,  which  extended  along  a 
range  of  hills  in  the  rear  of  the  town,  from  about  a  mile  and 
a  half  above  it  to  the  Richmond  Railroad  below.  As  these 
hills  were  lower  than  the  hills  in  possession  of  the  Federals 
on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  earthworks  were  constructed 
upon  their  crests,  at  the  most  eligible  positions.  The  nar- 


FREDERICKSBURG.  141 

rowness  of  the  Eappaliannock  and  its  deep  bed  presented 
opportunities  for  laying  down  bridges  at  points  secure  from 
the  fire  of  the  Confederate  artillery,  while  the  plain  of 
Fredericksburg  is  so  completely  commanded  by  the  Stafford 
Heights,  that  no  effectual  opposition  could  be  made  to  the 
construction  of  bridges  or  the  passage  of  the  river,  without 
exposing  the  Confederate  troops  to  the  destrnctive  fire  of  the 
numerous  Federal  batteries.  For  'these  reasons,  Lee  s?* 
lected  a  position  with  a  view  to  resist  the  Federal  advance 
after  they  should  have  crossed,  and  guarded  the  river  with  a 
force  sufficient  only  for  impeding  their  movements  enough 
to  afford  him  time  for  concentration. 

It  is  a  familiar  military  maxim  that  a  general  should 
never  do  what  his  adversary  wishes  him  to  do.  There  prob 
ably  never  was  an  occasion  since  the  first  body  of  troops  was 
arrayed,  when  a  general  did  more  precisely  what  his  adver 
sary  wished  him  to  do  than  Burnside  did  at  Fredericksburg. 
When  the  Confederates  began  to  fortify  the  heights  in  the 
rear  of  Fredericksburg  is  uncertain,  as  it  is  uncertain  just 
when  the  last  of  Lee's  army  arrived  there,  but  their  advance 
was  -there  nearly  a  month  before  the  battle,  and  their  last 
arrivals  probably  a  fortnight  before  it.  Lee's  present  for 
duty  December  10, 1862,  was  78,228.  Seventy  or  eighty  thou 
sand  men,  working  with  a  will,  throw  up  perfectly  sufficient 
earthworks  in  a  very  few  days,  not  to  mention  the  assistance 
which  the  Confederates  probably  had  from  working  parties  cf 
blacks.  There  was  probably  nothing  that  the  engineering 
talent  of  the  Confederacy  could  supply,  wanting  to  the 
completeness  of  their  defence  on  the  13th  of  December,  18G2. 

A  statement  of  Swinton 1  is   directly   to  the  effect  that 

Burnside  hoped  to  be  able  to  fight  no  battle  at  Fredericks- 

t 

i  A.  r.,p.  233. 


7 


142  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

burg  in  December,  but  to  be  permitted  to  pass  the  winter 
there  comfortably,  and  in  the  spring  to  embark  his  army  for 
the  James  River.  If  such  were  his  wishes,  they  were  to  his 
credit,  for  little  certainly  could  be  expected  from  an  offensive 
movement  against  Lee,  posted  as  he  was,  in  December  of  all 
seasons.  The  result  of  McClellan's  enterprise  two  months 
before,  when  Lee  occupied  a  much  weaker  position  with  a 
much  weaker  army,  was  an  instructive  lesson.  But  it  is 


probable  that  the  public  temper  and  the  wishes  of  the  ad- 
ministration  made  a  movement  so  imperative,  that  it  would 
have  required  a  leader  of  much  sterner  mould  than  Burnside 
to  declare  that  the  thing  must  not  be  done.  Whatever  the 
causes  that  impelled  him,  and  whether  willingly  or  unwil 
lingly,  Bumside  determined  to  cross  the  river  and  attack 
Lee.  The  mere  crossing  presented  no  serious  difficulties. 
The  important  questions  were  where  he  should  cross,  in 
what  force,  and  what  he  should  do  when  he  was  across. 

The  town  of  Falmouth,  which  was  in  front  of  the  centre  of 
the  Federal  positions,  is  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  a  little  above  Fredericksburg.  The  Confederate 
army  occupied  Fredericksburg,  and  a  ridge  extending  from 
above  the  Falmouth  Ford  to  Massaponax  River,  five  miles 
below  the  town.  The  ridge  forms  an  angle  with  the  river, 
passes  behind  the  town,  and  is  itself  overlooked  by  another 
ridge  behind  it.  Between  the  ridge  and  the  river  extends 
the  plain  on  which  the  town  stands.  It  is  narrow  in  its  upper 
portion,  but  grows  wrider  as  it  approaches  the  Massaponax. 
The  whole  length  of  the  ridge  is  about  six  miles,  t  The  Rich 
mond,  Fredericksburg,  and  Potomac  Railroad  passes  through 
the  town,  follows  the  general  course  of  the  river  for  three 
miles  or  more,  at  an  average  distance  of  a  mile  to  the  west 
ward,  and  then  turns  southward.  /  The  old  Richmond  stage 
runs  about  half  way  between  the  railroad  and  the  river 


..Cochleys 


The  Field  of  Frcdericksburg. 


FREDERICKSBURG.  143 

for  about  three  miles  from  the  town,  and  then  turns  sharply  I 
to  the  south,  and  crosses  the  railroad  at  the  southeastern  ex-  I 
trcmity  of  the  ridge.    This  point  is  called  Hamilton's  Cross- 1 
ing.   /The  telegraph  road  runs  from  the  southwestern  part     . 
of  tne  town,  and  pursues  a  circuitous,  but  generally  south 
westerly  direction,  which  carries  it  across  the  ridgeV  The  I 
plaiik  road  is  the  old  county  road,  which  crosses  the  river,  V 
continues   through  the  town  under  the  name   of  Hanover 
Street,  and  thence  proceeds  in  a  generally  westerly  direction 
through  Chancellorsville  to  Orange  Court  House/  The  plain 
between  the  river  and  the  ridge  slopes  gently  upward  to  the 
base  of  the  latter,  and  it  is  broken  slightly  by  low  ridges, 
shallow  ravines,  and  fences./  Behind  his  first  line  of  works, 
Lee  had  made  or  improved  a  communicating  road  from  the  / 
old  llichmond  road  to  the  telegraph  road./ 

It  is   fortunate   that  the  task  proposed  is  to  tell  what 
Burnside  did,  and  not  what  he  might  have  done.     To  attack     i 
Lee  and  Jackson  and  Longstreet  and  78,000  Confederates  in    / 
a  position  of  their  own  choosing  and  of  their  own  fortifying,  / 
was  an  enterprise  which  would  tax  the  powers  of  the  ablest  I 
commander,  and  the  possible  plans  of  operation  were  re-  I 
duced  within  very  narrow  limits  by  the  fact  that  Burnside  [ 
finally  determined  not  to  attempt  to  flank  his  opponent  out 
of  his  position,  but  to  cross  at  points  which  were  only  two 
miles  apart,  and  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  chosen  position. 
He  had  abandoned  strategy,  and  tied  himself  down  to  nar 
row  tactical  possibilities,  and  crossing  as   he   did,  it  was 
simply  a  question  whether  his  attack  or  attacks  should  bo 
more  or  less  directly  in  front. 

Singular  as  the  statement  may  appear,  it  seems  to  be  true 
that  Burnside  formed  no  definite  ]jlan  of  battle  at  all.  At 
the  very  last  moment,  after  his  orders  had  been  given  for 
the  troops  to  be  ready  to  move,  with  the  requisite  amount  of 


144  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ammunition  and  supplies,  lie  abandoned  the  project,  which 
he  had  entertained  till  then,  of  crossing  at  Skinker's  Neck, 
ten  miles  or  so  below  the  town,  and  determined  to  throw 
his  bridges  two  at  a  point  opposite  the  upper  part  and  one 
near  the  lower  part  of  the  town,  and  one  or  two  a  mile  or  so 
below  the  town.  He  ordered  his  Grand  Division  command 
ers  to  concentrate  their  troops  near  the  proposed  bridges, 
Sumner  near  the  upper  and  middle  bridges,  with  Hooker  in 
his  rear,  and  Franklin  at  the  bridge  or  bridges  below  the 
town.  The  bridges  were  to  be  thrown  on  the  morning  of 
le  llth.  How7  ill-defined  and  shadowy  his  plans  were,  may 
be  gathered  from  his  own  language  in  his  official  report : 
"  I  hoped  to  be  able  to  seize  some  point  on  the  enemy's  line 
near  the  Massaponax,  and  thereby  separate  his  forces  on  the 
river  below  from  those  occupying  the  crest  or  ridge  in  rear 
of  the  town."  If  it  had  been  sure,  or  probable,  that  the 
bridges  would  be  thrown  without  opposition  or  delay,  the 
army  passed  rapidly  across,  and  the  attack  made  at  once, 
this  would  have  been  vague  enough,  but  these  are  violent 
suppositions.  That  the  throwing  of  the  bridges  would  be 
opposed  and  delayed  was  reasonably  certain,  but  suppose 
them  laid  without  opposition.  The  laying  of  four  or  five 
bridges  capable  of  bearing  a  great  army  is  a  work  of  some 
time,  and  the  crossing  of  bridges  is  like  passing  a  defile. 
To  pass  100,000  men  with  a  numerous  artillery  over  four  or 
five  bridges  is  as  far  as  possible  from  being  a  short  or  easy 
affair  in  a  season  of  profound  peace,  and  when  there  are 
scores  of  long-range  rifled  guns  ready  to  fire  upon  every 
head  of  a  column  as  it  debouches  from  its  bridge,  a  serious 
complication  is  brought  into  the  affair,  and  it  was  as  certain 
as  anything  future  that  as  soon  as  it  was  announced  that  the 
engineers  were  at  work  on  the  bridges,  the  whole  Confeder 
ate  army  would  be  on  the  alert,  and  that  if  the  movement 


FREDERICKSBURG.  145 

appeared  to  be  serious,  any  troops  that  might  be  "on  the 
river  below  "  would  be  promptly  called  on  to  move  to  tho 
scene  of  action  as  swiftly  as  their  swift  Southern  legs  could 
carry  them,  and  it  was  altogether  probable  that  they  would  ; 
not  arrive  too  late.  And  when  it  is  remembered  that  the 
bridges  were  not  thrown  early  on  the  llth,  and  that  the 
attack  was  not  made  nor  the  army  crossed  that  day,  and 
that  the  attack  was  not  made  the  following  day,  nor  until 
more  than  forty-eight  hours  after  work  on  the  bridges  was 
begun,  it  will  be  clear  that  all  dreams  of  a  surprise  had 
vanished,  and  that  the  circumstances  were  well  suited  to 
filling  the  minds  of  Burnside's  lieutenants  with  grave  mis 
giving. 

""  General  Hunt  was  chief  of  artillery  in  Burnside's  army.  In 
that  capacity  he  had  charge  of  all  the  guns  on  the  Federal  side 
of  the  river.  "  In  order,"  he  says,  "  to  control  the  enemy's 
movements  on  the  plain,  to  reply  to  and  silence  his  batteries 
along  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  to  command  the  town,  to 
cover  and  protect  the  throwing  of  the  bridges  and  the  cross 
ing  of  the  troops,  and  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  army 
from,  attacks  in  the  direction  of  the  Massaponax  River,  it 
was  necessary  to  cover  the  entire  length  with  artillery, 
posted  in  such  positions  as  were  favorable  to  these  pur 
poses."  To  attain  these  ends,  General  Hunt  placed  forty 
rifled  guns,  of  which  six  were  20-poundcr  Parrotts,  on  the 
right,  from  Falinouth  down  to  a  ravine  about  five  hundred 
yards  below  Falmouth.  From  the  ravine  to  the  neighbor 
hood  of  the  middle  bridge,  he  stationed  twenty-four  light 
rifles  and  fourteen  light  twelves.  On  the  crest  of  the  high 
ridge  below  the  middle  bridge,  were  twenty-seven  rifled 
guns,  of  which  seven  were  4^-inch  siege  guns,  eight  were 
20-pounder  Parrotts,  and  twelve  were  light  rifles.  On  what 
was  left  of  the  high  ridge,  and  on  the  low  ridge  below,  as 
V.— 7 


146  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

far  as  Pollock's  Mill,  were  eight  20-pounder  Parrotts  and 
thirty-four  3-inch  rifles ;  147  guns  in  all. 

Soon  after  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  llth,  the 
work  of  throwing  the  bridges  was  begun.  One  of  the  lower 
bridges  was  laid  without  much  opposition,  and  was  finished 
by  half -past  ten.  Another  bridge  was  afterward  constructed 
near  it.  One  of  the  upper  bridges,  near  the  Lacy  house, 
and  the  middle  bridge,  were  about  two-thirds  built  at  six 
o'clock,  but  then  the  Confederate  sharpshooters  drove  away 
the  working  parties.  The  morning  was  foggy,  and  the  Fed 
eral  artillery  were  unable  to  fire  with  sufficient  accuracy  to 
drive  away  the  sharpshooters.  About  noon,  the  fog  cleared 
away,  and  all  the  batteries  that  could  be  brought  to  bear 
were  turned  upon  the  town,  and  the  fire  of  these  guns  soon 
checked  the  fire  of  the  concealed  riflemen.  General  Hunt 
suggested  that  advantage  should  be  taken  of  this  opportunity 
to  send  men  over  in  pontoons.  The  suggestion  was  adopted, 
and  the  work  was  gallantly  done  by  the  Seventh  Michigan, 
Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Massachusetts,  and  the  Eighty- 
ninth  New  York.  Under  the  cover  which  their  presence  on 
the  opposite  bank  afforded,  the  throwing  of  the  bridges  was 
resumed,  and  they  were  soon  finished. 

A  very  sharp  experience  befel  a  part  of  Hall's  (Third) 
brigade  of  the  Second  Division,  immediately  after  the  first 
of  the  upper  bridges  was  completed.  The  Seventh  Michi 
gan  and  Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Massachusetts,  which 
had  crossed  in  boats,  belonged  to  his  command.  As  soon  as 
the  first  of  the  upper  bridges  was  completed,  the  three  re 
maining  regiments  of  his  brigade  crossed  by  it.  It  was 
growing  dark,  Howard's  division,  to  which  Hall's  brigade 
belonged,  was  coming  across,  and  the  troops  were  crowding 
into  an  unmanageable  mass  near  the  bridge  head.  Hall 
sent  back  urgent  requests  to  have  the  column  halted  the 


FREDERICKSBURG.  147 

other  side  of  the  river,  to  give  time  (as  he  said)  to  fight  the 
enemy  in  his  own  way,  but  was  ordered  to  push  ahead.  He 
ordered  Captain  Macy,  commanding  the  Twentieth  Massa 
chusetts,  to  clear  the  street  leading  from  the  bridge  at  all 
hazards.  What  follows  is  taken  from  his  official  report :  "  I 
cannot  presume  to  express  all  that  is  due  the  officers  and 
men  of  this  regiment  for  the  unflinching  bravery  and  splen 
did  discipline  shown  in  the  execution  of  the  order.  Pla 
toon  after  platoon  was  swept  away,  but  the  head  of  the  col 
umn  did  not  falter.  Ninety-seven  officers  and  men  were 
killed  or  wounded  in  the  space  of  about  fifty  yards."  Be-j 
sides  Howard's  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  one  brigade  of  I 
the  Ninth  Corps,  also  of  Sumner's  command,  crossed  the  V 
river  above,  and  a  brigade  of  Franklin's  Grand  Division  did 
the  same  below,  and  the  town  was  occupied  before  daylight 
on  the  12th. 

The  12th  was  a  foggy  day.  Surnner's  and  Franklin's  di 
visions  crossed  over  and  took  position  on  the  south  bank. 
Nineteen  batteries,  of  one  hundred  and  four  guns,  passed 
the  river  with  Sumner's  command,  but  most  of  them  could 
not  be  used,  and  were  left  in  the  streets  of  Fredericksburg 
or  ordered  back  across  the  river.  Of  all  the  nineteen,  seven 
were  wholly  or  partially  engaged  the  following  day. 

/•  Twenty-three  batteries,  of  one  hundred  and  sixteen  guns, 
crossed  the  river  at  the  lower  bridges ;  all  but  one  of  these 
batteries  were  engaged,  and  many  of  them  were  engaged 
very  severely.  The  general  position  of  the  troops  whicl 
crossed  was  as  follows :  the  Second  Corps  at  the  town,  on 
the  right,  the  Ninth  Corps  next,  then  the  Sixth  Corps,  and 

Jihen  the  First.     All  these  troops,  excepting  two  divisions  of  J 
the  First  Corps,  were  formed  parallel  to  the  river.     Meade's 
division  of  the  First  Corps  was  formed  at  right  angles  to  the 
rest  of  the  army,  facing  southeast,  his  right  touching  the 


148  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

left  of  Gibbon  of  the  same  corps,  and  his  left  resting  on 
the  river  near  Smithfield.  Doubleday's  division  of  the  same 
corps  was  in  reserve,  formed  in  column  on  the  bank  of  tho 
river  in  rear  of  Meade's  left.  It  could  be  seen  that  the 
Confederates  occupied  with  artillery  and  infantry  the  crests 
of  the  opposite  heights,  and  the  woods  and  railroad  cuts 
opposite  the  Federal  left  with  a  line  of  skirmishers  extend 
ing  from  the  heights  to  a  ravine  and  some  houses  on  the 
river  bank,  opposite  the  extreme  crest  of  hills  on  the  Fed 
eral  left.  These  dispositions  of  the  Federal  troops  were 
made  without  material  interruption.  The  fog  was  dense, 
and  the  Confederate  artillery  could  only  be  used  with  effect 
when  the  occasional  clearing  of  the  mist  rendered  the  Fed 
eral  columns  visible.  Hooker's  division  was  retained  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river  to  support  either  the  right  or  the  left, 
or  to  press  the  enemy  in  case  either  command  should  suc 
ceed  in  moving  him. 

Lee's  forces  were  arranged  with  Longstreet  on  the  left,  with 
Anderson's  division  resting  upon  the  river,  and  the  divisions 
of  McLaws,  Pickett,  and  Hood  extending  to  the  right,  in  the 
order  named.  Eansom's  division  supported  the  batteries  on 
Marye's  and  Willis's  hills,  at  the  foot  of  which  Cobb's  bri 
gade,  of  McLaws's  division,  and  the  Twenty-fourth  North 
Carolina,  of  Eansom's  brigade,  were  stationed,  protected  by  a 
stone  wall.  The  immediate  care  of  this  point  was  committed 
to  General  Eansom.  The  Washington  artillery,  under  Col 
onel  Walton,  occupied  the  redoubts  on  the  crests  of  Marye's 
Hill,  and  those  on  the  heights  to  the  right  and  left  were  held 
by  part  of  the  reserve  artillery,  Colonel  E.  P.  Alexander's 
battalion,  and  the  division  batteries  of  Anderson,  Eansom, 
and  McLaws.  A.  P.  Hill,  of  Jackson's  corps,  was  posted  be 
tween  Hood's  right  and  Hamilton's  Crossing  on  the  railroad. 
His  front  line,  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Pender,  Lane, 


FREDER1CKSBURG.  149 

and  Archer,  occupied  the  edge  of  a  "wood.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Walker,  with  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery,  was  posted 
near  the  right,  supported  by  the  Thirty-fifth  and  Fortieth 
Virginia  regiments,  of  Field's  brigade,  commanded  by  Col 
onel  Brockenbrough.  Lane's  brigade,  thrown  forward  in 
advance  of  the  general  line,  held  the  woods  which  here  pro 
jected  into  the  open  ground.  Thomas's  brigade  was  stationed 
behind  the  interval  between  Lane  and  Fender,  and  Gregg's 
in  rear  of  that  between  Lane  and  Archer.  These  two  bri 
gades,  with  the  Forty-seventh  Virginia  regiment  and  Twen 
ty-second  Virginia  battalion  of  Field's  brigade,  constituted 
A.  P.  Hill's  reserve.  Early's  and  Taliaferro's  divisions  com 
posed  Jackson's  second  line,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  his  reserve. 
Jackson's  artillery  was  distributed  along  his  line  in  the  most 
eligible  positions,  so  as  to  command  the  open  ground  in 
front.  General  Stuart,  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  his 
horse  artillery,  occupied  the  plain  on  Jackson's  right,  ex 
tending  to  the  Massaponax  River. 

According  to  Eurnside's  report.  Stunner.  Franklin,  and 
Hooker  showed  by  their  morning  reports  of  December  13th, 
about  one  hundred  and  thirteen  thousand  men  present  for 
xhitv.  These  were  either  across  the  river  or  able  to  cross  it 
upon  the  receipt  of  orders.  Lee's  morning  report  showed  his 
present  for  duty  on  December  10th  to  be  upward  of  seventy- 
eight  thousand  men.  Not  to  insist  upon  the  considerations 
heretofore  presented  to  show  that  the  Federals  habitually 
took  into  action  a  vastly  less  number  of  men  in  proportion 
to  their  morning  reports  than  the  Confederates,  113,000 
against  78,000  was  not  a  great  disparity  of  forces  for  an  army 
which  proposed  to  attack  troops  of  at  least  equal  calibre  in 
a  position  of  their  own  choosing,  strong  by  nature,  and  im 
mensely  strengthened  by  art. 

As  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  Bnrnaide's  plan  of  attack,  so 


v> 

\ 

vj<  C 

150  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 


,u;   i 

far  as  lie  had   one,  was  formed  on  the  night   of  December 

x   12th.  He  £ays_himself  :  "  By  the  night  of  the  12th  the  troops 

were  all  in  position,  and  I  visited  the  different  commands 

f\  .1      -.•••.—•    —I    -.!•      .........  A....  !••...••  —  —  ...—     -.•  -.—.-.  .!  •  ••..•.•  .......   -.-.-..-I—..  ..........  II  .... 

with  a  view  to  determining  as  to  future  movements." 
This  in  itself  is  sufficiently  singular,  but  it  may  be  urged 
with  some  slight  show  of  plausibility  that  a  general  com 
manding  a  great  army  could  not  definitely  determine  his 
plan  till  he  came  into  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy. 

tUnf  ortunately  for  Bnrnside*s  reputation,  however,  there  is  no 
where  a  word  said  about  reconnoissances  after  crossing  the 

Driver,  not  a  word  to  indicate  that  he  either  sought  or  ob 
tained  a  particle  of  information  which  he  did  not  possess 
before  crossing  the  river.  General  Franklin  on  the  left  had 
had  placed  under  his  command  more  than  half  of  Burnside's 
army,  comprising  the  First  and  Sixth  Corps,  two  divisions  of 
the  Third  Corps,  Burns's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and 
Bayard's  cavalry,  and  he  asserts  positively  that  at  five  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  General  Burnside  came  to  his 
headquarters,  where  he  met,  besides  himself,  General  Smith, 
commanding  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  General  Eeynolds,  com 
manding  the  First  Corps.  He  says  :  **  The  subject  of  conver 
sation  was  a  proposed  attack  upon  the  enemy  on  the  follow- 
ing  morning,  when  I  strongly  advised  General  Burnside  to 
make  an  attack  from  my  division  upon  the  enemy's  right, 
with  a  column  of  at  least  thirty  thousand  men,  to  be  sent  in 
at  daylight  in  the  morning.'*  He  also  says  that  he  told 
General  Burnside  that  in  order  to  make  such  an  attack,  two 
divisions  of  Hooker's  command,  then  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river,  near  Franklin's  bridges,  must  be  crossed  during 
the  night.  He  says  that  he  reiterated  his  request  that  he 
should  receive  his  orders  as  early  as  possible,  that  he  might 
the  necessary  dispositions  of  the  troops  before  day 


light.     He  also  says  that  Burnside  left  him  at  about  6  P.M., 


FREDERICKSBURG.  151 

and  promised  him  that  he  should  have  his  orders  within  two 
or  three  hours,  or  in  any  event  before  midnight,  and  that  at 
midnight  ho  sent  an  aide  to  ask  for  them,  and  received  the 
reply  that  they  were  preparing  and  would  be  sent  forthwith. 
It  is  admitted  that  he  received  no  orders  till  half  past  seven 
on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  and  these  orders  came  by  the 
hand  of  General  Hardie;  of  General  Eurnside's  staff.  They 
will  be  given  presently.  The  night  had  passed  without 
orders,  and  General  Hooker's  two  divisions  had  remained 
on  the  farther  (Northern)  side  of  the  river. 

It  is  a  pitiful  picture,  but  is  probably  a  true  one,  that 
Burnside  passed  the  evening  of  the  12th  riding  about,  not 
quite  at  his  wits'  end,  but  very  near  it.  As  far  as  can  bemade 
out,  he  finally  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  wouldjittempt 
to  do  something,  he  did  not  quite  know  what,  with  his  left, 
and  if  he  succeeded,  to  do  something  with  his  right.  He 
says  :  "  Positive  information  had  reached  me  that  the  enemy 
had  built  a  new  road  in  rear  of  the  ridge  or  crest,  from  near 
Hamilton's  to  the  telegraph  road.  ...  I  decided  to 
seize,  if  x^ossible,  a  point  on  this  road  near  Hamilton's, 
which  would  not  divide  the  enemy's  forces  by  breaking 
their  line,  but  would  place  our  forces  in  position  to  enable 
us  to  move  in  rear  of  the  crest,  and  either  force  its  evacua 
tion  or  the  capitulation  of  the  forces  occupying  it.  It  was 
my  intention,  in  case  this  point  had  been  gained,  to  push 
Generals  Sumner  and  Hooker  against  the  left  of  the  crest, 
and  prevent,  at  least,  the  removal  of  the  artillery  of  the 
enemy,  in  case  they  attempted  a  retreat."  That  is  to  say, 
operating  with  forces  practically  equal,  used  as  they  were  to 
be  against  an  enemy  in  an  extremely  strong  position,  he 
proposed  to  himself  a  difficult  and  doubtful  enterprise,  and 
intended,  if  that  succeeded,  to  divide  his  forces  in  the  im 
mediate  presence  of  a  powerful  enemy,  concentrated  and 


152  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

strengthened  by  the  very  success  he  hoped  for.  It  is  per 
fectly  plain  that  if  Franklin  had  planted  himself  solidly  at 
the  lower  end  of  the  ridge,  near  Hamilton's  Crossing,  Lee 
would  still  have  had  at  least  nine  chances  in  ten  of  success. 
A  lodgment  there  would  have  made  Sumner's  attack  on  the 
right  no  easier,  and  if  Burnside  had  undertaken  to  pass  his 
troops  round  the  point  of  the  ridge-at  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
with  a  view  either  to  attacking  Lee  in  rear,  or  to  a  direct 
movement  upon  Richmond,  he  would  in  either  case  have  ex 
posed  his  flank  at  the  outset,  and  still  have  had  to  attack 
difficult  heights  with  a  divided  army  if  he  had  chosen  the 
former  course. 

But  bad  and  vague  as  the  plan  was,  the  orders  issued 
were  worse  and  more  vague.  The  orders  which  reached 
Franklin  at  7.30  A.M.  of  the  13th,  after  he  had  passed  a  night 
of  "sleepless  anxiety"  in  his  tent,  were  as  follows : 

HEADQUARTEKS  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC, 
December  13,  1802— 5.55  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL    FRANKLIN,    Commanding   Left    Grand    Division 
Army  of  Potomac  : 

General  Hardie  wi}l  carry  this  despatch  to  you,  and  remain  with 
you  during  the  day.  The  General  Commanding  directs  that  you  keep 
your  whole  command  in  position  for  a  rapid  movement  down  the  old 
Richmond  road,  and  you  will  send  out  at  once  a.  division,  at  least,  to 
pass  below  Smithfield,  to  seize,  if  possible,  the  heights  near  Captain 
Hamilton's,  on  this  side  of  the  Massaponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well 
supported  and  its  line  of  retreat  open.  He  has  ordered  another  column 
of  a  division  or  more  to  be  moved  from  General  Stunner's  command  up 
the  plank  road,  to  its  intersection  with  the  telegraph  road,  where 
they  will  divide,  with  a  view  to  seizing  the  heights  on  both  of  those 
roads.  Holding  those  two  heights,  with  the  heights  near  Captain 
Hamilton's,  will,  he  hopes,  compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  whole 
ridge  between  these  points.  I  make  these  moves  by  columns  distant 
from  each  other,  with  a  view  of  avoiding  the  possibility  of  a  collision  of 


FREDERICKSBURG.  153 

our  own  forces,  which  might  occur  in  a  general  movement  during  the 
fog.  Two  of  General  Hooker's  divisions  are  in  your  rear,  at  the 
bridges,  and  will  remain  there  as  supports. 

Copies  of  instructions  given  to  Generals  Sumner  and  Hooker  will 
be  forwarded  to  you  by  an  orderly  very  soon. 

You  will  keep  your  whole  command  in  readiness  to  move  at  once, 
as  soon  as  the  fog  lifts.  The  watchword,  which,  if  possible,  should  be 
given  to  every  company,  will  be  k '  Scott. " 

1  have  the  honor  to  be,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant, 

JNO.  G.  PAKKE, 

Chief  of  Staff. 


General  Franklin  says  that  in  the  state  of, 
len  it  was  received,   "  General  Burnside's 


This  order  is  exceedingly  hard  to  understand,  even  at 
this  distance  of  time,  and  with  all  the  light  which  has  been 
thrown  upon  it. 
facts  existing  when 
order,  though  incongruous  and  contradictory  on  its  face, 
admitted  of  but  one  interpretation,  viz.,  that  he  intended  to 
make  an  armed  observation  from  the  left  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  enemy — an  interpretation  also  given  to  it 
by  both  of  my  corps  commanders."  Without  assenting  un 
reservedly  to  this  interpretation,  two  propositions  seem  to  be 
safe,  viz. :  that  the  order  meant 

First. — That  Franklin  was  to  keep  his  whole  command  in 
readiness  to  move,  and  that  the  direction  of  the  movement 
was  to  be  down  the  old  Eichmond  road. 

Second. — That  the  seizure  of  the  heights  near  Captain 
Hamilton's  was  hoped  for,  but  not  counted  upon,  as  the  lan 
guage  is  "  to  seize,  if  possible,"  and  the  force  told  off  for  this 
task  is  to  be  kept  well  supported,  with  its  line  of  retreat 
open. 

Under  this  order  it  was  not  open  to  Franklin  to  engage 
his  whole  command.     The  minor  enterprise,  the  seizure  of 
the  heights,  might  have  required  that,  but  the  order  showed 
7* 


154  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

that  that  enterprise  was  considered  one  of  doubtful  issue, 
as  he  was  ordered  to  keep  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  attack 
ing  force  open.  But  the  dominant  feature  of  the  order  was 
the  injunction,  twice  repeated,  to  keep  his  whole  command 
in  position  and  in  readiness.  It  is  idle  to  say  that  a  general 
could  obey  this  order  and  yet  engage  his  whole  command. 
When  a  general  puts  his  troops  in,  it  passes  his  and  all 
human  knowledge  to  know  what  the  result  will  be,  but  it  is 
absolutely  and  unqualifiedly  true  that  he  cannot  both  en 
gage  his  whole  command  and  at  the  same  time  hold  his 
whole  command  in  readiness  to  move  anywhere  or  in  posi 
tion  to  do  anything. 
ft"  General  Franklin  was  practically  ruined  as  a  soldier  by 
\  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  and  his  connection  wTith  it,  but 
")  so  far  as  the  accessible  evidence  enables  one  to  judge,  he 
•  was  most  unjustly  blamed.  If  there  were  a  particle  of  evi 
dence  that  any  discretion  was  left  to  him,  if  we  read  any 
where  that  Burnside  had  said,  "Now,  Franklin,  I  have  given 
you  a  large  force,  and  I  leave  you  to  use  your  best  discre 
tion  as  to  operations  on  my  left,"  or  anything  nearly  or  re 
motely  like  it,  he  might  justly  be  held  liable  to  the  grave 
charge  of  having  lost  the  battle  by  his  own  inaction.  But 
upon  the  evidence  the  charge  is  not  sustained.  More  than 
that,  the  charge  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  orders  given. 
The  fault  was  in  the  orders,  and  not  in  any  failure  on 
Franklin's  part  to  understand  them  or  obey  them.  This 
conclusion  would  be  inevitable  if  the  orders  were  the  only 
evidence  in  the  case,  but,  besides  the  orders,  we  have  Frank 
lin's  statement  of  what  he  said  to  Burnside  the  night  before, 
in  the  presence  of  Smith  and  Keynolds,  which  is  very  im 
portant,  and  also  the  series  of  despatches,  twelve  in  number, 
sent  to  Burnside  by  his  own  staff  officer  who  earned  the 
orders  to  Franklin,  and  was  instructed  to  remain  with  him 


FREDERICKSBURG.  155 

during  the  clay,  at  short  intervals  from  7.40  A.M.  to  2.15  P.M. 

These  despatches  tell  completely,  and  with  very  consider 
able  detail,  just  what  Franklin  was  doing,  and  there  is  abso 
lutely  not  a  suggestion  in  them  that  Hardie  thought  that 
Franklin  had  misapprehended  his  orders,  or  that  his  conduct 
was  in  any  way  or  degree  unsatisfactory.  JWhen  we  couple 
with  this  fact  the  other  fact  that  not  one  word  of  disap 
proval  or  disappointment  was  sent  back  from  Burnside  to 
Franklin  for  six  or  seven  hours,  the  conclusion  is  irresisti 
ble  that  Burnside,  at  the  time,  was  satisfied  with  Franklin's 
construction  and  execution  of  his  orders.  The  obscurity  of 
Burnside's  own  language,  both  in  the  orders  sent  to  Frank 
lin  and  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  is  such  that  it  is  difficult 
^o  determine  what  his  expectations  were,  but  it  seems  to  be 
certain  that  he  expected  that  Franklin's  movement  upon  the 
heights  near  Hamilton's  would  be  a  movement  upon  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Confederates.  If  such  was  his  expecta 
tion,  he  was  all  wrong,  as  will  presently  be  made  to  appear. 
The  general  position  of  Franklin's  Grand  Division  has 
already  been  stated.  Smith's  Sixth  Corps  was  formed  on 
the  right,  with  Brooks's  division  on  the  right  and  Howe's  on 
the  left,  and  Newton's  in  reserve.  Brooks  held  the  Rich 
mond  road  and  Deep  Creek  with  one  line  in  front  of  the 
creek,  while  Howe  occupied  the  crest  of  a  hill  over  which 
the  Richmond  road  ran,  his  right  at  a  sharp  turn  of  Deep 
Creek.  Gibbon's  division  of  the  First  Corps  formed  on  the 
left  of  Howe,  and  Meade's  division,  also  of  the  First  Corps, 
was  formed  facing  to  the  left  of  the  general  position,  his 
right  joining  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  left  of  Gibbon, 
and  his  left  resting  on  the  river  near  Smithfield.  The  re 
maining  division  of  the  First  Corps,  Doubleday's,  was 
formed  on  the  bank  of  the  river  in  rear  of  Meade's  left.  The 
position  of  Smithfield  is  not  easy  to  identify.  ^  It  is  not 


156  ANTIETAM   AND   PREDERICKSBURG. 

marked  upon  the  best  maps.  It  was  probably  a  Virginia 
estate,  and  situated  on  the  Eappahannock,  about  a  mile 
above  the  mouth  of  the  Massaponax.  These  dispositions  of 
the  Left  Grand  Division  were  made,  Franklin  says,  in  compli 
ance  with  the  directions  of  the  commanding  general,  and  the 
very  fact  that  they  were  made,  is  evidence  that  he  was  not 
confident,  when  he  issued  them,  that  such  an  attack  as 
Franklin  was  ordered  to  make  was  to  be  an  attack  upon  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Confederates.  To  form  en  potence  so 
strong  a  force  as  two  divisions,  showed  plainly  that  some 
solicitude  was  felt  as  to  possible  attacks  from,  the  direction 
of  the  Massaponax.  The  sequel  showed  that  these  apprehen- 
sions  were  well  founded.  It  soon  appeared  that  the  Confed 
erates  had  both  artillery  and  infantry  on  Franklin's  left  as 
well  as  in  his  front.  This  fact  is  of  very  great  importance. 
It  is  not  to  be  lost  sight  of  for  a  moment  in  considering 
cLher  Burnside's  plan  or  Franklin's  action.  It  reduced 
Burnside's  plan  to  two  distant  and  isolated  attempts  to 
pierce  the  enemy's  line,  and  it  paralyzed,  pro  tanto,  Franklin's 
action.  It  increased  immensely  the  difficulty  of  the  difficult, 
not  to  say  impossible,  task  assigned  him,  to  seize  a  strong 
point,  keep  the  attacking  force  well  supported  and  its  line 
of  retreat  open,  and  to  keep  his  whole  command  in  readiness 
to  do  another  and  quite  different  thing. 

Franklin  informed  Reynolds  that  his  corps  would  make 
the  attack  indicated,  and  he  ordered  Meade's  division  to  the 
point  of  attack,  with  Gibbon  in  support.  He  thought  it 
impracticable  to  add  Smith's  Corps  to  the  force  detailed  for 
the  attack,  and  he  also  considered  Keynolds's  three  divi 
sions  sufficient  to  carry  out  the  spirit  of  the  order,  the  words 
of  which  were  "  a  division  at  least." 

The  point  indicated  for  Meade's  attack  was  near  the  (Fed 
eral)  left  of  the  ridge,  where  it  terminated  in  the  Massa- 


FREDERICKSBURG.  157 

ponax  Valley.  The  Confederates  occupied  the  wooded 
heights,  the  railroad  in  front  of  them,  and  the  woods  in  front 
of  the  railroad.  On  receiving  its  orders,  the  division 
moved  down  the  river  for  nearly  half  a  mile,  then  turned 
sharp  to  its  own  right,  and  crossed  the  old  Eichmond  (or 
Bowling  Green)  road.  The  column  of  attack  was  formed 
between  nine  and  ten  o'clock,  some  time  having  been  de 
voted  to  removing  fences,  and  to  bridging  the  drains  on 
each  side  of  the  road,  to  admit  of  the  passage  of  the  artil 
lery.  As  Meade's  formation  was  completed,  the  Confeder 
ates  opened  on  him  from  guns  which  reached  his  command 
from  the  left  and  rear,  and  there  was  so  much  strength  de 
veloped  by  the  Confederates  still  further  to  his  left  and  rear 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Massaponax,  that  Doubleday's 
division  was  advanced  in  that  direction  and  did  a  good  deal 
of  fighting  and  gained  some  ground.  As  soon  as  the  firing 
on  the  left  and  rear  had  been  controlled,  and  the  woods 
and  heights  in  front  had  been  smartly  shelled,  Meade  at 
tempted  to  advance  again,  but  again  a  sharp  artillery  fire 
burst  out  from  the  heights  on  his  extreme  left,  and  it  took 
rapid  firing  from  three  batteries  for  thirty  minutes  to 
silence  it.  The  "incomparable  Pelham  "  had  charge  of  at 
least  a  section  of  the  Confederate  guns  which  checked 
Meade's  progress  by  firing  upon  his  left. 

At  last  the  Confederate  guns  were  silenced,  or  silent,  and 
Meade  advanced.  The  first  brigade  succeeded  in  pene 
trating  the  woods,  driving  the  enemy  from  the  railroad  be 
yond,  and  finally  crossed  the  crest  of  the  hill  beyond,  and 
reached  open  ground  on  the  other  side.  With  great  gal 
lantry  and  ardor,  they  had  pressed  back  the  troops  in  front 
of  them,  and  made  or  found  an  interval  between  the  bri 
gades  of  Archer  and  Lane  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  and  forced 
two  regiments  of  the  former  and  the  whole  of  the  latter  to 


158  ANTIETAM  AND  FBEDERICKSBURG. 

give  way.  The  second  brigade  divided  as  it  followed  the 
first  up  the  hill,  to  meet  a  sharp  fire  which  assailed  it  on  both 
flanks,  but  only  a  small  portion  of  it  reached  the  same  point 
as  the  first  brigade.  One  of  its  regiments  took  prisoners 
and  a  color.  The  Third  Brigade  was  checked  by  a  destruc 
tive  .fire  from  the  battery  on  the  left,  its  commander  was 
killed,  and  it  accomplished  little.  Meade's  division  fared  as 
Pickett's  division  fared  at  Gettysburg.  Having  made  a 
most  brilliant  advance,  and  penetrated  the  hostile  line 
more  deeply  than  Pickett's  did,  it  was  enveloped  by  fire 
closing  in  upon  it  from  every  direction,  and  compelled  to 
Withdraw.  But  it  seems  to  have  been  better  commanded  and 
better  supported  than  Pickett's  division  was,  and  instead 
of  losing  seventy -five  per  cent.,  as  Pickett's  division  did,  it 
lost  only  forty  per  cent.,  and  it  captured  several  standards  and 
over  three  hundred  prisoners.  A  brigade  from  Birney's  divi 
sion  on  the  left  and  one  from  Gibbon's  division  on  the  right 
aided  materially  in  the  withdrawal  of  Meade's  line.  It  is  not 
quite  clear  why  Gibbon,  on  the  right  of  Meade,  did  not  ac 
complish  more.  The  wood  was  so  dense  that  the  connec 
tion  between  his  line  and  Meade's  could  not  be,  or  was  not, 
kept  up.J<  At  least  that  reason  is  assigned  by  Franklin,  but 
as  Gibbon  himself  says  that  the  left  of  his  leading  brigade 
wras  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy  posted 
behind  the  railroad  embankment,  and  that  all  (except  the 
Twelfth  Massachusetts)  of  the  brigade  then  ordered  up  in 
support  and  posted  on  the  left  "  soon  fell  into  confusion, 
and  most  of  it  retired  in  disorder,"  it  is  evident  that  a  large 
part  of  his  troops  were  poor,  and  that  the  failure  of  his 
attack  was  mainly  owing  to  the  inferiority  of  his  men.^  After 
all  of  Lyle's  brigade,  and  all  of  Taylor's  except  the  Ninety- 
seventh  New  York  and  Eighty-eighth  Pennsylvania,  had 
given  away,  Boot's  brigade  was  ordered  up.  The  Twelfth 


FREDERICKSBURG.  159 

Massachusetts  and  some  remnants  joined  it,  and  the  force 
advanced  gallantly  and  took  the  embankment  and  some 
prisoners.  But  the  embankment  was  a  long  way  from  the 
coveted  point,  and  a  brigade  and  a  regiment  cannot  cover 
the  ground  or  do  the  work  of  three  brigades.  Gibbon's  di 
vision  failed  to  give  substantial  support  to  Meade,  and 
Meade's  enterprise  was  too  much  for  a  single  division.  The 
Confederate  troops  engaged  in  this  repulse  were  A.  P.  Hill's 
division,  with  the  aid  of  a  large  part  of  Early's  division  (for 
merly  Ewell's),  and  a  small  part  of  Taliaferro's  (formerly  Jack 
son's).  The  reported  loss  of  Gregg's  South  Carolina  bri 
gade,  of  the  second  line,  was  41  killed  and  295  wounded, 
out  of  about  fifteen  hundred.  Gregg  himself  received '  a 
Wound  of  which  he  died  the  following  day. 

Meade  and  Gibbon  were  driven  back  by  2.15  P.M.  After 
an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  reform  Meade's  division  further 
to  the  front  than  the  old  Eichmond  (or  Bowling  Gre,en) 
road,  it  was  marched  to  the  ground  occupied  the  night 
before,  and  there  held  in  reserve.  Gibbon's  division,  Tinder 
Taylor,  Gibbon  having  been  wounded  near  the  wood,  also 
fell  back  to  its  original  position,  p 

Reserving  for  the  moment  such  comments  as  Franklin's 
action  may  seem  to  call  for,  it  may  be  well  to  turn  from  the 
left  to  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  thus  to  ob 
serve,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  the  order  of  time.  It  has  been 
seen  that,  in  compliance  with  Burnside's  order  to  send  out 
"a  division  at  least,"  Franklin  had  sent  out  three  entire  di 
visions,  and  had  had  two  of  them  pretty  completely  used  up. 
He  had  also  used  the  whole  of  Birney's  division  to  resist  the 
enemy  when  they  showed  a  disposition  to  follow  up  the  re 
treat  of  Meade,  and  Sickles's  division  to  relieve  Gibbon's 
division  when  the  latter  fell  back.  These  two  divisions  be 
longed  to  Stoneman's  corps,  the  Third.  K 


160  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDER1CKSBURG. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Burnside  sent  to  Sum« 
ner,  commanding  the  Right  Grand  Division,  the  following 
orders  : 

The  General  Commanding  directs  that  you  extend  the  left  of  your 
command  to  Deep  Run,  connecting  with  General  Franklin,  extending 
your  right  as  far  as  your  judgment  may  dictate.  He  also  directs  that 
you  push  a  column  of  a  division  or  more  along  the  plank  and  telegraph 
roads,  with  a  view  to  seizing  the  heights  in  the  rear  of  the  town.  The 
latter  movement  should  be  well  covered  with  skirmishers,  and  sup 
ported  so  as  to  keep  its  line  of  retreat  well  open.  Copy  of  instructions 
given  to  General  Franklin  will  be  sent  to  you  very  soon.  You  will 
please  await  them  at  your  present  headquarters,  where  he  (the  General 
Commanding)  will  meet  you.  Great  care  should  be  taken  to  prevent  a 
collision  of  our  own  forces  during  the  fog.  The  watchword  for  the  day 
will  be  "  Scott."  The  column  for  a  movement  up  the  telegraph  and  plank 
roads  will  be  got  in  readiness  to  move,  but  will  not  move  till  the  Gen 
eral  Commanding  communicates  with  you. 

These  orders  were  dated  at  6  A.M. 

The  orders  to  Hooker  were  dated  at  7  A.M.,  and  were  as 
follows : 

The  General  Commanding  directs  that  you  place  General  Butter- 
field's  Corps  and  Whipple's  division  in  position  to  cross,  at  a  moment's 
notice,  at  the  three  upper  bridges,  in  support  of  the  other  troops,  over 
the  river,  and  the  two  remaining  divisions  of  General  Stoneman's 
Corps  in  readiness  to  cross  at  the  lower  ford,  in  suppo:t  of  General 
Franklin.  The  General  Commanding  will  meet  you  at  headquarters 
(Phillips's  house)  very  soon.  Copies  of  instructions  to  General  Sum- 
ner  and  General  Franklin  will  be  sent  to  you. 

It  may  be  remarked  upon  the  orders  to  Hooker,  that  the 
instruction  as  to  placing  two  of  Stoneman's  divisions  at  the 
lower  ford  seems  out  of  place,  as  Burnside  states  that  on  the 
evening  of  the  12th  he  ordered  General  Stoneman,  with  two 
divisions  of  his  corps,  to  a  point  near  the  lower  bridge,  as  a 
support  to  General  Franklin.  To  find  a  general-in-chief 


FREDERICKSBURG.  161 

ordering  one  of  his  three  chief  officers,  on  the  morning  of  the 
13th,  to  do  what  he  himself  had  ordered  done  the  evening 
before,  does  not  give  a  high  idea  of  the  clearness  of  head  and 
strength  of  memory  of  the  superior,  nor  of  the  orderly  and 
efficient  management  of  staff  business  at  general  head 
quarters. 

Mlt  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  plank  road  mentioned  in 
the  order  to  Sumner,  is  the  county  road,  which  crosses  the 
Rappahannock  about  seven  hundred  yards  above  the  railroad 
bridge,  continues  through  the  centre  of  the  town  under  the 
name  of  Hanover  Street,1  and  afterward  becomes  the  plank 
road,  extending  through  Chancellorsville  to  Orange  Courb 
House.  West  of  the  town,  and  at  a  distance  of  about  half 
a  mile  from  it,  the  ridge  runs  from  northwest  to  southeast 
for  about  a  mile,  in  a  line  very  accurately  parallel  to  the 
river  and  to  the  length  of  the  town.  Then  it  bends  and  runs 
southerly  for  nearly  half  a  mile.  On  the  high  ground  above 
the  angle  thus  formed,  stands  the  estate  known  as  Marye's. 
The  eastern  boundary  of  this  estate  is  a  road  which  presently 
bends  to  the  west  and  southwest  and  crosses  the  hills  under 
the  name  of  the  telegraph  road.  The  eastern  front  of  tile 
Marye  estate  has  a  retaining  wall  of  stone,  and  another  sim 
ilar  wall,  shoulder  high,  makes  the  eastern  boundary  of  this 
road  in  front.  Earth  was  piled  up  against  the  eastern  face 
of  this  eastern  wall,  and  thus  there  was  formed  the  most  per 
fect  infantry  parapet  conceivable.  It  was  a  better  position 
for  troops  than  the  parapet  of  ordinary  field  works  affords, 
for  while  it  insured  perfect  protection  against  fire  from  the 
front,  it  placed  the  troops  behind  it  perfectly  at  their  ease, 
with  plenty  of  room,  and  a  good,  hard,  flat,  broad  road  be 
neath  their  feet,  while  the  elevation  of  the  ground  in  their 


1  Or  perhaps  Commerce  Street. 


1G2  ANTIETAM  AND  FRBDERICKSBURG. 

rear  gave  an  admirable  position  for  the  sharpshooters  in 
rifle-pits  and  the  guns  in  earthworks.  The  sharpshooters 
and  the  cannoneers  could  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  men  in 
i  the  road  with  absolute  safety  to  them.  It  can  hardly  be 

"\  necessary  to  say  more  of  the  artificial  strength  of  the  whole 
i  position,  whether  at  Marye's  or  above  or  below,  than  that 

/  the  Confederates   had   constructed  rifle-pits,   breast-highs, 

I  earthworks,   and    redoubts,   wherever    they   thought   them 

I  likely  to  be  of  service.  NT 

\Olt  is  to  be  remarked  upon  the  morning  orders  to  Sumner 
and  Hooker  that  they  gave  no  plan  of  battle  at  all.  Hooker 
was  not  even  ordered  to  cross  the  river,  and  Suniner  was 
not  ordered  to  attack,  or  even  to  move,  but  simply  to  get  a 
column  of  "a  division  or  more"  in  readiness  to  move  in  a 
direction  indicated.  The  injunction  to  take  great  care  to 
prevent  a  collision  of  the  Federal  forces,  must  be  taken  to 
mean  a  collision  between  Simmer's  men  advancing  by  the 

/  plank  and  telegraph  roads,  as  Franklin's  men  were  a  long 
way  from  the  nearest  of  these  two  roads,  probably  a  mile 
and  a  half.  The  language  of  Burnside's  orders  to  Sumner 
leads  to  the  belief  that  when  he  spoke  of  a  movement  along 
the  plank  and  telegraph  roads,  he  meant  a  movement  along 
the  county  road  and  the  second  road  through  the  town  to 
the  south,  which  runs  westward  from  the  river  parallel  to 
the  former  and  about  a  sixth  of  a  mile  from  it,  and  then 
runs  out  straight  to  the  Marye  estate. 

General  Burnside  says  that  ho  held  Simmer's  command 
in  position  until  after  eleven  o'clock,  in  the  hope  that 
Franklin  would  make  such  an  impression  upon  the  enemy 
as  would  enable  Sumner  to  carry  the  enemy's  line  near  the 
telegraph  and  plank  roads,  and  that,  "feeling  the  import 
ance  of  haste,  I  now  (i.e.,  at  about  11  A.M.)  directed  General 
Sumner  to  commence  his  attack."  He  adds  "  I  supposed 


FREDERICKSBURG.  1G3 

when  I  ordered  General  Snmner  to  attack,  that  General 
Franklin's  attack  on  the  left  would  have  been  made  before 
General  Simmer's  men  would  be  engaged,  and  would  have 
caused  the  enemy  to  weaken  his  forces  in  front  of  Sumner, 
and  I  therefore  hoped  to  break  through  their  lines  at  this 
point.  It  subsequently  appeared  that  this  attack  had  not 
been  made  at  the  time  General  Sumner  moved.  .  .  .* 
There  is  one  short  and  painful  criticism  to  be  made  upon 
this  statement.  It  cannot  be  true.  Burnside  could  not  sup-  / 
pose,  when  he  ordered  Sumner  to  attack,  that  General  Frank 
lin's  attack  on  the  left  would  have  been  made  before  General 
Sumner's  men  would  be  engaged.  His  own  report  proves 
it.  He  gave  his  orders  to  Sumner  to  commence  the  attack 
very  near  11  A.M.,  if  not  before.  Sumner  says  that  his  ad 
vance  division  moved  at  11  A.M.,  but  he  probably  puts  the 
hour  too  early,  though  Lee  says,1  that  he  moved  forward 
about  11  A.M.  The  last  despatch  from  Hardie,  Burnside's 
own  staff  officer  with  Franklin,  which  was  sent  before  11, 
was  dated  9.40  A.M.  It  told  him  that  cannon  on  the 
left,  playing  upon  Eeynolds's  advance,  in  rear  of  his  first 
line,  caused  him  to  desist  the  advance.  Hardie's  next  de 
spatch  is  dated  11  A.M.  It  is  not  stated  when  Burnside  re 
ceived  it,  but  unless  Hardie  was  at  one  end  of  the  wire, 
which  is  not  likely,  and  Burnside  at  the  other,  which  is 
still  less  likely,  it  did  not  reach  Burnside  for  a  good  many 
minutes  at  least.  Moreover,  it  has  a  postscript,  simply 
dated  "  Later,"  which  seems  to  have  been  sent  at  the  same 
time.  But  if  Burnside  received  the  11  A.M.  despatch  and  the 
"Later"  postscript  before  he  ordered  Sumner  to  advance, 
there  was  nothing  in  either  to  authorize  him  to  believe  or 

1  A.  N.  Va.,  i.,  42.  But  see  French's  Report.  He  commanded  the  division 
which  led.  and  he  says  he  received  his  orders  to  attack  \t  12  A.M.  He,  again, 
almost  certainly  puts  the  hour  too  late.  Longstrcet  and  McLaws  both  state  that 
the  attack  commenced  at  about  11  A.M. 


1G1  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

even  hope  that  Franklin's  attack  would  have  been  made 
before  Sumner's  men  would  be  engaged.     The   first  para 
graph   of    the    11    A.M.    despatch    contains   these    words: 
"  Meade   advanced  half  a   mile  and  holds  on."     This   lan 
guage  is  not  the  language  appropriate  to  a  successful  ad 
vance.     Ifc  is  language   appropriate  to  a  check.     The   lan 
guage  of  the  postscript  is  more  ominous.    It  says  :  "  Reynolds 
has  been  forced  to  develop  his  whole  line.     An  attack  of 
some  force  of  enemy's  troops  on  our  left  seems  probable 
as  far  as    can  now  be  judged.     .     .     ."     This  meant,  not 
that  the  attacking  force  was  in  the  way  of  carrying  every 
thing  before  it,  but  that  it  was  likely  to  be  put  on  the  defen 
sive.     The  "  division  at  least "  had  grown  to  a  corps,  and 
that   not   voluntarily,  but   Reynolds   had  been    "forced  to 
develop  his  whole  line."     The  postscript  added  that  Stone- 
man  had  been  ordered  to  cross  one  division  to  support  the 
left.     Thus  the  "  division  at  least  "  had  grown,  including  its 
support,  to  four  divisions.     However  the  fact  may  be  as  to 
the  time  when  the  11  A.M.  despatch  was  received,  Burnside 
himself  establishes  conclusively  the  fact  that  when  he  or- 
clered  Sumner  forward  he  had  received  no  encouraging  in 
formation  from  the  left,  and  nothing  to  load  him  to  suppose 
what  he  says  he  supposed,  but  the  contrary.^ 
S"    Burnside  says  he  ordered  Sumner  "  to  commence  his  at- 
(    tack."     One  would  think  from  this  language  that  a  plan  of 
\   attack  proportioned  to  the  strong  force  under  his  command, 
j     had  been  given  to  Sumner,  but  there  is  absolutely  nothing 
/     to  show  that  Sumner  had  received  any  other  instructions 
I     than  the  "  push  a  column  of  a  division  or  more  "  sentence  of 
V  the  6  A.M.  order,  except  that  Sumner  says  that  he  was  to 
attack  "with  a  division,  supported  closely  by  a  second." 
All  the   evidence,    Burnside's   own   testimony  being  most 
prominent,  is  to  tho  eillrt  that  Burnside,  really  had  no  com- 


FREDERICKSBURG.  165 

prehensive  plan  at  all»— that  he  proposed  to  tap  the  enemy's 
lines  here  and  there,  and  see  what  would  come  cf  it.  All 
his  action  on  the  further  side  of  the  Rappahannock  \vr.s 
jrurely  tentative,  and  it  would  have  been  vastly  better  for 
tho  Army  of  the  Potomac  if  he  had  not  been  there  at  all. 
Ho  contributed  nothing — ideas  and  example  were  alike 
wanting.  His  superior  rank  was  of  no  avail  in  combining 
and  connecting  the  movements  of  the  troops.  With  him 
away,  Franklin  might  have  made  the  grand  attack  he  pro 
posed,  and  driven  in  a  large  and  sufficient  wedge_where_ 
"under  his  orders  he  drove  in  a-  small  and  insufficient  one. 
With  him  away,  Sumner,  probably,  and  Hooker,  certainly, 
would  not  have  made  the  disastrous  attacks  they  did  make. 
Fee  metis.  It  was  a  dark  day  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  General  Burnside's  "generosity"  and  "magnanimity" 
after  the  battle,  though  they  imposed  upon  many  of  his 
easily  deluded  fellow-countrymen,  were  slight  comfort  to 
the  homes  that  were  darkened  and  the  lives  that  were  crip 
pled  by  his  insane  attempt  upon  the  heights  of  Fredericks- 
burg.^ 

Into  how  much  detail  shall  we  go  in  telling  the  story  of 
this  attempt  to  carry  wooded  slopes  and  successive  crests, 
this  advance  against  a  strong  force  of  admirable  troops, 
covered  by  breastworks  and  rifle-pits,  with  guns  protected 
by  earthworks,  disposed  in  lines  which  gave  both  front  and 
enfilading  fires  on  their  assailants  as  they  moved  up  the 
gradual  slope  which  swelled  from  the  town  to  the  hostile 
lines  ?  We  read  with  a  certain  equanimity  of  such  events  as 
the  storming  of  Ciudad  Eodrigo  or  Badajoz,  or  the  assaults 
on  the  Redan  and  Malakoff,  both  because  we  feel  that  in 
these  cases  necessity  determined  the  work  to  be  attempted, 
and  because  we  feel  that  the  leaders  of  the  assailants  ex 
erted  their  utmost  powers  to  increase  to  the  utmost  their 


166  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

chances  of  success.  But  at  Fredericksburg  we  see  a  gallant 
army  engaged  in  an  undertaking  at  once  unnecessary  and 
Jiopeless,  and  sent  to  destruction  with  no  plan  and  no  prep- 
jaration. 

Those  who  have  been  in  battle  know  how  much  and  how 
little  they  saw  and  heard.  They  remember  how  the  smoke 
and  the  woods  and  the  inequalities  of  groivhd  limited  their 
vision  when  they  had  leisure  to  look  about  them,  and  how 
eveiy  faculty  was  absorbed  in  their  work  when  they  were  ac 
tively  engaged  ;  how  the  deafening  noise  made  it  almost  im 
possible  to  hear  orders ;  what  ghastly  sights  they  saw  as  men 
and  horses  near  them  were  torn  with  shell ;  how  peacefully 
the  men  sank  to  rest  whom  the  more  merciful  rifle-bullet 
reached  in  a  vital  spot ;  how  some  wounded  men  shrieked 
and  others  lay  quiet ;  how  awful  was  the  sound  of  the  projec 
tiles  when  they  were  near  hostile  batteries,  how  incessant 
was  the  singing  and  whistling  of  the  balls  from  rifles  and 
muskets ;  how  little  they  commonly  knew  of  what  was  going 
on  a  hundred  yards  to  their  right  or  left.  Orderly  advances 
of  bodies  of  men  may  be  easily  described  and  easily  imag 
ined,  but  pictures  of  real  fighting  are  and  must  be  imper 
fect.  Participants  in  real  fighting  know  how  limited  and 
fragmentary  and  confused  are  their  recollections  of  work 
after  it  became  hot.  The  larger  the  force  engaged,  the 
more  impossible  it  is  to  give  an  accurate  presentation  of  its 
experiences.  We  can  follow  the  charge  of  the  six  hundred 
at  Balaclava,  from  which  less  than  one  in  three  carne  back 
unharmed,  better  than  we  can  follow  the  advance  of  Han 
cock's  five  thousand  at  Fredericksburg,  from  which  not 
quite  three  in  five  came  back  unharmed.  And  Hancock's 
f  'advance  was  only  one  of  many.  "  Six  times,"  says  Lee, 
y  "  did  the  enemy,  notwithstanding  the  havoc  caused  by  our 
(  batteries,  press  on  with  great  determination,  to  within  one 


FREDERICKSBURG.  167 

hundred  yards  of  the  foot  of  the  hill,  but  here  encountering  / 
the  deadly  fire  of  our  infantry,  his  columns  were  broken,  and  \ 
fled  in  confusion  to  the  town." 


Sumner  received  his  orders,  he  selected  French's 
division  of  the  Second  Corps  as  the  leading  column,  and  had 
Hancock's  division  formed  in  support.  French's  division, 
preceded  by  a  strong  body  of  skirmishers,  moved  out  of  the 
town  by  the  two  parallel  streets  above  mentioned.  About 
half  way  between  the  town  and  the  ridge  held  by  the  Con 
federates,  there  was  a  canal,  or  mill  race,  which  could  not 
be  crossed  except  at  the  bridges  by  which  the  two  streets 
crossed  it,  on  their  way  to  become  the  telegraph  and  plank 
roads.  A  little  beyond  the  canal  the  ground  rises  slightly, 
and  this  rise  formed  a  cover  behind  which  the  troops  were 
able  to  deploy.  The  skirmishers  worked  their  way  forward, 
followed  by  French's  division,  and  Hancock  pressed  on  and 
came  up  with  French,  and  joined  in  the  advance.  Hancock 
estimated  that  the  distance  the  troops  had  to  march  —  first  by 
the  flank  through  the  streets  of  the  town  and  across  the 
bridges,  then  still  by  the  flank  in  a  line  parallel  to  the 
Confederate  works,  to  effect  a  deployment,  and,  finally,  in 
lino  to  the  hostile  front  —  was  probably  seventeen  hundred 
yards,  all  the  way  under  a  most  murderous  fire,  the  artillery 
fire  reaching  the  Federals  destructively  even  before  they 
left  the  streets  of  the  town.  The  troops  were  delayed  also 
by  the  fact  (which  ought  to  have  been  known  and  provided 
for)  that  the  planking  of  one  of  the  bridges  was  partially 
taken  up,  which  made  it  necessary  for  the  men  to  cross  on 
the  stringers.  By  the  time  French  and  Hancock_  were 
within  assaulting  distance,  their  columns  were  too  much  re 
duced  for  their  work.  Their  objective  point  was  the  strong 
position  at  Marye's,  where  Cobb's  and  Kershaw's  brigades 
of  McLaws's  division,  and  Cook's  and  Ransom's  brigades  of 


168  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Ransom's  division,  were  ready  to  receive  them,  with  the  im 
portant  aid  of  the  artillery,  the  fire  of  which,  Longstreet 
says,  "was  very  destructive  and  demoralizing  in  its  effects, 
and  frequently  made  gaps  in  the  enemy's  ranks  that  could 
be  seen  at  the  distance  of  a  mile.1 

At  1  P.M.  Couch,  commanding  the  Second  Corps,  ordered 
Hancock  and  French  to  carry  the  enemy's  work  by  storm. 
Seeing  shortly  that  this  could  not  be  done,  the  men  falling 
I       by  hundreds,  he  directed  Howard,  who  commanded  his  re- 
\     maining  division,  to  move  to  the  right  and  turn  the  enemy's 
\    left,  but  the  order  was  immediately  revoked  by  him,  and 
•    Howard  was  ordered  to  support  Hancock.     The  three  divi- 
•>  sions  got  well  forward,  Hall's  brigade  of  Howard's  division 
and  some  of  Hancock's  men  apparently  doing  the  best  work 
that  was  done,  but  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  were  too 
great,  and  the  assault  failed.     The  general  line  got  up  to  a 
distance  of  some  one  hundred  yards  from  the  stone  wall,  and 
some  men,  probably  of  Kimball's  brigade  of  Hancock's  divi 
sion,  fell  dead  within  twenty-five  paces  of  it.     The  Twen 
tieth  Massachusetts  of  Hall's  brigade  was  praised  for  "  the 
matchless  courage  and  discipline  "  it  displayed,  especially 
in  standing  firm  and  returning  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  when 
its  comrades  fell  back,  until  the  line  was  reformed.     The 
hardest  fighting  was  done  by  Hancock,  who  lost  2,000  men, 
and  French,  who  lost  1,200.     Howard  was  put  into  action 
later  than  Hancock  and  French,  and  lost  877  men. " 

The  attack  of  the  Second  Corps  had  aboiit  spent  its  force 
by  2.30  P.M.  Sturgis's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  had 
shared  its  efforts,  and  with  a  like  result.  Under  orders  re 
ceived  at  about  noon  to  support  Couch,  it  was  moved  at 
once  to  the  front.  It  had  but  two  brigades.  Ferrero's  led, 

»  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  429. 


FREDERICKSBURG.  169 

and  did  some  good  fighting,  and  was  presently  joined  by 
Nagle's.  The  troops  behaved  to  the  satisfaction  of  their 
corps  commander,  and  lost  1,028  of  their  number,  but  the 
stone  wall  was  too  much  for  them.  They  could  not  carry 
the  position.  To  complete  the  story  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  it 
may  here  be  stated  that  Getty's  division  was  sent  forward 
much  later  in  the  day,  at  or  after  4  P.M.,  and  lower  down  in 
the  general  line.  It  was  not  very  severely  engaged,  and  lost 
only  284  men.  The  other  division  of  the  corps,  that  of 
Burns,  was  sent  to  the  support  of  Franklin  at  3  P.M.,  to 
cover  his  bridges.  It  had  next  to  nothing  to  do,  and  sus 
tained  no  losses  of  any  consequence. 

A  strict  observance  of  the  order  of  time  would  perhaps 
dictate  changing  the  scene  at  the  point  now  reached  to  the 
Federal  left,  but  when  a  battle  is  to  be  described  in  which 
large  numbers  of  troops  are  engaged  at  different  parts  of  a 
long  line,  there  are  objections  to  observing  too  closely  the 
connections  of  either  time  or  place.  Upon  the  whole,  the 
balance  of  convenience  seems  to  incline  in  the  direction  of 
completing  the  story  of  the  operations  on  the  Federal  right 
before  returning  to  Franklin  on  the  left. 

Whipple's  division  of  the  Third  Corps,  composed  of  two 
brigades  and  a  regiment,  was  ordered  on  the  morning  of  the 
13th  to  cross  the  river  and  send  one  brigade  to  report  to 
General  Willcox,  and  with  the  remainder  to  guard  the  ap 
proaches  to  the  town  from  the  west,  and  to  protect  the 
right  flank  of  Howard's  division  while  making  an  attack  in 
front.  The  brigade  and  regiment  assigned  to  the  latter 
duty  were  not  actively  engaged,  and  suffered  hardly  any 
loss.  The  other  brigade,  under  Carroll,  was  ordered  at 
about  1.30  P.M.  to  move  up  to  General  Sturgis's  support. 
Carroll  moved  up  on  the  left  of  Sturgis,  and  took  and  held 
a  crest  on  his  front,  and  suffered  a  loss  of  113  out  of  850. 
V.-8 


170  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

His  conduct  was  highly  praised  by  his  division  commander, 
but  his  action  had  no  other  influence  upon  the  general 
result  than  perhaps  to  facilitate  the  withdrawal  of  Willcox's 
men.  Griffin's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  ordered  also 
to  move  forward  to  the  support  of  General  Sturgis. 
Griffin's  report  does  not  agree  nicely  with  Carroll's  as  to 
either  time  or  position,  but  the  discrepancy  is  of  little  con 
sequence.  One  of  his  brigades  relieved  Ferrero's  brigade 
of  Sturgis's  division,  and  this  brigade,  aided  at  first  by  one 
and  then  by  both  of  the  other  brigades  of  the  division,  ad 
vanced  gallantly.  General  Griffin  says  that  his  lines  moved 
up  to  within  a  few  yards  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  but  that 
then  the  fire  became  so  galling  that  they  were  compelled  to 
fall  back  behind  the  crest  of  a  knoll.  The  loss  of  the  divi 
sion  was  818  men  killed  and  wounded.  Sykes's  division  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  was  not  actively  engaged,  but  was  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  both  artillery  and  riflemen,  and  lost  228  men. 
It,  or  most  of  it,  was  in  position  near  the  southern  edge  of 
the  town,  except  for  a  short  time,  while  it  was  acting  in 
connection  with  Humphreys's  division,  as  will  be  seen  here 
after.  K 

Some  of  the  very  best  fighting  that  was  done  at  Freder- 
icksburg  was  done  by  the  Third  Division  of  the  Fifth 
Corps.  The  division  was  commanded  by  General  Hum 
phreys,  who  was  probably  the  best  officer  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  that  day.  He  was  a  thoroughly  educated  sol 
dier,  possessed  of  a  quick  eye  and  a  clear  head,  and  a  man 
of  fiery  energy.  That  the  fighting  his  division  did  was  so 
good  was  due  to  him.  He  had  but  two  brigades,  and  many 
of  his  regiments  had  never  before  been  in  battle.  At  2.30  P.M. 
he  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river,  and  soon  after  received 
orders  to  support  Couch  on  the  left  of  the  telegraph  road. 
He  hastily  moved  his  Second  Brigade,  which  was  nearest,  to 


FREDERICKSBURG.  171 

the  front,  and  sent  orders  to  his  other  brigade  to  follow 
and  form  on  the  right.  He  led  his  Second  Brigade,  Alla- 
bach's,  rapidly  forward  to  the  position  occupied  by  Couch's 
men,  whom  he  found  in  great  numbers  sheltering  them 
selves  by  lying  on  the  ground  behind  a  slight  rise  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  stone  wall.  The  continued 
presence  of  these  men  proved  a  serious  obstacle  to  his  suc 
cess.  Allabach's  men  followed  their  example  in  lying  down, 
and  opened  fire.  As  soon  as  Humphreys  had  ascertained 
the  nature  of  the  enemy's  position,  which  the  urgency  of  the 
case  had  put  it  out  of  his  power  to  do  before  arriving  with 
his  men,  he  became  satisfied  that  his  fire  could  have  little 
effect  upon  them,  and  he  perceived  that  the  only  mode  of 
attacking  him  successfully  was  with  the  bayonet.  With 
great  difficulty  he  stopped  the  firing  of  his  men,  and  the 
charge  was  then  made,  but  the  deadly  fire  of  artillery  and 
musketry  broke  it  after  an  advance  of  fifty  yards.  Allabach 
then  reformed  his  brigade  in  the  rear,  part  in  the  line  from 
which  the  charge  was  made,  and  the  remainder  in  the  ravine 
from  which  it  originally  advanced.  General  Humphreys 
then  rode  to  Tyler's  brigade.  It  was  already  growing  dusky. 
Hiding  along  his  lines,  he  directed  his  men  not  to  fire  ;  that 
it  was  useless ;  that  the  bayonet  alone  was  the  weapon  to 
fight  with  here.  Having  learned  from  experience  what  a 
serious  obstacle  they  would  encounter  from  the  presence  of 
the  masses  of  men  lying  behind  the  natural  embankment  in 
front,  he  directed  them  to  disregard  these  men  entirely,  and 
to  pass  over  them.  He  ordered  the  officers  to  the  front, 
and  "with  a  hurrah,  the  brigade,  led  by  General  Tyler  and 
myself,  advanced  gallantly  over  the  ground,  under  the 
heaviest  fire  yet  opened,  which  poured  upon  it  from  the 
moment  it  rose  from  the  ravine." 
The  scene  which  followed  was  most  singular,  and  it  is 


172  ANTIETAM  AND   FREDERICKSBURG. 

well  to  describe  it  in  General  Humphreys's  own  words :  "  A3 
the  brigade  reached  the  masses  of  men  referred  to,  every  ef 
fort  was  made  by  the  latter  to  prevent  our  advance.  They 
called  to  our  men  not  to  go  forward,  and  some  attempted  to 
prevent  by  force  their  doing  so.  The  effect  upon  my  com 
mand  was  what  I  apprehended — the  line  was  somewhat  dis 
ordered,  and  in  part  forced  to  form  into  a  column,  but  still 
advanced  rapidly.  The  fire  of  the  enemy's  musketry  and 
artillery,  furious  as  it  was  before,  now  became  still  hotter. 
The  stone  wall  was  a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head 
and  flanks  of  the  column.  Officers  and  men  were  falling 
rapidly,  and  the  head  of  the  column  was  at  length  brought 
to  a  stand  when  close  up  to  the  wall.  Up  to  this  time,  not 
a  shot  had  been  fired  by  the  column,  but  now  some  firing 
began.  It  lasted  but  a  minute,  when,  in  spite  cf  all  our 
efforts,  the  column  turned  and  began  to  retire  slowly.  I 
attempted  to  rally  the  brigade  behind  the  natural  embank 
ment  so  often  mentioned,  but  the  united  efforts  of  General 
Tyler,  myself,  our  staffs,  and  the  other  officers,  could  not  ar 
rest  the  retiring  mass." 

General  Humphreys  had  one  horse  disabled  by  wounds 
and  another  killed  under  him.  He  had  but  one  staff  officer 
remaining  mounted,  and  his  horse  was  wounded  in  three 
places.  His  force  being  now  too  small  to  try  another 
charge,  he  was  directed  to  bring  in  Allabach's  men  from  the 
line  of  natural  embankment.  This  was  well  done,  two  of 
his  regiments  in  particular,  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
third  and  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania,  "  retir 
ing  slowly  and  in  good  order,  singing  and  hurrahing."  This 
jocund  march  of  Allabach's  men  may  have  been  what  the 
Confederate  General  Hansom  referred  to  when  he  said, 
"  This  last  desperate  and  maddened  attack  met  the  same 
fate  which  had  befallen  those  which  preceded,  and  his  hosts 


FREDERICKSBURG.  173 

were  sent,  actually  howling,  back  to  their  beaten  comrades 
in  the  town."  l  Humphreys  had  more  than  a  thousand  men 
killed  and  wounded  in  his  two  brigades. 

With  the  repulse  of  Hnmphreys's  division,  the  fighting  on 
the  Federal  right  came  to  an  end,  though  it  was  not  till 
well  into  the  evening  that  the  fire  of  the  sharpshooters  and 
the  artillery  entirely  died  out.  The  troops  as  a  rule  con 
tinued  to  hold  the  positions  in  which  they  found  themselves 
when  night  fell,  but  some  of  them  were  relieved  by  com 
mands  which  had  been  engaged  less  or  not  at  all.  Our  story 
returns  to  Franklin  and  the  Federal  left. 
It  must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  that,  under  Burn* 

Aside's  orders,  four  of  his  six  corps  had  been  arrayed  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  river,  in  what  was  substantially  the  paral- 
1^1  order  of  battle,  with  the  Second  Corps  on  the  right,  the 
Ninth  Corps  next,  then  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  then  the  First ; ./ 
that  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps,  those  of  Birney  and 
Sickles,  had  been  also  sent  to  Franklin ;  that  Whipple's 
division  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  those  of  Griffin  and  Hum 
phreys  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  took  part  in  the  right  attack,  and 
that  Sykes's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  only  remaining 
division  of  Hooker's  Centre  Grand  Division,  was,  for  the  most 
part,  held  in  reserve  near  the  town.  The  battle  of  Freder- 
icksburg  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  parts :  the  left 

^attack,  conducted  by  Franklin  with  the  Left  Grand  Division 
and  reinforcements,  and  the  right  attack,  conducted  by 
Sumner  with  the  Right  Grand  Division  and  reinforcements. 
Hooker's  command,  the  Centre  Grand  Division,  was  so  broken 
up  that  he  can  hardly  be  considered  to  have  taken  any  part 
in  the  battle,  and  cannot  at  all  be  considered  as  responsible 
for  the  defeat.  Especially  must  it  not  be  forgotten  that  the 

*  A.  N.  Va.,  ii.,  453. 


174  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Sixth  Corps  was  formed,  in  compliance  with  Burnside's 
directions,  parallel  to  the  old  Eichmond  road,  with  two  divi 
sions  in  front  and  one  in  reserve.  The  posting  of  the  troops 
gives  better  indications  of  what  was  in  Eurnside's  mind  than 
his  own  language,  and  so  far  as  a  plan  can  be  constructed 
from  the  indications  so  afforded,  it  would  seem  to  have  been 
his  idea  to  arrange  two  of  his  Grand  Divisions  in  line  in 

^front  of  the  ridge  held  by  the  enemy,  and  to  hold  the  third 
in  reserve,  and  from  his  front  so  formed  to  make  sallies 
wherever  he  fancied  he  might  do  so  to  advantage,  and,  with 
the  rest  of  his  line,  be  prepared  to  resist  such  sorties  as  the 
enemy  might  make  from  what  was  in  reality  their  fortified 

jcamp.  If  Franklin  believed  that  he  entertained  this  idea, 
his  conclusion  was  reasonable,  and  it  is  probable  that  he 
did,  and  in  considering  what  he  did  or  what  he  might  have 
done,  the  general  formation  of  the  troops  under  Burnside's 
orders  is  an  important  matter,  and  one  not  to  be  lost  sight 
of.  Under  these  orders,  Franklin's  line  extended  from  a 
point  west  of  Deep  Creek  to  at  least  as  far  down  as  Hamil 
ton's  Crossing,  and  must  have  been  as  much  as  three  miles 
long. 

Burnside's  report  contains  the  statement  that  between 
12.30  and  1.30  of  the  13th  he  sent  three  orders  to  Franklin 
— the  first  by  Captain  Cutts  (probably  written,  though  it  is 
not  so  stated),  directing  him  to  advance  his  right  and  front ; 
the  next  by  telegraph,  directing  him  to  make  an  attack  upon 
the  heights  immediately  in  his  front ;  the  third  by  Captain 
Goddard,  given  to  him  about  1.30,  and  delivered  by  him  to 
Franklin,  "in  the  presence  of  General  Hardie,  before  2.30 
o'clock."  This  order  was  verbal.  Burnside  gives  it  as  fol 
lows  :  "  Tell  General  Franklin,  with  my  compliments,  that  I 
wish  him  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  with  his  whole  force ; 
our  right  is  hard  pressed."  Franklin's  official  report,  dated 


FREDERICKSBURG.  175 

January  2,  1863,  makes   no  mention  of  any  one  of  these 
orders.     They  are  not  referred  to  in  Hardie's  despatches  to 

Burnside,  except  in  a  very  brief  one  dated  2.25  P.M.,  which 


is  as  follows:  "Despatch  received.  Franklin  will  do  his 
best.  New  troops  gone  in.  Will  report  soon  again."  In 
Franklin's  printed  Reply  to  the  Joint  Committee  of  Congress 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  on  the  First  Battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  he  says  that  the  telegraph  station  connecting  with 
General  Burnside's  headquarters  was  about  one-third  of  a 
mile  from  his  headquarters,  and  that  General  Burnside  did 
not  communicate  with  him  in  any  manner  from  the  time 
when  he  sent  him  the  morning  order  by  Hardie  till  about 
2.25  P.M.,  when  he  sent  him  an  order  in  writing,  in  which  it 
was  stated  that  his  instructions  of  the  morning  were  so  far 
modified  as  to  require  an  advance  upon  the  heights  immedi 
ately  in  his  front.  In  his  testimony  before  the  committee, 
however,  he  admits  that  he  received  a  message  from  Gen 
eral  Burnside,  and  he  seems  to  admit  that  it  was  to  the 
effect  that  he  should  make  a  vigorous  attack  at  once  with 
his  whole  force,  but  lie  says  that  the  message  was  not  an 
order.  "  It  was  more  in  the  light  of  a  request  to  do  it  if  I 
thought  I  could,  and  I  sent  back  word  that  I  could  not  do 
it."  General  Franklin's  testimony  is  not  absolutely  clear, 
and,  taking  it  in  connection  with  Burnside's  assertions  in 
his  report,  it  appears  possible  that  he  may  have  received 
messages  from  Burnside,  by  or  before  2.30  P.M.,  by  both 
Captain  Cutts  and  Captain  Goddard,  besides  the  order  by 
telegraph.  If  the  fact  be  so,  he  knew  that  Burnside  wished 
or  ordered  him  to  advance  his  right  and  front,  and  to  make 
a  vigorous  attack  with  his  whole  force ;  that  the  right  was 
hard  pressed,  and  that  Burnside  ordered  him  to  make  an 
attack  upon  the  heights  immediately  in  his  front.  It  is 
reasonably  certain  that  the  earliest  of  these  orders  did  not 


176  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERIC  KSBURG. 

reach  him  before  1.30,  and  that  all  that  reached  him  were 
received  by  him  by  or  before  2.25  P.M.  It  is  therefore  neces 
sary  to  inquire  what  was  the  condition  of  his  command  at 
1.30. 

Smith's  corps,  the  Sixth,  was  in  position  on  both  sides  of 
Deep  Creek,  holding  a  line  of  considerable  length.  Its 
skirmish  line  was  engaged  pretty  constantly,  and  the  main 
body  of  the  corps  was  exposed  to  artillery  fire,  but  neither 
the  corps  nor  any  of  its  divisions  or  brigades  had  been  en 
gaged  up  to  2.30  or  3  P.M. 

Of  the  First  Corps,  the  divisions  of  Meade  and  Gibbon  had 
been  severely  engaged,  and  had  retired  in  no  little  confusion 
and  disorder.  "Eegardless  of  threat  and  force,  and  deaf 
to  all  entreaties,  they  sullenly  and  persistently  moved  to  the 
rear,  and  were  reformed  near  the  river  by  their  officers."1 
Unacquainted  as  they  were  with  Franklin's  orders,  they 
probably  felt  wronged  and  indignant  that  they  had  not 
been  more  efficiently  supported.  Doubleday's  division  of 
the  same  corps  had  done  some  fighting  on  the  left,  and  was 
holding  the  extreme  left  of  the  general  position.  Of  the 
Third  Corps,  two  divisions,  those  of  Birney  and  Sickles,  and 
of  the  Ninth  Corps  the  division  of  Burns,  were  with  Frank 
lin.  Birney's  division  had  reached  the  field  at  about  11.30 
A.M.,  and  when  Meade's  division  was  hard  pressed,  it  had 
been  used  to  support  him,  to  help  to  cover  his  retreat,  and 
to  take  his  place  in  the  general  line.  It  had  done  some 
sharp  and  good  fighting,  and  many  of  the  regiments  had 
lost  a  third  of  their  effective  force.  The  whole  division  had 
lost  upward  of  a  thousand  men.  The  corps  commander 
claimed  for  this  division  the  credit  of  having  first  checked 
and  then  driven  back  the  Confederate  troops,  "  who,  yelling, 

1  Stoneman's  Report,    See  also  Birney's  Report. 


FREDERICKSBURG.  177 

were  in  hot  pursuit  of  the  two  exhausted  and  retiring  divi 
sions  of  Meade  and  Gibbon ; "  of  having  "  saved  all  their 
guns,  which  had  been  entirely  abandoned  by  their  supports  ; 
Doubleday's  division  from  being  cut  off  and  taken  in  re 
verse  ;  the  left  of  Smith's  corps,  which  had  not  been  en 
gaged,  from  being  turned,  and  possibly,  if  not  probably,  the 
whole  left  wing  of  the  army  from  disaster."1  Sickles's  divi 
sion  had  taken  or  was  about  to  take  Gibbon's  place  in  the 
general  line,  and  Burns' s  division  was  in  connection  with 
Franklin's  Grand  Division,  between  Hazel  Eun  and  Deep 
Creek,  and  subject  to  his  orders  if  called  upon.  These  two 
divisions  were  fresh. 

This  was  the  position  of  Franklin's  command  when  he 
received  such  orders  as  he  did  receive,  and,  for  the  sake  of 
clearness,  his  formation  may  be  briefly  stated.  From  right 
to  left,  his  line  was  formed  of  Burns's  division,  Smith's  corps, 
Sickles's  division,  Birney's  division,  and  Doubleday's  divi 
sion.  His  front,  including  the  ground  held  by  Burns,  seems 
to  have  been  over  three  miles  long.  Doubleday's  division 
was  bent  back  so  that  its  left  rested  on  tho  river.  All 
these  seven  divisions  were  fresh,  except  those  of  Birney 
and  Doubleday,  and  these  two  were  not  exhausted,  though 
they  had  done  a  good  deal  of  fighting.  _With  such  a  force 
at  his  commanJ,  such  a  line  to  hold,  two  bridges  to  protect, 
and  two  hours  of  daylight  left,  Franklin  was  ogdeyp.fl  "  to 
advance  his  right  and  front,"  or  "  to  make  a  vigorous  at- 
tack  with  his  whole  force, M  or  "to  make  an  attack  upon 
\hQ  heights  immediately  in  his  front."  What  did  these 
orders  mean  ?  If  the  phrase  his  "  right  and  front "  were 
construed  strictly,  it  meant  all  his  line  excepting  the  refused 
division  of  Ponbleday,  and  this  construction  agreed  with 

1  Stoneinan's  Report. 


178  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

the  order  which  directed  an  attack  with  his  whole  force. 
Again,  what  heights  did  Burnside  refer  to?  There  were 
"  heights  immediately  in  his  front "  along  his  whole  line. 
This  telegraphic  order,  about  the  language  of  which  there 
could  be  no  mistake,  seemed  also  to  mean  an  attack  along  his 
whole  line.  On  this  construction,  all  the  orders  or  messages 
he  received  were  harmonious,  and  this  construction  of  the 
three  agreed  equally  with  any  two,  and  was  the  only  con 
struction  of  which  the  telegraphic  order  admitted. 

One  of  the  nicest  and  most  difficult  questions  which  the 
operations  of  war  present,  is  the  question  how  far  an  officer 
may  use  his  own  judgment  in  acting  under  an  order  from  a 
superior.  Literal,  unquestioning,  immediate  obedience  is 
the  first  duty  of  a  soldier,  but  it  is  universally  admitted  that 
a  lieutenant  exercising  a  large  command  and  separated  from 
his  chief,  is  not  necessarily  and  universally  held  to  literal, 
immediate  obedience.  As  a  rule,  he  is,  but  there  may  be 
circumstances  when  he  is  not,  as,  for  instance,  when  he  is  in 
possession  of  important  information  which  he  knows  is  not 
shared  by  his  chief,  and  which  he  knows,  if  shared  by  him, 
would  have  altered  the  order,  or  prevented  its  being  given. 
General  Franklin  had  a  very  large  command,  he  was  sepa 
rated  from  his  chief,  he  knew  the  whole  position  of  affairs 
on  his  own  ground,  and  he  received  such  extraordinary 
orders  as  gave  him  a  right  to  believe  that  his  knowledge 
could  not  be  shared  by  his  chief.  Construing  the  orders 
which  he  received,  whether  one,  two,  or  three,  with  the 
utmost  possible  liberality,  they  seem  to  be  susceptible  of 
but  two  interpretations : 

First. — That  he  was  to  mass  a  strong  force  and  make  a 
vigorous  attack  with  it ;  or, 

Second. — That  he  was  to  make  an  attack  in  line  upon  the 
heights  immediately  in  his  front. 


FREDERICKSBURG.  179 

To  adopt  and  act  upon  the  second  construction  was,  in 
our  judgment,  out  of  the  question.  He  had  attacked  the 
heights  in  his  front  at  one  point,  bringing  at  least  as  many 
troops  to  bear  upon  it  as  he  could  hope  to  bring  to  bear 
upon  every  point  if  he  made  a  general  assault  in  line,  and 
the  result  had  been  not  only  a  bloody  repulse,  but  a  re 
pulse  attended  with  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  Confed 
erates  as  showed  that  they  were  both  able  and  willing  to 
take  the  offensive  wherever  and  whenever  an  opportunity 
for  an  offensive  return  might  present  itself.  Strung  out  as 
his  command  was,  and  posted  as  the  enemy  were,  a  general 
attack  upon  the  heights  was  altogether  likely  to  be  a  mere 
sending  of  his  men  to  useless  slaughter,  and  a  failure  or 
weakness  in  any  part  of  his  line  was  altogether  likely  to  be 
the  signal  for  a  downward  rush  of  the  Confederates,  the 
consequences  of  which  might  have  been  disastrous  in  the 
extreme.  For  these  reasons,  he  seems  to  us  to  have  been 
fully  justified  in  believing  the  second  construction  to  be  in 
admissible,  or  in  declining  to  obey  it  if  he  thought  it  the 
only  construction  the  orders  would  bear. 

It  therefore  remains  to  ascertain  what  he  did,  and  to  con- 
jdder  what  he  might  have  done,  upon  the  theory  that  he 
understood  his  orders  to  mean  that  he  was  to  mass  a  strong 
force  and  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  with  it.  It  has  been 
shown  that  the  Confederates  had  not  far  from  three  men  for 
every  four  of  the  Federals,  and  three  men  behind  breast 
works  and  abattis  are  far  more  than  a  match  for  four  advan 
cing  without  cover.  Jackson's  men  were  better  soldiers  than 
the  provincials  at  Bunker's  Hill,  and  Franklin's  men  did  not 
rate  as  high  compared  with  Jackson's  as  did  Howe's  com 
pared  with  Prescott's,  but  every  one  knows  what  hard  times 
the  British  soldiers  had  before  those  slight  defences. 
Franklin  was  prone  to  overestimating  the  force  of  the 


180  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

^enemy,  and  he  believed  that  at  this  time  they  greatly  out« 
numbered  him.1  He  knew  that  he  could  not  look  for  assist 
ance  from  the  right,  for  Burnside  had  sent  him  word  that 
his  right  was  hard  pressed.  He  knew  that  the  enemy  was  in 

force  on  his  left  as  well  as  in  his  front.  With  the  lessons  of 
the  forenoon  fighting  fresh  in  his  mind,  he  knew  he  could 
not  safely  attack  without  forming  a  strong  column,  that  he 
could  not  form  a  strong  column  without  stripping  portions  of 
his  line,  and  that  he  could  not  strip  portions  of  his  line  with 
out  putting  what  was  left  in  position  to  perfectly  cover  the 
flanks  of  the  column  of  attack  and  perfectly  protect  itself. 
The  latter  portion  of  this  programme  must  be  thoroughly 
attended  to,  because  he  had  an  unfordable  river  in  his  rear. 

To  do  what  was  required  to  be  done  required  time,  and  a 
great  deal  of  time,  and  he  decided  that  it  was  too  late  to  do 
anything  more  that  day.  It  is  not  easy  to  blame  him.  It  is 
easy  to  defend  him.  He  occupied  a  cruelly  hard  and  diffi 
cult  position.  He  was  a  good  soldier  and  a  man  of  character. 
He  had  a  large  command.  He  must  have  known  that  much 
was  expected  of  him,  though  his  chief  was  so  incompetent 
that  he  did  not  know  what  he  expected  of  him.  His  sugges 
tions  were  not  heeded,  and  he  saw  the  light  grow  and  fade 
with  the  painful  consciousness  that  he  was  losing  a  great 
^opportunity,  and  losing  it  because  the  general  commanding 
neither  gave  him  intelligent  orders  nor  left  his  action  to  his 
own  intelligence.  He  was  right  in  saying,  "Our  failure  was 
the  natural  consequence  of  the  insufficient  preparation  and 
inadequate  provision  for  an  attack  upon  an  army  like  that 
in  front  of  us." 

But_\yhile  it  is  easy  to  defend  Franklin,  and  impossible 
not  to  sympathize  with  him,  it  is  not  easy  to  feel  entirely 

1  Franklin's  Reply.     Pamphlet,  p.  4. 


FREDERICKSBURG.  181 

satisfied  with  him.  To  defeat  Jackson  with  the  men  he  had 
and  the  ground  he  held,  would  have  been  a  desperately  diffi 
cult  enterprise  for  Franklin,  even  if  the  best  possible  plan 
had  been  made  for  him  or  made  by  him.  It  was  a  hopeless 
enterprise,  absolutely  hopeless,  under  the  vague  shadowings 
which  Burnside  issued  under  the  name  of  orders.  And  yet 
.one  cannoji  help  feeling  that  with  his  ability  and  training, 
Franklin  might  have  done  something  more  than  he  did, 
with  the  large  force  under  Ms  command,  if  he  had  been 
impelled  by  the  energy  of  the  strongest  natures.  "What  that 
something  might  have  been,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  attempt 
to  say.  The  endeavor  would  lead  into  a  region  of  specula 
tion,  not  only  military  but  metaphysical,  for  much  would 
have  depended  upon  his  success  in  getting  Burnside  to  com 
prehend  and  appreciate  and  sanction  such  plan  as  he  might 
have  formed.  He  tried  the  experiment  the  night  before  the 
battle,  and  failed.  He  may  have  been  discouraged  by  the 
failure,  as  he  certainly  was  disappointed.  He  was  not  a 
man  of  an  active  temperament,  and  he  was  certainly  wanting 
in  audacity,  but  perhaps  it  was  just  as  well  for  the  country 
and  the  army  that,  while  Burnside  commanded  the  army, 
Franklin  commanded  the  left  wing.  The  enterprise  against 
Fredericksburg  was  so  radically  desperate  that  it  might  only 
have  cost  more  lives,  without  any  compensation,  if  a  fiery 
fighter  like  Hood  had  been  in  Franklin's  place.  One  re 
mark  must  be  added,  and  that  is  that.it  excites  both  surprise^ 
and  regret  to  find  such  a  total  want  of  evidence  that  Frank 
lin  communicated  to  Burnside  during  the  whole  day  of  the 
battle  anything  in  the  way  of  suggestions,  requests  for  in 
structions,  or  remonstrance.  If  it  were  shown  that  he  let 
him  know  that  he  did  not  understand  his  orders,  or  that  ho 
had  good  reasons  for  disapproving  .of  them,  or  that  he  dc- 
sired  to  do  something  more  or  different,  or  that  ho  wished 

THE        ^ 


182  ANTIETAMAND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

lie  would  come  and  see  for  himself,  he  would  appear  better 
in  the  history  of  the  battle  than  lie  does  now.  He  was 
cruelly  wronged  by  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  but  amiable  and  excellent  as  the  members  of  that  Com 
mittee  may  have  been  in  private  life,  the  worst  spirit  of  the 
Inquisition  characterized  their  doings  as  a  committee.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  their  treatment  of  him  was  an  act  of 
gross  injustice. 

It  could  hardly  be  said  that  night  ended  the  righting  of 
the  13th  of  December,  for  the  fighting  had  mostly  ceased 
when  night  came,  though  some  more  lives  might  have  been 
lost  had  the  day  been  longer.  Most  fortunately  for  the 
wounded,  the  deepening  twilight  did  not  bring  Avith  it  the 
growing  chill  which  is  common  to  winter  nights.  The  air 
was  mild,  and  the  wind  came  soft  and  almost  balmy  from 
the  south.  All  the  wounded  who  could  be  reached  were 
brought  in  during  the  night,  and  some  of  the  dead  were 
buried.^  The  losses  of  the  Federal  army  had  been  very 
severe,  Burnside  reported  them  as  follows  : 

Killed.  Wounded.  Missing. 

Right  Grand  Division 491  3,933            787 

Left  Grand  Division 373  2,697            653 

Cantre  Grand  Division 310  2,398            755 


1,180  9,028        2,145 

Hancock*s  division  of  the  Second  Corps  suffered  the  most. 
Out  of  5,006,  he  lost  2,013,  of  whom  156  were  officers.  He  had 
seventeen  regiments,  of  which  two  were  consolidated  under 
Miles,  now  a  brigadier-general  in  the  army.  Of  the  officers 
who  commanded  these  sixteen  battalions  during  the  engage 
ment,  25  were  killed  or  wounded  and  removed  from  the  field. 
In  eight  of  his  regiments,  numbering  2,548  officers  and  men, 
1,324:  officers  and  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  an  average  of 


FREDERICKSBURG.  183 

fifty-four  per  cent.  No  one  of  these  regiments  lost  less  than 
forty-five  per  cent. ;  one  lost  sixty  per  cent.,  and  one  lost 
sixty-seven  per  cent.,  or  two  more  than  two-thirds.  Han 
cock  was  one  of  the  very  best  soldiers  in  the  immediate  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ever  had. 
He  merited  the  epithet  "  superb  "  which  McClellan  applied  to 
him  early  in  the  war.  It  is  altogether  probable  that  if  more 
discretion  had  been  left  to  him,  he  would  have  so  used  his 
troops  as  to  achieve  more  and  suffer  less,  but  his  formation 
for  the  attack  was  prescribed  in  the  orders  he  received — bri 
gade  front,  intervals  between  the  brigades  of  two  hundred 
paces.  Left  more  to  himself,  he  would  have  been  likely  to 
do  more  as  Humphreys  did  and  as  Miles  asked  leave  to  do 
— attempt  to  carry  the  position  in  front  by  a  spirited  charge 
with  the  bayonet  alone.  But  it  must  be  confessed  that  it  is 
a  very  singular  fact  in  the  history  of  this  battle  that  this 
idea  seems  to  have  occurred  to  so  few. 

Longstreet's  corps  lost,  in  the  five  days  during  which  the 
Federals  were  across  the  river,  1,894  men,  of  whom  339  were 
lost  on  the  llth.  Thus  it  appears  that  all  the  heavy  losses 
of  the  Army  of_the  Potomac  in  its  engagements  in  the  rear 
of  Fredericksburg,  had  only  a  loss  of  1,555  to  be  set  against 
them  on  the  Confederate  side.  ^Jackson's  corps,  which  was 
attacked  by  Franklin,  lost  3,415.  As  well  as  can  be  made 
out  from  an  analysis  of  the  figures,  Franklin,  with  a  loss  of 
only  two  men  for  Summer's  three,  inflicted  upon  the  enemy 
more  than  twice  as  much  loss. 

The  Federal  commanders  were  generally  satisficdLwith  the 
^behavior  of  the  troops,  jlancock,  in  particular,  says  that 
the  valor  of  his  men  was  so  marked,  that  had  the  enemy  met 
them  in  the  open  field,  the  contest  would  have  been  decided 
in  their  favor  in  a  very  short  timely  Lee's  acknowledgment 
of  their  "  great  determination  "  has  already  been  cited.  Ivan- 


184  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG, 

som,  who  had  immediate  charge  of  the  defence  at  Marye's, 
^speaks  of  the  Federals  as  moving  to  the  attack  heroically^ 
and  displaying  "wonderful  staunchness." /^Jackson's  lan- 


. 


%  but  Longstreef  s  is  less  so,  though 


the  facts  that  he  states  show  that  he  recognized  merit  in  the 
Tjroops  which  he  repulsed.  The  gallantry  displayed  by  the 
Federal  army  was  the  more  to  its  credit,  because  of  the  feel 
ing  which  prevailed  in  it.  Swinton  wrote  to  the  New  York 
Times  that  day,  "  It  was  with  pain  and  alarm  I  found  this 
morning  a  general  want  of  confidence  and  gloomy  forebo 
dings  among  officers  whose  sound  judgment  I  had  learned  to 
trust.  The  plan  of  attacking  the  rebel  stronghold  directly 
in  front  would,  it  was  feared,  prove  a  most  hazardous  enter 
prise."  What  the  officers  think,  the  men  are  apt  to  know, 
and  soldiers  of  experience  are  sometimes  more  swift  than 
their  officers  in  coming  to  correct  conclusions.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  had  been  at  Malvern  Hill  and  at  Sharpsburg. 
It  knew  how  the  Southern  and  Northern  armies  in  turn  had 
fared  when  either  undertook  to  assail  its  opponent  in  a 
chosen  position,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  position  to  be 
carried  at  Malvern  Hill  and  at  Sharpsburg  were  as  nothing 
to  the  difficulties  of  the  position  at  Fredericksburg. 

Enough  has  already  been  said  of  the  unwisdom  of  Burn- 
side's  determination  to  assault  these  heights,  but  something 
remains  to  be  said  of  the  true  method  of  doing  it,  if  the 
thing  were  decided  on.  To  carry  one  or  more  points  in  the 
Confederate  line  was  like  storming  a  fort,  except  that  it  was 
not  necessary  that  the  artillery  should  first  make  a  prac 
ticable  breach.  The  character  of  the  Confederate  troops 
was  perfectly  well  known,  and  it  was  necessary  to  recognize 
in  them  an  even  match,  to  say  no  more,  all  the  conditions  of 
the  encounter,  including  numbers,  being  equal.  But  here 
the  conditions  were  not  equal.  The  Confederates  occupied 


FREDEBICKSBURG.  185 

a  position  of  great  natural  strength,  and  much  of  it  was 
admirably  strengthened  by  art.  Intrenchnients  are  some 
times  said  to  quadruple  the  power  of  the  defenders.  To 
assault  such  a  line  as  theirs,  especially  at  the  stone  wall,  col 
umns  of  attack  should  have  been  so  formed  as  to  be  as  nearly 
as  possible  irresistible.  Perfection  of  tactical  arrangement 
should  have  been  aimed  at,  and  careful  selection  of  material 
made.  Every  intelligent  officer  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
knew  that  there  existed  in  it  in  1862  enormous  differences 
in  the  character  of  commands.  Sometimes  a  brigade  was 
all  good,  sometimes  all  bad.  Sometimes  in  one  brigade 
there  were  two  or  three  excellent  regiments,  and  one  or  two 
"scalawag"  regiments,  the  presence  of  which  was  felt  by 
their  comrades  to  be  an  element  of  weakness  and  not  of 
strength.  The  men  did  not  difi'er  so  much.  They  were  such 
soldiers  as  their  officers  made  them,  and  the  officers  differed 
immensely.  It  was  very  commonly  true  that  the  efforts  made 
to  influence  the  press  were  in  direct  ratio  to  the  worthless- 
ness  of  the  man  or  set  of  men  who  brought  the  influence  to 
bear,  but  want  of  space  forbids  an  adequate  presentation  of 
the  degree  to  which  the  waters  of  history  were  thus  poisoned 
at  their  source.  In  engagements  of  the  ordinary  character, 
troops  must  be  used  as  they  are  organized,  but  in  an  excep 
tional  case  the  very  best  regiments  should  be  selected  for 
the  exceptional  work.  Second-class  troops  are  useful  for 
second-class  work,  and  difficult  as  it  would  have  been  for 
any  troops  to  force  Longstreet's  line  behind  Fredericksburg, 
it  is  just  possible  that  a  picked  column  of  the  very  best 
Northern  regiments  might  have  done  it,  but  failure  was  cer 
tain  from  the  outset  if  the  attack  was  to  be  in  line  and  the 
weak  were  to  advance  with  the  strong.  Nothing  but  the 
optimum  of  preparation,  in  every  particular,  was  adequate  to 
the  solution  of  the  problem. 


186  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

The  story  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  should  not  end 
without  some  further  mention  of  Hooker's  part  in  it.  His 
experience  was  a  trying  one,  and  he  bore  himself  well.  He 
had  made  a  name  for  himself  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign.  He  had  his  faults,  and  they  were 
many,  but  he  had  a  wholesome  love  of  fighting,  and  much 
soldierly  capacity.  Up  to  the  night  of  December  12th,  his 
command  consisted  of  two  corps,  each  comprising  three 
divisions.  By  two  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  or  at 
about  that  time,  his  Third  Corps  had  been  divided  into 
seven  different  commands,  distributed  over  a  space  of 
country  many  miles  long,  so  that  neither  Hooker  nor  its 
direct  commander,  Stoneman,  had  any  control  of  it.  Of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  Griffin's  division  had  been  sent  to  the  support 
of  Sturgis,  and  Hooker  was  left  with  the  divisions  of  Hum 
phreys  and  Sykes.  When  Hooker  received  orders  to  attack, 
these  two  divisions  were  all  that  were  left  to  him.  The 
Second  Corps  and  part  of  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  had  been  at 
work  all  day  on  the  ground  assigned  to  him,  and  had  failed 
to  make  any  impression. 

General  Hooker  makes  a  statement  of  such  importance 
that  it  is  given  in  his  own  words.  He  says  :  "  A  prisoner  in 
the  morning  had  given  to  General  Burnside,  General 
Sumner,  and  myself,  full  information  of  the  position  and 
defences  of  the  enemy,  stating  that  it  was  their  desire  that 
we  should  attack  at  that  point,  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg  on 
the  telegraph  road ;  that  it  was  perfectly  impossible  for  any 
troops  to  carry  the  position  ;  that  if  the  first  line  was  car 
ried,  a  second  line  of  batteries  commanded  it."  And  Hooker 
adds  :  "  The  result  of  the  operations  of  General  Sumner's 
Corps,  which  had  made  a  determined,  spirited  attack,  with 
out  success,  fully  confirmed  the  statements  of  this  prisoner." 
So  impressed  was  Hooker  with  the  hopelessness  of  the 


FREDERICKSBURG.  187 

enterprise,  that,  after  consulting  with  several  of  the  general 
officers  of  his  and  Simmer's  commands,  he  sent  an  aide  to 
Burnside  to  say  that  he  advised  him  not  to  attack.  The 
reply  came  that  the  attack  must  be  made.  Not  satisfied 
with  this,  and  under  a  strong  sense  of  his  duty  to  his  com 
mand,  Hooker  determined  to  give  Burnside  a  fuller  expla 
nation,  and  to  dissuade  him,  if  possible.  He  did  so,  but 
Burnside  insisted  upon  the  attack  being  made.  The  attack 
was  made,  with  the  result  to  Humphreys's  division  which  has 
been  stated.  This  worthy  action  of  Hooker  should  never  be 
forgotten  when  his  military  history  is  under  consideration. 
Sykes,  he, says,  moved  on  Humphreys's  right,  to  assault  in 
echelon  and  support,  but  the  loss  and  repulse  of  the  attack 
ing  columns  were  so  severe  that  Sykes  had  to  be  recalled, 
to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  Humphreys.  But  for  this  pre 
caution,  Hooker  feared  that  the  Confederates  might  follow 
up  their  advantage,  with  results  of  the  most  disastrous 
character. 

sjlTlie  short  winter's  day  came  to  an  end.  Fifteen  thousand 
men  lay  dead  or  wounded  along  the  banks  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  no  nearer  Richmond 

than  it  was  when  the  sun  rose,. The  Confederates  were  elated 

and  the  Federals  were  depressed.  The  Confederates  had 
had  a  day  of  such  savage  pleasure  as  seldom  falls  to  the  lot 
of  soldiers,  a  day  on  which  they  saw  their  opj)onents  doing 
just  what  they  wished  them  to  do,  but  what  they  did  not 
dare  to  hope  they  would  do.  The  Federals  had  had  a  day 
of  hard  and  hopeless  effort,  and  they  had  nothing  to  cheer 
them  but  the  consciousness  of  duty  nobly  donep  It  would 
be  interesting  to  know  with  what  feelings  Burnside  contcm- 
plated  the  day's  work.  Swinton,  who  was  present,  says 
that  as  he  saw  the  failure  of  the  assault  of  division  after 
division,  "there  grew  up  in  his  mind  something  which 


188  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

^those  around  him  saw  to  be  akin  to  desperation."  SwintoE 
also  says  that  the  chief  commanders  earnestly  urged  him, 
at  the  end  of  the  day,  to  recross  the  Rappahannock,  but  he 
would  not  be  persuaded.  So  far  was  he  from  assenting, 
that__he  proposed  to  recommence  the  action  the  following 
day,  by  storming  the  heights  with  a  column  of  eighteen 
regiments  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  to  direct  the  assault  in 
person.  There  was  nothing  to  be  hoped  for  from  this 
scheme,  and  the  fact  that  Burnside  determined  upon  it 
showed  that  his  mind  had  lost  its  balance.  There  was 
nothing  in  the  history  of  the  Ninth  Corps  on  which  to  base 
expectations  of  extraordinary  efficiency.  Besides  some 
facile  victories  in  North  Carolina,  some  service  of  two  of  its 
divisions  at  the  Second  Bull  Run,and  its  failure  at  the  Antie- 
tam,  it  had  had  little  military  experience.  It  did  not  compare 
in  sharp  experience  of  war  with  many  of  the  troops  of  the 
original  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  had  tried  and  failed. 
It  is  not  strange  that  Burnside  lost  his  head.  He  did  not 
belong  to  the  class  of  men  of  whom  the  poet  said, 

Impavidum  ferient  ruinse. 

The  very  fact  that  he  proposed  to  assault  in  person  on  the 
14th,  shows  that  he  was  incapable  of  learning  from  the  hard 
lessons  of  actual  encounter,  what  persons  of  clearer  percep 
tions  knew  before  the  first  Federal  troops  moved  out  in 
rear  of  Fredericksburg.  The  cheerful  prophet  who  wrote 
to  the  London  Times  from  Lee's  headquarters  on  the  13th 
of  December  that  the  day  was  memorable  to  the  historian 
of  the  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  American  Republic,  declared 
that  Lee  and  his  captains  under  him  enjoyed  a  moment  of 
proud  gratification  "  when  they  realized  beyond  all  question 
that  the  enemy  was  about  to  force  an  attack  under  circum 
stances  which  would  have  ensured  defeat  had  the  onslaught 
been  made  by  the  bravest  disciplined  troops  of  Europe," 


FREDERICKBBURG.  189 

and  what  Lee  and  his  captains  knew  before  the  assault  was 

delivered,  Burnside  ought  to  have  known  then,  and  was 
mad  not  to  recognize  after  the  experience  of  the  day.  The 
same  English  authority  declares  "  that  any  mortal  men 
could  have  carried  the  position  before  which  they  were 
wantonly  sacrificed,  defended  as  it  was,  it  seems  to  me  idle 
for  a  moment  to  believe."  The  wiser  counsels  of  Eurnside's 
chief  officers  prevailed,  and  the  attack  was  not  made. 
Nothing  of  interest  occurred  on  the  Sunday  or  the  Monday 
following  the  battle,  and  on  Monday  night,  in  a  storm  of 
wind  and  rain,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  quietly  and 
skilfully  withdrawn  across  the  river,  and  returned  to  its 
camps. 

The  question  whether  Lee  should  have  taken  the  offensive 
after  the  repulse  of  the  Federal  attacks  on  the  13th,  has 
been  much  discussed,  but  it  will  only  be  touched  lightly 
here.  With  his  forces,  and  with  the  exhilaration  incident  to 
their  success  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  unfavorable  position 
of  the  Federals  on  the  other,  it  seems  as  if  he  might  have 
attacked  to  advantage,  but  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  he 
must  necessarily  descend  into  the  plain  to  attack,  and  there 
find  not  only  a  very  powerful  army,  but  expose  his  own 
troops  to  the  fire  of  Hunt's  almost  countless  guns  across  the 
river.  He  himself  says  that  the  Federal  attack  had  been  so 
easily  repulsed,  and  by  so  small  a  part  of  his  army,  that  it 
was  not  supposed  the  enemy  would  limit  his  efforts  to  one 
attempt,  which,  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  his  prepara 
tions  and  the  extent  of  his  force,  seemed  to  be  compara 
tively  insignificant.  In  the  belief  that  Burnside  would  at 
tack  again,  he  deemed  it  inexpedient  to  lose  the  advantages 
of  his  position,  and  expose  his  troops  to  the  fire  of  the  inac 
cessible  batteries  across  the  river.  He  probably  decided 
wrongly,  but  the  point  may  be  left  to  his  apologists. 


190  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

It  is  not  pleasant  to  say  the  things  which  the  course  of 
this  story  has  made  it  necessary  to  say  of  Burnside,  but  the 
true  aim  of  history  is  the  pursuit  of  truth.  War  is  a  very 
dreadful  thing.  It  should  be  so  waged  as  to  do  the  greatest 
possible  injury  to  the  enemy  with  the  least  possible  injury 
to  one's  self.  Then  only  it  becomes  merciful,  and  its  ten- 
derest  mercies  are  hard.  Modesty  is  n-n,  fljpifthle  quality. 
Jjut  it  is  not  what  is  wanted  in  the  commander  of  a  hundred 
^thousand  men.  No  man  should  accept  the  command  of  an 
ftrniy  who  honestly  feels  himself  unequal  to  it.  No  man 
jhould  offer  battle  until  he  has  satisfied  himself  that  the 
battle  must  be  fought,  and  how  it  should  be  fought.  No 
such  necessity  compelled  Burnside,  and  no  adequate  prepa 
ration  was  made  by  him.  If  he  intrigued  for  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  is  hard  to  understand  how 
he  ever  could  have  slept  soundly  after  the  battle  of  Freder- 
icksburg.  If  he  did  not,  and  his  "  nolo  episcopari "  was 
genuine,  the  recollection  of  the  13th  of  December  must  still 
have  been  bitter  to  him  all  his  days. 

It  would  be  too  much  to  say  that  there  are  no  sadder 
stories  in  military  history  than  that  of  the^Army  of  the 
TPotomac,  but  its  story  is  sad  enough.  Always  better  than 
its  commanders,  always  ready  to  "  stand  in  the  evil  hour," 
and  "  having  done  all  to  stand,"  it  marched  and  fought  and 
hungered  and  thirsted  for  four  long  years,  hardly  ever  ani 
mated  by  victory.  It  showed  in  all  that  it  endured  and 
achieved,  that  it  was  an  admirable  instrument  for  the  hand 
that  knew  how  to  wield  it,  but  it  never  had  the  good  for 
tune  to  be  commanded  by  a  soldier  who  was  worthy  of  it. 
It  fought  through  to  the  end,  it  did  its  work,  and  gained 
its  crown,  but  its  path  was  long  and  rough  and  seldom 
cheered,  and  jme  of  its  saddest  and  sharpest  experiences  was 
its  brave,  hopeless  effort  at  Fredericksburg. 


APPENDIX  A. 

COMMANDERS  IN  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
UNDER  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  McCLEL- 
LAN  ON  SEPTEMBER  14,  1862.1 

RIGHT  WING. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  E.  BURNSIDE. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENEKAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  RUFUS  KING. 

(2)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  P.  HATCH. 

(3)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  DOUBLEDAY. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

(1)  Brig. -Gen.  JOHN  P.  HATCH.  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  A.  DOUBLEDAY. 

(2)  Col.  WALTER  PHELPS,  Ja.  (2)  Col.  WM.  P.  WAINWRIGIIT. 

(3)  Lieut.-Col.  J.  W.  HOFMANN. 

Third  Brigade.  Fourth  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  M.  R.  PATRICK.  Brig.-Gen.  JOHN  GIBBON. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JAMES  B.  RICKETTS. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  DURYEA.    Col.  WM.  H.  CHRISTIAN.    Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  L.  HARTSUFP. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEO.  G.  MEADE. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.  Gen.  T.  SEYMOUR.    Col.  A.  L.  MAGILTON.    (1)  Col.  THOMAS  F.  GALLAGHEE. 

(2)  Lieut-Col.  ROB'T  ANDERSON. 

1  As  shown  by  the  Records  of  the  Adjutant- General's  Office.    Furnished  Gen 
eral  F.  W.  Palfrey,  in  compliance  with  his  request  dated  July  4,  1881. 


192  ANTIETAM  AND   FREDERICKSBURG. 

NINTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

(1)  MAJOR-GENERAL  JESSE  L.  RENO. 

(2)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  J.  D.  COX. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIBR-GENERAL  O.  B.  WILLCOX. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Col.  B.  C.  CHRIST.  Col.  THOMAS  WELSH. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIKR-GENEEAL  S.  D.  STURGIS. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Col.  JAMES  NAGLE.  Col.  EDWARD  FERRERO. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER  GENERAL  ISAAC  T.  RODMAN. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Col.  H.  S.  FAIRCHILD.  Col.  EDWARD  HARLAND. 


CENTRE. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  V.   SUMNER. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  V.   SUMNER. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ISRAEL  B.  RICHARDSON. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig. -Gen.  THOMAS  F.  MEAGHBR.  Brig.-Gen.  JOHN  C.  CALDWELL. 

Third  Brigade. 
Col.  JOHN  R.  BROOKE. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  SEDGWICK. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  A.  GOBMAN.    Brig.-Gen.  O.  O.  HOWARD.    Brig.-Gen.  N.  J.  T.  DANA. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  H.  FRENCH. 

Firat  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  NATHAN  KIMBALL.     Col.  DWIGHT  MORRIS.     Brig.-Gen.  MAX  WEBER, 


TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
BBIGADIEK-GENERAL  A.  S.  WILLIAMS. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  S.  W.  CRAWFORD. 
First  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  J.  F.  KNIPB.  Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  H.  GORDON. 


APPENDIX  A.  193 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEO.  S.  GREENE. 

Fir*t  Brigade.  Second  Bi  igade.  Third  Brigade. 

Lt.-Col.  HECTOR  TYNDALE.    Col.  HENRY  J.  STAINROOK.    Col.  WM.  B.  GOODEICH. 


LEFT  WING. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  WM.   B.   FBANKLIN. 

SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  WM.  B.  FRANKLIN. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  SLOCUM. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  A.  T.  A.  TORBERT.         Col.  J.  J.  BARTLETT.         Brig.-Gen.  JOHN  NBWTON. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GHNERAL  WM.  F.  SMITH. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  S.  HANCOCK.      Brig.-Gen.  W.  T.  H.  BROOKS.       Col.  W.  H.  IRWIN. 

COUCH'S   DIVISION  (Fourth  Corps). 

MAJOR-GENEBAL  D.  N.  COUCH. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  CHAS.  DEVENS.    Brig.-Gen.  A.  P.  HOTVB.    Brig.-Gen.  JOHN  COCHRANB. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  MORELL. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  JAMES  BARNES.      Brig.-Gen.  CHARLES  GRIFFIN.      Col.  T.  B.  W.  STOCKTON. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  SYKES. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Lieut-Col.  R.C.BUCHANAN.     Lieut. -Col.  WM.  CHAPMAN.     Col.  G.  K.  WARREN. 

ADJUTANT- GEN  EKAL'S  OFFICE,  C.  McKEEVER. 

Washington,  September  5,  1881.  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


V.— 9 


APPENDIX  B. 

ORGANIZATION !  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  NOETHERN 
VIRGINIA,  FROM  AUGUST  13  TO  NOVEMBER 
15,  1862,  FROM  REPORTS  OF  MILITARY  OPER 
ATIONS  DURING  THE  REBELLION,  1860-65, 
WASHINGTON,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  PRINT 
ING  OFFICE. 

LONGSTREET'S  (FIRST)  CORPS,   OR  RIGHT  WING. 

McLAWS'S  DIVISIONS 

Sarksdale^a  Brigade.  Kershaw's  Brigade. 

13th  Mississippi.  2d  South  Carolina, 

17th          "  3d       " 

18th          "  7th     " 

21st          "  8th     "           " 

Semmes's  Brigade.  CobVs  Brigade. 

10th  Georgia.  Col.  SANDERS  Com'd'gat  Sharpsburg. 

5-'M        "  Cohb's  Georgia  Legion. 

15th  Virginia.  16th  Georgia. 

32d         "  24th 

Manly's  Battery.  15th  North  Carolina. 
Bead's  Battery. 

R.  H.  ANDERSON'S  DIVISION." 
Commanded  by  GENERAL  WILLCOX." 

WiUcox's  Brigade.  Pryofs  Brigade.  Featherston 's  Brigade. 

8th  Alabama.  14th  Alabama.  Gen.  FEATHERSTON  and 

9th        "  3d  Virginia.  Col.  POSEY  Com'd'g. 

10th        "  5th  Florida.*  2d  Mississippi  Battalion, 

llth        "  8th        u  32th  Mississippi. 

16th          " 
19th 

1  Made  up  from  reports,  casualty  sheets,  organization  table  of  July  2od,  and 
return  of  September  30th.  The  arrangement  of  divisions  accords  with  the  latter, 
except  in  the  case  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  which  is  there  made  to  belong  to  Jack 
son's  corps.  Between  these  sources,  and  owing  to  changes  made  during  this  cam 
paign,  there  are  some  discrepancies,  and  some  organizations  will  be  found  to 
appear  twice,  and  an  absolutely  accurate  table  has  been  impossible. 

a  These  two  divisions  were  under  AIcLaws's  command  in  Maryland  campaign. 

3  General  Willcox,  in  Ids  report,  states  that  his  division  was  composed  of  three 
brigades  (the  first  named),  but  the  casualty  sheet  makes  the  division  to  consist  of 
six. 

4  Fifth  in  report  of  Pryor,  Second  in  Guild's  report. 


APPENDIX  B. 


195 


Wright's  Brigade. 
3d  Georgia. 
22d       " 
48th     " 
44th  Alabama. 
44th  Georgia. 


Armistead's  Brigade. 
14th  Virginia. 
38th 
53d  " 
57th  " 
Dixie  Battery  (Chapman's). 


Mahone's  Brigade. 
Col.  PARHAM  command 
ing  at  Sharpsburg. 

6th  Virginia. 

12th 

16th         " 

41st         " 


JONES'S  (D.  R.)  DIVISION. 
Anderson's (Gf.T.) Brigade. *      Toombs's  Brigade. l 


Draytoris  Brigade. ] 


Gen.  EVANS  Com'd'g. 
1st  Georgia  Regulars. 
7th  Georgia. 
8th 
9th       " 

Gen.  TOOMBS,  Com'd'g. 
Col.  BENNING  Com'd'g 
in  Maryland, 
yd  Georgia. 
15th     " 
17th     " 
20th     *« 

15th  South  Carolina. 
50th2    " 
51st  a    "            " 

Kemper's  Brigade.* 
Col.    CORSE    Com'd'g    at 
battles  of  Groveton  and 
Manassas. 
1st  V  rginia. 
7th 
llth      " 
17th      " 
24th      " 

Picketfs  (or  Garnetf*) 

Brigade  ,3 
8th  Virginia. 
18  h      " 
10th       " 
28th      " 
56th      " 

Jenkins's  Brigade.* 
Col.  WALKER  Com'd'g. 
1st  South  Carolina. 
2d       '* 
5th     " 
6th     "             " 
Palmetto  Sharpshooters. 

Ransom's  Brigade. 
24th  North  Carolina. 
25th      " 
35th      "  " 

49th      "  " 

J.  R.  Branch's  Battery. 


WALKER'S  DIVISION. 

Walker's  Brigade. 
Col.  MANNING  Com'd'g. 
80th  Virginia. 
46th  North  Carolina. 
48th      " 
27th      "  " 

3d  Arkansas. 
French's  Battery. 


Whiting's  Brigade. 

(See  Hood's  or  Whiting'c 

Division.) 


PICKETT'S  DIVISION.* 
Kemper's  Brigade.6  Picket? s  (or  Garnett's)  Brigade.6 


1st  Virginia. 
7th 
llth      " 
17th      " 
24th      " 

8th  Virginia. 
18th      " 
19rh      " 
28th      " 
56th      " 

iree  brigades  formed  a  temporary  division  un- 


1  In  Ma 

der  General  Toombs. 

2  Called  Georgia  in  Guild's  report. 

3  Attached  to  this  division  in  the  Maryland  campaign,  previous  to  which  it  was 
in  Pickett's  division. 

4  Attached  to  this  division  in  the  Maryland  campaign  ;  belonged  to  Pickett'a 
division  in  Northeastern  Virginia. 

6  Jenkins's  brigade  was  in  this  division  in  Northeastern  Virginia. 
'  Belonged  to  D.  R.  Jones's  division  in  Ma  yland  campaign. 


196  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

HOOD'S   (OR  WHITING'S)  DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 

Hood's  Brigade.  Whiting's  (Law's)  Brigade.         Evans's  Brigade. l 

Col.  WOFFORD  Com'd'g.          4th  Alabama.  Gen.  EVANS  and  Col.  STE- 

18th  Georgia.  (5th  North  Carolina.  YENS  Com'd'g. 

1st  Texas.  2d  Mississippi.  17th  South  Carolina. 

4th      "  llth        "  18th      "  " 

6th      "  22cl        "  " 

Hampton  Legion.  23d        "  " 

Holcombe  Legion. 
Boyce's  Battery,  Macbeth's 
Artillery. 

ABTILLEBY. 

Reilly's  Battery.2  Walton's  Artillery  Battalion,  Washing- 

Garden's  Battery.2  ton  Artillery,  of  Louisiana. 

Bachman's  Battery.2  Lee's  Artillery  Battalion. 


JACKSON'S  (SECOND)  CORPS. 

JACKSON'S   DIVISION. 
TALIAFERRO,  STARKE,  and  J.  R.  JONES,  Commanding. 

INFANTRY. 

Winder's  Brigade.  J.  R.  Jones's  (or  CampbelVs')  Brigade. 

Cola.  BAYLOR  and  GRIGSBY  Com'd'g.      JONES,  B.  T.  JOHNSON,  and  SEDDON, 
2d  Virginia,  Com'd'g. 

4th        •*  21st  Virginia. 

5th        "  42d 

27th      "  48th 

33d        «  1st  Virginia  Battalion. 

TaUaferro'f.  Brigade.  Starke's  Brigade. 

Cols.  TAXIAFERRO  and  WARBEN  Com'd'g.    STABKE,  STAFFORD,  and  PENDLETON, 
2:3d  Virginia.  Com'd'g. 

47th  Alabama.  1st  Louisiana. 

48th        "  2d  " 

37th  Virginia.  9th  3       " 

10th        "  10th 

15th        " 

Coppen's  Louisiana  Battalion. 

ARTILLERY. 
Major  L.  M.  SHTJMAKEB  Commanding. 

Brockenbrough's  Battery.  Carpenter's  Battery. 

Wooding's  Battery.  Danville  Artillery.  Caskie's  Battery. 

Poague's  Battery,  Rockbridge  Artillery.  Raine's  Battery. 


i  Not  attached  to  any  division. 

3  In  battle  of  Sharpsburg. 

'  October  5th  transferred  to  Hays's  Brigade. 


APPENDIX  B.  197 

EWELL'S   DIVISION". 
EWELL,  LAWTON,  and  EARLY,  Commanding. 

INFANTRY. 

Lawton's  Brigaded  Early' s  Brigade, 

LAWTOV  and  Done  LASS  Com'd'g.  13th  Virginia. 

13th  Georgia.  25th 

31sr,        •*  31st 

60th        "  44th 

61st        "  49th 

52d 
5Sth2 

Hayffs  Brigade,  Trimble's  Brigade. 

Gen.  HAYS  and  Cols.  FORNO  and      TRIMBLE, WALKKR,  and  BROWN  Com\Tg. 

STRONG  Coiu'd'g.  12th  Georgia. 

6th  Louisiana.  21st        '• 

6ih          "  15th  Alabama. 

7th          "  2Gih  North  Carolina.3 

8th         "  21st       " 

ARTILLERY. 
Major  COURTNEY  Commanding. 

Brown's  Battery.  Latimer's  Battery. 

Dements  Battery.  Balthis'  Battery  (Lieut.  Garber). 

D'Aquin's  Battery. 


A.  P.  HILL'S  DIVISION. 
INFANTRY. 

Branch's  (or  Lane's)  Brigade.  Gregg'*  (or  3/cGro?.can'.9)  Brigade. 

37th  North  Carolina.  1st  South  Carolina  Rifles  (Orr's). 

7th        "           *  1st  South  Carolina. 

18th      '»            "  12th    " 

28th      "           "  13th    '«           " 

33d        "           "  14th    »*           " 

Field's  Brigade.  Fender's  Brigade. 

Col.  BROCKENBROUGH  Com'd'g.  16th  North  Carolina. 

55th  Virginia.  22d        "            " 

47th        4k  34th       "            " 

2d            "        Battalion.  38th      "            " 
40th 

Archer's  Brigade.  Thomas'  Brigade. 

1st  Tennessee.  14th  Georgia. 

7th         "  19th*      " 

14th        "  35th        «« 

19th  Georgia.  45th        " 

5th  Alabama  Battalion.  49th        " 

1  On  Guild's  report,  Twenty -sixth  and  Thirty- eighth  Georgia  added. 

2  According  to  Guild's  report. 

3  See  also  Garland's  Brigade,  D.  H.  Hill's  Division. 

4  See  Guild's  Report. 


198  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ARTILLERY. 

Major  R.  L.  WALKEB  Commanding. 

Braxton's  Battery.  Mclntosh's  Battery. 

Latham's        "  Davidson's      " 

Crenshaw's    "  Pegram's        " 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION.1 

INFANTRY. 

Garland? '8  Brigade.  Anderson? 's  (G.  B.)  Brigade. 

OAKLAND  and  McRAE  Com'd'g.  2d  North  Carolina. 

20th  North  Carolina.*  4th      " 

3d »       "  "  13th    "  " 

lst»       "  »  14th    " 

5th         "  "  23d      "  " 

30th    " 

Rlpletfs  Brigade.*  ColquiWs  Brigade.  Rodes's  Brigade. 

4th  Georgia.  19th  Georgia.  3d  Alabama. 

6th        "  23d          "  5th 

21st       "  27th        "  6th        " 

44th      "  28th        "  12th      " 

13th  Alabama.  26th      '* 

ARTILLERY. 

Jones's  Battery.  Bondurant's  Battery. 

Lane's        "  Hardaway's        " 

King  WUiiam  Artillery.  (Carter's)  Cutts's  Battalion.8 

J.  E.  B.  STUART'S  CAVALRY  DIVISION. 
Robertson's  Brigade.  Hampton^s  Brigade. 

7th  Virginia  Cavalry.  Jeff.  Davis  Legion  (10  companies).7 

2d          "  1st  North  Carolina  Cavalry. 

6th        "  Ca valry  of  Cobb's  Legion  (9 companies).7 

12th      «  *«  2d  South  Carolina  Cavalry. 

17th  Virginia  Cavalry  Battalion.6  Phillips's  Legion  (5  companies).7 

Fitzhugh  Lee's  Brigade. 
1st  Virginia  Cavalry. 
5th  8      " 
3d         "  " 

4th        "  " 

Stuart  Horse  Artillery. 
White's  Battalion  Virginia  Cavalry  (independent).  9 

1  Appears  to  have  been  independent  of  any  corps,  though  in  field  return  of  Sep 
tember  SOth  it  is  included  in  Jackson's  corps. 

2  In  Guild's  report  of  Manassasthe  Twentieth  North  Carolina  appears  in  Trim 
ble's  brigade,  Ewell's  division,  but  in  his  Maryland  campaign  it  appears  here. 

3  From  llipley's  report  it  would  appear  these  were  in  his  brigade. 

4  See  Garland's  Brigade. 

6  Not  known  whether  Cutts's  battalion  embraced  any  of  the  above  batteries,  or 
was  separate  and  distinct  from  them. 

8  Called  Eleventh  Virginia  on  return  of  October  24,  186?,  and  attached  to  an 
other  brigade  with  Fifth,  Ninth.  White's  Cavalry,  and  Scott's  Rangers. 

7  From  return  of  OctoDer  24, 1862. 

8  Return  of  October  524,  1862,  makes  Tenth  Virginia  in  place  of  this  Fifth  Regi 
ment,  which  is  assigned  to  another  brigade  with  Ninth,  Eleventh,  White's  Bat 
talion,  and  Scott's  Rangers. 

8  Assigned  to  a  brigade  on  return  of  October  24, 1862. 


APPENDIX  C. 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
DECEMBER,  1862,  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  E.  BURN- 
SIDE,  COMMANDING.1 

LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  B.  FRANKLIN  COMMANDING. 

SIXTH  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  F.  SMITH  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  T.  H.  BROOKS  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY 
First  Brigade. 

Colonel  A.  T.  A.  TORBERT,  1st  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  Commanding. 
1st  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  M.  W.  Collet. 


2d 

3d 

4th 

15th 

23d 


Colonel  Samuel  L.  Buck. 
Colonel  Henry  W.  Brown. 
Colonel  William  B.  Hatch. 
Lieut.-Colonel  E.  L.  Campbell. 
Lieut. -Colouel  H.  O.  Ryerson. 


Second  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  J.  J.  BABTLETT  Commanding. 
27th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  A.  D.  Adams. 
121st        "  "          Colonel  Emory  Upton. 

5th  Maine  Volunteers,  Colonel  E  A.  Scammon. 
IHth  Now  York  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  J.  J.  Seaver. 
96th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  H.  L.  Cake. 

Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  G.  W.  TOWN,  95th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Commanding. 
18th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  George  R.  Myers. 
31st         "  Lieut.-Colonel  L.  C.  Newmann. 

32d          "  "  Captain  Charles  Hubbs. 

95th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  E.  Hall. 


»  From  Reports  of  Military  Operations  During  the  Rebellion,  1860-65.    Wash 
ington.    War  Department  Printing  Office,  1877. 


200  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 


ARTILLERY. 

Battery  D,  3d  U.  S.  Artillery,  First  Lieutenant  E.  B.  Williston. 
44        A,  1st  New  Jersey  Artillery,  Captain  W.  Hexamer. 
*'        A,  1st  Massachusetts  Artillery.  Captain  W.  H.  McCartney. 
44        A,  1st  Maryland  Artillery,  Captain  J.  W.  Wolcott. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  P.  HOWE  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  CALVIN  E.  PRATT  Commanding. 
5th  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  Colonel  Amasa  Cobb. 
40th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers.  Colonel  William  H.  Irwin. 
6th  Maine  Volunteers,  Colonel  Hiram  Burnham. 
43d  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  B.  F.  Baker. 
119th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  P.  C.  Ellmaker. 

Second  Brigade. 
Colonel  HENRY  WHITING,  2d  Vermont  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

2d  Vermont  Volunteers,  Colonel . 

3d         "  44          Colonel  B.  N.  Hyde. 

4th       '•  4l          Colonel  C.  B.  Stoughton. 

5th       4t  "  Colonel  Lewis  A.  Grant. 

6th       "  Colonel  N.  Lord,  Jr. 

26th  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  Colonel  A.  J.  Morrison. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  FRANCIS  L.  VINTON  Commanding. 
77th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  James  B.  MrKean. 
49th         4%  4>          Colonel  D.  D.  Bidwell. 

20th          "  "          Colonel  E.  Von  Vepcsack. 

33d  "  "          Colonel  Robert  F.  Taylor. 

21st  New  Jersey         "         Colonel  Gilliam  Van  Houten. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  F,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery.  Captain  R.  B.  Ayres. 
Battery  B,  1st  Maryland  Artillery,  Captain  Alonzo  Snow. 
1st  Battery,  New  York  Light  Artillery,  Captain  Andrew  Cowan. 
3d        "  "  "  Captain  William  Stewart. 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  NEWTON  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  COCHRANE  Commanding. 
82d  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  D.  H.  Williams. 
23d  "  "          Colonel  T.  H.  Neill. 

Hist  4'  "          Colonel  G.  C.  Spear. 

65th  New  York  Volunteers  (1st  U.  S.  Chasseurs),  Colonel  Alexander  Shaler. 
122d        "  "  Colonel  Silas  Titus. 

67th        *'  4t  (1st  Long  Island),  Lieut.-Colonel  Nelson  Cross. 


APPENDIX  C.  201 


Second  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  CHARLES  DEVENS  Commanding. 
2d  Ehode  Island  Volunteers,  Colonel  Frank  Whcaton. 
7th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Colonel  D.  A.  Ilussell. 
10th  '•  "  Colonel  H.  L.  Eustis. 

3(>th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  W.  H.  Browne. 
37th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Colonel  Oliver  Edwards. 

Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  THOMAS  A.  ROWLEY  Commanding. 
62d  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  David  I.  Nevin. 
93d  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  J.  M.  McCarter. 
98th  "  "  Colonel  J.  F.  Ballier. 

lOid  "  "  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  M.  Kinkead. 

139th          «•  •*  Colonel  F.  H.  Collier. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  C.  1st  Pennsylvania  Artillery,  Captain  J.  McCarthy. 
"       G,  2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  J.  11.  Butler. 

FIRST  CORPS. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  J.  F.  REYNOLDS  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER  GENERAL  A.  DOUBLEDAY  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Colonel  WAI/TEU  PHELPS,  JR.,  Commanding. 
2d  U.  S.  Sharpshooters,  Major  H.  B.  Stoughton. 
14th  New  York  State  Militia,  Lieut  -Colonel  W.  H.  De  Bevoise. 
22d  New  York  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  McKee,  Jr. 
24th         "  "  Major  R.  Oliver,  Jr. 

30th        "  Lieut. -Colonel  M.  H.  Chrysler. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  JAMES  GAVIN  Commanding. 

56th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Colon el  J.  W.  Hofinann. 
95th  New  York  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  J.  B.  Post. 
76th          "  "          Colonel  W.  P.  Wainwright. 

7th  Indiana  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  J.  F.  Cheek. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  G.  R.  PAUL  Commanding. 
20th  New  York  State  Militia.  Lieut.-Colonel  J.  B.  Hardenbergh. 
21st          "          Volunteers.  Captain  G.  N.  Layton. 
23d  "  "  Colonel  H.  C.  Hoffmann. 

35th         "  "  Colonel  N.  B.  Lord. 

Fourth  Brigade. 

Colonel  L.  CUTLER  Commanding. 
6th  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  E.  S.  Bragg. 
2d  "  "  Colonel  L.  Fairchild. 

7th          "  "  Lieut.-Colonel  C.  A.  Hamilton. 

19th  Indiana  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  S.  J.  Williams. 
24th  Michigan  Volunteers,  Colonel  H.  A.  Morrow. 

9* 


ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ABTILLEBY. 

Captain  G.  A.  GKREISH  Commanding. 
Battery  B,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  James  Stewart. 

/"  D,  1st  Rhode  Island  Artillery,  Lieutenant  G.  C.  Harkness. 
"  D,  1st  New  Hampshire  Artillery,  Lieutenant  F.  M.  Edgell. 
"  L,  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Captaiu  J.  A.  Reynolds. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

BBIGADIEB-GENEBAi  JOHN   GIBBON  COMMANDING. 
INFANTBY. 

First  Brigade. 

Colonel  ADRIAN  R.  ROOT  Commanding. 
94th  New  York  Volunteers,  Major  John  A.  Kress. 
104th      "  "  Major  G.  G.  Prey. 

305th       "  Major  D.  A.  Sharp. 

107th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  T.  F.  McCoy. 
16th  Maine  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  C.  W.  Tildeu. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  P.  LTLB,  90th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Commanding. 
26th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  H.  Richardson. 
12th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Colonel  J.  L.  Bates. 
90th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  W.  A.  Leech. 
136th  "  "  Colonel  Thomas  M.  Bayne. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  NELSON  TAYLOR  Commanding. 
83d  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  John  W.  Stiles. 
97th        "  "          Colonel  Charles  Wheelock. 

13th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Colonel  S.  H.  Leonard, 
llth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  Richard  Coulter. 
88th  Colonel  G.  P.  McLean. 

ARTILLERY. 

Captain  GEORGE  F.  LEPPIEN  Commanding. 
Battery  F,  1st  Pennsylvania.  Lieutenant  R.  B.  Ricketts. 
Independent  Battery,  Pennsylvania,  Captain  J.  Thompson. 
Battery  E,  Maine,  Captain  G.  F.  Leppien. 
"       B,  Maine,  Captain  J.  A.  Hall. 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Colonel  WILLIAM  SINCLAIR,  6th  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Commanding. 
1st  Rifles,  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  Captain  D.  McGee. 
1st  Infantry,        "  "  "      Captain  W.  C.  Talley. 

2d         u  "  "  "      Colonel  W.  McCandless. 

6th        "  "  •'  "      Major  W.  H.  Ent. 

121st  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  C.  Biddle. 


APPENDIX  0.  203 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  A.  L.  MAGILTON,  4th  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Commanding. 
3d  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  Colonel  H.  G.  Sickle. 
4th  "  "  "       Lieut.  -  Colonel  R.  II.  Wool  worth. 

7th  "  "  "       Colonel  H.  0.  Bolinger. 

8th  "  "       Major  S.  M.  Bailey. 

142d          "  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  P.  Cummins. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  C.  FEGER  JACKSON  Commanding. 
6th  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  Colonel  J.  W.  Fisher. 
9th  "  "      Lieut.-Colonel  R.  Anderson. 

10th  "  "      Lieut.-Colonel  A.  J.  Warner, 

llth  "  "  "      Colonel  T.  F.  Gallagher. 

12th  •«  "  "      Colonel  M.  D.  Hardin. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  A,  1st  Pennsylvania,  Lieutenant  J.  G-.  Simpson. 
"       B,  *'  Captain  J.  H.  Cooper. 

"       G,  "  Captain  F.  P.  Amsdon. 

"      C,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Captain  D.  R.  Ransom. 

Line  of  Extra  Caissons, 
Captain  J.  M.  CLARK,  Co.  F,  2d  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  Commanding. 

CAVALRY  BRIGADE. 

Brigadier-General  GEORGE  D.  BAYARD  Commanding. 
1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Colonel  Owen  Jones. 
10th  New  York  Cavalry," Lieut.-Colonel  William  Irvine. 
2d  "  "        Major  H.  B.  Davies. 

1st  New  Jersey        "        Lieut. -Colonel  Joseph  Karge. 

Artillery. 
Battery  C,  3d  TL  S.  Artillery,  Captain  H.  G.  Gibson. 


CENTKE  GRAND  DIVISION. 
MAJOB-GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER  COMMANDING. 

THIRD  CORPS. 
BBIGADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  STONEMAN  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BEIGADIEE-GENEBAL  D.  B.  BIRNEY  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  C.  ROBINSON  Commanding. 
20th  Indiana  Volunteers,  Colonel  John  Van  Valkenburg. 
63d  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Major  J.  A.  Banks. 
105th  "  "          Colonel  A.  A.  McKnight. 

114th  "  "          Colonel  C.  H.  T.  Collis. 

141st  "  •«          Colonel  H.  J.  Madill. 

68tu  «  "         Colonel  A.  H.  Tippin. 


_    i  AXnFTAM  A5T>  FBEDBRICKSBUBG. 


Brigadier-General  J.  H.  HOBABT  WJJKD  Commanding. 
5Tih  Pcc&^fTuua  Toimrteen,  CUnaei  C.  T.  ^•^•Ha 

.•-••-••. 

4^b     "  "  Cotoo*!  E.  Walter. 

t&f.h  New  York  Vdtanteti*,  Oofooei  R.  De  Trobraad. 


Tltrd 
H. 


37lh  New  York  VobntnnL 


17th  Maine  Volant«er«,  Oofaoei  T.  A. 

1st  New  York  Yaianteera,  Oato»4  J.  fmlerki  PSc 

»d  Mirhittan  YoJauteqa,  UenL^aotaMi  Bjroa  R. 


Cjptsio  G.  E.  RANDOLPH  Commanding. 

,  9d  TT.  &  Artinery.  Gaptaia  L.  L.  UrjagXtm. 
BMtaj  E,  1st  Rhode  Uud  ArtDkrr,  r^^»««"*  P.  5.  Jartnm. 


SECOND  DIVISIOT. 
DAXIEL  E.   SICKLES 


Firtt  Briyadf. 

Bkfcadier-Generml  JOSIT-H  B.  CA«E 
llth  MiiMiliBMlli  Voinnteen.  OolonH  W. 
16th  *•  Cokmei  T.  B.  T 

B.  BakHio. 


»h  Pcnnrrlraaim  "          Uent.-Cbla0rl  B.  C. 

llth  New  J«nqr  "  OiteMl  B.  McAl  irter. 

ad  New  HamfKhxra          *•  Cotoael  G.  Manton. 

Second  Brigade. 

OolofK^  GEOBOZ  B.  U  ALL  Commanding. 

70th  (Ufcbnrtnor)  N<?w  York  Volunteers,  Oafcmel  J.  Egbert  Fanram. 
Tint  (td  Exoel«ior)          •'  -  M       : 

7*1  (W  Exoelnor>  **  *•  Cotooci  Wlliaaa  O.  Sterena. 

78d  (*fa  BxeeWer)         "  u  Cvknel  William  E. 

T  Li«B  -C<4onel  W. 

120th  Kev  Ywrk  Vohmteexr,  Cohmei  George  H.  Sharp. 


Brigadier-General  J.  W.  P.EYEBE  Command  ing. 
5th  New  Jersey  Tolnnteera,  Oolonei  Williwn  J.  SewdL 
7th         **  **          Cokmel  ~ 


Battpry  K.  «h  TJ.  a  Aitflkry,  Lientenant  F.  W.  Sedej. 
Battery  H,  1«  U.  8.  ArtUterr.  Lieotenaot  J.  R  Dimkrk. 
Battery  B,  bit  New  Jersey  Artillery.  Captain  A.  J  Clark. 
4th  Battery,  New  York  Artillery,  Captain  James  E.  Badda, 


.  '.    '.-'.  "  >'. 
JL  W.  VM11V1K 


_-_-V       -     "    -•-     -V       .       -...-.    i  .-_-.:  ,77  ~--i.-   :..r.-. 

I  e-Ki  New  York  Vohnueets,  Oicnel  A.  T.  Elia. 
astii  -  -          Ijeot -Colonel  BL  L  < 

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:•-•=:=»      - 

Steh 

lltkh  -          LMcL-Catatti  J. 

ItiBki  ^tev  Tock  Tahmteecs,  Major  J.  J.  Byrne. 


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llth  Bmaerr.  ^Tew  Tort: 
1ft  BUD*  j  (Xxaeb*ai%  : 
BMttexy  H,  bt  OU»  Aitafery. 

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CHJLKLBS  GBUFDT  OlMMMBlMHk 

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MQt  Sew  Tack  VohnMers.  lient-Cotonri  T. 


•-  -.  :..•-•     :-  --  T...:  ;>---.  -      -  v    :..    -  -.-.-. 


BM 


206  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

ARTILLERY. 

Captain  A.  P,  MABTIN,  Battery  C,  Massachusetts  Artillery,  Commanding. 
Battery  C  (3d),  Massachusetts  Artillery,  First  Lieutenant  V.  M.  Drum. 
"       E  (5th),  "         Captain  C.  A.  Phillips. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  SYKES  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Lieut. -Colonel  R.  C.  BUCHANAN,  4th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Commanding. 
3d  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  John  D,  Wilkins. 
4th     "          "  Captain  Hiram  Dryer. 

1st  Battalion,  12th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  M.  M.  Blunt. 
2d  "        12th      "  "         Captain  T.  M.  Anderson. 

1st  "        14th      "  "         Captain  J.  D.  O'Connell. 

2d  «•        14th      "  "         Captain  G.  B.  Overton. 

Secoiid  Brigade. 

Major  GEORGK  L.  ANDREWS,  17th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Commanding, 
llth  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  C.  S.  Russell. 

JJattalion  of  1st  and  2d  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  Sulem  S.  Marsh. 
"        of  (ith  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  Levi  C.  Bootes. 
"        of  7th     ''  "         Captain  D.  P.  Hancock. 

"        of  10th  "  "         Captain  H.  E.  Maynadier. 

"        of  17th  and  19th  U.  S.  Infantry,  Captain  J.  P.  Wales. 

Third  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  G.  K.  WARRBN  Commanding. 
Bth  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  C.  Winslow. 
140th      "  "  Colonel  P.  H.  O'Rorko. 

146th      "  "          Colonel  K.  Garrard. 

ARTILLERY. 

First  Lieutenant  M.  F.  WATSON,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Commanding. 
Battery  I,  5th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  M.  F.  Watson. 
"       L,  1st  Ohio  Artillery,  First  Lieutenant  F.  Domes. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BBIGADIEB-GENEBAL  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier  General  E.  B.  TYLER  Commanding. 
91st  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  E.  M.  Gregory. 
134th  "  "  Lieut. -Colonel  E.  O'Brien. 

126th  "  "  Colonel  James  G.  Elder. 

129th  «  "  Colonel  J.  G.  Frick. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  P.  H.  ALLABACH,  131st  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Commanding. 
131st  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Colonel  W.  B.  Shunt. 
123d  •*  "  Colonel  J.  B.  Clark. 

133d  "  "  Colonel  B.  F.  Speakman. 

155ta          ••  "  Colonel  E.  J.  Allen. 


APPENDIX  C.  207 

ARTILLERY. 
Captain  A.  M.  RANDOL,  1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  Commanding. 

Battery  H,  1st  U.  S.  Artillery,  Captain  A.  M.  Randol. 

Section  of  Battery  C,  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Lieutenant  W.  H.  Phillips. 

GRAND  DIVISION  CAVALRY. 
Brigadier-General  W.  W.  AVEHELL  Commanding. 


EIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  V.  SUMNER,  U.S.A.,  COMMANDING. 

SECOND  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  N.  COUCH  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIOADIEB-GENEBAL  W.  S.  HANCOCK  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 

First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  J.  C.  CALDWELL  Commanding. 

61st  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  N.  A.  Miles. 

64th        "  '•          Captain  Harvey  L.  Jones. 

145th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  H.  L.  Brown. 

5th  New  Hampshire         "  Colonel  E.  E.  CroFS. 

81st  Pennsylvania  •«  Lieut. -Colonel  H.  B.  McKeen. 

7th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  George  Von  Schack. 

Second  Brigade. 
Brigadier- General  THOMAS  F.  MEAGHEB  Commanding. 

69th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  Nugent. 
88th        "  "  Colonel  P.  Kelly. 

63d          *'  "  Major  J.  O'Neill. 

28th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  Byrnes. 
116th  Pennsylvania         "  Colonel  D.  Heenan. 

Third  Brigade. 
Colonel  S.  K.  ZOOK,  57th  New  York  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

57th  New  York  Volunteers,  Major  N.  G.  Throop. 
63d  Pennsylvania        "         Colonel  John  R.  Brooke 
3d  Delaware  Volunteers,  Colonel  W.  P.  Bailey. 
52(1  New  York        "  Colonel  Paul  Frank. 

66th         "  "          Captain  Julius  Wehle. 

27th  Connecticut    "          Colonel  R.  S.  Bostwick. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  C,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  Evan  Thomas. 
**       B^  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Captain  R.  D.  Pettit, 


208  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  O.  O.  HOWARD  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  ALFKED  SULLY  Commanding. 
34r,h  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  J.  A.  Suiter. 
15th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Major  C.  Philbrick. 
82d  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  H.  W.  Hudson. 
19th  Maine  Volunteers,  Colonel  F.  D.  Sewell. 
1st  Minnesota  Volunteers,  Colonel  G.  N.  Morgan. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  J.  T.  OWEN,  69th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Commanding. 
(!9th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Colonel  D.  O'Kane. 
71st  "  "  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  Markoe. 

72d  "  "  Colonel  1).  W.  C.  Baxter. 

lOtith  Colonel  T.  G.  Morehead. 

Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  NORMAN  A.  HALL  Commanding. 
20th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Captain  George  N.  Macy. 
19th  Captain  J.  F.  Plimpton. 

42d  New  York  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  G.  N.  Bomford. 
127th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  W.  W.  Jennings. 
7th  Michigan  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  Henry  Baxter. 
B'Jth  New  York  Volunteers,  Lieut. -Colonel  William  Northedge. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  A,  1st  Rhode  Island  Artillery,  Captain  Tompkins. 
"       B,  1st       "          "  "         Captain  J.  G.  Hazard. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BBIGADIEB-GENEKAL  W.  H.  FRENCH  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  NATHAN  KIM  BALL  Commanding. 
4th  Ohio  Volunteers,  Colonel  John  S.  Mason. 
14th  Indiana  Volunteers,  Major  E.  H.  C.  Gavins. 
7th  Virginia  Volunteers,  Colonel  James  Snyder. 
8th  Ohio  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  F.  Sawyer. 
24th  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  Colonel  W.  B.  Robertson. 
2Sth        "  "          Colonel  M.  N.  Wisewell. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  O.  H.  PALMER,  108th  New  York  Volunteers,  Commandingo 
14th  Connecticut  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  S.  H.  Perkins. 

108th  New  York  " . 

130th  Pennsylvania      "  Colonel  H.  I.  Zinn. 

Third  Brigade. 

Lieutenant- Colonel  JOHN  W.  MARSHALL  Commanding. 
132d  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  Charles  Albright. 
4th  New  York  Volunteers.  Colonel  John  D.  McGregor. 
1st  Delaware  •'  Colonel  J.  W.  Andrews. 

10th  New  York       "  Colonel  John  E.  Bendix. 


APPENDIX  C.  209 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  G,  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Captain  John  D.  Frank. 
"      G,  1st  Rhode  Island  Artillery,  Captain  C.  D.  Owen. 

SECOND  CORPS  RESERVE  ARTILLERY. 
Battery  I,  Iht  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  E.  Kirby. 
*»     A,  4th  U.  S.        "        Lieutenant  R.  King. 


NINTH  CORPS. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  O.  B.  WILLCOX  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER- GENERAL  W.  W.  BURNS  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

70th  New  York  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  David  Morrison. 
2d  Michigan  Volunteers,  Colonel  Orlando  M.  Poe. 
17t,h      "  "  Colonel  W.  H.  Withington. 

20th      "  "  Colonel  A.  W.  Williams. 

Third  Brigade. 
45th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  Thomas  Welsh. 

ARTILLERY. 
Battery  D,  1st  New  York  Artillery,  Captain  T.  W.  Osbora. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  S.  D.  STURGIS  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
first  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  JAMES  NAGLE  Commanding. 
6th  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,  Colonel  S.  G.  Griffin. 
7th  Rhode  Island  Volunteers,  Colonel  Z.  R.  Bliss. 
2d  Maryland  Volunteers,  Major  H.  Howard. 
4Sth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  J.  K.  Sicrfriod. 
12th  Rhode  Island  "          Colonel  George  H.  Browne. 

9th  New  Hampshire        "         Colonel  E.  R.  Fellows. 

Second  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  EDWARD  FERRERO  Commanding. 
51st  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Colonel  J.  F.  Hartranft. 
21st  Massachusetts  "  Lient. -Colonel  W.  S.  Clark. 

51st  New  York  Volunteers,        Colonel  R.  B.  Potter. 
35th  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  Lieut.-Colonel  S.  Carruth. 
llth  New  Hampshire        "          Colonel  W.  Harriman. 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  E,  4th  TJ.  S.  Artillery.  Lieutenant  Georere  Dickenson. 
"       D,  1st  Rhode  Island  Artillery,  Captain  W.  W.  Buckley. 


210  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BHIGADIBR-GBNBRAL  GEORGE  W.  GETTY  COMMANDING. 

INFANTRY. 
First  Brigade. 

Colonel  RUSH  C.  HAWKINS  Commanding. 
9th  New  York  Volunteers,  Major  E.  A.  Kimball. 
89th        "  "  Colonel  H.  S.  Fairchild. 

103d        "  Major  B.  Ringold. 

10th  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,  Colonel  M.  T.  Donohoe. 
13th  Colonel  A.  F.  Stevens. 

25th  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  Colonel  Andrew  Derrom. 

Second  Brigade. 

Colonel  EDWARD  HARLAND  Commanding. 
4th  Rhode  Island  Volunteers,  Major  Martin  P.  Buffom. 
21st  Connecticut  Colonel  Arthur  H.  Dutton. 

8th  "  Major  John  E.  Ward, 

nth  Colonel  Griffin  A.  Stedman,  Jr. 

15th  Lieut.  Colonel  Samuel  Tolles. 

ltith  Colonel  Frank  Beach  (Captain  4th  U.S.  Artillery). 

ARTILLERY. 

Battery  E,  2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Lieutenant  S.  N.  Benjamin. 
A,  5th    "  "         Lieutenant  C.  P.  Muhlenberg. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASONTON  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. 

Brigadier- General  J.  H.  FABNSWORTH  Commanding. 
8th  New  York  Volunteers,  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis. 
6th        "  "  Colonel  T.  C.  Devin. 

8th  Illinois  "  Colonel  W.  Gamble. 

Second  Brigade. 
Colonel  D.  McM.  GREGG,  8th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

8th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers, . 

6th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Captain  G.  C.  Cram. 

ARTILLERY. 
Battery  M,  3d  TL  S.  Artillery,  Captain  A.  C.  M.  Penniagton, 


NOTE  TO  PAGE  72.— A  suggestion  made  to  me  by  Colonel  Archer  Anderson,  of 
Richmond,  since  the  first  edition  of  this  book  was  published,  seems  to  me  of  suffi 
cient  weight  to  justify  my  reproducing  it  here.  "I  do  not  think  you  establish 
your  Sharpsburg  contention,  because  the  stress  upon  10,000  men  at  deadly  grip 
with  an  equal  number  is  enormously  increased  if  tie  first  plainly  see  5,000  fre&h 
men  standing  in  reserve  to  the  second."— F.  W.  P. 


INDEX. 


NOTE. — Regiments,  batteries,  etc.,  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  caf>tairi's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  indexed  under  BATTERIES. 


ACQUIA  Creek,  138 

Alabama  regiments  :  Fifth,  104 ; 
Sixth,  103 

Alexander's,  Colonel  E.  P.,  artil 
lery  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  148 

Allabach's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  171 

Anderson,  Colonel  G.  B.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Tur 
ner's  Gap,  35,  36 ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  93,  102,  103 ;  killed,  104 

Anderson,  Colonel  G.  T.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Tur 
ner's  Gap,  36  ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
80 

Anderson,  General  R.  H.,  assists 
in  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
34  ;  arrives  at  Sharpsburg,  57, 
63 ;  engaged  there,  90  et  seq. , 
102,  105;  at  Frcdericksburg, 
148 


Antietam,  battle  of  the,  42;  di 
visible  into  five  parts,  72  (see 
First  Corps,  Twelfth  Corps, 
Second  Corps,  etc.,  etc.) ;  its 
result  considered,  119 

Antietam  Creek,  position  at,  48 ; 
character  of  stream,  49 

Archer's,  General  J.  J.,  brigade  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Sharpsburg,  113  et 
seq.;  at  Fredericksburg,  149, 
157 

Armistead's  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at 
Sharpsburg,  86,  90 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  2 ; 
composition  and  strength  of, 
in  September,  1862,  7  ;  move 
ments  of,  11,  15  ;  condition  of, 
15,  16 ;  quality  of,  17  ;  crosses 
Poto-iac,  18  ;  concentrated  at 
Frederick,  1 8 ;  character  of, 
39;  at  Sharpsburg,  63;  its 
strength  there,  63  et  seq.  ;  its 
character,  compared  with  that 


212 


INDEX. 


of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
125  ;  its  movements  after  the 
battle  of  Sharpsburg,  139  et 
seq. ;  strength  of,  October  20, 
1862, 129 ;  position  of,  Novem 
ber  7th-9th,  136;  strength 
of,  December  10,  1802,  141; 
position  of,  December  12, 
1862,  148;  strength  of,  De 
cember  13,  1862,  149 
A-rrny  of  the  Potomac,  under  Mc- 
Clellan,  how  composed,  6; 
strength  of,  September  20th, 
1862,  6 ;  moves  out  in  Mary 
land  campaign,  10 ;  position  of 
on  September  9th  and  13th,  13, 
14;  its  burdens,  17;  position 
of,  when  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  concentrated,  18 ; 
movements  of,  after  South 
Mountain,  45  ;  strength  of,  at 
:he  Antietam,  63  et  seq. ;  its 
character,  compared  with  that 
of  A^.  y  of  Northern  Virginia, 
125 ;  its  movements  after  the 
battle  of  the  Antietam,  129  et 
seq.  ;  position  of,  September 
7th-9th,  136;  divided  into 
three  grand  divisions,  138 ; 
strength  of,  November  10, 
1862,  138;  formation  of  the 
army  December  12,  1802, 
147 ;  strength  of  army,  De 
cember  13,  1802,  149;  gal 
lantry  <  £  its  action  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  166;  its  formation 
under  Burnsidu's  orders,  De 
cember  13,  1862,  173  ;  its  be 
havior  in  th<.  battle,  183  et 
eeq.  ;  its  sense  of  the  hopeless 
ness  of  its  task,  184;  its  in 
equality  of  merit,  185;  with 


drawn  across  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  189  ;  tribute  to  it,  190 

Army  of  Virginia,  composition  of, 
2  ;  ceases  to  exist,  5 

Artillery  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  57 

Artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  at  Fredericksburg,  145  et 
seq. 

Artillery  regiments  :  First,  101 ; 
Second,  101-109 ;  Fourth,  74  ; 
Fifth,  128;  First  New  Hamp 
shire,  74  ;  First  Nsw  York, 
I,  74;  First  Pennsylvania,  F, 
74 ;  Independent,  74  ;  Rhode 
Island,  D,  74 

BALL'S  Bluff,  52,  88 

Banks,  General  N.  P.,  placed  in 
command  of  defences  of  Wash 
ington,  5 

Barksdale's,  General  Wm.,  bri 
gade  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  at  Sharpsburg,  80,  90 

Barlow,  Colonel  F.  C.,  at  Sharps 
burg,  100, 103,  104  ;  his  love  of 
fighting,  126 

Barnesville,  13 

Bartlett's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
106 

Batteries.  Confederate :  Branch's, 
124  ;  Braxton's,  114  ;  Brown's. 
115;  Carleton's,  90;  Cren- 
shaw's,  114;  Ewbank's,  109; 
French's,  124 ;  Garden's,  115  ; 
Lane's,  139;  Lewis's,  139; 
Mclntosh's,  113, 114 ;  Miller's, 
102,  116;  Moody's,  112;  Pe- 
gram's,  114;  Ramsey's,  116 ; 
Read's,  90;  Reilly's,  110; 
Richardson's,  109 ;  Squires's, 


INDEX. 


213 


115 ;  Washington  artillery, 
112,  148.  Federal  Batteries  : 
Benjamin's,  109,  110 ;  Clark's, 
110;  Cook's,  110;  Cothran's, 
78,  91  ;  Cowan X  91  ;  Dorell's, 
109,  110;  Frank's,  91;  Gib 
son's,  106;  Graham's,  101; 
Hains's,  106  ;  Hampton's,  78  ; 
Hexamer's,  101  ;  Knapp's,  78  ; 
Kuserow's,  106;  McMullin's, 
110;  Miller's,  123;  Muhlen- 
burg's,  110;  Randol's,  106; 
Robertson's,  101,  106;  Sim- 
mons's,  110 ;  Tidball's,  106 

Bayard's  cavalry,  150 

Berlin,  131 

Birney's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  158,  176 

Blue  Ridge,  11,  15 

Bolivar,  33-45 

Bolivar  Heights,  23,  25,  26 

Boonsboro',  21,  23,  2S 

Bowling  Green  road,  157 

Branch's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  113  et  seq. 

Bridges  over  the  Antietam,  48,  49 

Brockenbrough's  brigade  of  Army 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  113 ;  at  Fredericksburg, 
149 

Brooke's,  J.  R.,  brigade  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  at 
Sharpsburg,  81,  91,  93,  95,  99 
et  seq. 

Bvooks's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  155 

Brookville,  13 

Brownsville  Gap,  31,  42 

Buckeystown,  13,  14,  29 


Bull  Run,  53 

Bunker  Hill  (Va.),  129 

Burke,  Colonel,  assumes  command 
of  Meagher's  brigade  at  Sharps- 
burg,  101 

Burldttsville,  22,  24,  27,  28 

Burning  buildings,  51,  93 

Burns's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  169 

Burnside  Bridge,  48,  57,  58,  109  et 
seq. 

Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  com 
manding  right  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  6,  45  ;  his  history 
and  character,  54 ;  his  com 
mand  divided  at  Sharpsburg, 
58 ;  his  consequent  position, 
59 ;  his  slowness  at  Sharps 
burg,  59 ;  his  loyalty  to  Mo- 
Clellan,  107 ;  his  part  in  the 
battle  of  the  Antietam,  107  ec 
seq. ;  his  conduct  there  re 
viewed,  120 ;  his  apparent  want 
of  firmness  the  following  day, 
127 ;  appointed  to  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  132, 
136 ;  submits  plan,  and  dis 
cusses  it  with  Halleck,  137 ; 
it  is  approved  by  President, 
ib.  ;  it  contemplates  supply  of 
pontoons,  and  Burnside  not 
responsible  for  their  failure 
to  arrive,  137  et  seq.  ;  orders 
army  to  more,  138;  prevents 
Sumner  from  crossing  Rappa- 
hannock,  139  ;  decides  to  cross 
in  force,  140;  his  error,  140, 
141  ;  his  hopes,  141,  142;  his 
vague  plans,  143  et  seq.;  throws 
bridges,  146 ;  occupies  town, 
147;  his  uncertainties  on  the 


214 


INDEX. 


night  of  December  12th,  150, 
151 ;  issues  vague  orders  to 
Franklin,  153  et  seq.  ;  re 
marks  upon  them,  153 ;  for 
mation  ordered  by  him,  156, 
173;  sends  orders  to  Sumner, 
100 ;  and  to  Hooker,  ib. ;  re 
marks  upon  these  orders,  ib.; 
upon  his  management  of  office 
business,  ib.;  upon  his  state 
ment  as  to  his  hopes  and  be 
liefs,  163  et  seq.  ;  orders  Sum 
ner  to  attack,  162 ;  vagueness 
of  his  orders  to  him,  104  ;  and 
of  his  plan  generally,  165 ;  his 
uselessness  there,  105  ;  fighting 
on  right  ends,  173  ;  his  plan  as 
gathered  from  his  posting  of 
troops,  174  ;  his  later  orders  to 
Franklin,  and  the  same  con 
sidered,  174  et  seq. ;  the  full 
knowledge  with  which  he  at 
tacked  in  front  of  Marye's, 
186 ;  his  condition  at  the  close 
of  the  day,  187 ;  proposes  to 
renew  the  assault  on  the  14th, 
but  is  dissuaded,  188 ;  re 
marks  on  his  failure  and  his 
character,  188 

CALDWELL'S  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81,  99  et  seq.,  104 

Carroll's  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Fredericksburg, 
169 

Catoctin  Valley,  28 

Cavalry,  Confederate,  at  Sharps- 
burg,  74 

Chambersburg  occupied  by  Stuart, 
131 

Chancellorsville,  143 


Character  of  Federal  and  Confed 
erate  armies  and  Federal  and 
Confederate  commanders  coin- 
pared,  52 

Cheek's  Ford,  21 

Clarksburg,  14 

Christ's  brigade  of  the  Army  ot 
the  Potomac,  at  Sharpsburg, 
108 

Cobb's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  31,  32  ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  86,  90 ;  at  Fredericks, 
burg,  148,  167 

Colquitt's,  Colonel  A.  H.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Turner's  Gap,  32,  35, 
36,  40;  at  Sharpsburg,  93,  103, 
104 

Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  unjust  to  Franklin,  182 

Connecticut  regiment:  Eleventh, 
111 

Cook's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  167 

Cooksville,  14 

Corn  Exchange  Regiment,  128 

Couch,  General  D.  N.,  command 
ing  division  of  Fourth  Corps, 
6;  ordered  to  join  Franklin, 
30  ;  does  so,  43,  63  ;  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  sent  to  Mary 
land  Heights,  90;  hastens  to 
join  McClellan,  129  ;  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  168 

Cox,  General  J.  D.,  commanding 
Kanawha  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  South 
Mountain,  34 ;  his  character, 
55 ;  commanding  Ninth  Corps, 


INDEX. 


215 


58;  at  Sharpsburg,  1C8  et 
seq.  ;  his  conduct  there  re 
viewed,  117 

Crampton  s  Gap,  23,  27,  29,  31,  42, 
63 

Crawford,  General,  commanding 
division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  at  Sharpsburg,  78, 
81  et  seq. 

Crook,  Colonel,  commanding  bri 
gade  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  at  South  Mountain,  34 

Crook's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
108et  seq. 

Cross,  Colonel,  commanding  Fifth 
New  Hampshire  at  Sharps 
burg,  100,  105 

Culpeper,  186 

Cumberland  Valley,  20 

Cutts's  battalion  of  artillery  in  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
58 

DAMASCUS,  14 

Dana's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg  81, 
et  seq. 

Darnestown,  18 

Dawsonville,  13 

Deep  Creek,  155,  174 

Delaware  regiments :  Third,  78  ; 
Second,  99 

Doubleday,  General  Abner,  com 
manding  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Sharps 
burg,  63,  73,  75,  78  ;  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  155  et  seq. 

Douglas,  Colonel,  commanding 
Lawton's  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  killed 
at  Sharpsburg,  76 


Drayton's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Turner  » 
Gap,  30,  37;  at  Sharpsburg,  114 

Dryer,  Captain  Hiram,  command 
ing  some  regular  infantry  at 
Sharpsburg,  10G 

Danker  Church,  50,  51,  57,  61S  79, 
80,  81,  84,  85  et  seq.,  92,  95, 
96,  97,  106 

EARLY,  General  Jubal  A.,  com 
manding  brigade  and  division 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Sharpsburg,  74,  85 
et  seq. 

Early' s  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  57,  76,  90 

Early's  division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  149,  159 

East  Woods,  51,  61,  74,  78,  79,  83 
etseq.,  13 

Eleventh  Corps,  under  Sigel,  6; 
near  New  Baltimore,  136 

Elk  Ridge,  11,  24 

Evans's,  General  N.  G.,  brigade  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  7,  86,37,  114,  115 

Ewell's  division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  57,  79,  80,  85 

Ewing's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  at  Sharpsburg, 
108  et  seq. 

FAIRCHILD,  Colonel  H.  S.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Turner's 
Gap,  35 

Fairchild's  brigade  of  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Sharpsburg,  108 


216 


INDEX. 


Falmouth,  138,  142 

Featherston's,  General  Wm.  S., 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  104,  105 

Ferrero's,  Colonel  Edward,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
at  Sharpsburg,  108  ;  at  Fred- 
cricksburg,  168 

Field's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  149 

Fifth  Corps,  undor  Porter,  6 ; 
ordered  to  join  McClellan,  G  ; 
at  Sharpsburg,  63,  71  ;  cap 
tures  some  guns  and  meets 
with  some  loss  across  the 
river,  128  et  seq. ;  part  of 
Centre  Grand  Division  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  138  et 
seq. 

First  Corps,  under  Hooker,  6 ; 
part  of  Right  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  6 ;  at  Turner's 
Gap,  39,  45;  at  Sharpsburg, 
71,  72,  77,  78,  79,  80,  83  et 
seq.,  96 ;  part  of  Left  Grand 
Division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  138 

Forces  of  the  two  armies  at  the 
Antietam  compared,  63  et 
seq.,  89 

Fords  of  the  A.ntietam,  49 

Fourth  Corps,  6  ;  Couch's  division 
of,  attached  to  Sixth  Corps,  6  ; 
part  of  Left  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  6 ;  sent  to 
Maryland  Heights,  90 

Fox's  Gap,  34 

Franklin,  General  W.  B.,  com 
manding  Sixth  Corps,  6  ;  Left 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
6  ;  ordered  to  move  on  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  28 ;  carries  it,  and 


moves  into  Pleasant  Valley, 
33 ;  inactive  after  South 
Mountain,  43  ;  responsible  for 
loss  of  Harper's  Ferry,  44; 
his  history  and  character,  54  ; 
remains  near  Crampton's  Gap, 
63  ;  ordered  to  join  McClellan, 
90  ;  paralyzed  by  Sumner  and 
McClellan,  106;  his  desire  to 
attack  from  centre,  121  ;  in 
command  of  Left  Grand  Divi 
sion  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  under  Burnside,  138  et 
seq.  ;  large  command  assigned 
to  him,  150 ;  urges  attack  from 
his  front,  ib.  ;  mystified  by 
Burnside's  orders,  153 ;  his 
action  under  them  considered, 
154 ;  position  of  his  troops, 
155  ;  arranges  his  attack,  156  ; 
and  makes  it,  157  et  seq.  ; 
long  line  held  by  him,  174; 
the  later  orders  received  by 
him,  and  the  same  considered, 
174  et  seq.  ;  condition  of  his 
command  when  these  orders 
reached  him,  176  ;  disposed  to 
overestimate  force  of  enemy, 
180 ;  general  view  of  his  con 
duct,  180 

Frederick  City,  11,  14,  15,  18,  23, 
33 

Fredericksburg,  136  et  seq.,  161 ; 
end  of  fighting  on  Federal 
right,  173  ;  battle  of,  divisible 
into  two  parts,,  173;  end  of 
battle,  182 

French's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81  et  seq.,  91  et  seq.,  99;  at 
Fredericksburg,  167  et  seq. 

Fry's  house,  50,  51,  61, 119 


INDEX. 


217 


GALLAGHER,  Colonel,  command 
ing  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap,  36 

Garland's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Turn 
er's  Gap,  32,  35,  36,  37;  at 
Sharpsburg,  93 

Garnett,  General  R.  B.,  command 
ing  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Turner's 
Gap,  36,  37  ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
114 

Georgia  regiments  :  Second,  66, 
109,  113;  Eleventh,  113;  Fif 
teenth,  113 ;  Seventeenth,  113; 
Twentieth,  109,  113;  Fiftieth, 
109 

Getty's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  169 

Gibbon,  General  John,  command 
ing  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap, 
35,  40;  at  Sharpsburg,  75, 
76 ;  commanding  division  at 
Fredericksburg,  155  et  seq., 
176 

Goodrich's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
78 

Gordon,  General  George  H.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
78 

Gordon's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
78,  79,  81  et  seq. 

Gorman's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81  et  seq. 

Grant,  General,  character  of,  135 

Greene,  General,  commanding  di- 
V.-10 


vision  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Sharpsburg,  78, 
79,  81  et  seq.,  96 

Gregg's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  113  et  seq.  ;  at  Freder 
icksburg,  149,  159;  General 
Gregg  killed,  ib. 

Griffin,  General  Charles,  after 
Sharpsburg,  128;  at  Freder 
icksburg,  170 

Grigsby,  Colonel,  commanding 
Jackson's  division  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at 
Sharpsburg,  86 

HAGERSTOWN,  20,  21 

Hagerstown  Pike,  28,  49,  50,  51, 
61,  78,  81  etseq.,  93  et  seq., 
97 

Hall,  Colonel  E.  D.,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  at  Sharpsburg, 
94 

Hall's  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Fredericksburg, 
146, 168 

Halleck,  General  H.  W.,  com- 
mander-in-chief ,  3  ;  his  atti 
tude  to  McClellan,  3  ;  declines 
to  order  garrison  away  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  19  ;  effect  of 
his  so  doing,  48  ;  his  dealings 
with  Burnside,  137  et  seq. 

Halltown,  23,  45 

Hamilton's  Crossing,  143  et  seq., 
174 

Hampton's  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  140 

Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  at 
Sharpsburg,  91  et  seq.,  101 ; 
his  love  of  fighting,  126;  at 


238 


INDEX. 


Fredericksburg,  167  et  seq.; 
heavy  losses  of  his  division, 
182 ;  his  brilliant  leadership, 
183 

Hanover  street,  143 

Hardie,  General,  with  Franklin  at 
Fredericksburg,  151  et  seq., 
163. 

Harlan,  Colonel  Edward,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Turner's 
Gap,  35 

Harland's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
108 

Harper's  Ferry,  11,  14,  15,  18,  19, 
20,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25 ;  surren 
dered  to  Jackson,  26,  27,  4:3, 
44 ;  the  cause,  44  ;  effect  of  re 
taining  Federal  garrison  there, 
48  ;  reoccupied  by  Federals, 
130,  131 

Hartwood,  138 

Hatch,  General  John  P.,  com 
manding  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Turner's 
Gap,  35 

Hayes,  Colonel  R.  B.,  command 
ing  regiment  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  South  Moun 
tain,  34 

Hays's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  57,  74,  76 

Heintzelman,  General  S.  P.,  com 
manding  Third  Corps,  6 

Hill,  General  A.  P.,  commanding 
division  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  engaged  in  cap 
ture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  25  ; 
and  left  to  receive  the  surren 
der,  27;  arrives  at  Sharps- 


burg,  57,  63,  112  et  seq.;  his 
singular  report  about  affair 
on  the  Potomac,  129  ;  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  148,  159 

Hill,  General  D.  H.,  commanding 
division  of  the  Army  >f 
Northern  Virginia ;  7,  15 ; 
leads  the  advance,  18 ;  his  di 
vision  unattached,  21  ;  his  re 
sponsibility  for  loss  of  special 
order  No.  191,  22  ;  ordered  to 
Turner's  Gap,  32;  his  report 
of  action  there,  37,  38.  40 ; 
reaches  Sharpsburg,  42,  57 ; 
his  forces  there,  58 ;  and  his 
position,  63,  77,  79,  80,  92  ct 
seq.,  116,  121;  sent  to  Fred 
ericksburg,  140;  in  position 
there,  149 

Hillsborough,  24 

Holcombe  Legion,  115 

Hoffman,  Lieutenant-Colonel  T. 
W.,  commanding  brigade  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at 
Sharpsburg,  74,  75 

Hood,  General  John  B.,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Turner's 
Gap,  36,  37 ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
57,  62,  76,  79,  80,  81,  85,  102, 
115;  at  Fredericksburg,  148 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  com 
manding  First  Corps,  6 ;  or 
ders  to,  31 ;  at  Turner's  Gap, 
35-45 ;  his  history  and  charac~ 
ter,  55  ;  his  corps  sent  to  right 
of  army  at  Sharpsburg,  and 
perhaps  through  his  agency, 
58 ;  ordered  to  cross  the 
Antietam,  61 ;  does  so,  62 ; 
and  attacks,  on  the  16th,  and 
again  on  the  17th,  7o,  74,  75 ; 


INDEX. 


219 


his  forces  in  the  battle,  75 ; 
his  part  in  it,  77  et  seq.,  80  ; 
wounded,  and  his  corps  routed, 
8-3;  his  language  about  Mc- 
Clellan,  133;  in  command  of 
Centre  Grand  Division  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
Burnside,  138  et  seq.  ;  receives 
orders  from  Burnside,  160 ; 
takes  small  part  in  the  battle 
of  Fredericksburg,  173  ;  praise 
of  his  conduct  there,  186  et  seq. 

Howard's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81  et  seq. 

Howard's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  1G8  et  seq. 

Howe's  division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Fredericksburg, 
155 

Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  his 
love  of  fighting,  126 ;  hastens 
to  join  McClellan,  128;  his 
soldierly  character,  170 ;  his 
part  in  the  battle  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  ib. 

Hunt,  General  H.  J.,  posts  Fed 
eral  artillery  opposite  Fred 
ericksburg,  145 

Hunton,  Colonel  Eppa,  command 
ing  Eighth  Virginia  regiment 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Sharpsburg,  114 

INDIANA  regiments  :  Nineteenth, 
75;  Twenty- seventh,  78,  79; 
Fourteenth,  95 

Irwin'c  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  91,  92,  95 

JACKSON,  General  T.  J.,  command 
ing  wing  of  the  Army  of 


Northern  Virginia,  7 ;  his 
captures  at  Manassas  Junc 
tion,  16 ;  engaged  in  capture 
of  Harper's  Ferry,  23 ;  has 
tens  to  rejoin  Lee,  27  ;  does  so, 
57 ;  at  Sharpsburg,  73,  74,  76, 
79,  80  et  seq.  ;  saying  attrib 
uted  to,  121  ;  his  readiness  to 
take  the  offensive,  124  ;  saying 
of,  126  ;  position  of  his  com 
mand,  November  7th-9th, 
136,  140  et  seq. 

Jackson's  division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  80 

Jefferson,  27,  28 

Jenkins's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  114,  115 

Jones's,  D.  R.,  division  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
at  Sharpsburg,  80,  110,  113, 
114,  115 

Jones,  General  J.  R.,  commanding 
division  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  engaged  in  cap 
ture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  23  ;  at 
Sharpsburg,  57;  his  brigade,  74 

KANAWHA  division,  losses  of,  at 
Turner's  Gap,  39  ;  at  Sharps 
burg,  108  et  seq. 

Kcarny,  General  Philip,  killed, 
3  ;  his  love  of  fighting,  126 

Kearse's  regiment  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  113 

Keedysville  road,  61,  97,  106 

Kemper's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Turner's 
Gap,  36,  37;  at  Sharpsburg, 
114 

Kershaw's,  General  J.  B.,  brigade 


220 


INDEX. 


of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Sharpsburg,  86,  90  ; 
at  Fredericksburg,  167 

Keys's  Ford,  21 

Kimball's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81-92  et  seq.;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  168 

Kingsbury,  Colonel,  killed  at 
Sharpsburg,  113 

Knipe's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
78,  79,  80,  81  et  seq. 

Knoxville,  27 

LACY  House,  146 

Lane's,  General  Jas.  H.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  148,  149,  157 

Law,  Colonel  E.  M.,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  Nort.h- 
ern  Virginia  at  Turner's  Gap, 
36 ;  at  Sharpsburg,  85 

Lawton,  General,  commanding  di 
vision  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  engaged  in  cap 
ture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  26  ;  at 
Sharpsburg,  57,  62 ;  wounded, 
76,  79 

Lawton's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps 
burg,  57,  63,  74,  76 

Lee,  General  R.  E.,  his  views  as 
to  Maryland  campaign,  14 ; 
his  plan,  16  ;  his  hopes  of  aid 
from  Maryland,  17  ;  his  prob 
able  estimate  of  McClellan, 
17 ;  expects  evacuation  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  etc.,  18;  his 
action  on  finding  that  it  was 
not,  19;  his  Special  Order 
No.  191  falls  into  hands  of 


McClellan,  20  ;  orders  troops 
to  Turner's  Gap,  3'3 ;  his 
promptness  after  South  Moun 
tain,  42  ;  forms  his  troops  in 
front  of  Sharpsburg,  49;  his 
position  considered,  49  ;  evac 
uates  Maryland,  119  ;  period 
of  battle  when  his  danger 
probably  greatest,  121 ;  his 
readiness  to  take  the  offensive, 
124;  his  movements  after  re- 
crossing  the  Potomac,  129  et 
seq. ;  reinforces  garrison  of 
Fredericksburg,  139 ;  strength 
ens  his  position  there,  140  et 
seq.;  his  inaction  after  repuls 
ing  Burnside's  attack,  189 

Lee,  Colonel  S.  D.,  commanding 
battalion  of  artillery  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
at  Sharpsburg,  73,  74 

Lee's,  W.  H.  F.,  brigade  of  cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  1S9,  140 

Leesboro',  10 

Leesburg,  11,  15,  18 

Lincoln,  President,  orders  McClel 
lan  to  cross  the  Potomac,  etc., 
130 ;  approves  Burnside's  plan, 
137 

Longstreet,  General  James,  com 
manding  wing  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  7 ;  ordered 
to  Turner's  Gap,  32,  88; 
reaches  Sharpsburg,  42,  62 ; 
in  action  there,  112,  116  ;  posi 
tion  of  his  command,  Nov. 
7th-9th,  136 ;  sent  to  Freder 
icksburg,  140,  148,  168 

Losses  at  Turner's  Gap,  39,  40; 
Sharpsburg,  76,  90,  95,  106, 
114,  127, 128  ;  Fredericksburg, 


INDEX. 


221 


168,  169,  170,  173,  170,  183  et 

seq. 
Loudoun  Heights,   11,  19,  21,  24, 

25,  26 

Lovettsville,  21 
Lyle's  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 

Potomac    at   Fredericksburg, 

158 

MACY,  Captain  George  N.,  147 
Magilton,  Colonel  A.  L.,  command 
ing   brigade   of  the   Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap, 
36 

Mahone,  General,  commanding  bri 
gade  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  at  Crampton's  Gap, 
32 

Maine  regiments  :  Sixth,  91 ;  Sev 
enth,  101 

Manassas,  captures  at,  16 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  131 
Manassas  Junction,  captures  at,  16 
Manning's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  86,  94 

Mansfield,  General  J.  K.  F.,  com 
manding  Twelfth  Corps,  6, 
45 ;  ordered  to  cross  the  Antie- 
tam,  61;  does  so,  63,  77; 
killed,  78 

Martinsburg,  15,  18,  20,  22,  23 
Marye's  Hill,  148  et  seq.,  161, 167 

et  seq. 
Maryland,  Lee's  hopes  of  aid  from, 

17 
Maryland  Heights,  11,  20,  21,  22, 

24,  25,  26,  27,  31,  42,  90,  130 
Maryland  regiments :  Second,  111 ; 

Third,  78 

Massachusetts  regiments :  Second, 
79;  Twelfth,  158;  Fifteenth, 


87,  88;  Eighteenth,  128; 
Nineteenth,  87,  146;  Twen 
tieth,  87,  88,  91,  146,  147,  168  ; 
Twenty-first,  112;  Twenty- 
second,  128 ;  Thirty-fifth,  112 
McClellan,  General  Geo.  B.,  posi 
tion  of  at  end  of  August,  1863, 
3 ;  placed  in  command,  5 ; 
movements  of,  10  ;  his  field  of 
possible  operations,  12;  gains 
information  of  enemy's  plans, 
14 ;  perceives  uselessness  of 
retaining  garrison  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  19  ;  his  application  for 
its  withdrawal  refused,  19 ; 
his  duty  with  his  then  know 
ledge,  20  ;  his  previous  slow 
ness,  and  the  excuses  for  it, 
20 ;  comes  into  possession  of 
Lee's  "  lost  order,"  20,  22  ;  his 
plans  thereupon,  27,  and  his  in 
structions  to  Franklin,  28 ; 
comments  thereon,  29 ;  orders 
to  the  army,  30  ;  his  estimate 
of  numbers  at  Turner's  Gap, 
38  ;  loses  his  opportunity  at 
South  Mountain,  41 ;  his  orders 
to  Franklin  after,  43  ;  respon 
sible  for  loss  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  44 ;  his  opportunity 
after  South  Mountain,  46 ;  his 
disposable  forces,  46 ;  loses  his 
opportunity,  47 ;  his  history 
and  character,  53  ;  welcomed 
by  his  army  near  Sharpsburg, 
56 ;  does  little  September  15th 
and  16th,  56,  59 ;  his  plan  of 
battle,  59 ;  reveals  his  inten 
tions  to  Lee,  60 ;  criticisms  on 
his  orders,  62 ;  paralyzes  action 
of  Sixth  Corps,  106,  121  ;  his 
plan  for  using  Ninth  Corps, 


222 


INDEX. 


107 ;  whether  or  not  satisfied 
with  Burnside's  conduct,  107  ; 
his     orders    and     connection 
with  his  left  attack,    110  et 
seq.  ;  his  conduct  of  the  bat 
tle    reviewed,    119;    want    of 
simultaneousness  in  use  of  his 
troops,  120;  error  in  not  judg 
ing  for  himself,  123 ;   his  ex 
traordinary    estimate    of    the 
strength  of  his  opponent,  123  ; 
decides  not  to  renew  the  at 
tack  on  the  18th,  127  ;  remarks  \ 
thereon,  ib. ;  orders  renewal  of  ; 
the  attack  on  the  19th,    but 
learns  then  that  Lee  is  gone, 
128 ;    his    movements    there-  ! 
after,  129  et  seq.  ;  his  calls  for 
supplies  and    reinforcements,  < 
130;    his  want  of  tone,   ib.  ; 
ordered  by  President  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  etc.,  130;     de- j 
layed   by   want   of    supplies,  i 
131 ;     crosses    Potomac    and  | 
moves    towards     Warrenton, 
ib.  ;    his    plan    of    campaign,  i 
132 ;     relieved    of    command, 
132 ;    comments    on    his    re-  j 
moval,  career,  and  character,  j 
132  et  seq. 

McLaws,  General  Lafayette,  aids 
in  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  | 
24  ;  in  command  near  Cramp-  | 
ton's  Gap,   31;    after    South 
Mountain,  43,  44  ;   joins  Lee, 
45,  57,  63,  77 

McLaws's  division  of  the  Army  of  j 
Northern    Virginia    sent    to 
Fredericksburg,  139,  148 

McMaster,  Colonel,  commanding 
Evans's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  115 


McRae,  Colonel  D.  K.,  command 
ing  Garland's  brigade  at 
Sharpsburg,  93 

Meade,  General  George  G.,  com 
manding  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Turner's 
Gap,  35 ;  his  military  charac 
ter,  55  ;  at  Sharpsburg,  C2,  13, 
75  ;  at  Fredericksburg,  155  et 
seq.;  his  gallant  assault.  157  et 
seq. ;  his  troops  after,  176 

Meagher's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  at  Sharpsburg, 

81,  99etseq. 
Mercers  ville,  48 

Meredith,  Colonel,  at  Turner's 
Gap,  40 

Michigan  regiments  :  Fourth,  128  ; 
Seventh,  146 

Middleburg,  13,  14 

Middletown,  14,  20,  21,  22,  23,  27, 
28,  33,  45 

Miles,  Colonel  DixonS.,  command 
ing  at  Harper's  Ferry,  18,  24; 
mortally  wounded  there,  26 

Miles,  Colonel  Nelson  A.,  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  182,  183 

Miller's  house,  51,  80,  88 

Minnesota  regiment :  First,  87 

Mississippi  regiments  :  Fourth, 
139 ;  Sixteenth,  105 

Monocacy  River,  13,  14 

Morell,  General  George,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Sharpsburg,  63, 

82,  123,  127,  128 

Morris's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81-92  et  seq. 

Mountain  House,  33,  34 

Mount  Tabor  Church,  35,  45 

Mume's  house,  51 


INDEX. 


223 


NAGLE'S  brigade  of  the  Array  of  j 
the  Potomac    at   Sharpsburg, 
108 ;  at  Fredericksburg,  169 

National  Cemetery  at  Sharpsburg, 
49 

New  Baltimore,  136 

New  Hampshire  regiments  :  Fifth, 
100,  105  ;  Sixth,  111 

New  Jersey  regiment :  Thirteenth, 
78 

New  Market,  14 

Newton's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
106 

Newton's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
barg,  155 

New  York  regiments  :  Thirty- 
third,  95  ;  Forty-third,  01  ; 
Fifty-arst,  113;  Fifty-second, 

99  ;  Fifth-seventh,  100  ;   Six 
tieth,    78  ;    Sixty-first,    100  ; 
Sixty-fourth,  100 ;  Sixty-sixth, 

100  ;  Seventy-seventh,  95  ;  Sev- 
enty-e:ghth,  78 ;  Eighty-ninth, 
146 ;      Ninety-seventh,     158 ; 
One  Hundred  and  Seventh,  78 

Nicodemus's  house,  51 

Ninth  Corps,  under  Reno,  6 ; 
part  of  right  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  6  ;  at  Turner's 
Gap,  3i,  35,  39  ;  after,  45;  at 
Sharpsburg,  under  Cox,  58, 
59,  63,  71,  73,  107  et  seq. ,  130  ; 
part  of  Right  Grand  Division 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  j 
138  ;  at  Fredericksburg,  143  ; 
its  experience  and  character, 
188 

North  Carolina  regiments :  Fourth, 
105  ;  Twenty-fourth,  148  ; 
Forty-eighth,  124 


OFFUT'S  Cross  Roads,  10 

Ohio       regiments  :       Eighth,  95 ; 

Sixty-sixth,  78 

Old  Hagerstown  road,  33,  35,  45 
Old   Richmond  road,  142  et  seq  , 

155 

Old  Sharpsburg  road.  33,  45 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad, 

131 
Orange  Court  House,  140,  143 

PATRICK,  General,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Sharpsburg,  75,  77 

Pelham,  Major  John,  157 

Fender's,  General  W.  D.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Sharpsburg,  113  et 
seq. ;  at  Fredericksburg,  148 

Pennsylvania  regiments  :  Forty- 
ninth,  91;  Fifty-first,  112; 
Fifty-third,  99;  Eighty-first, 
100  ;  Eighty-eighth,  158  ;  One 
Hundred  and  Eleventh,  78 ; 
One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth, 
205 ;  One  Hundred  and  Twen 
ty-third,  173;  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-fourth,  78  ;  One 
Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth, 
78;  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
eighth,  78  ;  One  Hundred  and 
Thirty-second,  95,  99;  One 
Hundred  and  Thirty-seventh, 
91 ;  One  Hundred  and  Fifty- 
fifth,  173 

Pennsylvania  Reserves,  73 

Phelps,  Colonel  Walter,  jr.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Sharps 
burg,  75,  76 

Philadelphia  brigade,  87 

Pickett's  brigade  of  tho  Army  of 


224 


INDEX. 


Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  114 

Pickett's  division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  148 

Piper's  house,  97,  98  et  seq.,  104, 
105 

Plank  road,  143  et  seq.,  161 

Pleasant  Valley,  24,  28,  31,  42, 
43,91 

Pleasonton,  General  Alfred,  com 
manding  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  South 
Mountain  and  Sharpsburg,  32, 
34,  45,  105,  106,  123 

Poffenbergers,  51 

Point  of  Rocks,  24 

Pollock's  mill,  146 

Poolesville,  10,  13 

Pope,  General  John,  commanding 
Army  of  Virginia,  2,  132 

Port  Royal,  140 

Porter,  General  F.  J.,  command 
ing  Fifth  Corps,  6,  45;  his 
vindication  by  the  military 
commission,  55 ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  106;  his  conduct  there 
approved,  123  ;  captures  guns 
two  days,  and  loses  men  three 
days,  after  the  battle,  128 

Potomac  river,  11,  18,  25,  48 

Pry  or,  General  R.  A.,  assumes 
command  of  R.  H.  Anderson's 
division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  97,  103,  104,  105 

RANSOM'S  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  86,  90;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  167 

Ransom's  division  of  the  Army  of 


Northern     Virginia    sent    to 
Fredericksburg,  139,  148 

Rappahannock  River,  136  et  seq. 

Reno,  General  J.  L.,  commanding 
Ninth  Corps,  6;  at  South 
Mountain,  34  ;  killed,  40 

Reynolds's  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  156,  163,  164 
i  Richardson,  General  Israel  B., 
commanding  division  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  45, 
48  ;  at  Sharpsburg,  81  et  seq., 
99  et  seq. ;  mortally  wounded, 
101 

Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and 
Potomac  Railroad,  142  et  seq. 

Ricketts,  General  James  B.,  com 
manding  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  at  Turner's 
Gap,  36,  38  ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
62,  73,  75,  76,  81  et  seq.,  96 
|  Ridgeville,  14 

Ripley's,  General  H.  S.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Turner's  Gap,  35,  30, 
37  ;  at  Sharpsburg,  92,  93 

Roads :  Sharpsburg  to  Rohrers- 
ville,  49 ;  Sharpsburg  to 
Keedysville  and  Boonsboro', 
49;  Keedysville  to  Williams- 
port,  49  ;  Sharpsburg  to  Shep- 
herdstown,  49  ;  Sharpsburg  to 
Hagerstown,  49  ;  near  Danker 
Church,  51,  85  ;  Sunken  road, 
61;  Old  Richmond,  142  et  seq. 

Rockville,  10,  13 

Rodes,  General  R.E.,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  at  Turner's  Gap, 
36,  37,  88,  40 ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
93,  98,  102,  103,  104 


INDEX. 


225 


Rodman,     General,     commanding 

division   of   the   Army  of  the 

Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap,  35  ; 

at    Sharpsburg,    108    et  seq., 

killed,  114 
Rohrersville,  28 
Root's  brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 

Potomac  at    Fredericksburg, 

158 
Rosser,  Colonel  T.  L.,  commanding 

some    cavalry,     etc.,    of    the 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at 

Turner's  Gap,  35-37 
Bullet's  house,   85,  92,  94,  97,  98, 

99  et  seq. 

SCAMMON,  Colonel,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  South  Mountain, 
34 

Scammon,  General,  commanding 
division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Sharpsburg,  108 
et  seq. 

Second  Corps,  under  Sumner,  6 ; 
part  of  Centre  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  6;  after  South 
Mountain,  45,  48 ;  at  Sharps 
burg,  61,  63,  71,  72,  81  et  seq., 
91  et  seq.,  95,  99  et  seq.  ;  char 
acter  of,  81  ;  losses  at  Sharps 
burg,  127  ;  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
130  ;  part  of  Right  Grand  Divi 
sion  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  138  et  seq. 

Sedgwick,  General  John,  com 
manding  division  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  9  ;  his  career, 
55  ;  at  Sharpsburg,  81  et  seq.  ; 
strength  of  his  division  there 
and  his  losses,  90,  127 

Semmes,  General  Paul  J.,  com- 
10* 


manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  32  ;  at 
Sharpsburg,  80,  90 

Seneca  Creek,  13 

Seymour,  General  T.,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap,  36 

Sharpsburg,  20,  27,  40;  character 
of  Confederate  position  at,  42  ; 
distance  from  Turner's  Gap, 
47  ;  description  of  position  at, 
48,  61,  72,  85 

Shenandoah  River,  11,  25,  26 

Shenandoah  Valley,  16,  17,  18 

Shepherdstown  and  Shepherds- 
town  Ford,  48 

Sickles's  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  159 

Skinker's  Neck,  144 

Sigel,  General  Franz,  commanding 
Eleventh  Corps,  6 

Sixth  Corps,  under  Franklin,  6 ; 
part  of  Left  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  6,  63 ;  at  Sharps 
burg,  71,  73,  90  et  seq.,  106; 
moved,  136 ;  part  of  Left 
Grand  Division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  138  et  seq., 
155  ;  formation  of,  at  Freder 
icksburg,  174 

Slocum,  General  H.  W.,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
91  et  seq.,  105,  106 

Smith,  General  W.  F.,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
91  et  seq.  ;  complains  of  divi 
sion  of  his  command,  96 

Smithfield,  148,  155 


226 


INDEX. 


South  Carolina  regiments  :  First, 

115  ;  Seventeenth,  115 
South  Mountain,  11,  22,  24,  27,  33  ; 

remarks  on  battles  at,  40 
Stafford  Court  House,  138 
Stafford  Heights,  141 
Stainrook's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 

the  Potomac   at   Sharpsburg, 

78 

Stanton,  Secretary,  133 
Starke,      General,       commanding 

Stonewall  division,    killed  at 

Sharpsburg,  76 
Stoneman's   command  ordered  to 

support  Franklin,  160 
Stonewall  division  of  the  Army  of 

Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 


Stuart,    General  J.    E.    B.,    com 

manding  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  South 
Mountain,  33  ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
57,  74,  76,  80,  84,  124  ;  raids 
through  Maryland,  130  ;  re 
connoitres  in  Virginia,  140;  at 
Fredericksburg,  149  et  seq. 

Sturgis,  General  S.  D.,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap, 
35;  at  Sharpsburg,  108  et 
seq.;  at  Fredericksburg,  168 
et  seq. 

Sunder,  General  E.  V.,  command 
ing  Second  Corps,  6;  Centre 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
6  ;  after  South  Mountain,  45  ; 
his  history  and  character,  54  ; 
at  Sharpsburg,  81  et  seq.  ;  re 
marks  upon  his  use  of  Sedg- 
wick's  division,  88  ;  orders 
French  in,  94  ;  paralyzes  ac- 
tion  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  106, 


121 ;  his  previous  experience. 
120;  his  character,  122;  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  130  ;  in  com 
mand  of  Right  Grand  Divi 
sion  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  under  Burn  side,  138  et 
seq.  ;  proposes  to  cross  the 
Rappahannock,  139 ;  receives 
orders  from  Burnside,  160; 
ordered  to  attack,  162;  time 
when  he  moved  out,  163  ;  his 
attack,  167  et  seq. 

Sunken  road,  93  et  seq. ,  97  et  seq. 

Swinton,  William,  statements  as 
to  feeling  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  before  the  attack  at 
Fredericksburg,  184 ;  as  to 
Burnside's  condition  at  the 
close  of  the  day,  187 

Sykes,  General  George,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  45,  48,  122,  128, 
170,  187 

TALIAFERRO'S,  General  W.B.,  bri 
gade  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  at  Sharpsburg,  57 

Taliaferro's  division  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  149,  159. 

Taylor,  Colonel  Walter  H.,  author 
of  u  Four  Years  with  General 
Lee,"  accounts  for  loss  of  Spe 
cial  Order  No.  191,  21  ;  esti 
mates  forces  at  Sharpsburg, 
04  et  seq. 

Taylor's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks 
burg,  158 

Telegraph  road,  143  et  seq. 

Tenallytown,  10,  13 

Third  Corps,  part  of  Centre  Grand 


INDEX. 


227 


Division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  138  et  seq. 

Thomas's,  Colonel  E.  L.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  149 

Third  Corps,  under  Heintzelman, 
6 ;  part  of  army  under  Burn- 
side,  136 

Torbert's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  at  Sharpsburg, 
106 

Toombs,  General  R.,  commanding 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  at  Sharpsburg, 
57,  109  et  seq. 

Trimble's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Sharps- 
burg,  57,  62,  74,  76 

Turner's  Gap,  22,  27,  31 ;  action 
at,  33;  distance  from  Sharps- 
burg,  47 

Twelfth  Corps,  under  Mansfield, 
6  ;  part  of  Centre  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  6  ;  after  South 
Mountain,  45  ;  at  Sharpsburg, 
61,  63,  71,  72,  77;  under  Wil 
liams  (and  its  strength  there), 
78,  79,  80,  81  et  seq.  ;  losses  at 
Sharpsburg,  90;  retires,  96; 
at  Harper's  Perry,  130  et  seq. 

Tyler's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  171 

Tyndale's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
78 

URBANNA,  13, 14 

VALLEY  of  Virginia,  18,  25 
Virginia  (Confederate)  regiments  : 
Fifteenth  Cavalry,  139 ;  Twen 


ty-second,  149;  Thirty-fifth, 
149;  Fortieth,  149;  Forty- 
seventh,  149 

Virginia  (Federal)  regiment :  Sev 
enth,  99 

WALKER,  Colonel  James  A.,  com 
manding  Trimble's  brigade  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  94 ;  perhaps  wounded 
at  Sharpsburg,  76  (sed  qu.  and 
see  p.  94) 

Walker,  Colonel  Joseph,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Tur 
ner's  Gap,  36 ;  wounded  at 
Sharpsburg,  76  (sed  qu.,  see 
p.  94) 

Walker,  Colonel  R.  L.,  command 
ing  artillery  in  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  149 

Walker,  General  J.  G.,  aids  in 
capture  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
24 ;  rejoins  Lee  at  Sharps 
burg,  27;  at  Sharpsburg,  57, 
94, 102 

Walton,  Colonel  J.  B.,  148 

Warren's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
123 

Warren  ton,  131,  136;  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  concentrated 
near,  137 

Waterloo,  136 

Weber's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
81,  92etseq. 

Welch's  brigade  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Sharpsburg, 
108 

West  Woods,  51,  61,  74,  76,  84  et 
seq. 


228 


INDEX. 


Wevertou  Pass,  43 

Whipple's  division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  109 

White,  General  Julius,  at  Martins- 
burg,  18,  23  ;  surrenders  Har 
per's  Ferry,  26' 

Wilcox's,  General  C.  M.,  brigade 
of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  at  Sharps  burg,  105 

Willcox,  General  O.  B.,  command 
ing  division  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Turner's  Gap, 
35 ;  losses  there,  39  ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  108  et  seq. 

Williams,  General  A.  S.,  succeeds 
to  command  of  Twelfth  Corps 
at  Sharpsburg,  78  et  seq. 

William  sport,  23 

Willis's  Hill,  148 


Winchester,  15,  129 

Winder,  General,  commanding  di 
vision  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  at  Sharpsburg, 
57,  74 

Wisconsin  regiments  :  Second, 
75 ;  Third,  79,  90 ;  Fifth,  91 ; 
Sixth,  75  ;  Seventh,  75 

Wofford,  Colonel  W.  T.,  com 
manding  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Tur 
ner's  Gap,  S6,  73,  80,  85 

Woodruff,  Lieutenant  George  A., 
commanding  Battery  I,  First 
artillery,  at  Sharpsburg,  74, 
101 

Wright,  General,  commanding  bri 
gade  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  wounded  at  Sharps 
burg,  102 


MESSRS.  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

publish,  under  the  general  title  of 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR, 

A  Series  of  volumes,  contributed  by  a  number  of  leading 
actors  in  and  students  of  the  great  conflict  of  1861-65,  with 
a  view  to  bringing  together,  for  the  first  time,  a  full  and 
authoritative  military  history  of  the  suppression  of  the 
Rebellion. 

The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a'matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a  whole  generation 
has  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
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From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special  infor 
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The  volumes  are  duodecimos  of  about  250  pages  each, 
illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under  the  direction 
of  the  authors. 

The  price  of  each  volume  is  $1.00. 


J. — The  Outbreak  of  Rebellion.     By  JOHN  G.  NICOLAY, 
Esq.,   Private  Secretary  to  President   Lincoln;     late  Consul- 
General  to  France,  etc. 
A  preliminary  volume,  describing  the   opening  of  the  war,  and  covering  UM 

period  from  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 


II.— From  Fort,  Henry  to  Corinth.  By  the  Hon.  M. 
F.  FORCE,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati!;  late 
Brigadier- General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  I7th  Corps:  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
2Oth  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer -of  1861  to  May,  i86s; 
Covering  the  capture  of  *  ts.  Henry  and  Uonelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 

III.— The  Peninsula.  By  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,  LL.D., 
President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York :  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i86i-'62  ;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps ;  Major  General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  history  of  McClellan's  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 

IV. — The  Army  under  Pope.  By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq., 
of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the  Massa 
chusetts  Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint 
ment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862 

V.—The  Aniietam  and  Fredericksbiiry.  By  FRANCIS 
WINTHROP  PALFREY,  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  and  form 
erly  Colonel  20th  Mass.  Infantry ;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the  2oth 
Massachusetts  at  the  Battle  of  the  Antietam;  Member  of 
the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massa 
chusetts  Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  September,  i862,"to 
the  end  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

VI.— Chancellor a,ville  and  Gettysburg.  By  ABNER 
DOUBLED  AY,  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A.,  and  Maj.  Gen'l, 
U.S.V.  ;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hoolcer,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 

VII.—TJie  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  By  HENRY  M. 
CIST,  Brevet  Brig.  Gen'l  U.S.V.  ;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 
Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterwards  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 
Thomas  ;  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battle*  tt 

Chattanooga,  November,  1863, 


VIII.— The  Mississippi.  By  FRANCIS  VINTON  GREENE, 
Lieut,  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army  ;  late  Military  Attache  to  the 
U  S.  Legation  in  St.  Petersburg ;  Author  of  "  The  Russian 
Army  and  its  Campaigns  in  Turkey  hi  1877-78,"  and  ot 
"Army  Life  in  Russia." 

An  account  of  the  operations — especially  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson — by 
Wkich  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  shores  were  restored  to  the  control  of  the  Union. 

IX. — Atlanta.  By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex- Governor  of 
Ohio ;  late  Secretary  of  the  Interior  of  the  United  States ; 
Major  General  U.  S.V.,  commanding  Twenty-third  Corps 
during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta  and  the  Carolinas,  etc. ,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to  the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X.—Tfie  March  to  the  Sea— Franklin  and  Nashville. 

By  Vhe  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XI. -The  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1864.  The  Cam 
paign  of  Sheridan.  By  GEORGE  E.  POND,  Esq.,  Asso 
ciate  Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

XII.—  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  64  and  >65.  TJie 
Army  of 'the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the 
James.  By  ANDREW  A.  HUMPHREYS,  Brigadier  General 
and  Bvt.  Major  General,  U.  S.  A.  ;  late  Chief  of  Engineers ; 
Chief  of  Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1863-64;  commanding 
Second  Corps,  i864~'65,  etc.,  etc. 

Statistical   Record   of  the   Armies   of   the   United 

States.     By  FREDERICK  PHISTERER,  late  Captain  U.  S.  A. 

This  Record  includes  the  figures  of  the  quotas  and  men  actually  furnished  by 
all  States  ;  a  list  of  all  organizations  mustered  into  the  U.  S.  service;  the  strength 
of  the  army  at  various  periods  ;  its  organization  in  armies,  corps,  etc.;  the  divisions 
of  the  country  into  departments,  etc.;  chronological  list  of  all  engagements,  with  the 
losses  in  each  ;  tabulated  statements  of  all  losses  in  the  war,  with  the  causes  of 
death,  etc. ;  full  lists  of  all  general  officers,  and  an  immense  amount  of  other  valuable 
statistical  matter  relating  to  the  War. 


The  complete  Set,  thirteen  volumes,  in  a  box.     Price,  $12.50 
Single  volumes,       ......        x.co 

"„,*  For  fale  by  all  booksellers,  or  sent,  post-paid,  ufon  receipt  of  price  *  \ 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,     Publishers, 

743  AND  745  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK. 


THE  NAVY  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


HTHE  WORK  OF  THE  NAVY  in  the  Suppression  of  the  Rebellion  was 
-^  certainly  not  less  remarkable  than  that  of  the  Army.  The  same  forces 
which  developed  from  our  volunteers  some  of  the  finest  bodies  of  soldiers  in 
military  history,  were  shown  quite  as  wonderfully  in  the  quick  growth — almost 
creation — of  a  Navy,  which  was  to  cope,  for  the  first  time,  with  the  problems  of 
modern  warfare.  The  facts  that  the  Civil  War  was  the  first  great  conflict  in 
which  steam  was  the  motive  power  of  ships  ;  that  it  was  marked  by  the  introduc 
tion  of  the  ironclad  ;  and  that  it  saw,  for  the  first  time,  the  attempt  to  blockade 
such  a  vast  length  of  hostile  coast — will  make  it  an  epoch  for  the  technical 
student  everywhere.  For  Americans,  whose  traditions  of  powers  at  sea  are 
among  their  strongest,  this  side  of  the  four  years  struggle  has  an  interest  fully 
equal  to  the  other — perhaps  even  with  the  added  element  of  romance  that  always 
belongs  to  sea  fighting. 

But  while  the  Army  has  been  fortunate  in  the  number  and  character  of  those 
who  have  contributed  to  its  written  history,  the  Navy  has  been  comparatively 
without  annalists.  During  a  recent  course  of  publications  on  the  military  opera 
tions  of  the  war,  the  publishers  were  in  constant  receipt  of  letters  pointing  out 
this  fact,  and  expressing  the  wish  that  a  complete  naval  history  of  the  four  years 
might  be  written  by  competent  hands.  This  testimony  was  hardly  needed  to 
suggest  the  want ;  but  it  was  a  strong  encouragement  to  ask  the  co-operation  of 
naval  officers  in  supplying  it.  An  effort  made  in  this  direction  resulted  in  the 
cordial  adoption  and  carying  out  of  plans  by  which  Messrs.  CHARLES  SCKIBNER'S 
SONS  are  enabled  to  publish  a  work  of  the  highest  authority  and  interest, 
covering  this  entire  field,  in  the  following  three  volumes,  giving  the  whole  narra 
tive  of  Naval  Operations  from  1861  to  1865. 

I.— The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers. 

By  Professor  J.  RUSSELL  SOLEY,  U.  S.  Navy. 

II.—  The  Atlantic  Coast. 

By  Rear-Admiral  DANIEL  AMMEN,  U.  S.  Navy. 

III.— The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters. 

By  Commander  A.  T.  MAHAN,  U.  S.  Navy. 


The  Volumes  are  uniform  in  size  with  the  Series  of  "  Cam 
paigns  of  the  Civil  War,"  and  contain  maps  and  diagrams 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  authors. 


Price  per  volume,  $1.00. 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,   PUBLISHERS, 
743  AND  745  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK. 


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